"Lessons can be learned from history - but humanity never learns the right 
ones." APL - June 1998.

I would like to respond to this feedback, which has been encouraging and
thought provoking - you'll see I've incorporated the sensible suggestions in
order that this scenario remains competitive with the most recent design
efforts. Rome wasn't built in a day, you know.

So perhaps a few words need to be said about World War 2 first, in view of
the fact that this is supposed to be an historical recreation of that 
conflict. Suggestions as to why it happened, war aims, tactics, use of units,
etc...By the way, let me reassert that it was only my attention to recreate
the military conflict, not straying into the domestic changes that occurred
(we can't do everything in civ, but now that the thought occurs to me I shall
think about new techs and improvements - I still haven't done that SAM 
battery replacement I raved about before).

I know that restricting the scope of the simulation to Europe (mostly) is
inherently inaccurate, but gameplay must feature. To use a world map at its
largest size in other scenarios greatly restricts the available powerbase of
the powers to only a few cities (think about it: 3 in the UK (including the
Republic of Ireland), 2/3 in France, 5 in Germany and Italy, a few more in 
Eastern Europe, 2 in Japan, 5/6 in British India, 2/3 in Canada, 7-9 in the 
USA, lots in China and the USSR. Can this make an interesting game to play? 
In six years, or 72 turns? Perhaps if the map resource seed was set to give 
more benefits to Europe (I think someone has already used this idea, but you 
can't copyright history - yet (like privatizing oxygen)). 

I can see a debate here:
Me:     I say again that as a recreation we must think about realism.
Critic: So the USA, USSR and China end up as the most powerful three nations. 
        Isn't that what actually happened?
Me:     Well...Yes, okay. I guess you do have a point there. 

However my view is inherently contaminated by Eurocentricism - I can't be 
expected to take into account the rest of the world (I think I've just
convinced myself to start this as a project. Now then: players? Timescale?).


        CAUSES AND NATURE OF THE WAR

War is usually a question of economics. World War 2 is an example. As the USA
was the most powerful economic nation at the end of 1918 - escaping the damage
caused by four years of total war to the Great Powers (who were now 
emasculated), the economic centre of the world shifted from London to New 
York, where the global economy was subjected to American values. The problem
was that these were out of date. Americans still had a nineteenth century
outlook that the world was none of their concern. The great bulk of US trade
was internal, therefore the health of the economy depended on this and not
external trade with other nations. However, other capitalist nations were
greatly reliant on the American economy, not only for trade but for the 
financial loans and investment. 

As we all know, American confidence was shaken by the panic of 1929. In
retrospect this was an over-reaction: the problems with the economy were not
as dangerous as they would become. The reaction of American legislators was
badly misjudged: by raising tariffs to exclude foreign imports they in turn
reduced those countries spending power (before 1945 there was no global
currency except that of gold - a limited resource) to buy American goods,
which in turn damaged the American economy further as manufactured goods were 
not being sold but stockpiled. Workers were laid off, the spending power of 
the American people was reduced, more goods went unsold, more workers laid 
off. A catastrophe, n'est-ce pas? Nobody had any money to make purchases to
restore the economy, and agriculture suffered because farmers couldn't
meet their costs in transporting their products. In Europe the effects were
worse. States there turned to socialism to deliver them from evil: Marxists
had always preached that capitalism was inherently irrational, and observers
noted that the economy of the USSR was only slightly affected by The Crash.
An alternative to this, which still had revolutionary overtones from 1917,
was an extreme right-wing form of socialism: fascism, that strongly 
identified with national ethnicity to unite the people behind a strong 
government able to achieve a higher standard of living. Hitler of course
went further and blamed the situation on the Jews, purely in order to
strengthen the government's powers.

Because international trade had failed, nations looked to gain self-
sufficiency in raw materials. The British commonwealth formed an Imperial 
Preference system (to the outrage of American politicians who always objected 
to closed spheres of influence that excluded them; this is what the US feared 
in Europe (and should still fear): a single hegemonous power able to repeat 
Napoleon's Continental blockade of turning continental Europe into a single 
economic bloc. Avoiding this was also the driving concern of British foreign 
policy makers, which explains their intervention and adherence to the Balance 
of power. Americans, as ex-colonials, had a biased view of the world that saw 
all of these notions (spheres of influence, balance of power, hegemony) as 
Old-world and Imperialistic. Japan had the same mission in the Far-East of 
conquering China to gain access to raw materials (lacking them herself). 
Manchuria was a prized asset, and both Korea and Formosa (Taiwan) were a part 
of the Japanese empire before 1937. At this time she was forced to drive 
deeper into China and Indo-China for more materials. The US response of 
embargoes on strategic raw materials (scrap iron, petrol, rubber) backfired 
by increasing the Japanese commitment to the Asian Co-Prosperity Scheme. The 
reason she turned on the Pacific was to secure the vast rubber and oil 
reserves of Polynesia: Pearl Harbour was to prevent effective American 
intervention by crippling her navy (the sole means of projecting force - this 
is why Naval forces are so important to this scenario, see below), a quick 
war of conquest against undermanned outposts and the creation of a defensive 
screen to protect the empire (of which Hawaii was a key link).

This concludes my lecture in international relations, circa 1930. You too
can study this subject by contacting your nearest adult education centre
(or you can go to university and be funded by the state - like me 
(heh, heh)). I recognize this to be an inherently Marxist interpretation of
the war as based on markets, but then power politics - the Realist school
of International Relations - is difficult to distinguish. We don't always
aceept capitialism as the root cause of war.


        WAR AIMS AND STRATEGIES

The European struggle was as much about the struggle for the title of single
most-powerful hegemonous power (think back to Napoleon). For this reason
Hitler rightly saw the Soviet Union as the greatest possible threat to
German dominance (yes, I do say German dominance: traditionally the largest
state in terms of population and economy, she dominated the culture of the
region, and will do again). Continental powers use large armies to project
their power: France did in the 17th + early 18th centuries; Germany did from
the mid 18th century. Think back to the 1870 Prusso-France war which saw a
humiliating quick defeat of France, and the consternation caused by the
implications that Germany had now unbalanced the balance of power. Of course
German Revisionists claim that if any power had done this it was Britain by
her acquisition of a large overseas empire controlling three-fifths of the
world population. British Revisionists blame France as the one who more than
doubled her colonial assets between 1815-1870. New Imperialism only started
after this date; French Revisionists have yet to comment. :)

Britain, as an island nation, had no need for large standing armies of the
continental type. Her small, professional forces were used only to garrison
her empire. Her national security resided in naval supremacy, able to 
dominate her home waters to deter and prevent any invasion. The construction
of a large German fleet from about 1895 was viewed with alarm by the British
who saw the only possible use of such a force as against her, but German
policy-makers were influenced too much by the American A.T.Mahan at this time,
who argued that colonial powers needed navies to project force, conquer
territory and police the oceans. German naval doctrine at this time saw the
use of her navy as essentially sacrificial: by causing as much damage to the
enemy fleet as possible, so that that nation slips in the world rankings (as
explained in the preamble to the 1896 Navy Act). There were only two, 
inconclusive naval battles between the German and British fleets in the first 
world war. After Jutland, an astute American journalist noted that: "The 
German fleet has assaulted her jailor, but is still in jail." Technically a 
materialistic victory for the Germans, it was a strategic victory for the 
British. The apocalyptic clash was studiously avoided by both sides (as 
Churchill said, only Jellicoe could lose the war in a day), and the German
fleet was eventually scuttled by German officers at Scapa Flow in protest.

Great Britain (Aye: great!) was to maintain her supremacy until the 
mid-1930s when America became dominant. Under the expansionist-minded 
Theodore Roosevelt, the American fleet was set to expand at a rate of two
battleships per year, a rate that alarmed the British who knew that the US
could easily afford more and out-perform her. The British were aware that
their days of economic supremacy were numbered. However, this policy was
unbalanced in giving more weight to battleships than support vessels. A Navy
bill of the mid-1930s would expand the navy by one-third by adding 288 
vessels to give a more balanced composition: FDR signed the bill in 1937 as
a New Deal measure. Likewise, the Japanese saw their protection as ultimately
relying on their naval forces, and had quickly expanded her fleet to become
the dominant regional power by 1918, if not 1905, with the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance that made Japan responsible for the protection of British interests
in exchange for German territory, and allowed the British to withdraw their
naval forces to home waters. A process that was complete two years later to
counter the German challenge. The sight of the imposing bulk of the Grand
and Home fleets was designed to make German Admirals wet themselves :)


        TACTICAL FORCES

Obviously the use of Submarines was pioneered in this war, also in conjunction
with "starvation tactics" of blockading Britain. This would also be one 
strategy to be used in the Second "Great War" against Britain. The other was
to be air power. Air power has come along way from its beginnings, when 
the first observation balloons went aloft miles behind the front. This was
the role of the first heavier than air machines as well: reconnaissance, plus
the advantage of territorial penetration from above. These airplanes were
used as spotters for artillery in order to check their accuracy and report
corrections: a great innovation was the installation of equipment able to
send morse code messages in such craft, to be operated by a second person.
If you ever see a photograph of a WW1 plane with the person in the back
hanging over the side, it's okay: he's not being sick, he's actually
operating the panel, which couldn't be fitted internally. The next step was
to introduce armed aircraft able to shoot down enemy aircraft, usually with
the observer carrying a rifle. The fighter was born. Later the use of air
power diversified into different roles: interceptor and air superiority;
Ground attack; Tactical (various methods of delivery) and Strategic bombing;
Visual and Photo reconnaissance. 

Naval, as well as ground forces saw the value of having an air arm. The first 
seaplanes again had reconnaissance in mind, able to spot an enemy fleet. 
Actually the first naval planes were land planes, catapulted off battleships 
and cruisers that had to ditch when out of fuel (the military mind: men are 
expendable. Only those observers manning balloons had parachutes). The 
aircraft carrier was born, in concept - the practical reality called for 
experimentation. Most were converted from other classes of ship: the first 
carriers designed as such, again only appeared after the war. Naval aerial 
warfare diversified: Reconnaissance, Torpedo carrying and conventional bombing
(later dive-bombing), and air supremacy roles were envisaged. Anti submarine 
duties were carried out by airships with extended endurance; when convoys were 
eventually implemented in 1917 they could became a shadow. In contrast, land 
bombers evolved to the point where the Handley-Page V/1500 could fly to Berlin 
and back from Britain, carrying a 4,000lb bombload. Not bad for the first 
generation. Ex-bombers were used in the inter-war period to set exploration 
records (trans-Atlantic by a Vickers Vimy, for example). 

However they were overshadowed by airships as the most economical (and safe!) 
means of passenger aviation...until the Graf Zeppelin disaster, by which time 
aviation design was producing fast twin-engined planes for the purpose of 
carrying bombs (sorry, carrying the mail. No, really.). The peace treaty 
imposed on Germany restricted her development of an air force, but not 
Luthansa, so that such subterfuges were accepted. The planes (Dornier Do17 and
Heinkel He111) revealed their true purpose during the Spanish Civil War by 
bombing a little town called Guernica and achieving lasting world notoriety. 
The Junkers Ju88 was designed as a dedicated tactical bomber, and was 
consequently the most successful design. The Luftwaffe was marked by two 
characteristics, a) the sole possession of a trans-Atlantic land-plane, the 
Fokker Conder that performed mainly reconnaissance in the Atlantic (also the 
first type of plane to be shot down by US fighters, over Greenland), only able 
to carry a small bombload, and b) the lack of a dedicated strategic air arm. 
As I said, her tactical bombers were envisaged of mainly front line support, 
they had to be adapted to the strategic role against Britain, and failed. 
Operating beyond the range of escort fighters, any bomber that isn't designed 
to operate outside local air supremacy will be massacred. Mutual support 
helps, with defensive guns able to cover all angles of approach, often with 
overlapping fields of fire. It is said that the B-17 did more than the P-51 
in winning the battle of air supremacy over Europe. The British were sensible 
and managed to con the Americans into this burden, preferring night-bombing. 
At this time the British were ineffectual at both due to inadequate armament 
for daylight raids, and poor navigation for night raids. Also the bombloads 
were too puny to be worth the cost of sacrificing the flower of the Royal Air
Force on such raids.

Night bombing developed into its own art, mostly a technological one, with
improved target-finding aids for the British, a radar network for the
Germans, plus installed infra-red and later radar equipment in night fighters.
Intruder missions came about, consisting of planes attacking tactical targets
under cover of night. The RAF used Hurricane fighters, and later Mosquito 
tactical bombers to "beat up" enemy airfields. On the Eastern Front, both sides
used small aircraft on "nuisance" raids to disrupt communications. Tactical
bombing gained importance in the desert warfare, firstly by using strategic
aircraft to attack troop concentrations, and later using dedicated support
aircraft in conjunction with land forces. The US 9th Air Force specialized in
this role in the Italian campaign and the prelude to D-Day by bombing 
railways and bridges (if only in Civ2 we could fly bombers deep into enemy
territory and pillage improvements to represent this).


        THE PACIFIC

Yes, I must definitely be Eurocentric. Of course the Pacific war featured
its own innovations: Island hopping, forward bases, fleet actions, plus
limited strategic bombing. The Pacific consists of islands that are small,
and grouped in island chains that are spread out. Naval supremacy was 
therefore more important in transporting troops from one island to another
(don't mock me, this is serious). It is a traditional interpretation that 
carrier warfare developed only because most of the US battleships were put
out of action at Pearl Harbour. This is of course an over-simplification as
Japan had already built her naval task forces around the aircraft carrier
(the Pearl Harbour task force included four carriers) before then, so that
therefore the battleship was already past its prime. But that did not stop
the Japanese from continuing projects that would eventually build two super-
battleships (displacing 72,000 tons, compared to an average of 30,000 tons
for a US carrier, or 20,000 tons for a RN carrier). The Battle of the Coral 
Sea in early 1942 was the first naval battle in which the two surface fleets
did not meet.

Amphibious assault would be pioneered in this theatre, along with the 
preparations that would be transplanted back to Europe as used in the 
invasion of Sicily, Italy and Normandy. Until then Europe was more noted for
its naval evacuations of Dunkirk, Greece and Crete. Plus the Norway 
expedition which ended in the tragic loss of the RN carrier returning from
Narvik with veteran, frost-bitten airmen. Crete is the sole example of the
use of paratroopers (and back-up from glider drops and airlifting) to invade
an island without conjunction with other forces. The Royal Navy dominated the
Mediterranean, so an airborne invasion was the only option. Unfortunately, the
ANZAC defenders were such marksmen that the elite paratroops were decimated
by the effort and unable to be of further use in the war. But they succeeded.

Other aspects would include anti-costal shipping strikes by tactical fighters
and communications (irrelevant to Civ), plus the development of high-tech
weapons, principally by the Germans who beat the British effort of jet 
engined flight, and were supreme in rocketry and high speed design (swept-
wings). Last word, the use of guided bombs: these were like air launched V-1s
that were controlled by radio signal from the mother aircraft to guide them
to the target. They were used by the Germans on a small scale, most 
successfully against the Italians, which is another story.


        THE WORLD OF WAR IN CIV2

In my notes.txt for the scenario, in the units section, I have outlined what
each is and what its historical role was. I think I conform quite well by
my own standards. The above text is designed to explain the concepts of war
as used in the tactical and strategic sense during World War 2, in order to
bestow a greater understanding of the scenario and the control of forces at
the player's disposal. Andrew Livings.
