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Spiffor
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CPA - Evil Clone brigade
Nov 2001
time: 06:17
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quote:
Originally posted by lord of the mark
er, cause pacifists and others impaired british rearmament in the '30s, satisfying Goering just fine? Do I need to list every instance where antiwar sentiment effected a democracys foreign policy? Again there are several from that period alone. |
True, but the point, which is really true, is that no matter the politicial system, the government can manipulate the people into supporting war through fearmongering and propaganda. Pretty much every time a democratic folk has supported a war, this was proven true.
quote:
I suppose you can always say that in those instance the govt didnt want war - since govt counsels in demos are often divided, it would be hard to prove otherwise. But its a very self-serving statement, from a man whom I would not consider an authority. |
Of course it's a self-serving statement, and of course the uy is an *******. But the statement is true nonetheless.
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mrmitchell
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Spiff, I was quoting Fez/Giancarlo. I haven't even read the Goering thing yet.
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GePap
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of the Big Apple
Nov 2001
time: 23:17
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quote:
Originally posted by lord of the mark
i guess the point is that its sometimes hard to tell whos winning. D Day isnt that good an illustration. Much better is to look at how desperate things looked for the UK in the early years. And not just when things really were desperate, in 1940, but even after. |
Except that the UK was waging a defensive war against an aggressive great power that had taken opver half of Europe. last time I checked:
1. The US is a superpower- the insurgents are NOT
2. This was a war the US chose to wage, in which the US attacked
Thus, any comparison to the allied situation in WW2 is absurd.
quote:
For example in May 1941, theyd just screwed up an offensive in Libya. Theyd lost thousands of troops, and several ships, in the evacuation from Crete, only the latest in a string of German triumphs. They didnt have enough troops to deal with the Vichy forces in Syria, and had barely won in Iraq. Sinkings in the Atlantic were high, and the Luftwaffe had just destroyed the House of Commons (the building, not the members)
The whole war was seriously screwed up. Yet in retrospect we know that they were well on their way to victory. |
Except that the insurgents have no armored divisions, no planes, no government, so comparing their situation to that of a great power army like the Wermacht is absurd.
quote:
which doesnt prove a thing about Iraq today, but it does tell us something about the need to look beyond the headlines to the underlying strategic questions. |
Fine, but the underlyting strategiuc situation of a great power war is fundamentally different from that of a local insurgency. If WW2 comparisons are going to be made, then the only valid ones are those of insurgencies happening during the war against an occupying power working with a local government they installed. Unfortunately, the US invariably has the position of the Germans or Japanese in those comparisons.
Interestingly, Algeria or Vietnam comparisons are endlessly more valid.
But is screws up the moralistic arguement right quick.
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GePap
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of the Big Apple
Nov 2001
time: 23:17
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quote:
Originally posted by lord of the mark
I thought this was a strategic discussion, not a moralist one, but then i didnt read the first post too closely.
Algeria and Viet Nam are certainly interesting comparisons. Arguably we are going through Tet, and the public and media reaction is far more sophisticated now. I do think Rummy is going to have go the way of McNamara though. There is of course no equivalent in Viet Nam to the upcoming elections (thats a strategic point NOT a moralistic point). Algeria is of course a poor analogy as that was a fight to retain the metropolitan power's sovereignty, NOT a fight over ideology. Similarly analogies to the West Bank or the Phillipines are inapt. Analogies to Afghanistan, BOTH the Soviet experience and the recent US experience are more apt, though differences are still great.
But are you saying that in insurgency wars, unlike great power conventional wars, it IS correct to focus on headlines rather than underlying strategic drivers? |
Comparing a conventional war between industrial powers and their mass armies and a situation of occupation forces fighting insurgents is inherently wrong.
If we are going to look for comparisons, then comparisons to irregular wars are endlessly more valid. Honestly, if the matter of elections is important to you in invalidating a comparison to Vietnam, then how could you even think of comparing this situation to WW2, were elections were never an issue?
As for the underlying strategic conditions for Iraq:
1. An occupying power that did not gain control at the start
2. An occupying power unable to involve itself in any further major wars because its forces are overstreched
3. Nervous or hostile neighbors trying to secure their own interests
4. A slow and uneven reconstruction effort
5. Internal secterian and ethnic divides
6. Islamist trying to gain power violently
Yes, these point to a sun breaking from the clouds....
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lord of the mark
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FUKCOV - Former United Kingdom Colony of Virginia
Dec 2000
time: 00:17
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quote:
Originally posted by GePap
Comparing a conventional war between industrial powers and their mass armies and a situation of occupation forces fighting insurgents is inherently wrong.
If we are going to look for comparisons, then comparisons to irregular wars are endlessly more valid. Honestly, if the matter of elections is important to you in invalidating a comparison to Vietnam, then how could you even think of comparing this situation to WW2, were elections were never an issue?
LOTM - Sigh. because when I was looking at WW2, I was looking at the broad question of the uncertainty and fog of war. In looking at VN, I was looking more at details, as you seem to be.
As for the underlying strategic conditions for Iraq:
1. An occupying power that did not gain control at the start
LOTM - certainly not adequate control. Had we achieved better control we would be far ahead now, IMHO. But thats not a statement about the current situation.
2. An occupying power unable to involve itself in any further major wars because its forces are overstreched
I thought we were talking specifically about the situation in Iraq, rather than the global situation. While I do think another of Rummys mistakes was to not increase the end strength of the Army, Im not sure theres anywhere that i would like to see US ground troops intervene in the next 12 to 18 months.
3. Nervous or hostile neighbors trying to secure their own interests
Yes, thats a problem to manage. Fortunately all subject to pressure by the US, and all have interests in their own survival. Also, the more overtly they intervene, the more the arouse resentment in Iraq.
4. A slow and uneven reconstruction effort
Someone should hang for that. But it seems to have picked up since Bremer left. The Iraqi force training effort has gone better since Petraeus took over, though results are still uneven. Also were getting more allied help on that now.
5. Internal secterian and ethnic divides
The most interesting question is going to be Sunni Arab turnout in the Jan 30 election. However I continue to see willingness to compromise on the part of Shias and Kurds, which is promising. Also some divides cross each other - for example a secular- fundie split WITHIN the Shia AND the Sunni communities.
6. Islamist trying to gain power violently
Well, er year. Like in Afghanistan, Saudi, Pakistan, and elsewhere. But that doesnt say what their level of support is locally, how much they rely on outside financing, armament and recruitment, what the loss of Fallujah meant, how successful the insurgents and the coalition forces are in developing intell sources, infiltrating each other, etc. Whats the quality level and motivation of the govt forces, and how is it changing, and how will it change in the next few months.
I hope you see Im NOT saying that we're "winning" or even that things are improving. ALL Im saying is that its difficult to gather whats going in underneath by looking only the headlines of the latest bombing, or even by looking at the factors you list (though thats a much more sophisticated approach than looking at headlines) And THATS where the analogy to WW2 comes it. In May 1941 the German bombing of the Houses of Parliament was much less signficant than the relative figures on Brit and German aircraft production. Someone privy to those figures would have known that the air war was shifting in Britains favor, and would have done so even if US and USSR had not come in. While a newspaper reader looking at what happened to the House of Commons would NOT know that.
Ok - what do you think the Sunni Arab turnout will be? And what do you think it has to be to improve the situation? Marginally? Decisively?
(I think the Sunni Arab turnout will be much higher than 50%, but significantly less than the SHia turnout, and will be particularly low in Anbar province, resulting in only a marginal improvement in the govts situation in the Sunni triangle)
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MRT144
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Seattle Washington
Oct 2002
time: 21:17
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g dub killed my pet goat. I want an invasion.
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18-12-2004 00:30
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