04-03-2005 03:53									#211
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Egypt was there for the taking. Compared to logistical problems Germany faced in Russia, desert warfare was child's play. Even a small supplementation of Rommel's force would have been decisive.

But Rommel was starved of troops and supplies not because they could not be delivered, but because the desert war was not a priority and he had to beg for everything he got.

	04-03-2005 04:03									#212
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quote: Originally posted by Alexander's Horse Egypt was there for the taking. Compared to logistical problems Germany faced in Russia, desert warfare was child's play. Even a small supplementation of Rommel's force would have been decisive. But Rommel was starved of troops and supplies not because they could not be delivered, but because the desert war was not a priority and he had to beg for everything he got.

A. He lost decisively at El Alamein. He needed a significant supplement.
B. No, axis logistics couldnt supply much more than they did
C. So what? So he takes Egypt? What is there in Egypt thats decisive? Egypt has about zero industry. So the Reich gets a bunch of cotton, so what? So they cut the Canal, thus keeping the RN out of the Med? So what?

	04-03-2005 04:24									#213
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Capturing Eygpt gives Germany a chance for the oil fields in the Middle East. Any success in the middle east, starts to pressure Russia from the south around the Caspian sea. Also, the British could feel too comfortable with the box starting to close between Japan in Burma/India and Germany near or in Persia.

Lastly, success in the Middle East may have been enough to convince Turkey to join the Axis. Another threat to Russia near the Caucaus area.

	04-03-2005 05:07									#214
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The Germans never worked out that Britain was obsessed with the ME, Egypt and the Suez canal because of their concern with the defence of India and communications with their Asian and African empire.

If Churchill had lost Egypt, capping off 2 years of military reverses and the fall of Singapore, the appeasement camp would have been in a very strong position to topple him. Appeasement was about preserving the empire and a longstanding British policy which Churchill overturned.

The Germans could have easily put the forces on the ground but only the German navy grasped the significance of controlling the Mediterranean and they were not influential with either the army high command or Hitler.

	04-03-2005 09:44									#215
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Yep, taking Egypt would have cut the British Empire in half. That would have been both a strategic and morale blow big time.

Germans could have easily wiped the map in North Africa had they really wanted to.

	04-03-2005 15:27									#216
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quote: Originally posted by David Floyd Sikander, Well, actually, the US DID reach it's peak potential forces, given the priorities set at the beginning of the war - that is, "only" 89 Army and 6 Marine divisions, with a major emphasis on specialist forces, naval forces, and army air forces, as well as industrial production (the US pretty much outproduced the rest of the world combined from 1941-1945). By 1944-1945, US forces were suffering from a shortage of infantry, and US generals were arguing for a larger number of infantry divisions. Thank God those arguments did not prevail.

This is really a question of setting the bar too low rather than reaching our true potential. Without the Russians eating up supplies we could have increased our forces by reducing our production (we wasted an incredible amount during the war as it was) and by further utilizing our population to create more formations. Women and African Americans could have been utilized to a much greater degree than they were for instance.

The infantry shortage was silly for several reasons. Firstly it should have been obvious that units would need to replace a lot of infantry just from all of the previous combat experience we had in the war. The fact that we did an abysmal job of training and integrating replacements simply exacerbated the problem, as many of them became unnecessary casualties. We also killed off a lot of good veterans by running them into the ground in terms of stamina and by sending understrength infantry elements into action.

Another large reason that we suffered so many infantry casualties was our "hey diddle diddle, straight up the middle" mentality at all levels. If anything the grunts learned more quickly to try and bypass strongpoints and take terrain with maneuver than the brass did, though with so many green units being fed into the meatgrinder and no successful means of disseminating this information to incoming units everyone pretty much had to learn the hard way. Ike's insistence on pushing the Germans back step by step rather than attacking the shoulders of "the bulge" caused a huge number of infantry casualties, and still mystifies me to this day. Patton was exactly right about this. Attack the shoulders and they'll fall all over themselves giving away the terrain that took months and tens of thousands of casualties to regain. And we'd have bled them a lot more in the process.

	04-03-2005 15:36									#217
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quote: Originally posted by lord of the mark and supposing they take Suez, and Churchill falls - why should a successor Brit goverment make peace? Suez doesnt matter, the Brits arent moving anything through the Med other than for the defense of Egypt anyway.

Maybe they shouldn't make peace, but it's a huge strategic blow nonetheless. For starters how about axis submarines loosed in the Persian Gulf and all over the Indian Ocean?

	04-03-2005 16:12									#218
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Its isn't just Suez but you have to understand that Churchill desperately needed victories to justify his belligerent policies in 1941/2.

	04-03-2005 17:46									#219
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Nice posts. Ok, I've read the same data people have noted here. My only disagreement, and it's simply over terminology, would be the British consideration of the Suez canal as a critical asset (versus obsession). The fall of Egypt, the loss of Arabia, the creation of an Iraq friendly to Germany (which actually happened for short while), would have split the British Empire in two. The Nazis never realized the simple strategic issue - while they did not need the Mideast, i.e. oil production was not that high yet - Britian HAD to have the Mideast. The Kreigsmarine realized this vulnerability, but since they were not part of Hitler's inner circle.. (see earlier posts). And yes, with the Uboats based out of ports off the Indian Ocean, the British Empire would have been split in two.

Now - hard data. We need two pieces of hard data to assess the ability of the Axis to take the Mideast. The tonnage figures per day for a mechanized divisoin I can dig up easily. But what merchant tonnage did the Italians have deployed in the Mediterranean? Secondly, and I've sceen the figure somewhere years ago, number/tonnage analysis of the British submarine warfare in the Med, with attempts to correct for Malta as an Axis airbase.

You can assume negligable Axis ASW via warships, they had never geared up for it and by the time they learn the necessary lessons, it will be decided. An interesting comparison would be British submarine warfare against the Japanese, whose navy was more effectively employed than the Italians but still weak in ASW. You can figure in this scenario efficiency somewhere betweent the two since you are adding Malta as a factor in the Axis favor.

Sikander, unfortunately, and I posted this in our Russia versus US post WW2 thread, Ike's insistance on grinding the Germans down was standard policy. Since Grant's successes in the Civil War, engaging and directly destroying the enemy had been the official US Amy doctrine. Patton was the maverick, and he and some other US generals had understand what the Blitzkreig meant to the old doctrine (after the success in France 1940). Unfortunately Ike did not. The US Army is always terribly slow to adjust doctrine, and often take decades to adjust to new types/styles of conflicts. Very often it is the grunts who figure out that the standard manual is going to get me killed, and they come up with their own solutions, i.e. hedgerow cutters.

One other problem with US Army combat soldiers in WW2 was that the Air Force and Navy essentially got first dibs on the best conscripts. Plus many volunteered when they realized they were going to be drafted, and leveraged that to stay out of the infranty. Add in the cleverer individuals who were also gaming the system, and you end up with a GI who is not on par with the average German combat soldier. Conversely the policy did work when you look at the quality and success of our maintenance units, navy, etc. It's a matter of where you put the assets.

You are correct that they ignored numerous signs, as early as 1943, about the nature of the war and the probable losses. Those errors kept dogging us for the rest of the war. I had never considered it in this aspect, but it is interesting how the US did such a superlative job of managing it's material assets while doing an adequate job of managing it's human assets (I am also including the idiotic policy of having green formations committed to battle rather than the German system of working them into existing units) versus the Germans doing a poor job of managing material assets but yet the Wehrmacht, until losses/committments caused it to break down, did such an excellent job managing it's human assets. I had to change that last statement, the Nazi policy on Untermenschen meant I had to keep it carefully delimited.

	04-03-2005 18:05									#220
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edit - double post of version I had rewritten

Last edited by shawnmmcc on 05-03-2005 at 12:55

	04-03-2005 18:13									#221
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As I said in a previous post, you also need to figure in the ability of the axis to transport supplies by road from Tripoli to the front. Normally German and Italian army formations relied upon rail to bring supplies from a main depot to some point relatively near the front, then animal drawn transport carried them the rest of the way. This wasn't possible in North Africa, there wasn't any rail system, and there was a dearth of suitable draft animals. The axis was forced to rely upon motorized transport to carry supplies more than one thousand miles from port to the troops in Egypt. The British became very good at interdicting those supplies routes both by air raids and by fast raiding parties, and gradually longer range fighters were introduced, pushing back the point at which the supply convoys were forced to travel at night at a mere 10 miles/hour. Convoys which were able to lay low during the day and avoid the air patrols were often picked off by "desert rats" during the night.

	04-03-2005 18:34									#222
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quote: Originally posted by shawnmmcc Nice posts. Ok, I've read the same data people have noted here. My only disagreement, and it's simply over terminology, would be the British consideration of the Suez canal as a critical asset (versus obsession). The fall of Egypt, the loss of Arabia, the creation of an Iraq friendly to Germany (which actually happened for short while), would have split the British Empire in two. The Nazis never realized the simple strategic issue - while they did not need the Mideast, i.e. oil production was not that high yet - Britian HAD to have the Mideast. The Kreigsmarine realized this vulnerability, but since they were not part of Hitler's inner circle.. (see earlier posts). And yes, with the Uboats based out of ports off the Indian Ocean, the British Empire would have been split in two. Now - hard data. We need two pieces of hard data to assess the ability of the Axis to take the Mideast. The tonnage figures per day for a mechanized divisoin I can dig up easily. But what merchant tonnage did the Italians have deployed in the Mediterranean? Secondly, and I've sceen the figure somewhere years ago, number/tonnage analysis of the British submarine warfare in the Med, with attempts to correct for Malta as an Axis airbase. You can assume negligable Axis ASW via warships, they had never geared up for it and by the time they learn the necessary lessons, it will be decided. An interesting comparison would be British submarine warfare against the Japanese, whose navy was more effectively employed than the Italians but still weak in ASW. You can figure in this scenario efficiency somewhere betweent the two since you are adding Malta as a factor in the Axis favor.

Take a look at how bad the Italian shipping losses were during the campaign in North Africa and you'll have some idea of their supply potential. Good enough to supply a lot more than they did in the actual event had they approached the campaign with a more serious and concerted mindset. But the commitment which would have been necessary to ultimately succeed was not present in either the German or Italian high commands. In fact their mutual distrust and lack of respect diluted their effectiveness quite considerably.

quote: Originally posted by shawnmmcc Sikander, unfortunately, and I posted this in our Russia versus US post WW2 thread, Ike's insistance on grinding the Germans down was standard policy. Since Grant's successes in the Civil War, engaging and directly destroying the enemy had been the official US Amy doctrine. Patton was the maverick, and he and some other US generals had understand what the Blitzkreig meant to the old doctrine (after the success in France 1940). Unfortunately Ike did not. The US Army is always terribly slow to adjust doctrine, and often take decades to adjust to new types/styles of conflicts. Very often it is the grunts who figure out that the standard manual is going to get me killed, and they come up with their own solutions, i.e. hedgerow cutters. One other problem with US Army combat soldiers in WW2 was that the Air Force and Navy essentially got first dibs on the best conscripts. Plus many volunteered when they realized they were going to be drafted, and leveraged that to stay out of the infranty. Add in the cleverer individuals who were also gaming the system, and you end up with a GI who is not on par with the average German combat soldier. Conversely the policy did work when you look at the quality and success of our maintenance units, navy, etc. It's a matter of where you put the assets. You are correct that they ignored numerous signs, as early as 1943, about the nature of the war and the probable losses. Those errors kept dogging us for the rest of the war. I had never considered it in this aspect, but it is interesting how the US did such a superlative job of managing it's material assets while doing an adequate job of managing it's human assets (I am also including the idiotic policy of having green formations committed to battle rather than the German system of working them into existing units) versus the Germans doing a poor job of managing material assets but yet the Wehrmacht, until losses/committments caused it to break down, did such an excellent job managing it's human assets. I had to change that last statement, the Nazi policy on Untermenschen meant I had to keep it carefully delimited.

Good point about the quality issue. The real crux was the lack of good small unit leaders in the Army, and one of the prime areas to which they were shunted was as crew members on AAC heavy bombers. A B-17 effectively carried (in terms of quality and quantity) the entire leadership cadre of an infantry company, the vast majority of whom only fired machine guns or pounded German farms with bombs and operated the radio. The AAC should have been forced to make do with less (plenty of people would have been capable of firing machine guns) and the Infantry should have been able to build a decent Officer / NCO contingent to lead the masses of infantry.

The Wehrmacht as you say were a lot more efficient both in their initial disposition of personnel and with their replacements. But the nature of the Nazi regime also ensured an immense amount of waste as both Himmler and to a lesser extent Goering were given large ground forces, which generally constituted an extravagent waste of manpower considering the German situation. The late war Luftwaffe divisions were a complete waste of good manpower, while the Waffen SS formations IMO never quite justified their expense on the whole. The Wehrmacht could have done more with those men.

	05-03-2005 00:45									#223
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[QUOTE] Originally posted by Shogun Gunner

quote: Capturing Eygpt gives Germany a chance for the oil fields in the Middle East.

Its gonna take Rommel quite awhile to accumulate the supplies to move from Egypt to Iraq. and he doesnt have the trucks to move those supplies. Meanwhile the Brits will destroy the oil fields. IIRC it took the japanese months to get the east indies fields working again, after the Dutch blew them. And the Japanese were in better position to move equipment in then the Germans were. By the time the Germans have the fields working it will be too late, as the allies will be coming on their rear in North Africa.


aside from which, assuming the Germans DO get the fields working, how do they transport the oil? They dont have the tankers to do it - and if they did the Brits would shoot up the tankers in the Indian Ocean. Are they going to use the presumably destroyed pipelines to the Med? And they dont even have enough tankers in the Med. Or maybe theyll use the first class Turkish railways, huh?

quote: Any success in the middle east, starts to pressure Russia from the south around the Caspian sea.

They cant cross the Caucasus mountains, they cant cross the Caspian sea.

quote: Also, the British could feel too comfortable with the box starting to close between Japan in Burma/India and Germany near or in Persia.

assuming the Japanese had moved. That has its own problems.

quote: Lastly, success in the Middle East may have been enough to convince Turkey to join the Axis. Another threat to Russia near the Caucaus area.

Turkish railways to weak to support much offense in that area. In OTL the brits were trying to get Turkey to join the allies, joining the axis was way to risky for Turkey.

	05-03-2005 00:50									#224
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quote: Originally posted by Alexander's Horse The Germans never worked out that Britain was obsessed with the ME, Egypt and the Suez canal because of their concern with the defence of India and communications with their Asian and African empire. If Churchill had lost Egypt, capping off 2 years of military reverses and the fall of Singapore, the appeasement camp would have been in a very strong position to topple him. Appeasement was about preserving the empire and a longstanding British policy which Churchill overturned.

there was no appeasement camp anymore in 1942. the last gasp for that was the attempt by Musso to mediate in 1940, and even Chamberlain opposed that (though Halifax didnt) If Churchill falls in 1942 the new UK govt continues the war. There was PLENTY of criticism of WSC, especially after the Greek disaster, but no important critics calling for peace.

	05-03-2005 00:51									#225
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quote: Originally posted by Sikander Take a look at how bad the Italian shipping losses were during the campaign in North Africa and you'll have some idea of their supply potential.

assuming they only have to move stuff to Libyan ports, which was NOT the case. the stuff still needs to get to the front.

also this assumes shipping was the only constraint - the capacity at the ports was as well, IIUC.

	05-03-2005 00:53									#226
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quote: Originally posted by Sikander Maybe they shouldn't make peace, but it's a huge strategic blow nonetheless. For starters how about axis submarines loosed in the Persian Gulf and all over the Indian Ocean?

And where do these additional subs come from? If they pull them from the Atlantic, theyre doing the Brits a favor, as they do much more damage there. In the Indian Ocean the brits will fight them with convoys and air power, kill lots of subs. Trying to run subs past Aden should be a lot of fun too - not. And if the brits ever feel overstretched on asw, they can always pull planes from bomber command.

	05-03-2005 00:56									#227
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quote: Originally posted by Ted Striker Yep, taking Egypt would have cut the British Empire in half. That would have been both a strategic and morale blow big time.

how does this cut the empire in half? They were in communication with India and the East via Good Hope, NOT via Suez. The Suez route was too dangerous cause of axis air in the central Med.


It would be a morale blow, but not a huge strategic blow.

	05-03-2005 01:00									#228
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gad, none of you people read SHWI, do you?

	05-03-2005 02:36									#229
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quote: Originally posted by lord of the mark there was no appeasement camp anymore in 1942. the last gasp for that was the attempt by Musso to mediate in 1940, and even Chamberlain opposed that (though Halifax didnt) If Churchill falls in 1942 the new UK govt continues the war. There was PLENTY of criticism of WSC, especially after the Greek disaster, but no important critics calling for peace.

What happened was the appeasement lobby was conveniently air brushed out of history. Noone after the war was going to admit that they thought Britain should seek terms in 1941 or 42. Just as those who complained about the blitz kept mum after the war. Churchill was booed in that period and couldn't go into parts of the East end of London, or other cities. Of course this is all forgotten now.

Churchill fell into a deep depression during that period because he heard the dog whistle.

This also explains why Churchill sacked 8th army commander after commander - he needed success badly for political reasons. The loss of Egypt and the canal would probably have finished him.

	05-03-2005 02:48									#230
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yeah, but at what point became Polish defeat inevitable?

	05-03-2005 02:53									#231
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day 2

	05-03-2005 02:56									#232
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heh, and why only day 2 of all.... of all 28?

	05-03-2005 03:01									#233
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quote: Originally posted by Alexander's Horse What happened was the appeasement lobby was conveniently air brushed out of history. Noone after the war was going to admit that they thought Britain should seek terms in 1941 or 42. Just as those who complained about the blitz kept mum after the war. Churchill was booed in that period and couldn't go into parts of the East end of London, or other cities. Of course this is all forgotten now. Churchill fell into a deep depression during that period because he heard the dog whistle. This also explains why Churchill sacked 8th army commander after commander - he needed success badly for political reasons. The loss of Egypt and the canal would probably have finished him.

theres plenty of evidence that there was dissatisfaction with WSC. Thats NOT whats being disputed (ISTR PM Menzies fell during the war. Australia did NOT appease anyone or make a seperate peace. Now do you see the difference?) What evidence do you have for any major UK pol being pro-peace, post July 1940?

	05-03-2005 03:08									#234
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Actually the major evidence, which is only coming to light now, is Churchill's own letters and diaries, and those of other cabinet members.

I expect that once the WWII generation has passed on there will be some revision of this period of history. The crucial period is from 1940 through to the turning point victory at El Alamein in October 1942. This was a very dark period for Britain.

This is still a very sensitive subject so not much is written about it yet.

	05-03-2005 07:36									#235
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I can't read this whole thread but I credit Franco for standing up to Hitler. Had he supported ole Adolph's desire to control the Rock, well, England would have been in a pretty pickle and things could have turned out quite differently than they did.

	05-03-2005 07:41									#236
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Hitler met Franco once and never put any real pressure on him to allow the transit of German troops to take Gibraltar. This was a major strategic error.

	05-03-2005 09:19									#237
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Franco was too busy obsessing over little boys in short pants to effectively participate in the axis. That just goes to show what kind of talent fascism attracts.

	05-03-2005 09:45									#238
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quote: Originally posted by Sikander Another large reason that we suffered so many infantry casualties was our "hey diddle diddle, straight up the middle" mentality at all levels. If anything the grunts learned more quickly to try and bypass strongpoints and take terrain with maneuver than the brass did, though with so many green units being fed into the meatgrinder and no successful means of disseminating this information to incoming units everyone pretty much had to learn the hard way. Ike's insistence on pushing the Germans back step by step rather than attacking the shoulders of "the bulge" caused a huge number of infantry casualties, and still mystifies me to this day. Patton was exactly right about this. Attack the shoulders and they'll fall all over themselves giving away the terrain that took months and tens of thousands of casualties to regain. And we'd have bled them a lot more in the process.

This very scene is played out in Thin Red Line when Nick Nolte orders a platoon over the middle against 3 machine guns the guys can't even see.

The LT. in charge wants to flank it and refuses the order. Nolte calls him a coward and sends him home, but the LT. was right and he saved his entire platoon.

Of course the machine guns stopped firing when Nolte arrived on the scene to see what was going on.

	05-03-2005 09:57									#239
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While we're on the subject of Rommel, OKW did not resource him for offensive operations. That is the real reason he couldn't take Egypt, not supply problems. His mission was to stiffen up the Italians and help them hold Libya. He exceeded his orders by undertaking offensive operations and Halder considered disciplining him or even removing him from command. He was seen as a show pony by his fellow general staff officers but was enjoyed a meteoric career because of Hitler's patronage and the myth Goebbels built around him, the desert fox and all that BS. Churchill also had motive to build him up because he used it to show how well the British forces were doing holding him off.

There was a brief period in 1942 when the German army was advancing into the Caucasus when some sort of giant pincer movement from Russia and Africa was briefly dreamed of but Rommel never received the resources to carry out his end and the tide of war quickly turned against Germany in Russia and that was that.

Its fortunate really because even one decent German infantry corps could have shifted the balance in Rommel's favour. There was a rough parity of forces, about 7 divisions each, for most of the desert war so taking Egypt was always a bit of a pipedream in spite of all Rommel's fancy moves. As soon as the resources shifted against him, which was in the second half of 42, he was finished.

Last edited by Alexander's Horse on 05-03-2005 at 10:04

	05-03-2005 10:00									#240
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quote: Originally posted by lord of the mark how does this cut the empire in half? They were in communication with India and the East via Good Hope, NOT via Suez. The Suez route was too dangerous cause of axis air in the central Med. It would be a morale blow, but not a huge strategic blow.

I'm not sure I agree.

There were 3 wars fought over that canal since 1950, and alot of oil ships through it to this day.

I have no hard data on what was being shipped in 1940 UK, but it's a looong way around the Cape to Britain. And on top of that, it's strategically right in the middle of Africa and the Middle East, cutting off most of the UK's colonial possessions from it, or at least making shipping much much harder to undertake.