 |
|  |
 |
|
Lancer
|
|
Oregon Coast, USA! or Bohol, Philippines!
Apr 1999 time: 05:19
|
|
Vesayen, yes I'm aware of that. My point is that is you factor in the nukes the Sovs have no chance to win. It makes the thread pointless.
JohnT, that's true but by '45 the Sovs already had all that stuff. It would take a while for the allies to bomb it into oblivion.
If the Sovs can push the allies off the continent they have to do it very fast before allied airpower wipes them out. I don't think they could do it. They would have to absolutely crush the allied armies right off so there would be not enough tp stop them driving east through Germany and France.
I don't see the Sovs crushing allied armies so quickly. Supply would be very difficult also.
|
|
|  |
 |
|
techumseh
|
 |
of the frozen North.
Apr 1999 time: 22:19
|
|
Reality Check:
1. The US wouldn't use the A-bomb: false. It was available in small numbers, but the Soviets were 3 years away, assuming their espionage network performed as well as it did historically. If the Soviets couldn't retaliate, the US would certainly have used it again.
2. The allies would have had automatic air superiority: questionable. The Soviets had a large airforce, with some high quality fighters. The airforce was overwhelmingly tactical, with few heavy bombers of any quality. Soviet production was good, but keeping pace with the allies in technolgy would be tough.
3. The allies "let" the Soviets take Berlin, who were overextended: false. The Red Army was larger, better equiped and more effective than the combined allied armies. The logistics of both armies was a limiting factor, however.
4. The allies could have attacked the Soviets immediately after the defeat of Germany: false. Sympathy for the Soviets and the communists who led the resistance in France, Italy and eastern Europe was very high in allied nations and armies in 1945. The effect on morale of turning on your esteemed ally at the moment of victory cannot be overestimated. Governments would have fallen over this.
5. Patton was a significant factor: silly. Patton was a good general, but no better than a dozen Soviet marshals. Zuhkov in particular was a better strategic general overall.
In the end, I think it would come down to whether the long term Allied economic and technological advantage would have overcome the short term Soviet political advantage. Probably, but it would have been closer than some seem to think.
|
|
|  |
 |
|
Lancer
|
|
Oregon Coast, USA! or Bohol, Philippines!
Apr 1999 time: 05:19
|
|
Ves, some years ago we Poly OT people built a house for some poor people. Since then there hasn't been a single thread that wasn't pointless that I'm aware of. It's all BS or info or chat, and none of it will make a bit of difference.
|
|
|  |
 |
|
Alexander's Horse
|
 |
Panmunjon, hands up!
Jan 1970 time: 15:19
|
|
Reality Check
quote: Originally posted by techumseh
1. The US wouldn't use the A-bomb: false. It was available in small numbers, but the Soviets were 3 years away, assuming their espionage network performed as well as it did historically. If the Soviets couldn't retaliate, the US would certainly have used it again.
|
Politically it would have been difficult to use the A-bomb against a former ally which for 3 years had been built up as a heroe by Allied propaganda but I agree it would have been used if necessary.
quote:
2. The allies would have had automatic air superiority: questionable. The Soviets had a large airforce, with some high quality fighters. The airforce was overwhelmingly tactical, with few heavy bombers of any quality. Soviet production was good, but keeping pace with the allies in technolgy would be tough.
|
It would not have been a walk over but the Sovs were simply outclassed in both technology and production - there were some accidental encounters between Soviet and allied fighters and the Soviet usually came off second best. Not out of the question the Sovs could have caught up - by Korea they were ahead - but the lack of a strategic bombing force would have really hurt them.
quote:
3. The allies "let" the Soviets take Berlin, who were overextended: false. The Red Army was larger, better equiped and more effective than the combined allied armies. The logistics of both armies was a limiting factor, however.
|
This was a political decision. The allied armies could have taken Berlin but the Americans failed to graps its strategic significance and did not want to expend the lives necessary. The Brits wanted to go for it.
quote:
4. The allies could have attacked the Soviets immediately after the defeat of Germany: false. Sympathy for the Soviets and the communists who led the resistance in France, Italy and eastern Europe was very high in allied nations and armies in 1945. The effect on morale of turning on your esteemed ally at the moment of victory cannot be overestimated. Governments would have fallen over this.
|
I agree with this - but we must assume an incident serious enough to spark conflict.
quote:
5. Patton was a significant factor: silly. Patton was a good general, but no better than a dozen Soviet marshals. Zuhkov in particular was a better strategic general overall.
|
Patton is overrated, I agree. A good general, amongst many good generals.
quote:
In the end, I think it would come down to whether the long term Allied economic and technological advantage would have overcome the short term Soviet political advantage. Probably, but it would have been closer than some seem to think. |
I think Stalin would have a done a deal to get his troops out of Eastern Europe at the first whiff of conflict. The price for not applying some pressure was almost 50 years of Soviet occupation in Eastern Europe.
|
|
|  |
 |
|  |
 |
|
Pekka
|
 |
em seu burro dos pais!
Feb 2002 time: 07:19
|
|
I think the west would have won it relatively clear. To the point of surrender. No one could have kept Soviets in submission AFTER the war. Too many, in too large areas.. no way.
It depends who from west would have joined. If everyone, then it's a clear cut IMO. Stalin would think between inflicting unbareable damage to Euro cities with his truly massive artillery, bomb them to stone age, which they were close being already. OR draw back majority of the troops from newly gained regions and defend the older borders. He would prolly not leave the new regions, and at most would try to play costly drawing back fight to the west and set up final perimeter in the old borders plus buffer.
I feel any penetration attempts would be extremely stupid, as they would just get caught and starved at the end, but some of those could happen, trying to shuffle the game a little.
It would come down to west partitioning the places.
US could concentrate more troops in Japan and draw some of the attention there, and other ones in the west would concentrate on attacking the old borders and isolating large areas and making big ass motti's, to starve everyone to death. Or surrender. Stretch the logistical support into impossibility. Try to break up the army into 5 or 6 main areas and fight them locally, while having logistical superiority and air superiority. There would be no way out. That's why I believe Stalin would either do the hail mary and try to push some front, taking the momentum back, or commit to one single region to fight hard in, turn it into a hell. But in any case, that would mean losing soon anyway.
|
|
|  |
 |
|
chegitz guevara
|
 |
Ft. Lauderdale, FL Communist Party of Apolyton
Jun 2000 time: 00:19
|
|
The effect of Allied airpower is highly overrated. The U.S. Strategic Bombing Assessment condicted after the war found that the only usefull effect strategic bombing had during the war was the bombing of the Ploesti oil fields, which cut of the Nazis oil supplies. Unless the Allies could bomb Baku, that's not going to be a factors.
Technology wasn't a significant factor. Nazi tanks were better than Allied tanks, though Soviet tanks were superior to Nazi tanks. Both the Allies and the Soviets practiced meatgrinder tactics, overwhelm the enemy with men and material. The Soviets had superiority in tank tech, and unlike the Nazis, had them in sufficient numbers to make a difference.
Allied logistics would be hampered by Communist Partisans.
The Brits wouldn't be in the war, so it would be the U.S. alone, unless they wanted to start using Nazi troops, which would almost certainly bring down the American government.
The main edges the U.S. has are in production and control of the seas. Control of the seas allows the U.S. to strike anywhere, but it won't keep them from losing on the ground. Production isn't that much of a factor when your workers are on strike because you started a war for no good reason.
The 2nd largest strike wave in U.S. history occured in '46. The largest occured in '47. Commies were still a very important political factor in the U.S.
In fact, it's a possibility that a U.S. attack on the Soviets would have led to a communist planet.
|
|
|  |
 |
|
molly bloom
|
 |
Lundenwic
Oct 2001 time: 15:19
|
|
quote: Originally posted by chegitz guevara
Allied air support wasn't as effective as claimed, having little effect on the Nazi war effort, |
That's simply not the case- unless of course you think Goebbels was lying when he said it did have an effect on the Germans' war effort.
Studies by people such as Professor Richard Overy take an overview and factor in financial costs and costs in materials for the creation of an integrated anti-aircraft system, for the detection and tracking of aircraft, the repair and relocation of industrial and residential buildings, relocation of airfields and barracks, emergency housing and medical centres, the drain on food supplies and interference with transport by refugees, the need to concentrate on fighter aircraft production in the West, fewer bombers being produced, and fewer offensive aircraft available to fight the Russians.
Albert Speer calculated that in 1944 the effects of Allied bombing were such that 35% fewer tanks were produced, 31% fewer aircraft, and 42% fewer lorries, all down to bombing of Reich industrial areas.
On Jnuary 30th, 1945, Speer wrote a memo. to Hitler stating that:
'Realistically the war is over in this area of heavy industry and armaments.'
By 1944, one third of all German artillery production was anti-aircraft guns, which absorbed 20% of all ammunition production, one third of the output of the precision optics industry, and roughly half to two thirds of radar and signals equipment manufacturing.
Two million Germans were engaged in anti-aircraft defence by 1944, staffing weapons and repairing damaged industrial areas and clearing away destroyed civilian infrastructure.
See also:
Frederick Taylor: 'Dresden, Tuesday 13th February 1945'
Richard Overy: 'Why the Allies Won'
|
|
|  |
All times are GMT. The time now is 05:19. Apolyton Time is 00:19. |
top of page
|
|
|
Forum Rules:
You may not post new threads
You may not post replies
You may not post attachments
You may not edit your posts
|
HTML code is ON
vB code is ON
Smilies are ON
[IMG] code is ON
|
|
|
|
|
|