 |
|  |
 |
|
Sirotnikov
|
 |
<--- Yes, It's a "kitty" in a boot.
Feb 2000 time: 07:18
|
|
quote: Nope, there was collateral damage. Happens in war... very unfortunate and really shouldn't ever happen, but I guess we tried to be careful.
Israel's incursion doesn't seem to be solely against Hamas. It seems to also have as motive to humiliate the Palestinian people and destroy their spirits... in short further oppression against the people. |
Or in short : double standard.
Why is it when America reportedly kills 3000 people, it's collateral damage, while When Israelis kill 28 people in ramallah, most of which are armed militants, it's "opresseion"?
quote: They aren't being killed for being Jewish (many Christians and Muslims die in the blasts)... they are killed for being part of an oppresive regime. |
So what are you saying, infact, that there is no "civilian" population?
If so, I gather you feel ok whith Israel killing non-armed palestinians, since, after all, they are part of a terrorist regime 
quote: I doubt either would work.. in the case of Gandhi, you have a colonial regime that wants the same land as the colonized. |
And in this situation, you have Israel which wants to keep only small patches of land, to assure it's safety in case of war.

|
|
|  |
 |
|  |
 |
|
Sirotnikov
|
 |
<--- Yes, It's a "kitty" in a boot.
Feb 2000 time: 07:18
|
|
The (Revised) Palestinian Account of Camp David Part I: The Refugee Issue
Introduction The Palestinian account of Camp David and the reasons why Israel's proposals were rejected by Arafat, have recently undergone a transformation aimed at improving both the Palestinian image and the Palestinian public relations strategy. While Palestinian demands made at the summit have remained unchanged, the PA leadership and the PLO are beginning now to address the charge that the summit's failure rests on their shoulders.
The first shot of the revised Palestinian version of events was fired by Robert Malley, President Clinton's special assistant for Arab-Israeli affairs from 1998 to 2001 in a July article in the New York Times.[1] In a recent interview with the Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram, Yasser Arafat was asked about the charge that he had missed an opportunity at Camp David. He replied: "Rob Malley is good enough for me; [he] documented the Camp David talks in Clinton's presence, and published in the international press that I was not the reason for the [talks'] failure."[2]
The central motifs of the new Palestinian position also appeared in an interview with Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), published in the Palestinian Authority daily Al-Ayyam[3], and in other statements by senior Palestinian leaders.
The new position has now been consolidated into a Palestinian Information Ministry document entitled "The Camp David Peace Proposal, July 2000 – Frequently Asked Questions." This document was published in Arabic and English on the ministry's Web site,[4] with the Hebrew version of the document published on the Web site of the PLO's Negotiation Affairs Department.[5] The quotes presented below are taken from the English version.
Many of the claims presented in the document are identical to those made by the Palestinians immediately after the conclusion of the Camp David summit. However, a comparison between the new narrative and statements made by senior Palestinian leaders a year ago shows different emphases on issues and some discrepancies between versions.
The Refugee Issue The Palestinian Information Ministry document establishes that "the Palestinians… seek… to secure the right of Palestinian refugees to return to the homes they were forced to leave in 1948. Although Palestinian negotiators have been willing to accommodate legitimate Israeli needs [in the Hebrew version, the word "legitimate" does not appear]… it is up to Israel to define these needs and to propose the narrowest possible means of addressing them."
Further down, the document raises a question of principle on the refugees issue: "Isn't it unreasonable for the Palestinians to demand the unlimited right of return to Israel of all Palestinian refugees?"
The answer the PA offered is as follows: "The refugees were never seriously discussed at Camp David, because Prime Minister Barak declared that Israel bore no responsibility for the refugee problem or its solution. Obviously, there can be no comprehensive resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict without resolving one of its key components: the plight of the Palestinian refugees. There is a clearly recognized right under international law that non-combatants who flee during a conflict have the right to return after the conflict is over. But an Israeli recognition of the right of return does not mean that all the refugees will exercise that right. What is needed in addition to recognition is the concept of choice [in Hebrew, ‘the consolidation of options'; in Arabic, ‘the freedom of choice']. Many refugees may opt for: 1) resettlement in third countries; 2) resettlement in a newly independent Palestinian state; 3) normalization of their legal status in their hosting countries. In addition, the right of return may be implemented in phases, so as to address Israel's demographic concerns."
Return to Israel or a Choice of Options In the revised document, the Palestinians claim that at Camp David their position was that the refugees be given the right to choose between four options, one of which was to be resettled in the new Palestinian state.
However, in November 2000, Abu Mazen said that the Palestinians had opposed this at the Camp David summit and had demanded a return to Israel proper only. "It should be noted in this matter," he wrote in an article in the London daily Al-Hayyat, "and this is also what we clarified to the Israelis, that the right of return means a return to Israel, not to a Palestinian state, because the territory of the Palestinian Authority, which will in the future be the State of Palestine, was not a [body] that expelled refugees, but [a body] that absorbed them. Not a single refugee is from Gaza, Hebron, or Nablus. All the residents of these cities remained, and absorbed refugees from the neighbor[ing area]. Up to 70% of Gaza residents are refugees, as are 40% of West Bank residents. Therefore, when we talk of the right of return, we are referring to the return of refugees to Israel, because it is [Israel] that expelled them and because their property is there…"[6]
The Right of Return: Principle Versus Implementation The Palestinian Information Ministry account of Camp David states that while the principle of return must be absolute, there can be flexibility on the part of the Palestinians regarding the implementation of that right, both on the timeline – "the right of return may be implemented in phases, so as to address Israel's demographic concerns" – and geographically, since many refugees may prefer other options to a return to Israel. This emphasis, on the "right" and the "principle" of return, as distinct from its practical implementation as per various models, has been a long-standing and recurrent theme in the statements of senior Palestinians, and even more so since the summit.
However, during the Camp David negotiations and afterwards at Taba, the principle went hand in hand with the implementation. Abu Mazen clarified that "the Palestinian delegation [to Camp David] refused to set a limit on the number of refugees that would be allowed to return – even if they [the Israelis] were to offer us [to allow a return of] three million refugees… This is because we wanted them to recognize the principle, and then we will come to an agreement on a timetable for the refugees' return, or for compensation for those who do not wish to return."[7]
Saeb Ereqat said in interviews with the Palestinian dailies Al-Hayat Al-Jadida and Al-Ayyam that the proposal on the refugees was rejected because it "left the door open to implementation without time limit, an implementation that could take just about forever."[8]
Yet Nabil Sha'ath, who was also present at Camp David and later on conducted the negotiations on the refugee issue at Taba, said, "At Taba we did not change a single line of the position paper we presented at Camp David… We said that recognition of Resolution [194] was not enough for us and that even recognition of the absolute right of return is not enough for us without the inclusion of a mechanism of implementation and international guarantees for implementation, as set forth in the UN resolutions. That is, I can't be happy just because they say beautiful words to me… my worries must be addressed with a mechanism of implementation. For example, how would a refugee apply for return? How can I guarantee his return? If the refugee returns, how can we guarantee that he gets his house back? And if he returns, how can we guarantee that he will be able to bring his family? Will the entire clan return, and if so how? We are discussing these details in order to ensure their implementation."[9]
[1] The New York Times, July 8, 2001.
[2] Al-Ahram (Egypt), August 2, 2001.
[3] Al-Ayyam (Palestinian Authority), July
28, 2001 (Part I); July 29 2001 (Part II). Also see Special Dispatch 249 &
250 for more on Abu Mazen.
[4] English:
www.minfo.gov.ps/issues/camp_david­_II.HTM ; Arabic:
www.minfo.gov.ps/issues/camp_david_II_arabic.htm
[5] www.nad-plo.org/eye/newsH40.html
[6] Al-Hayat (London-Beirut), November 23,
and 24, 2000.
[7] Al-Ayyam (Palestinian Authority), July
30, 2000.
[8] From: www.nad-plo.org/david/diaries/html
[9] Al-Ayyam (Palestinian Authority),
February 3, 2001.
Last edited by Sirotnikov on 05-04-2002 at 00:19
|
|
|  |
 |
|
Sirotnikov
|
 |
<--- Yes, It's a "kitty" in a boot.
Feb 2000 time: 07:18
|
|
The (Revised) Palestinian Account of Camp David Part II: Jerusalem and Territorial Withdrawal By: Yotam Feldner*
Jerusalem The Palestinian Information Ministry addressed the Israeli proposal on Jerusalem at Camp David as follows: "The [Israeli] proposals at Camp David demanded that the Palestinians relinquish every claim [in Arabic: 'all the rights'] to the occupied parts of Jerusalem. The proposal would require the Palestinians to recognize the Israeli annexation of all of Arab East Jerusalem."
The document further states: "In talks after Camp David, it was suggested that Israel was prepared to allow Palestinians sovereignty over isolated Palestinian neighborhoods in the heart of East Jerusalem, however such neighborhoods would remain surrounded by illegal Israeli colonies and separated not only from each other, but also from the rest of the Palestinian state. In effect, such a proposal would create Palestinian ghettos in the heart of Jerusalem."
The document's central claim, therefore, is that any sovereignty in East Jerusalem was proposed to the Palestinians only in talks held after the Camp David summit. While at the summit itself what was proposed was, in fact, the Israeli annexation of the entire eastern part of the city, which is why there is no wonder that the Palestinians rejected the proposal.
Yet this claim contradicts statements by senior Palestinians after the end of the summit. Although the Jerusalem proposals at Camp David were obviously not satisfactory to the Palestinians, they did offer some Palestinian sovereignty in the eastern part of the city. Abu Mazen himself said that "once, they talked about [Palestinian] sovereignty over the villages surrounding Jerusalem, autonomy in the neighborhoods outside the [Old City] walls, and special status inside the walls; another time, they talked about [Palestinian] sovereignty over the neighborhoods outside the walls, autonomy in the surrounding villages, and special status for the neighborhoods within the walls."[1]
During the summit too, the Americans put forth a proposal to divide the Old City so that the Jewish and Armenian quarters would be under Israeli sovereignty and the Christian and Muslim quarters would be under Palestinian sovereignty. Barak did not reject this proposal. The Palestinians were unwilling to recognize any Israeli sovereignty whatsoever in the Old City area. Saeb Ereqat said about this proposal: "Clinton said that the Palestinians would have full sovereignty over the Muslim and Christian quarters; as for the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound, the [UN] Security Council will take a decision to hand it over to Palestine and Morocco, the chair of the Jerusalem Committee, while Israel maintains full sovereignty over it."[2]
President Clinton's advisor Robert Malley himself determined that "in Jerusalem, Palestine would have been given sovereignty over the many Arab neighborhoods of the eastern half [of the city], and over the Muslim and Christian quarters of the Old City."[3] Malley stated that the Palestinians refused because of Israel's demand for sovereignty over Al-Haram Al-Sharif. Indeed, the disagreement at Camp David centered on the question of the Temple Mount and of what came to be called the "holy basin."
When the Palestinian leaders left the summit, they did not claim that they had been offered no sovereignty over East Jerusalem. They said they had rejected the proposal because of Israel's various claims to the Al-Aqsa compound, because of its uncompromising demand for sovereignty over the Western Wall, and because of its demand for sovereignty in the Armenian quarter. According to Saeb Ereqat, Arafat said: "I will not agree to Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem, in the Armenian quarter, over the Al Aqsa Mosque, in the Via Dolorosa, or over the Church of the Holy Sepulcher."[4] Recently, Arafat also said that according to the Camp David proposal, the Israelis "would take over the churches and the Armenian quarter. I told them, 'My name is Arafatian,' to indicate my affiliation with the Armenian ethnic group and [my commitment] to the protection of their rights."[5]
Therefore, it can be said that the Israeli and American proposals at Camp David were not compatible with the minimum demands set out by the Palestinians. But it would be wrong to claim that at issue was Israel's annexation of "all Arab East Jerusalem," as the Palestinian Information Ministry claims.
A Change of Tact in Palestinian Public Relations The section on Jerusalem in the Palestinian Information Ministry account reflects the Palestinian leadership's attempt to retroactively change its image with regard to its position at the Camp David summit. The document makes no mention of the bone of contention – Al-Haram Al-Sharif, an issue that was discussed for many days.
When the Palestinian leadership left the Camp David summit, it enumerated three main reasons why it found the Israeli proposal unacceptable: its affront to the sanctity of Jerusalem, its impingement on the just rights of the refugees, and its insult to rights, honor, and justice with regard to the territorial issue. Obviously, all these claims were in the emotional and symbolic sphere.
The Western world found it difficult (and still does) to accept emotional and symbolic claims, especially when they are contrasted with what was viewed as Prime Minister Barak's slaughter of all Israel's sacred cows and his compromise on all Israel's symbols in favor of what he conceived as a realistic solution. The West found it even harder to comprehend the Palestinians' clinging to emotional and symbolic themes against the backdrop of the renewed bloodshed.
When Arafat returned from Camp David, a mass rally was held in Gaza City in his honor. "Jerusalem is all Jerusalem, not only the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, Al-Haram, or the Armenian quarter," he declared, adding that "anyone who doesn't like it should go drink from the Dead Sea."[6] The world refused to accept this attitude, and labeled him rejectionist.
Hanan Ashrawi, who was recently appointed Arab League spokeswoman, acknowledged that the Palestinians' handling of the international media was "shocking" and "catastrophic," and that this was why Barak had managed to convince the world that Arafat was to blame. "The Palestinian leaders spoke to the UN as if they were talking to a bunch of Palestinians on the street in Gaza,"[7] she said.
The Palestinians' growing awareness of the damage to their image following the Camp David summit led to a change of tact in PR efforts, which now began to focus on realistic arguments.
Now, the Palestinians are claiming that the proposal at Camp David was rejected because it was not "viable" – not because it violated "just" and "sacred" rights, and not because it was an affront to the honor of the Palestinians. Al-Haram Al-Sharif, the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, the Western Wall, the Wailing Wall, the Al-Burraq Wall, Arafat's denial that a Jewish Temple ever existed on the site, and the discussion of questions such as whether Jews would be permitted to blow the shofar at the Western Wall plaza or whether Arab donkey traffic would be allowed only before a certain hour in the morning – all these issues are not to be found in the Palestinian Information Ministry document. Instead, a single term appeared again and again: viability.
The Camp David proposal, "denied the Palestinian state viability and independence"; "such a Palestinian state would have had less sovereignty and less viability than the Bantustans created by the South African apartheid regime." The Palestinians "seek to establish a viable and sovereign state on their own territory"; and "no people can be expected to compromise fundamental rights or the viability of their state."
This shift in image and PR is also evident in the question of the size of the area on which the Palestinian state is to be established. The Palestinians are now demanding 100% of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, seeing this as the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 242. This is documented in countless statements, including one by Abu Mazen, who once said, "I will cut off my hand if it signs an agreement in which even one centimeter of Palestinian territory conquered in 1967 is missing."[8] As a conciliatory move, the Palestinians declared their willingness to accept a limited swap of territories equal in size and quality, so that the total area of their state would be equal to 100% of the area of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Such was their position at Camp David, and it remains their position today.
After the Camp David summit, it became accepted by the international community that the Palestinians had been offered a state on the territory of the Gaza Strip and 95% of the West Bank. This figure was mentioned also by a number of senior Palestinian leaders, among them Faisal Husseini who in March 2001 said: "Barak agreed to withdraw from 95% of the Palestinian lands occupied before 1967… If we undermine Sharon and his [promised] security, no one else will be able to conduct a dialogue with us that does not start where Barak left off – that is, our right to 95% of the territory."[9]
However, now there is a Palestinian consensus that the Camp David proposal concerned only over 91% of the West Bank being handed over to the Palestinians and an additional percentage be granted to Israel for a long-term lease, as Malley sets forth in his New York Times article. Yet the Palestinian Information Ministry does not present any figure for the size of the state offered to the Palestinians. Instead, it focuses on the parts that Israel seeks to keep for itself, i.e. the annexation of some 9% of the West Bank in exchange for 1% in a land swap. "However," the Information Ministry emphasizes, "the question is not one of percentages. It is a question of the independence and viability of the state." According to the new Palestinian PR strategy, Israel's holding on to parts of the West Bank damages the viability of the Palestinian state, rather than impinges upon the just rights of the Palestinians according to the Palestinian interpretation of Resolution 242. *Yotam Feldner is MEMRI's Director of Media Analysis.
[1] Al-Hayat (London-Beirut), November 23, and 24, 2000.
[2] From: www.nad-plo.org/david/diaries/html.
[3] The New York Times, July 8, 2001.
[4] Al-Hayat Al-Jadida (Palestinian Authority), August 12, 2000.
[5] Al-Ahram (Egypt), August 2, 2000.
[6] Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, (Palestinian Authority), July 28, 2000.
[7] Al-Qahira (Egypt), August 21, 2001.
8] Al-Quds (Palestinian Authority) November 11, 1998.
[9] Al-Safir (Lebanon), March 21, 2001.
|
|
|  |
 |
|  |
 |
|
Sirotnikov
|
 |
<--- Yes, It's a "kitty" in a boot.
Feb 2000 time: 07:18
|
|
The (Revised) Palestinian Account of Camp David Part III: The Palestinian Strategic Goals By: Yotam Feldner*
The Palestinian Information Ministry document also addresses a question that was not included in the Camp David negotiations. "Have the Palestinians abandoned the two-state solution and do they now insist on all of historic Palestine?"
The Information Ministry's answer is: "The current situation has undoubtedly hardened positions on both sides with extremists in both Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories claiming all of historic Palestine. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that the PA or the majority of Palestinians have abandoned the two-state solution. The two-state solution however is most seriously threatened by the ongoing construction of Israeli colonies and bypass roads aimed at incorporating the Occupied Palestinian Territories into Israel. Without a halt to such construction, a two-state solution may simply be impossible to implement – already prompting a number of Palestinian academics and intellectuals to argue that Israel will never allow the Palestinians to have a viable state and Palestinians should instead focus their efforts on obtaining equal rights as Israeli citizens." (In the Hebrew version: "That is, to strive towards a democratic bi-national state.")
What Is the Palestinian Position?
A statement in an official Palestinian Information Ministry document saying that "there is no evidence" that the Palestinian Authority and most Palestinians have abandoned the two-state solution is strange. One could have expected that the ministry would set out an official position favoring two states, instead of using negative language, i.e. "there is no evidence…" – as if it were merely making an observation about the Palestinian Authority position.
The demand for "all of historic Palestine," attributed in the document to both Palestinian and Israeli extremists, is a long-standing ideological and religious claim that has not arisen from "the current situation."
Ideas of a "bi-national state," "a state of all its citizens," and a "secular democratic state" are also not new; they are based on ideology not on settlements, bypass roads, or despair because "Israelis will never allow the Palestinians to have a viable state." Intellectuals such as Edward Said and Azmi Bishura, and those who share their opinions in the PA territories had presented such ideas as an alternative to the Oslo Accords at the time of their signing, not as a result of their failure.
Moreover, there is enthusiastic support in PA circles for the various models of a bi-national state, primarily among the old guard. Even though these positions are not voiced by Arafat or by members of the Palestinian negotiating team, they are not restricted to academics and independent intellectuals, or to Islamic extremists.
Thus, for example, Faysal Al-Husseini, reiterated his position on the matter several times. For example, during a speech in Lebanon, he said, "A distinction must be drawn between the strategic aspirations of the Palestinian people, who are unwilling to relinquish a single speck of Palestinian territory, and [their] political striving, connected to the balance of power and the nature of the current international system… Our eyes will continue to be lifted to the strategic goal - that is, a Palestine from the river to the sea – [and] what we take today cannot make us forget this supreme truth."[1]
Fateh Central Committee member Sakhr Habash recently adopted a similar approach in a speech on Arafat's behalf: "If a democratic state is not established on all this land, peace will not be realized. We are now in the interim stages, through which we can make the Zionist society rid itself of Zionism. Zionism cannot coexist with the national Palestinian movement, and these Jews must rid themselves of the Zionism that takes them over and casts them into battles that do not serve their interests. They must be citizens of the state of the future – the democratic state of Palestine."[2]
Palestinian Minister of Supplies in the PA Cabinet, Abu Ali Shahin, declared several times that "the Oslo agreement was a precursor… The Palestinian Authority is a precursor of the Palestinian state, and the Palestinian state will be a precursor to the liberation of all Palestinian lands"; "We still insist on implementing what [the PLO] was established for on January 1, 1965, and the negotiation process is only a way station… we anticipate the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state in which Muslims, Christians, and Jews will live"; "The Fateh movement still adheres to the plan of January 1, 1965"; "the Oslo Accords will not be the end of the road. The Palestinian state is a transitional state, on the way to the great humane solution…"[3]
The New Palestinian Position on Camp David's Failure The Information Ministry document states that Ehud Barak is to blame for the failure of the Camp David summit and the peace process. "What decisively undermined Palestinian support for the peace process," it states, "was the way Israel presented its proposal. Prior to entering into the first negotiations on permanent status issues, Prime Minister Barak publicly and repeatedly threatened Palestinians that his 'offer' would be Israel's best and final offer and if not accepted, Israel would seriously consider 'unilateral separation' (a euphemism for imposing a settlement rather than negotiating one). The Palestinians felt that they had been betrayed by Israel, who had committed itself at the beginning of the Oslo process to ending its occupation of Palestinian lands in accordance with UN Resolutions tack 242 and 338."
The Palestinian claim is not presented as a retrospective account after nearly a year of mini-war between the parties, but as the reality at the time the Camp David talks ended in July 2000, a reality which stemmed from Barak's declarations prior to the summit.
However, the Palestinian leaders' statements at the time reflected no sense of predestined failure. Then, they stated that the summit had not been a failure at all; on the contrary, it was a stunning success: "Contrary to the opinions of the many pundits who were not even there, Camp David was not a failure," wrote Saeb Ereqat in The Washington Post a week after the summit.[4] "Camp David was an important, even historic, step in the 52-year effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. As someone who has been involved in negotiations since the 1992 Madrid Middle East Peace Conference, I can state categorically that Palestinians and Israelis are [now] closer to a comprehensive peace agreement than ever before. The end of our conflict is truly in sight. I say it without underestimating the gaps that still exist between the two sides on all issues."
In a Palestinian Television interview, Abu Mazen added his voice to Ereqat's albeit with slightly less enthusiasm: "I consider the Camp David summit a success in that it brought about an understanding of all the final status issues among the sides."[5]
In addition, it should be noted that the Palestinian Information Ministry document, which states that Barak was at fault for the summit's failure because of his threats of unilateral separation, disregards the fact that threats of unilateral actions were voiced by both sides. As early as 1996, Arafat began setting target dates for the unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state. Before and after the Camp David summit, the Palestinian and international press was full of declarations by Arafat and PLO heads that the state would be declared unilaterally, this time on September 13, 2000.
Conclusion The Palestinian positions on the various elements of the final status agreement have not changed in the thirteen months since the Camp David summit. The only thing that has changed is the way in which the Palestinian positions during the summit are presented. This change is in accordance with the Palestinians' realization that in the international arena they are considered to be responsible for the summit's failure. In the revised Palestinian version of Camp David, the summit has been transformed from a "stunning success" to a failure. The "nobody is to blame" position stated by Saeb Ereqat right after the summit has turned into "Barak is to blame now." Israel's consent to Palestinian sovereignty over parts of East Jerusalem has been turned into an Israeli demand for sovereignty over all of East Jerusalem. The insult to Palestinians' sacred and just rights has turned into "non-viability" of the Palestinian state; and the resolute Palestinian demand for the return of refugees to Israel has turned into a claim that the Palestinians had agreed to "a choice" between options.
The corrosive effect of time on memory is not the issue here. It appears that the new Palestinian position derives from the need to adjust past positions to present political needs. At the summit's conclusion, Arafat needed to prove to the Arabs that he had resisted all pressures and had fought uncompromisingly. In contrast, Barak passed up an opportunity to entrench himself in the domestic political arena for the sake of political gains in the international arena, and paid for it by losing power.
Today, after nearly a year of violence, no one in the Palestinian street has any doubt about Arafat's loyalty to the cause, but his international status has seriously weakened. The Palestinian Information Ministry has changed tacks accordingly.
[1] Al-Safir (Lebanon), March 21, 2001; also see MEMRI Special Dispatch 197.
[2] Al-Hayat Al-Jadida (Palestinian Authority), January 30, 2001.
[3] Respectively, Al-Hayat Al-Jadida
(Palestinian Authority) January 4, 1998; Al Ayyam (Palestinian Authority), July
27, 1997; Al Ayyam (Palestinian Authority), December 31, 1997; Al Quds (Palestinian Authority) November 15, 2000.
[4] Washington Post, August 5, 2000.
[5] July 29, 2000, from the Web site of the Palestinian negotiating team: www.nad-plo.org/speeches/abumazen3.html
|
|
|  |
 |
|
Sirotnikov
|
 |
<--- Yes, It's a "kitty" in a boot.
Feb 2000 time: 07:18
|
|
"The Intifada of Al-Aqsa" - Roots and Goals
October 11, 2000
By Yigal Carmon and Yotam Feldner*
The Camp David Summit ended with a Palestinian rejection of the American proposal for shared sovereignty over Jerusalem in general and over the Temple Mount in particular. Following this rejection, President Clinton placed full responsibility for the failure on PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. This resulted in a major change in the political stature of both Israel and the PLO in the eyes of the international community. While Barak was praised for his courageous peace initiatives, Arafat faced difficulties even in states that traditionally supported the Palestinian cause. Now, in France, South Africa, China, and Russia and throughout the world, leaders will not support a Palestinian unilateral declaration of an independent state.
Because of the shift in the international position towards Israel, the PLO realized that it had reached the limit of its possible achievements in the current political process. Worse, even the unilateral declaration of an independent Palestinian state (UDI) - Arafat's immediate and long awaited goal - had lost international support. Arafat found himself at a dead end.
The PLO's Dual Strategy
The PLO had prepared for this stage. From the outset of the Oslo process, PLO spokesmen stated that the PLO would take a political course as long as it continued to bear fruit. But when a dead end was reached, the PLO would turn to the military option in order to continue to advance its basic goals: an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 line, the establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, and the implementation of the Palestinians' right of return.
As early as January 1996, PA Minister of Planning and International Cooperation Nabil Sha'ath stated in a symposium in Nablus: "We decided to liberate our homeland step by step... this is the strategy... we say: 'should Israel continue – no problem. And so we honor the peace treaties and non-violence, so long as the agreements are fulfilled step-by-step. [But] if and when Israel says 'enough,' namely, 'we will not discuss Jerusalem, we will not return refugees, we will not dismantle settlements, we will not withdraw to the borders,' in that case it is saying that we will return to violence. But this time it will be with 30,000 armed Palestinian soldiers and in a land with elements of freedom. I am the first to call for it. If we reach a dead end we will go back to our war and struggle like we did forty years ago."[I]
In most of his public speeches and interviews, Arafat stated that "all options are open," a slogan that became a permanent motif in the declarations of PLO spokesmen throughout the years. "No one believed him when he used to say it, " said Nabil Sha'ath, "but in fact throughout the period in which we conducted negotiations, three Intifadas took place. This one is indeed the most important... [but] the Palestinian people did not cease throughout the seven years of negotiations [since Oslo] from carrying out Intifadas against Israel and stating its positions by means other than the negotiating table."
"The choice," explained Sha'ath, "is not at all between options of negotiation and fighting: You can have negotiations and fight at the same time... the Palestinian people fight with weapons, with jihad, with Intifadas and suicide actions... and it is destined to always fight and negotiate at the same time."[1]
But in the aftermath of Camp David, the PLO needed an excuse to begin violent pressure, in order not to be viewed by international public opinion as the initiator of violence. The excuse was found when Likud leader Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount. And indeed, the international community accepted the Palestinian version about the causes for the outbreak of violence, and world leaders criticized the "provocative visit" - a position which was also echoed in the UN Security Council resolution.
Preparations for Violence
However, in public statements before the end of the Camp David summit, high-ranking PLO officials betrayed their feeling that the time for the "military option" was nearing. A senior PA security official, told the Israeli Arab paper Kul Al-Arab, "The Palestinian people are in a state of emergency in view of the failure [to achieve an agreement] at Camp David... The next Intifada will be much more severe and violent than the first - the official forewarned - since the Palestinian people [have] weapons enabling it to defend themselves in a confrontation with the Israeli army."[2]
The following week, the same source announced that, "The popular recruitment in the PA's territories has significantly increased, and a Palestinian Liberation Army was established under the Fatah leadership. The PA has already distributed weapons to the citizens and is supervising training and preparation for the possible confrontation with the forces of the Israeli occupation."[3]
As early as the beginning of July, the Director-General of the PA Ministry of Information, Hasan Al-Khashef instructed the Palestinians: "If all the households are turned into storage houses to secure the residents' basic needs, this will lift a heavy burden off the leaderships' shoulders, since it will allow it to focus on the chief and necessary challenges that it will inevitably face."[4]
The failure of the Camp David Summit heightened the awareness among Palestinian officials that the violence was getting closer. Hasan 'Asfur stated that "The failure to reach a final agreement will force the Palestinians to opt for military action"[5] including inside Israel proper.[II] PA Justice Minister Freih Abu Middein went even further, and warned that "Violence is around the corner, and the Palestinians are willing to sacrifice even 5,000 casualties."[6]
The Political Goals of the Intifada
The PLO hopes to translate the violence into political achievements. Its primary, constant and ultimate goal is Israel's withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 borderline and the realization of the right of return for Palestinian refugees. But it also has the intermediate goal of declaring an independent state. To support these objectives the PLO is pursuing an interim goal: internationalization of the Palestinian problem through the deployment of international forces to "protect the Palestinians." This would deprive Israel of its sovereignty and may improve Palestinian opportunities for a UDI. The PLO's demand for an international committee to investigate the reasons for the outbreak of violence is the first step in this direction.
"I believe that today we are no longer talking about going back to negotiations," Nabil Sha'ath states. "Now we are talking about the need for an Israeli withdrawal and about the need to end the occupation. If there are going to be negotiations, they must be determined by international legitimacy, namely withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 borderline and the return of the refugees."[7]
The PLO hopes to reach this immediate goal by conducting negotiations at the same time that it orchestrates and escalates the violence. Consequently, Palestinian leaders are increasingly making public statements that the violence is PLO policy and constitutes a part of the PLO's negotiating strategy. In a symposium in Ramallah, PA Finance Minister Muhammad Al-Nashashibi said, "The Intifada will continue until the achievement of our national goals."[8]
PLO representative in Washington, Hassan Abd Al-Rahman clarified the PLO's policies: "The Intifada is a means of popular struggle in which all parts of the people take part in order to realize the internationally recognized legitimate rights of the Palestinian people... This is the goal of the Intifada... The use of violence, the struggle and martyrdom... used by people to achieve their rights."[9]
The Struggle for World Public Opinion during the Intifada
Parallel to the battle on the ground, and integral to the PLO's goal of internationalizing the conflict, is the struggle for the support of world public opinion. The diplomatic success that Israel's Prime Minister initially achieved at Camp David assisted Israel in its struggle to win over international public opinion. But the pictures of Palestinian casualties neutralized this success.
"The only way to impose our conditions," explained the Director-General of the PA Ministry of Information, "is inevitably with our blood. Without it, the world would lose interest in our cause. Consequently, the continuation of the popular confrontation is of an urgent necessity... the force of the Intifada is our only power... our national duty is to continue the confrontation, the Intifada and martyrdom, so that our martyrs and our injured will not be in vain, and the Intifada of Al-Aqsa will be the gate to independence and liberty."[10]
Escalating the Violence
The head of the Fatah organization in the West Bank, Marwan Al-Barghuthi, stated, "The Intifada should be continued and escalated."[11] Al-Barghuthi even reorganized his Fatah 'Tanzim' armed men in Nablus into a new militia that in order to create the appearance that Fatah is not responsible for the continuation of the violence. Additionally, the PA released 60 Hamas and Islamic Jihad members, who may engage in terrorist acts that would then not be attributed to the PA. The field leadership of the Fatah also seeks to continue the use of violence. The October 9, 2000 Flyer No. 1 of the "United National Leadership of the Intifada," which was recently re-established, prepared the Palestinian public for a long-term confrontation: "The blessed Intifada is a strategic choice for the liberation of our lands from the Zionist occupation and it is not a temporary thing."
Conclusion
The Palestinian use of violence after the failure of the Camp David summit gained the PLO a public relations advantage, but no political achievements. While Israel has been criticized for its use of force, this has not translated into international support for the PLO's goals. The PLO is being pressured to halt the violence but has not been promised any political returns for doing so. Barak, who will have difficulty meeting Arafat as long as violence continues, nevertheless stated that he is willing to do so. Barak also withheld the seemingly inevitable creation of a national emergency government in order not to be held responsible for the failure of the peace process. The PLO, on the other hand, which is withholding its consent for a summit with Clinton and Barak, is again perceived as the party rejecting peace and insisting on continuing the violence.
*Yigal Carmon is President of MEMRI. Yotam Feldner is MEMRI's Director of Media Analysis
[I] A speech in Nablus, January 1996. MEMRI has this speech on videotape. In September 1996, the PLO employed this strategy when it used the opening of the Western Wall Tunnel to force Netanyahu to meet with Arafat and to carry out the Hebron agreement.
[II] Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, (PA) August 16, 2000. The Gaza Chief of Preventive Security, Muhammad Dakhlan, even warned, "If an agreement is not reached, and the confrontation with the occupation [forces] ensues, anyone who thinks that the confrontation with us will be an easy one is engaged in wishful thinking. Our ability to react is better than it was during the Beirut days. We have the ability to affect daily life in Israel... We will achieve a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, even if it is by blood." Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, August 16, 2000.
[1] An interview with ANN television, London. October 7, 2000.
[2] Kul Al-Arab,(Israel) July 14, 2000.
[3] Kul Al-Arab, July 21, 2000.
[4] Al-Ayyam, (PA) July 24, 2000.
[5] Al-Quds Al-Arabi (London), August 24, 2000.
[6] Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, (PA) August 24, 2000
[7] ANN television, (London) October 7, 2000.
[8] Al-Ayyam, October 10, 2000.
[9] TV MBC, October 10, 2000.
[10] Al-Ayyam, October 3, 2000.
[11] Al-Jazeera TV, (Qatar) October 11, 2000.
|
|
|  |
 |
|
Sirotnikov
|
 |
<--- Yes, It's a "kitty" in a boot.
Feb 2000 time: 07:18
|
|
quote: Originally posted by chegitz guevara
The resolution to let them into the UN was contingent upon them letting the Palestinians back in to Israel. |
Seriously?

source/
quote: Oslo Peace Accords. |
They also state that the PA will figh terrorism, while infact they created more of it.
Read the article I posted.
Here's what Arafat has to say about the Oslo accords:
quote: "We chose the 'Peace of the Brave' out of faith in [the conduct of] the Prophet in the 'Hudaybiyeh Agreement.'* We adopted this agreement, the 'Agreement of the Brave.' Whoever thinks he can 'play' with us regarding the 'Agreement of the Brave,' should know that we are a people of giants... A people of giants."
- 'Fatah' conference on November 15, 1998
* - This agreement was a ten year truce signed between the Prophet Muhammad and the Qureish tribe in 637, Muhammad violated the agreement 18 months later and occupied Mecca.
|
quote: (BTW Siro, In read all those on the links you provided.) |
You will? or will not?? I don't get the spelling sorry 
quote: Dalgetti, the PLO did live up to its peace agreement with Israel prior to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Hence the need of Israel to invade, the PLO was gaining legitmacy. |
That was a cease fire agreement, and the Israeli ambassador to somwhere was killed the day before.
|
|
|  |
 |
|
chegitz guevara
|
 |
Ft. Lauderdale, FL Communist Party of Apolyton
Jun 2000 time: 00:18
|
|
quote: Originally posted by Sirotnikov
Seriously?

source/ |
UN Resolution 194 para (11).
quote: Resolved that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation for the property of those choosing not to return and for the loss of property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made by the Governments or authorities responsible. |
It's that part that's italicized that's the loophole for Israel.
From, How Israel Was Won, p99.
quote: Israel's admission to UN membersheip was partly contingent on acceptance of resolution 194 and Israel pledge to enforce it.24 Israel also signed the 1949 Lausanne Protocl asserting that the original UN plan calling for a Palestinian state -- a potential homeland for Arab refugees -- was a basis for peace negotiations.25
24. General Assembly Res. 273 (III), UN Doc. A/818 and Doc. s/1093 (1949) The Arab countries would not accept Resolution 194 because they viewed it as a recognition of Israel's right to exist. Flapan, Birth of Israel, 218.
25. Shlaim, Collusion [across the Jordan], 469; Flapan, Birth of Israel, 214. |
|
|
|  |
 |
|  |
 |
|
Sirotnikov
|
 |
<--- Yes, It's a "kitty" in a boot.
Feb 2000 time: 07:18
|
|
Abu Mazen discusses Jerusalem and the Refugees
In an article published by the London-based pan-Arabic daily Al-Hayat, Secretary-General of the PLO Executive Committee, Mahmoud Abbas, aka Abu Mazen revealed some details of the Camp David negotiations over Jerusalem and the refugees. Following are excerpts from the article:
Jerusalem
"...In Camp David... the Israelis and Americans were releasing test-balloons regarding solutions to the Jerusalem issues...."
"In all of their proposals, they spoke of annexing more than one quarter within the walls; they focused on the Armenian quarter, assuming that [the annexation to Israel of] the Jewish quarter was a given."
"We categorically rejected all of these proposals, and so they dropped, the bomb of their demand for sovereignty over the Al-Haram [the Temple Mount], claiming that the remains of Solomon's Temple are in its square or directly underneath the Al-Haram Al-Sharif itself. They also demanded praying privileges in the Al-Haram for a set number of people per day or per week."
"We rejected this as well, but we agreed that they could pray next to the [Wailing] Wall, without acknowledging any Israeli sovereignty over it. We relied on the resolution of Britain's 1929 Shaw Commission. The Commission acknowledged that the Wall belongs to the Muslim Waqf, while the Jews are allowed to pray by it as long as they do not use a Shofar."[1]
"After the summit they demanded, through mediators, to establish a small synagogue in Al-Haram's square and said that they would be satisfied with that. When their proposal was rejected, they proposed that a Muslim state establish an installation on Temple Mount, part of which would be used by the Jews as a synagogue. However, we rejected this proposal as well."
"Afterwards, they proposed that the sovereignty [over the Temple Mount] be [given] to God and that neither side demand proprietorship. We rejected this proposal because God is sovereign of the Universe in its entirety; why, then, should His sovereignty be established specifically in this case? In fact, they wanted to establish it specifically in this case so that the sovereignty would return to them, since they, in their view, are the closest to God out of all the world's nations [i.e. 'the Chosen People']."
"Israel operates in such a way in order to indicate to its adversary or enemy that any demands of it are futile... it tries to cause its enemy or adversary to doubt his own rights and his ability to achieve them..."
"Some believed that erasing the [Israeli] 'redline' or 'taboo' on the issue of Jerusalem is a victory for us... the truth is that Israel has no objection to opening up taboo issues in order to feel the other side's pulse. Thus, they create an impression that it is Israel that makes concessions and demonstrates flexibility, so that the other side is expected to answer in kind and begin the process of compromising..."
"Therefore, whatever achievements we may gain [by the erasing Israeli taboos], we will end up the losers, because it is merely a negotiating maneuver which cannot be perceived as a [Palestinian] victory or achievement..."
"Our position on the issue of Jerusalem is simple: Jerusalem is part of the territories occupied in 1967 and, hence, Resolution 242 applies to it. Jerusalem must return to our sovereignty and we will establish our capital on it. We have no objection that East and West Jerusalem will be open to one another and cooperate in municipal activities."
The Refugee Problem
"The issue of the refugees was at least as important as the Jerusalem issue, and judging by the results, maybe even more important and difficult. We encountered, and will encounter in the future, fierce resistance on this subject from the Israeli government, because the bottom line is that [the return of refugees] means altering the demographic character [of Israel] that the Israelis hope to preserve. In addition, recognition by Israel of the existence of a refugee problem entails an acknowledgment of Israel's responsibility for this humanitarian tragedy."
"The refugee issue is an Israeli taboo and Barak's foremost redline. This is the most prominent issue on which there is an Israeli consensus: left, right and center, religious and secular, new immigrants and old. Therefore, all the doors to this difficult problem are locked... [In Israel's view] the Refugee Problem is an Arab and international affair in which Israel does not have the slightest interest. This is the Israeli rhetoric as we see, hear, and read in all their media and in their leaders' statements."
"...The Israelis say how the Palestinians left their homeland of their own volition and after a call [to leave] by Arab and Palestinian leaders, who wanted to annihilate Israel."
"If compensation is needed, Israel will be delighted to put up an international fund. It is even ready to participate in this fund in order to settle the refugees - outside of Israeli territory, of course - but Israel also states that there is a tragedy that is parallel to that of the Palestinian refugees: the tragedy of the Jewish [immigrants] from Arab countries. Israel claims that the international compensation should include these people and that the money should be divided equally between the Palestinians and the Jews..."
"We, on the other hand, claim the following: paragraph 2b. of Resolution 242 says that 'achieving a just settlement for the refugee problem' is necessary. There is no UN resolution dealing with the Refugee Problem other than General Assembly Resolution 194 from 1949 that states 'compensation should be paid [...] for those who choose not to return.' The right of return has priority and whoever does not wish it, may demand compensation. It is noteworthy that the US kept bringing this resolution up each year until it was nicknamed the "American baby resolution."
"Testimony by Israeli new historians prove that the main reason for the exile of the refugees was the premeditated massacres committed by the Zionist organizations in order to empty the land of its inhabitants..."
"Compensation should be paid by the Absentee's Property Fund that was founded by Israel in 1949 in order to invest the money of the Arab absentees whose property was stolen. Therefore, compensation should go to those who wish to return as well: compensation for the use of their lands and for their suffering for fifty years and more. Naturally, this compensation should also go to the refugee-hosting states: Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, and the PA."
When we entered the details of the number of refugees, the Israeli side claimed that no more than 150 thousand refugees left their homes. However, we confronted them with official international, and even Israeli, data. According to UN figures, the number of refugees who left their homes [in 1948] was 950 thousand, while official Israeli circles set the number at 750 thousand. Whatever the real number may be is irrelevant, since the question relates to the principle and the right.
[SIRO: A report by the UN Mediator on Palestine arrived at an even lower figure — 472,000
Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine,
Submitted to the Secretary-General for Transmission to the Members of the United Nations,
General Assembly Official Records: Third Session,
Supplement No.11 (A\648), Paris, 1948, p. 47 and Supplement No. 11A (A\689, and A\689\Add.1, p. 5.]
It is noteworthy in this matter, and this is also what we clarified to the Israelis, that the Right of Return means a return to Israel and not to the Palestinian State... When we talk about the Right of Return, we talk about the return of refugees to Israel, because Israel was the one who deported them and it is in Israel that their property is found..."[2]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] Although the violence erupted in August 1929, the Shaw Commission submitted its report in March 1930, and recommended an International Commission of Inquiry, which in its turn submitted its own report in December 1930. This report declared the Muslim Waqf as the proprietor of the Wailing Wall and stated that Jewish prayer arrangements should be in accordance with the status quo. The Ottoman status quo prohibited the use of the Shofar by the Jews.
[2] Al-Hayat (London-Beirut), November 23, 2000 part I, November 24, 2000 part II.
Last edited by Sirotnikov on 05-04-2002 at 04:08
|
|
|  |
 |
|
Sirotnikov
|
 |
<--- Yes, It's a "kitty" in a boot.
Feb 2000 time: 07:18
|
|
|
|
05-04-2002 03:54
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#90
|  |
|
Ah, one has to love those "Palestinian / Arab Studies"
|
Remove this text
|
|
The Arab Answer to "Schindler's List"
In 1983 the Syrian Minister of Defense, Field Marshal Mustafa Tlass, one of the pillars of the Syrian Ba'athist regime, wrote the book The Matzah of Zion in which he described the notorious Damascus Blood Libel of 1840. In that year, the leaders of the Jewish community in Damascus were accused of murdering a Christian priest, Toma [Al-Kabushi], and his servant, in order to use their blood in the baking of Passover Matzahs. Minister Tlass presented this accusation as a historical fact and even declared, in an interview with the German news magazine Der Spiegel, that his book is "an historical study... based on documents from France, Vienna and the American University in Beirut."[1]
Then US Secretary of State, George Schultz, instructed the American ambassador in Damascus to meet with Minister Tlass and to protest the publication of the book, but Tlass refused to meet with the American ambassador, claiming that he had "nothing to say to him."[2]
"Matzah of Zion" - the Movie
Eighteen years after the publication of the book, the Egyptian weekly Roz Al-Yussuf [3] reports that Egyptian producer, Munir Radhi is making a film adaptation of the book. He contacted the Syrian Minister of Defense to ask his permission. According to Roz Al-Yussuf Minister Tlass asked Radhi: "Aren't you afraid of what might happen to you... because the book openly accuses the Zionist movement of being behind the assassinations of people who exposed the Zionist conspiracy right from the start." Radhi responded that he was not afraid, and the project got on its way.
The script was written by Al-Sayyed Sa'id and by Palestinian writer, Hassan Sami Yussuf. Roz Al-Yussuf reported that the famous Egyptian actor, Omar Al-Sharif, best known for his role in Dr. Zhivago is a candidate for the lead role, and that two other Egyptian actors will appear in the film.
Minister Tlass and the producer signed a contract in which the Syrian Minister will receive 5% of the film's profits. Tlass committed to donating his earnings to the Palestinian Intifada.
The Goal: An Answer to Schindler's List
It has not yet been decided whether the film will have the same title as the book on which it is based, "The Matzah of Zion," or whether it will be changed to "Harari's List," after the name of the head of the Jewish community in Damascus who was accused of murdering Father Toma to use his blood for baking Matzahs.
The producer, Munir Radhi, explains that the primary goal of the film is "to respond to all of the Zionist films distributed by the American film industry, which is backed by the Zionist propaganda apparatus. Among these films is 'Schindler's List' which supports the idea of the Jews' right to the land of Palestine." Schindler's list, he explains, "contained the names of Jews who Schindler saved from the Nazis in order to send them to Palestine." Therefore, "'The Matzah of Zion' will deal with 'David Harari's List' which was prepared in 1840 in order to slaughter a group of people who early on exposed the Zionist conspiracy to take over Palestine."
The plot of "The Matzah of Zion," Roz Al-Yussuf continues, takes place in Damascus in 1840, and describes "Damascus' markets, demographic composition, and its dominant atmosphere of religious and ethnic tolerance." The plot is based on "the true story" of the murder of the priest Toma "who is portrayed in the film as an amiable character, who loved life and took part in the holidays and celebrations of the people of Damascus and solved their everyday problems."
According to the producer, although the film focuses "dramatically" on the crime against Father Toma, "the script will expose much more horrible things than this loathsome crime. The connection between Western colonialism and the Zionist movement, and the way in which the Jews were used in colonialist conspiracies," explains the producer, "will be exposed through documents found by the movie's heroes while they are investigating the murder of Father Toma."
[1] Der Spiegel (Germany), September 23, 1986.
[2] Der Spiegel (Germany), September 23, 1986.
[3] Roz Al-Yussuf (Egypt), February 24, 2001.
|
|
|  |
 |
|  |
All times are GMT. The time now is 05:18. Apolyton Time is 00:18. |
top of page
|
| archivepost |
|
Forum Rules:
You may not post new threads
You may not post replies
You may not post attachments
You may not edit your posts
|
HTML code is ON
vB code is ON
Smilies are ON
[IMG] code is ON
|
|
|
|
|
|