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David Floyd
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The bottom of a large bottle of beer
Jan 1970 time: 05:22
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quote: I'm suggesting a professional soldier. |
But for the officer to have any degree of competence, he would necessarily have to be Russian, from one of the NATO nations, Australian/New Zealander, Israeli, and POSSIBLY Chinese. Unfortunately, these nations do not make up the majority of the UN, and there's a very good chance the general who gets selected would be some guy who promoted himself during the revolution and is buddies with the tinpot dictator that runs the country. There are lots of tinpot dictators who are represented in the UN, remember.
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David Floyd
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The bottom of a large bottle of beer
Jan 1970 time: 05:22
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I think you're underestimated the political aspect of selecting someone to command. Lot's of UN nations wouldn't accept an American commander, and certainly not an Israeli one, even though those two nations probably have the best officer classes in the world.
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C0ckney
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Big Up The Macedonian Massive
Apr 2000 time: 05:22
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quote: Yes, that is a fairly major difficulty... |
and that's the problem. no country, or at least no country that counts, would support this. the fact is that any UN force would be paid for, equiped by and be made up of people from western nations, who would benefit least from such a force.
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Kontiki
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Canada
Aug 2001 time: 00:22
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In principle, a UN army is a good idea, but I can't see it working in practice. One of the biggest problems I see lies in the determination of when and how to react to any given situation. Do you make it based on a general vote in the GA (and then, simple majority, two-thirds...)? Do you still leave it up to the SC? The problem with the latter is that there is almost always a clash of opinions among the permanent members, unless the flashpoint is totally neutral for all parties (which, I guess, could be said about Rwanda). Overall, it boils down to the need for a RAPID reaction force, when decision making in the UN tends to be anything but rapid. The only way I can conceive to overcome this obstacle is to have a pre-established set of guidelines for when the force is deployed and, if the conditions are met, the force is activated automatically. However, can you imagine the nightmare (or impossibility, really) of having member nations draft such a set of guidelines? Further, can you imagine the number of instances where you'd get arguements of "yeah, but this situation is a little different"?
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MichaeltheGreat
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Apolyton Grand Executioner
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mooning the house that Ruth built.
Oct 1999 time: 21:22
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MacArthur was also wilfully blind to the capabilities of his enemy, and a grossly overrated tactician who managed to get credit for the successes of subordinates and shift blame to anyone convenient.
His mismanagement in SWPOA during WWII (wrt Fertig in particular, but also his reticence in coordination and communication with Pac fleet and Nimitz) should have seen him retired. Ethically, his trying to shaft Wainwright for failures in the Philippines defense when Wainwright was both a subordinate and a POW should have been a careeer-ender, but Mac was the darling boy of the far right, and too politically volatile to be touched.
Ned Almond's sole qualification for being an independent commander in Korea was being one of MacArthur's "boys" - between Almond and MacArther, they almost gave away the 1st Marines entirely, with orders which were utterly insane. The only thing which kept the 1st Marines from being overrun piecmeal was the division commander's (Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Smith) silent disobedience of marching orders that would have fatally split his division into separate elements too far apart to ever rejoin or support each other.
MacArthur didn't act without consultation because he had to act, he did it because he considered that consultation with political types was meddling in his command.
That type of prima-donna professional officer is not tolerated in most modern militaries, so his case is an anomoly, but there has to be a strict balance between giving commanders scope for independent action and maintaining overall political control of the mission. That's what the UN needs to work out on a standardized basis, because otherwise, it doesn't matter who has the troops.
Rwanda was a failure of UN bureacracy, not an argument for a UN military force.
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Ned
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of Aptos, CA
Oct 1999 time: 21:22
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My dad served under MacArthur and had nothing but great praise for his leadership. My dad was there from Guadalcanal to Bataan. He said that what distinguished MacArthur from other commanders was two things: First he planned his campaign to achieve his objectives with minimal lose of human life (something we take as a given in modern warfare, but not then); second, he personally conducted reconnaissance which gave him a much better feel for the situation on the ground than other rear-guard generals.
I don't know much about Almond's and MacArthur's orders concerning the Marines in Korea. This is highly uncharacteristic of the man if he ordered them to do something which was insane. (Maybe Almond interferred with MacArthur's call by misrepresenting the battlefied situation.)
As to "racing through North Korea" without orders, did anyone tell him to simply stop at the 38th Parallel or stop at the 39th even?
Last edited by Ned on 13-09-2002 at 02:46
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David Floyd
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The bottom of a large bottle of beer
Jan 1970 time: 05:22
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quote: My dad served under MacArthur and had nothing but great praise for his leadership. My dad was there from Guadalcanal to Bataan. |
Actually, Guadalcanal was not under MacArthur's command at all. It was under first Robert Ghormley's and then William Halsey's.
Although MacArthur did graciously allow a couple of "his" aircraft to operate in defense of the US Marines and Army troops once.
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Q Cubed
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t3h y3ll0w p3ril
Apr 1999 time: 23:22
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quote: Actually MacArthur is the perfect example of who NOT to have on a peace-keeping mission. Because of him, and him almost alone, the war dragged on for another two years, gaining neither side anything and resulting in millions more casualties and the desolation of the Korean peninsular, as well as destroying any possibility of freindly relations between the US and the PRC. |
...

...
ok, see, maybe you're fine with the idea that if all of korea became stalinist under kim il sung, but i'm not.
without macarthur, all of korea would be a starving hellhole, part of bush's stupid "axis of evil". without him, all of korea would be bankrupt, its economy frozen. without him, i'd be stuck in a third-rate pos country.
no, i like macarthur and his style of "peacekeeping". if anything, i'm peeved that truman didn't regain his balls after nuking japan-- he should have let macarthur do the same to the legions of mao troops in china.
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connorkimbro
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Seoul Korea
Jan 1970 time: 23:22
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quote: Because of him, and him almost alone, the war dragged on for another two years |
Not exactly. MacArthur wanted to take the war farther than it needed to be taken, sure, but he certainly didn't act alone. It was not OUR war we were fighting, after all, it was South Koreas. Ultimately, they were the ones calling the shots, and THEY wanted to continue the war as well. MacArthur didn't argue with them, but his presence (well, the US forces presence) allowed the war to be continued for as long as it was.
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