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Chris 62
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But I'm feeling MUCH better now
Jan 2001
time: 00:25
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Interesting discussion.
US Grant is perhaps the most slandered officer in American history.
As previously mentioned, his Western campaign was brilliant, and he command Sherman to undertake the march to the sea, which so badly hurt the Confederacy, and a campaign where Lee could not directly affect matters.
It must be understood the RE Lee was NOT commander in chief of the Rebels, he commanded The Army of Northern Virginia.
This army had but two missions, keep the federals out of Richmond and remain an army in being.
In each campaign in which Lee defeated the Army of the Potomic, he failed to persue aggressivly, but only for ONE reason, he could NOT risk losing large portions of his army in persuit.
His STRATEGIC postion dictated caution.
Lee carried out both of these brilliantly, his failings are only seen when he operated outside this mandate.
The Pennsylvania campaign that leads to gettysburg was a strategic error, it was carried to curry favor in Europe, in the hope France and Britain would recognize the Confedracy.
This was the Southern CinC's idea, Jefferson Davis (who was a west pointer, and had served with both Lee and Grant in Mexico with great distinction).
It was not untill near the end of the war that Davis listened to Lee.
US Grant had read all the reports (including little Mac's rediculous intelligence reports from Pinkerton that stated the Southerners had 150,000 men!) on the campaigns of his predecessor's.
He knew the South was limited in manpower, and that if he could keep them engaged, they were doomed.
Grant did EXACTLY this.
His losses man seem excessive, but in the age of rifles losses of roughly equal forces were always more severe for attackers.
Navy, if Lee had gone to North Carolina, it would have meant nothing, the South could not feed itself, the men were starving.
The war was lost, all it would have done was sullied the honor of a fine man, RE Lee.
Grant it must also be remembered, treated his enemies with respect, feeding the Southerners after the surrender (and they cheered him greatly for it).
US Grant was a great officer, he was Lee's equal, Lee and Grant both knew it.
Only hubris and false pride prevent others from seeing this.
Grant the president is ANOTHER matter...
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MichaeltheGreat
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Apolyton Grand Executioner
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mooning the house that Ruth built.
Oct 1999
time: 21:25
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quote:
Originally posted by Shi Huangdi
"Hardly turned out to be a catastrophic defeat,"
Sure it was. It spelled the end of the invasion of Pennsylvania, sent Lee running, and made the CSA lose alot of troops. And had the Army of the Potomac had a better commander it could have been alot worse. I don't see how Pickett's charge stopped the Union's ability to persue they still had plenty of strong troops left and if they wanted to do so I think they could of. In fact Lincoln got very angry at Meade for not more agressively persuing. |
Reality was that the Army of the Potomac was in no shape to make a vigorous pursuit after the 3rd, and with the weather providing cover for the ANV on the 4th and 5th. The Army of the Potomac's I and III Corps were so badly damaged they were disbanded. II Corps was without it's commander (Hancock). XI and XII Corps were so badly damaged they were consolidated into XX Corps in a reorganization. The Yankee cavalry was heavily damaged - both Buford's and Kilpatrick's divisions were heavily chewed up, and not combat effective.
In fact, things were so quiet in the eastern theater in the rest of 1863 that Lee had no problem detaching Longstreet's Corps to the west, unfortunately to be wasted by the idiocy of Bragg.
The invasion of Pennsylvania wasn't Lee's idea in the first place, and it was a desperate gamble, by a political leadership which realized it was running low on options.
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"You apparently haven't been to the battlefield, or don't remember it well. "
I have been to the battlefield, and I remember it well enough to see why it is was a dumb manuever. They had to go a long stretch of field in open ground where US artillery had excellent shots and the climb up a large hill against entrenched Union fire.
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The rise is only 30-odd feet, quite gentle, and it is the least impressive defensive terrain in the area. The only digging in on the Yankee side had been overnight on the 2nd. Given everything that was known, and the lack of cavalry screens, there wasn't much else as an alternative. Longstreet's vaunted move to the south wasn't feasible - the army would have ran out of water, and had a very hard time moving supply trains and artillery, as trails would have to be axed through the woods.
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Some of the Confederate generals including Longstreet IIRC realized why this wouldn't work, and protested the idea. For all your rationalization of why the charge was a good idea, he reality of why it wouldn't work bore out in the assault- say goodbye to Pickett's division.
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I don't think I said it was a good idea - just a necessity under the circumstances. And Pickett's division wouldn't have made much difference had it not been engaged and Lee had done something else.
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"and despite the dramatization of the damage the ANV received, the overall casualty numbers on the third day were proportionate to those on the second day, when both armies were fully engaged."
That's still very bad though, especially considering how if you combine 3 days Gettysburg was the bloodiest battle in the entire war(though Antietam was the bloodiest single day).
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The south couldn't afford any casualties at that point. Schurz (who got himself appointed Secretary of the Interior for his work) was very successful recruiting German immigrants, the Yankees had the Homestead Act, so they had much higher immigration rates, over and above the huge advantage in population. Mind you, 13 months earlier, the Yankee armies had been in sight of the Richmond suburbs, and Lee had transformed that situation into making two invasions of the north, which were the only chance of obtaining a political victory. There wasn't much chance there, but from the outset, the CSA was doomed in terms of numbers and resources - the only question was how long would it hang on, and would the Yankees lose the will to fight?
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"Hardly - the numerical superiority of the Union armies, and their vastly superior supply late in the war overwhelmed the man for man superiority of underclothed, underfed, underarmed, half starved veterans."
Right, and Grant made the best of what he had. But as Rhea points out in the article, both armies had been retooled by that point. But you had already brought up the point of US logisitical superiorites, I was bringing up that when Grant and Lee fought Lee had the advantage of elite veteran troops.
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Lee did not really have so much of an advantage - the southern troops were more determined, and used to more hardship, but their chronically poor state of supply and living conditions severely eroded their combat effectiveness. The artillery definitely favored the Yankees - the ANV artillery was chronically short on rifled pieces suitable for counterbattery fire, and chronically outnumbered, so their casualty rates severely affected troop quality. Cavalry was affected by the attrition of the mounts and quality of replacements.
Had Lee's army been well supplied, consistently armed, and well fed, then things would have been a lot different, but they weren't.
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"Lee can only be judged in terms of the scope of his command and how he did with the resources he had available to him."
He still had control of his army. And what did he do with those resources? Delay defeat.
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Lee started with only a two man staff taking over command of an undisciplined, demoralized, uncoordinated army in the middle of a fight where he was outnumbered more than two to one, with the enemy in sight of his capital. Given that start, I'd say Lee's delaying defeat from a matter of days, to over 34 months, was a relatively decent accomplishment. Not one that any other general on either side could have pulled off.
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And that hardly makes you a very good general IMNSHO. |
Then obviously von Manstein, von Manteuffel et al are a bunch of slouches.  I never knew that good generalship required starting out with major advantages over your enemy.
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"The so should all the founding fathers of the United States. Had we remained loyal colonists, slavery would have passed from the scene three decades earlier."
Not really, because now you are bringing in alot of historical what ifs into play. Would there have been another rebellion during the Napoleonic wars that would have been a drag on British forces. Would the empire be so quick to abolish slavery if it would have controlled the US South? Even if it did, would it be abolished name only and would we simply see the practice of "forced labor" as had happened in Africa? Would there have been another revolt and some other point, maybe whenever they did get around to abolishing slavery, and if so would the South then just go on opressing blacks? I would imagine blacks might be loyal to the crown in the event of another revolt if it meant they would be free in the process- I would imagine Southerners would have unleashed their fury on them whenever they got the chance as a result. There are too many what ifs, as compared to a Republican dominated government waiting to abolish slavery when it became feasible. |
The facts are that the British abolished slavery throughout their empire three decades earlier, when the US wasn't even concerned with it, as they benefitted from trade in ol' King Cotton. Had the hotheads further south not rebelled without adequate preparation, the Yankees wouldn't have abolished slavery for quite some time - all those sticky legal and property issues, and they couldn't solve the debate as to where and how to deport the freed blacks.
But surely you don't want to introduce the concept of exploitation of essentially captive labor as close to the moral equivalent of slavery?  We could get into all sorts of interesting discussions about coolies and Irish coal miners and company towns, the 100 hour work week, etc. 
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You could argue that, but that's not how the government was set up to work."
Right, but the question is if the government should have done it anyway. |
So just ignore the Constitution whenever convenient? Come to think of it, that is pretty popular.
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"Lincoln made clear his views that blacks could not function as equals in white society, and that his overriding concern was the preservation of the union. The emancipation proclamation was an offer to the seceded states that they could keep their slaves if they returned to big daddy like so many prodigal sons."
Most people interpert it as a political gesture aimed at avoiding Anglo/French intervention. As far as Lincoln saying blacks couldn't be equals, someone saying they could be would have made them an extreme radical at this point in the 19th century. Lincoln also had reason to put forth his main cause- there were plenty of whites in the North who would have opposed a war simply aimed at helping black people. Lincoln was simply being a pragmatist at a time when pragatism was very much needed. |
Butler, Douglass and others held more enlightened views. And thank you for confirming that Lincoln was a "pragmatist" concerned with posturing for foreign powers, rather than a principled abolitionist who believed in that quaint notion that "all men were created equal..."
Yep, preserve that union. Make that big ol' power grab.
edit - damned multiple quote tags.
Last edited by MichaeltheGreat on 14-01-2003 at 02:35
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MichaeltheGreat
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Apolyton Grand Executioner
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mooning the house that Ruth built.
Oct 1999
time: 21:25
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Everything boils down to the road net and Stuart. Stuart had gotten caught with his pants down by Buford at Brandy Station, VA, a month prior, and fought to a draw against a heavy raid which could/should have gone badly for the Yankees.
As a result, Stuart had his blood up, and wanted to humiliate the Yankee army by riding around it again. Then his men ran onto a major Yankee supply convoy, captured 400 wagons, and realizing that one purpose of the ANV's foray north was shortage of supplies, he tried (and suceeded) to keep possession of that supply train, but at the cost of having his cavalry force's movement controlled by a bunch of damn Yankee mules hauling heavy wagons. Stuart should have supplied up his men, burned the wagons, let the mules run amok, and kept going about his main job. Instead, he let himself be kept in isolation from the ANV for many days, on the opposite side of the Army of the Potomac, doing insignificant raiding in view of the overall strategic picture.
Lee, meanwhile, had to disperse his army to forage and to avoid overdrawing local wells, so Baldy Ewell's Corps was up north of Gettysburg, Hill was to the west around Cashtown, and Longstreet further west still, with Pickett's division the farthest west.
Lee had sent out riders looking for Stuart, or word of his activities, and had issued orders that his troops were to avoid any general engagement. Part of his army had moved through Gettysburg a few days ago, ran into some Pennsylvania militia, and when the ANV units shook out into a battle line, the militia backed away without a fight. Yankee cavalry in the area was assumed to be one of the two regiments of Pennsylvania militia cavalry known to be in the area, since it was assumed wherever Stuart was, the Army of the Potomac cavalry would be there also.
Early's division had passed through Gettysburg on the way north a few days before, Pettigrew's brigade had been there on the 30th, and despite the value of the road net, Gettysburg wasn't seen as essential to be held, because the armies were still (in theory) on the move, and the whereabouts of the Army of the Potomac were unknown. The assumption was that if the Army of the Potomac or any Pennsylvania militia tried to hold the town, they would be displaced and driven out. Had Rodes not mishandled his division and Early been late and lackadaisical (with the *****-whipped Ewell being useless as a Corps commander and dominated by Early) on the 1st, that would have been the case, and the Army of the Potomac would have had the need to attack against good defensive ground.
When Lee had broken away from Hooker after Chancellorsville, he'd had to move north and west, and Hooker (later Meade) pursued, but was behind, and to the south and east. The armies kept that general position with respect to each other, with the ANV moving through Maryland west of South Mountain, and the Army of the Potomac east.
On the morning of July 1st, Archer's and Davis' brigades were just going foraging, and were under orders to avoid any general engagement. Once things piled on, Meade was coming up from the south and east, and Lee from the north and west, so the failures by Rodes and Early on the first day left the Yankees in possession of the road net and the best ability to maneuver. Without a cavalry screen, Lee would have been very hard pressed to go back towards Cashtown and then south, without being blocked by Meade, so once the meeting engagment started, it was just a classic case of both armies piling on as fast as units could get into action.
As for Lee holding on the defensive to the west (Herr's ridge and Seminary ridge) water was the critical problem. The Yankees had Spangler's spring and Rock Creek, plus a larger number of wells.
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13-01-2003 05:01
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