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Ned
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of Aptos, CA
Oct 1999 time: 21:27
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quote: Originally posted by Sava
Ned, I'm not saying that the principles of the strategy weren't used in Iraq, or that they didn't work. I'm saying you can't effectively compare Iraq vs US to Axis vs Allies. |
I agree that the Axis ground forces were absolutely superb vs. the Iraqi's. But the disparity in airpower was just as great if not greater. True, bombs were not as accurate then, but we carpet bombed German forces with 1,000's of heavy bombers and mauled anything that moved with an even greater number of ground attack fighters. Our airpower advantage over the Germans was decisive.
Given this, we should have conducted the war in a manner that consistently worked to our advantage, not theirs. The breakout from Normandy used our air supremacy to our advantage. But the subsequent broad frontal attack allowed the Germans to use dug in infrantry and artillery to their advantage, and to concentrate their forces for a counterattack. Meanwhile, our bombers were again "wasted" on strategic bombing.
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gsmoove23
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Your comparisons between airpower are not true as our planes were much more susceptable to German AA.
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chegitz guevara
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Ft. Lauderdale, FL Communist Party of Apolyton
Jun 2000 time: 00:27
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quote: Originally posted by Ned
As to Patton being an overrated general - well, it seems to me that he and his troops performed very well. But the idea with blitz warfare is to destroy enemy divisions with airpower. In order to counterattack, the enemy must move. When they move, they are exposed to airpower and can be destroyed. |
Actually, this is incorrect. The purpose of airpower in the blitzkrieg (which was developed by B.H. Liddel-Hart, not Guderian, Hitler, Patton, or anyone else) is to disrupt communications and interdict supplies, reinforcements, and retreat. Armor punches a hole in enemy lines and surrounds the enemy, which then is left which is then left with the choice of trying to fight while surrounded or surrendering.
Franks used a modified blitzkrieg, in which airpower did much of the killing, rather than armor and infantry.
Finally, remember, Patton got clobbered at Kaserine Pass (my jr. high history teacher was in that battle and got run over by a tank--fortunately for him, it passed right over him--he was also at the Bulge).
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Tingkai
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To find the Northwest Passage
Aug 2001 time: 13:27
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quote: Originally posted by chegitz guevara
Actually, this is incorrect. The purpose of airpower in the blitzkrieg (which was developed by B.H. Liddel-Hart, not Guderian, Hitler, Patton, or anyone else) is to disrupt...
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The intro for the edition I have of Guderian's book claims that Liddel-Hart edited the first translation and inserted comments that made L-H look good. The added comments had Guderian saying he developed his theories after reading L-h's theories. Talk about the victors writing history.
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yavoon
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I wouldn't have done it even if it was a master stroke. cuz just staying the course america's industrial superiority was going to win the war. I doubt there would have been a compelling reason to risk the more daring strategy when winning was becoming an inevitability and there was no political opposition to worry about.
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yavoon
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true, it was a race to claim post war territory.
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Sikander
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Boulder, Colorado, United Snakes of America
Jan 2000 time: 22:27
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quote: Originally posted by gsmoove23
Airpower wasn't anywhere near as effective as it is today, at the mercy of weather conditions, frightfully inaccurate bombing technology, far more vulnerable to German AA... Frankly, the forces were far to equally matched for this to be possible and the Germans were far too adept at these tactics and their counters. We would have been offering too many vulnerabilities to an enemy who was all too able to capitalize.
...and yeah, supply was a problem even without a rapid advance. |
While planes were not nearly as capable, neither was AA fire. The differences of course are that the capability to attack from the air has grown at a much greater rate than the capability to exact a price from aircraft. The one area where you fail to note a very large difference today is the capability for aircraft to operate at night. Even with the vast numbers of aircraft operating at the time, WW2 era air forces could do very little to nothing in reaction to enemy movement during the hours of darkness, and often for a while after dawn as they made their way toward their area of operation. Carpet bombing of the type that Ned is enamored of took days to arrange, and would have not been capable of dealing with anything but a static defense, and even then it was a very blunt instrument.
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CerberusIV
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The differences between western europe in 1944 and iraq in 2003 are terrain and weather. Western europe has numerous minor and major rivers which european armies are trained to use as defensive barriers. The road system was much less developed than now and areas of forest and hills made life much more difficult for attackers.
Southern and central Iraq is relatively flat desert with few major watercourses and the Iraqis failed to destroy the bridges.
It may be getting hot now but Iraq doesn't have rain every day or fog and snow - all of which could ground airpower in 1944.
Patton's idea may have been good in theory but the means to carry it out and the circumstances in 1944 leave it as a beguiling theory, nothing more.
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Vanguard
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Monster Island
Apr 1999 time: 05:27
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quote: Market-Garden was a sound plan, destroyed by faulty intelligence and bad luck. If the Brits had been able to get reliable intel about the 2 panzer divisions in the area they would not have launched the attack. As it was, it was a complete failure for that reason IMO. |
I can't agree with this.
Market-Garden was a terrible plan. In order to succeed, the British had to capture three bridges, including one deep behind enemy lines by airborne assault. Failure to capture any one of the bridges doomed the whole mission to failure and ensured the destruction of a parachute division.
And it isn't as if the British had any particular reason to think that they were highly likely to capture all three bridges intact. They were fighting the Germans, after all, not a minor power of dubious competence. Did Monty really think that the Germans were going to let him waltz into Northern Germany without putting up a fight? This seems more like wishful thinking than strategic planning.
And even more doubtful was the question of what we could have done even if the attack had succeeded completely. The Allied supply situation in October was very difficult to start with. Trying to supply an army over the Rhine by means of one road and three bridges hardly seems feasible.
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