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GePap
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of the Big Apple
Nov 2001
time: 23:35
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quote:
Originally posted by Elok
Well GePap, as a test, you define "personality" in terms of biological self-sufficiency of the mother, no? Sorry if this has already been asked, but does that mean that in the future, when we can invent functioning artificial wombs, a dozen-cell zygote will be a person, and illegal to abort? Do women have to race against the clock to whack their kids?  |
If we have artificial womb, then "choice" of women would be irrelevant, in so far as we would asusme that if they took the steps necessary to incubate a child out of the womb, then this is a wanted rpegnancy, and there isn't even the risk of death to the mother, and certainly what woman would incubate the child of incest or rape?
So your tongue in cheek question is correct-the current abortion debate would become moot for fetuses being incubated technologicaly.
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Ben Kenobi
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McGregornobi!
Oct 2002
time: 21:35
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Okay.
I finally have a better answer for you Loinburger.
I wasn't happy with my earlier point, but I had my memory refreshed by reading a textbook of a friend that went over Substance Dualism as argued by JP Morland in a book that I read 3 years ago.
I had forgotten some of his arguments, but he refines the definition of personhood, moreso than Beckwith. I guess I never thought to combine the two since I first read both books at about the same time.
Here we go.
1. JP Morland's argument against physicality is that our body changes, yet we stay the same, even as our cells change. We are not like an automobile when you change a tire, in that we do not change when we lose an arm, and the arm is replaced by a synthetic arm.
Now, why does the person maintain absolute identity through the change? The answer is that in addition to the physical bodies, there exists a soul. Personal identity is constituted by the soul.
Going back to our point at hand about my definition of personhood, Aristotle taught that when something new emerges, it comes not from nothing, but from something. An apple does not spring from nothing, but in the apple contained in the seed.
In the general case, when a property (such as a mind) emerges from a substance, the property was in the substance already, and becomes actual when it emerges.
What this means, is that even if a substance, (person), does not exhibit a mind, the mind is already there, just in a different form.
Therefore, a definition of personhood, more refined than my earlier one, is the state of a being with the intrinsic capacity to form a mind.
A mind is an emergent property, in that with sufficient complexity, the mind emerges all at once. It does not spring from nothing, but from the complexity of the body, as the body develops, it activates the innate capacity to form a mind.
Now, in brain death, the mind has irreverseably reverted to its inert form, such that we cannot recover the mind from the body. This is why when we lose consciousness, we retain the memory that we had before, in that the mind simply stops functioning, but remains intact. If we could revive a brain dead person, they would be as someone temporarily unconscious, they retain their previous memories, but they have no memories of the intervening events.
Tacking your thought experiment, the mind would exist without either the body or the brain, but until the body and brain were reunited, the emergent property condition of the mind would not be satisfied. Therefore, I am correct to say that I am still alive if one can rejoin both the body and brain, such that they still function, but if you cannot, than I have truly died, and keeping my brain in the jar will not bring me back.
Secondly, this also explains why the zygote is a person, and why the sperm and egg are not. The sperm, and egg, are two halves, that when combined gain this intrinsic capacity to form a mind. A sperm and egg will not form a mind by themselves. Therefore, there is a link between the formation of the mind, and the genetic code, such that the genetic code, when put together, and combined with the physical engine, will develop and attain increasing complexity.
At a certain point, this complexity will manifest a mind. Personhood is not the point in which the mind becomes manifest, but when all the ingredients are there for the increasing complexity. This we see at conception, in the formation of the necessary substance.
I don't know if this helps, but the idea came to me over the last couple of hours.
Last edited by Ben Kenobi on 19-04-2004 at 11:24
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Ben Kenobi
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McGregornobi!
Oct 2002
time: 21:35
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quote:
1. People do not maintain absolute identities through physical changes. Brain damage can cause significant changes to somebody's personality, with probably the most famous case being that of Phineas Gage.
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If so, then what sets aside one type of physical change from another?
I would argue, that even after brain damage, you still have the same Phineas Gage as before, and you fall to the first critique of physicality.
quote:
2. If nothing can come form nothing, and if the zygote contains a soul, then wouldn't this require that the sperm and ova contain half-souls, along with the half-souls of all sperm/ova that will ever be generated by the testes/ovaries of the fully-grown child-to-be, along with the half-souls of all sperm/ova that will ever be generated by the testes/ovaries of the child-to-be's offspring, and so forth?
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If this were true, then we would all contain more than one soul in our bodies. But this is absurd, ergo, the soul must come afterwards.
The argument in favour of infusing the soul at conception seems to make the most sense when combined with what we know about conception, and the necessary components required for further growth and development. Significantly, among those who disagree, none place a date before conception. Ergo, it does not make sense to say that the soul infuses before conception.
Last edited by Ben Kenobi on 28-04-2004 at 03:07
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loinburger
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Sweet Sauce Jones
Jul 1999
time: 00:35
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quote:
Originally posted by Ben Kenobi
If so, then what sets aside one type of physical change from another? |
What do you mean? What are these different types of physical change to which you refer?
quote:
I would argue, that even after brain damage, you still have the same Phineas Gage as before, and you fall to the first critique of physicality. |
What is your justification for your stance? Phineas Gage underwent a radical personality change as a result of brain damage, which argues against dualism. Yet all you've done is to say "I disagree," as if that were sufficient justification for your position.
quote:
If this were true, then we would all contain more than one soul in our bodies. But this is absurd, ergo, the soul must come afterwards. |
1. How is it absurd? On what basis do you argue that this is not possible?
2. If the soul comes afterwards, then where does it come from? You said that nothing can come from nothing, and yet now you seem to claim that the soul comes from nothing.
quote:
The capacity to form consciousness is an intrinsic property, at least according to JP Moreland. |
Where does this intrinsic property come from? If this property is emergent upon conception, then it isn't intrinsic. If it is intrinsic, then it exists prior to conception, and we're left with the infinite recursion of souls.
BTW, when I said that you'd never given me a straight answer to my questions, I was referring to the question of how much of your body you can part from before you cease to be "you." Your last answer was circular:
quote:
Originally posted by loinburger
How much of your body can be replaced by machinery or transplants or whatever before you cease to be "you"? |
quote:
Originally posted by Ben Kenobi
Everything but what connects your brain to your body, and your body to your brain. |
Last edited by loinburger on 28-04-2004 at 04:27
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Ben Kenobi
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McGregornobi!
Oct 2002
time: 21:35
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quote:
What do you mean? What are these different types of physical change to which you refer?
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Any physical change to our bodies.
Skin cells shedding for example.
If you argue only things that change our personalities count, then you are a new person every day because your new experiences change who you are.
Secondly, your example of Phineas Gage argues that one must maintain a constant personality in order to retain one's identity. If this is so, then you return to my problem of experience.
Employing the term radical implies a set limit on change to qualify. I find this standard arbitrary because it is impossible to delineate the precise moment where one crosses the line.
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1. How is it absurd? On what basis do you argue that this is not possible?
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Because that would imply that one contains thousands of souls.
Secondly, in postulating your theory, you suggest that it is possible to have such an entity as 'half a soul.' I don't believe that's possible, like splitting a magnet into magnetic monopoles. Souls are indivisible. That's one of the reasons why people only suggest a soul sometime after conception, and not before.
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Where does this intrinsic property come from? If this property is emergent upon conception, then it isn't intrinsic. If it is intrinsic, then it exists prior to conception, and we're left with the infinite recursion of souls.
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A new entity forms at conception from the individual parts. The property of growth and development comes from this union, from the formation of the genetic code directing the growth, and from the motive power supplied by the cells of the zygote.
The intrinsic capacity comes from this union, and so long as the union remains the capacity is inherent in the zygote.
Where do souls come from?
Well, that's a rather deep question. But now we're getting into theology.
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loinburger
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Sweet Sauce Jones
Jul 1999
time: 00:35
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quote:
Originally posted by Ben Kenobi
Skin cells shedding for example. |
Shedding skin cells do not affect one's consciousness.
quote:
If you argue only things that change our personalities count, then you are a new person every day because your new experiences change who you are. |
Yes, that could be. I wouldn't say that I'm a "new person," seeing as how I carry some of my memories from the previous day. However, I'm certainly a different person than I was on the previous day.
quote:
Secondly, your example of Phineas Gage argues that one must maintain a constant personality in order to retain one's identity. |
Phineas Gage retained his identity -- he still knew that he was Phineas Gage, he still had many of his memories intact, etc. However, he behaved like a completely different person, which runs contrary to a dualistic Gage.
quote:
Employing the term radical implies a set limit on change to qualify. |
Not really. It just implies that Phineas's personality change was more drastic and more rapid than most people's personality changes. This is understandable -- rather than suffering from a slow process of development/deterioration/change like the rest of us, Gage suffered a much more rapid process of physical change.
quote:
Because that would imply that one contains thousands of souls. |
So?
quote:
Souls are indivisible. |
Okay, maybe the souls are only stored in the ova, and potential ova. Or (potential) sperm.
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The intrinsic capacity comes from this union, and so long as the union remains the capacity is inherent in the zygote. |
Then this intrinsic capacity is really an emergent property? What's so special about this particular emergent property, then -- why is the "potential to form consciousness" a more metaphysically important emergent property than is "consciousness"? It seems as though the former property is essentially meaningless -- it belies the fact that consciousness and only consciousness is the emergent property.
quote:
Where do souls come from?
Well, that's a rather deep question. But now we're getting into theology. |
It's an important question if you're going to link the formation of a soul with the formation of the "intrinsic capacity to potentially form consciousness."
How much of your body can you cut away before you cease to be "you"?
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19-04-2004 04:25
), and since electrons do not demonstrate consciousness, they are not. Plus, it has been proven that consciousness resides in the brain.
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