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lord of the mark
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FUKCOV - Former United Kingdom Colony of Virginia
Dec 2000
time: 00:29
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quote:
Originally posted by Serb
It was a legal deal. The leadership of Yukos cheated Russia and were pursued in accordance with the Russian law. They've evaded taxes for a sum of dozens of billions USD.
What techniques? They were caught for a tax evasion and got their punishment.
In case you if westerners still do not get it, "SPS" got about 3% during last elections into parliament. This party and leaders of this party are not competitors for Putin (like he fears any comopetition, since its his last term). Absolute majority of Russians hate them, because those bastards robbed the population of Russia during privatisation.
As for Chubais, and your (forgive my French ) silly insinuations, for your information Chubais IS NOT THE OWNER of Unified Energy Systems (UES). He is the HIRED MANAGER of the STATE-CONTROLLED COMPANY. So, your claims about Putin being somehow related to this failed assasination attempt is no more than bullsh!t (forgive my French again).  Putin can fire him anytime he wish. When the hell you will understand that whenever anyone farts in Russia, it's not necessary a Putin's fault.
As for "pigs", a proper word you've used there brother. They are no more than a dirty pigs. Btw, do you know that according to Forbs, Russia holds the second place in the world (after USA) in the number of billioneres? Those f*cking pigs robbed MY country and thus made fortunes within a couple of years, some monarchies couldn't make within centuries of their existance.
As for nationalization, once again it was a LEGAL PURCHASE of a SINGLE company in an auction. During this auction the owners get paid by the maximum price.
In so belowed by westerners Ukraine, a newly elected leadership (a pro-democracy, pro-western and liberal of course) annonced that they will "RE-PRIVATIZE" over 3 000 enterprises (just get them from previous legal owners for free and give them to new owners (from Yushenko's clan of course).
What the f*ck is this if not a nationalization?
It's a f*cking highway robbery!
As I was always saying Ukrnians will regret about their 'orange stupidity' pretty soon, - when their country will be robbed by your western puppets. Russia already experienced this during Yeltsin's rule. |
i did not state or imply that Chubais was an owner. Nor did I say that he was assasinated on Putins orders. I did ask why he was targeted - other than the skimpy info the article ive quoted i havent seen anything. I thought you might know more.
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lord of the mark
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FUKCOV - Former United Kingdom Colony of Virginia
Dec 2000
time: 00:29
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wikipedia on SPS:
"The Union of Right Forces, or SPS (Сою́з Пра́вых Сил, СПС/Soyuz Pravykh Sil), is a Russian political party commonly associated with free market reforms, privatization, and the legacy of the 'Young Reformers' of the 1990's: Anatoly Chubais, Boris Nemtsov, and Yegor Gaidar. Chubais and Nemtsov, along with Irina Khakamada, the party's unofficial candidate in Russia's March presidential elections, constitute the party's leadership. The Party is considered by most western media organs such as the Economist, and the BBC to be one of Russia's only parties that support western-style capitalism, and is often named a liberal party. It is affiliated to the International Democratic Union. The Liberal International has as its Russian member the Yabloko party.
In 1999, the Party, then new, gained 32 seats in Russia's Parliament. However, following the 2003 elections, it maintains a mere 2 seats out of 450. A number of SPS candidates came second in single-mandate electoral districts, such as Irina Khakamada in St. Petersburg, Vladimir V. Kara-Murza in Moscow, or Boris Nadezhdin in the Moscow region.
According to Russian electoral law, a party must gain 5% of the popular vote in order to gain seats. The Union of Right Forces, which is closely associated with the groups involved in the privatisation of the 1990, won 3.8% of the vote. Khakamada's presidential bid fared slightly better; she won 3.9% of the vote.
According to the Economist, "The liberals' chief faces are Yabloko's Mr Yavlinsky, who after ten years as almost the sole front-man of Russia's social conscience resembles an embittered torch-singer; and SPS's Anatoly Chubais, who as deputy prime minister in the mid-1990s oversaw the privatisations that made the oligarchs rich." (Economist, 11 Dec 2003) Chubais is himself considered a 'магнат' or oligarch in Russia; he is the President of UES, the state energy company.
However, many suspect foul play on the part of the President and his United Russia party in the counting of votes during Russia's December, 2003 elections. Both the Communists and the Yabloko Party concur that a re-count would have placed SPS above the 5% hurdle rate. These criticisms had a direct bearing on the March elections, in which several of the parties, including Rodina, SPS, and Yabloko refused to officially endorse a candidate. However, Sergei Glazyev (of Rodina) and Irina Khakamada both ran without party endorsements, and were able to gain the number of signatures necessary to run as independents.
At an annual meeting on June 26, 2004 all party leadership (Presidium of the Federal Political Council) resigned. Only Anatoly Chubais and Boris Nemtsov remain in the Council, but not in the Presidium."
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lord of the mark
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FUKCOV - Former United Kingdom Colony of Virginia
Dec 2000
time: 00:29
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by the way, just to make clear, while the discussion here would imply that forces like SPS and Yabloko represent the failed Yeltsin era, in fact Putins party, United Russia, is in fact the party that supported Yeltsin in his final administration - Putin was appointed PM by Yeltsin. Yavlinsky, leader of Yabloko, ran against Yeltsin while Putin was still a supporter.
Russian parties -
United Russia - the party of power, formerly of Yeltsin, now of Putin.
SPS - the more "conservative" of the pro-reform parties.
Yabloko - the more "liberal" of the pro-reform parties - Yavlinsky, its leader, has said the rush to privatize before an adequate legal structure was in place was a mistake.
KPRF - the communists.
Liberal Democrats - nationalists, not democrats
Rodina - hardline nationalists.
these last represent the opposition in the Duma. SPS and Yabloko could have entered the Duma had they been united, however they could not reach agreement before the election.
Yabloko and the Communists, as well as SPS, protested various electoral irregularities, including but not limited to govt dominance of television time.
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Serb
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Siberia, Communist party of Apolyton
Nov 2001
time: 11:29
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quote:
Originally posted by lord of the mark i did not state or imply that Chubais was an owner. Nor did I say that he was assasinated on Putins orders. I did ask why he was targeted - other than the skimpy info the article ive quoted i havent seen anything. I thought you might know more. |
It was a reply to a Spiffor's post, not yours.
As for your question,
quote:
Originally posted by lord of the mark
If I was unfamiliar with Chicago mobs, I would. Thats how you get information. So youre saying its interests threatened by his business activities? Any info on which interests in particular? |
Beside that I know (ok, I suspect) him to be a mother******, I have no idea what shady business of his caused this assasination attempt. AFAIK your police knew that Al Capone is a gangster, but couldn't get him for a long time, till he was caught during tax evasion. Same with Chubais, everyone here knows he is a gangster, but's not enough to throw him in jail. He was involved in a corruption scandal when he was in government in 90's. Chubais was caught for recieving a 50 000 USD fee for a non-existant book. But Yeltsin PERSONALY saved his as$ back then. I do remember Yeltsin's explanations - "it wasn't a crime more like a moral problem, but since he (Chubais) already transfered those 50 000 to a charitable foundation, I see no problem there anymore".
F*cking shame. Had this happen in the US or EU he would be in jail for a long time, but unfortunatelly it has happened in Yeltsin's Russia.
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Serb
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Siberia, Communist party of Apolyton
Nov 2001
time: 11:29
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quote:
Originally posted by Oerdin
Then we could all watch the Russian economy collapse because no one, Russian or foreigner, will want to invest money in Russia since the Russian state could steal their money at any moment. They'd be back to square one again. |
Good logic, but I'm not really sure that Russian economy survives thanks to foreign investments. I'm veryyyyyyy unsure about that.
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lord of the mark
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FUKCOV - Former United Kingdom Colony of Virginia
Dec 2000
time: 00:29
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quote:
Originally posted by Serb
Beside that I know (ok, I suspect) him to be a mother******, I have no idea what shady business of his caused this assasination attempt. AFAIK your police knew that Al Capone is a gangster, but couldn't get him for a long time, till he was caught during tax evasion. Same with Chubais, everyone here knows he is a gangster, but's not enough to throw him in jail. He was involved in a corruption scandal when he was in government in 90's. Chubais was caught for recieving a 50 000 USD fee for a non-existant book. But Yeltsin PERSONALY saved his as$ back then. I do remember Yeltsin's explanations - "it wasn't a crime more like a moral problem, but since he (Chubais) already transfered those 50 000 to a charitable foundation, I see no problem there anymore".
F*cking shame. Had this happen in the US or EU he would be in jail for a long time, but unfortunatelly it has happened in Yeltsin's Russia. |
FYI, Capone couldnt be prosecuted cause he'd bought the local authorities in Chicago and the state of Illinois. Tax evasion was under Federal jurisdiction, and so he was arrested and convicted for that. Surely youre not saying Chubais has bought the regional govt where he is active?
If Chubais is such scum, why does Putin allow him to be head of such an important enterprise?
On reflection, one notes that Chubais played a role in preventing SPS from joining with Yabloko in the last election. 
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Serb
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Siberia, Communist party of Apolyton
Nov 2001
time: 11:29
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quote:
Originally posted by Spiffor
Yes, the *******s were bastards and they deserved their comeuppance. And instead of having a clean comeuppance (a nationalization, or a regular forced sale at an auction), they had a shady one: an auction where only one shady company took part, that was surprisingly bought by the national company. What a surprise!  |
There was more than a single company participating in this auction.
But sure, such purchase is against market economy, liberalism, democracy, etc (for obvious reason - it has happen in Russia). Real liberals and pro-western progressive politicians just took the enterprise for free, like pro-western, pro-democratic, liberal Ukrainan government.
Last edited by Serb on 18-03-2005 at 02:14
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Serb
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Siberia, Communist party of Apolyton
Nov 2001
time: 11:29
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quote:
Originally posted by lord of the mark
by the way, just to make clear, while the discussion here would imply that forces like SPS and Yabloko represent the failed Yeltsin era, in fact Putins party, United Russia, is in fact the party that supported Yeltsin in his final administration - Putin was appointed PM by Yeltsin. Yavlinsky, leader of Yabloko, ran against Yeltsin while Putin was still a supporter.
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Not true. United Russia didn't exist while Yeltsin was a president.
quote:
Rodina - hardline nationalists. |
More like Social-Democrats in fact. My choice.
quote:
Yabloko and the Communists, as well as SPS, protested various electoral irregularities, including but not limited to govt dominance of television time. |
Loosers.
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lord of the mark
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FUKCOV - Former United Kingdom Colony of Virginia
Dec 2000
time: 00:29
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from a ukrainian blog
"The Zvarych affair was sparked on 16 February, when Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and her government banned the re-export of crude oil from Ukraine. The government argues that Ukraine, a country which imports over 90% of its oil, needs to maintain stable prices for petroleum products. The import of Russian oil for subsequent export at a hefty mark-up distorts and destabilizes oil prices in Ukraine, it contends. The next day, Zvarych said he would not sign off on the government's new decree, even hinting that he might resign.
Then an open letter to Tymoshenko appeared from a company, Oil Transit, whose deputy director happens to be Zvarych's wife, Svitlana. It complained that the government's decision interfered with its plans to re-export 3 million tons of oil from Russia to Slovakia. That would be roughly one-tenth of the 34 million tons of oil that Ukraine has so far imported each year from Russia. (Ukraine itself needs 22 million tons; the rest goes to Ukraine's petroleum refineries.)
For a country such as Ukraine, not used to debate about conflicts of interest, the Zvarych scandal has been a learning experience. (Zvarych himself, a former U.S. passport-holder, should know a little more about conflicts of interest.) Initially, the media were concerned primarily about Zvarych's accusation that the government was "attempting to drag members of [his] family into corrupt schemes," a reference to a complex business deal that he claims was suggested to him. When a connection with Zvarych's wife came to light, however, cries of "scandal" were heard and sentiment turned against the minister.
Yushchenko, however, came down on Zvarych's side and stated publicly that he was against banning the re-export of oil but favored imposing a value-added tax on the import of oil. That would limit the mark-up on re-exports by Oil Transit, while boosting budget revenues.
In the end, Svitlana Zvarych's business interests have been dealt a double blow: the government's ban on re-export has not been lifted, and oil imports are now subject to a 20 percent value-added tax (that is a hefty blow since Oil Transit had not yet imported most of the 3 million tons earmarked for re-export).
The scandal seems far from over, given that Zvarych last week claimed the ban on re-exports violated Ukraine's constitution, while the economics minister, Serhiy Teryokhin, claimed that there would be no re-export of crude oil from Ukraine, at least while he is a minister.
Government seeks metals giant for reprivatization
But a new government policy is attracting even more attention than this one minister's conflict of interests. That issue is the possibility of a large-scale review of previous privatizations.
The focus so far has been on Kryvorizhstal, a privatization singled out by Yushchenko in his election campaign as a particularly questionable deal. When, on 12 May 2004, Ukraine's State Property Fund put 93 percent of the factory's shares up for sale foreign investors such as the LNM Group, U.S. Steel, and TATA Steel showed an immediate interest in the largest steelmaker in what is a major steel-making country. But, then, after the tender had already been announced, the State Property Fund ruled that potential investors must have a history of producing at least one million tons of coke--a coal residue used in smelting iron ore--per year in Ukraine. Perhaps not coincidentally, only Ukrainian companies fulfilled this condition.
But what particularly concerned Yushchenko, and many others, was that the buyer, Investment Metallurgical Union, won with an offer ($800 million) that was only a little higher than the starting price ($715 million). Interested foreign investors had mentioned sums at least twice as large. The privatization had also proceeded at a record pace, with the deal concluded by 14 June 2004. Investment Metallurgical Union is a joint venture between Viktor Pinchuk, the son-in-law of former President Leonid Kuchma, and Renat Akhmetov, a man who later bankrolled much of the presidential campaign of then-Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych.
After her appointment as prime minister on 24 January, Yulia Tymoshenko announced that Kryvorizhstal would be returned to the state and, on 8 February, her cabinet instructed the State Property Fund to cancel all its decisions regarding the metal giant's privatization.
The real battle for Kryvorizhstal, however, is taking place in the courts. So far, Tymoshenko also seems to be getting her way there. On 17 February a local Kyiv court annulled its own decision from August 2004 that Kryvorizhstal's privatization was legal, and on 25 February froze the company's shares. On 1 March, Ukraine's Supreme Court annulled a number of lower-court decisions that had ruled the sale legal. It sent the case back to the commercial court to review from scratch.
In the meantime, Oleksandr Turchynov, the newly appointed head of Ukraine's secret service and before that the first deputy chairman of Tymoshenko's party, Batkivshchyna (Fatherland), said on 17 February that his agency would investigate 3,000 cases of alleged corruption in the privatization of state enterprises. In what is probably not a coincidence, Tymoshenko had earlier announced that her government would review 3,000 privatizations.
A bad example?
This policy has been dubbed "reprivatization" and stirred lively debate in the press and among policy-makers. Indeed, even Yushchenko seems to have been taken aback by the ambition of Tymoshenko, his main ally in the Orange Revolution. He responded to Tymoshenko's declarations by saying that at most 30 large enterprises would be reprivatized. But the intense and driven Tymoshenko has in the past proven hard to stop.
The danger is that "reprivatization" might become wild. Already, there is some sign that the Orange Revolution has introduced a new and disturbing element into Ukrainian business life. A case in point is the ownership of the football team Dynamo Kyiv, which was privatized in 1993 by the Surkis brothers, Hryhoriy and Ihor. Since then, it has expanded into a sports empire worth $200 million, according to Kostiantyn Grigorishin, a former business partner of the brothers'.
Grigorishin, a Russian businessman, began cooperating with the Surkises and their partners in 1998, when Ukraine's regional electricity distributors began to be privatized. But this cooperation stalled by 2002, when Grigorishin was briefly arrested at the instigation of another business partner of the Surkis brothers, Viktor Medvedchuk.
Medvedchuk is the former head of President Kuchma's administration. Hryhoriy Surkis is a member of the Social Democratic Party (United), a party led by Medvedchuk.
When the Orange Revolution was in full swing in November and December, Grigorishin declared publicly that he would "take back" Dynamo Kyiv. That threat took a tough form in mid-February when armed guards hired by Grigorishin tried unsuccessfully to seize two energy companies from the Surkis brothers. His attention has now turned to Dynamo Kyiv, although in a less violent fashion. An offshore company belonging to Grigorishin is now taking the football club to court for allegedly diluting the rights of minority shareholders. It has already won a court order prohibiting the sale of Dynamo Kyiv shares, though this might prove problematic in practice since court executors have been unable to locate the shares' registrar. All of this is worrying observers. Grigorishin clearly feels he has a chance to wrest control over companies belonging to the Surkis brothers at a time when their fortunes, long closely tied to the political scene, have taken a sharp downturn. Grigorishin knows that the new government will not interfere to protect the Surkises as it would have under Kuchma and Medvedchuk. Some fear Grigorishin may even have the backing of the current administration. During the Orange Revolution, Grigorishin made several appearances on stage with members of the opposition. He denies he offered any material help to the opposition or to Yushchenko.
How far Grigorishin is willing to go in his pursuit of the Surkis family's assets is unclear, but his strong-arm approach suggests he will not be meek. Tymoshenko, too, can be remorseless in pursuit of her goals. The danger is that a Tymoshenko-backed mass reprivatization might create a business and legal whirlwind in which men like Grigorishin will pursue their own wild reprivatization. A sense of a free-for-fall akin to the privatization of the 1990s is beginning to emerge. No detailed criteria about what companies might or might not be reprivatized have been announced. The possibility now is that some, like Grigorishin, will look at Tymoshenko's initiative and believe anything goes. Those may just be fears at this point, but already the atmosphere is unhealthy. What looks certain is that Ukraine's courts face a very busy period and a test of their malleability. "
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lord of the mark
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FUKCOV - Former United Kingdom Colony of Virginia
Dec 2000
time: 00:29
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UPI
"Sergei Glazyev's neo-communist party Rodina (translated as "Motherland" or "Homeland") and Vladimir Zhirinovsky's misnamed party Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, or LDPR, will control approximately 20 percent of the seats in the new Duma. Both parties ran on platforms calling for a radical redistribution of wealth and an extreme interpretation of "law and order." The acute rhetoric employed by Rodina and the LDRP won them considerable popular support from voters outraged due to a strong sense of social displacement since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It remains very questionable, however, if that same rhetoric will be translated into independent and real political power.
Rodina ran on an anti-oligarch platform wrapped in heavy nationalist overtones, and was able carve off a sizeable portion of the Communist vote, emasculating the inheritor of the Soviet party. Rodina's leader, Sergei Glazyev, is an economist and one-time member of Yegor Gaidar's groundbreaking reformist administration of the early 1990s who later became disillusioned and joined the Communists only to break them in September. Rodina campaigned on the redistribution of profits from big business to the state to be paid to pensioners and state sector workers. He also advocated banning immigration.
Zhirinovsky doubled his party's 1999 vote -- to 11.6 percent -- with an outrageous campaign of antics especially made for prime-time television. The consummate performer ran a campaign demanding the arrest of all of Russia's oligarchs and calling for the return of Russia to its former super-power status in world affairs, with a couple of fistfights during TV debates thrown in for good measure. The result is Zhirinovsky's best since he burst onto the scene in 1993. His incendiary one-liners and down-to-earth cynical humor was the highlight of the campaign.
Both Rodina and the LDPR present themselves as independent and as a political alternative. However, this is seen as far from true. During the campaign, both parties relentlessly attacked Russia's two small liberal conservative parties -- Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces -- claiming their politics had impoverished over 30 percent of the population and charging that they are responsible for the creation of Russia's oligarchs. Interestingly enough, neither Rodina nor the LDPR attacked the pro-Kremlin United Russia that has controlled the Duma since Vladimir Putin was elected president in 2000. Refraining from criticizing the powers-that-be maybe the first indication of how Rodina and the LDPR will work with United Russia and the Kremlin in the next Duma.
It is widely believed that the Kremlin encouraged Glazyev to create a left-wing party bloc that would divide the Communist constituency. Glazyev succeeded in this endeavor; his next mission will most likely be to slowly sway other members of the Communist Party to join Rodina or to "invade" the Communist Party and take it over from within. Either way, Rodina is the Kremlin's appointed vehicle to create a loyal left opposition.
Moving forward, Glazyev may continue to call for a nationalist-populist platform, though he most certainly will do this without an all-out attack on United Russia or Putin. Glazyev certainly supports a leftist and nationalist agenda, but within the framework of support the state first. This is why the Kremlin agreed to quietly support Rodina's parliamentary election bid. "
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lord of the mark
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FUKCOV - Former United Kingdom Colony of Virginia
Dec 2000
time: 00:29
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Mosnews
"The patriotic Rodina (Motherland) party leader Dmitri Rogozin has proposed that the city of Volgograd be renamed once again to Stalingrad, RIA Novosti has reported.
The battle of Stalingrad in 1943, in which the invading Germans were defeated, marked a turning point in World War II, and put the central Russian city on the world map. Originally called Tsaritsin, it was renamed Stalingrad by Soviet ruler Josef Stalin in 1925. The city was renamed Volgograd in 1961, eight years after the dictator’s death.
“We are not insisting on anything, we do not want to return to anything, especially ahead of the 60th anniversary of the World War II victory,” Rogozin told journalists, in an apparent attempt to assuage fears the move was an attempt to return to Soviet-style authoritarian rule.
Renaming the city Stalingrad “is a matter of historical memory”, Rogozin said. He added that giving the city back its old, world-famous name would boost the city’s attractiveness for investors.
Rogozin told journalists that he will “approach the issue delicately”. According to him, a referendum will be conducted in Volgograd to determine local opinion."
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Serb
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Siberia, Communist party of Apolyton
Nov 2001
time: 11:29
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quote:
Originally posted by lord of the mark
from a ukrainian blog
"The Zvarych affair was sparked on 16 February, when Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and her government banned the re-export of crude oil from Ukraine. The government argues that Ukraine, a country which imports over 90% of its oil, needs to maintain stable prices for petroleum products. The import of Russian oil for subsequent export at a hefty mark-up distorts and destabilizes oil prices in Ukraine, it contends. The next day, Zvarych said he would not sign off on the government's new decree, even hinting that he might resign.
Then an open letter to Tymoshenko appeared from a company, Oil Transit, whose deputy director happens to be Zvarych's wife, Svitlana. It complained that the government's decision interfered with its plans to re-export 3 million tons of oil from Russia to Slovakia. That would be roughly one-tenth of the 34 million tons of oil that Ukraine has so far imported each year from Russia. (Ukraine itself needs 22 million tons; the rest goes to Ukraine's petroleum refineries.)
For a country such as Ukraine, not used to debate about conflicts of interest, the Zvarych scandal has been a learning experience. (Zvarych himself, a former U.S. passport-holder, should know a little more about conflicts of interest.) Initially, the media were concerned primarily about Zvarych's accusation that the government was "attempting to drag members of [his] family into corrupt schemes," a reference to a complex business deal that he claims was suggested to him. When a connection with Zvarych's wife came to light, however, cries of "scandal" were heard and sentiment turned against the minister.
Yushchenko, however, came down on Zvarych's side and stated publicly that he was against banning the re-export of oil but favored imposing a value-added tax on the import of oil. That would limit the mark-up on re-exports by Oil Transit, while boosting budget revenues.
In the end, Svitlana Zvarych's business interests have been dealt a double blow: the government's ban on re-export has not been lifted, and oil imports are now subject to a 20 percent value-added tax (that is a hefty blow since Oil Transit had not yet imported most of the 3 million tons earmarked for re-export).
The scandal seems far from over, given that Zvarych last week claimed the ban on re-exports violated Ukraine's constitution, while the economics minister, Serhiy Teryokhin, claimed that there would be no re-export of crude oil from Ukraine, at least while he is a minister.
Government seeks metals giant for reprivatization
But a new government policy is attracting even more attention than this one minister's conflict of interests. That issue is the possibility of a large-scale review of previous privatizations.
The focus so far has been on Kryvorizhstal, a privatization singled out by Yushchenko in his election campaign as a particularly questionable deal. When, on 12 May 2004, Ukraine's State Property Fund put 93 percent of the factory's shares up for sale foreign investors such as the LNM Group, U.S. Steel, and TATA Steel showed an immediate interest in the largest steelmaker in what is a major steel-making country. But, then, after the tender had already been announced, the State Property Fund ruled that potential investors must have a history of producing at least one million tons of coke--a coal residue used in smelting iron ore--per year in Ukraine. Perhaps not coincidentally, only Ukrainian companies fulfilled this condition.
But what particularly concerned Yushchenko, and many others, was that the buyer, Investment Metallurgical Union, won with an offer ($800 million) that was only a little higher than the starting price ($715 million). Interested foreign investors had mentioned sums at least twice as large. The privatization had also proceeded at a record pace, with the deal concluded by 14 June 2004. Investment Metallurgical Union is a joint venture between Viktor Pinchuk, the son-in-law of former President Leonid Kuchma, and Renat Akhmetov, a man who later bankrolled much of the presidential campaign of then-Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych.
After her appointment as prime minister on 24 January, Yulia Tymoshenko announced that Kryvorizhstal would be returned to the state and, on 8 February, her cabinet instructed the State Property Fund to cancel all its decisions regarding the metal giant's privatization.
The real battle for Kryvorizhstal, however, is taking place in the courts. So far, Tymoshenko also seems to be getting her way there. On 17 February a local Kyiv court annulled its own decision from August 2004 that Kryvorizhstal's privatization was legal, and on 25 February froze the company's shares. On 1 March, Ukraine's Supreme Court annulled a number of lower-court decisions that had ruled the sale legal. It sent the case back to the commercial court to review from scratch.
In the meantime, Oleksandr Turchynov, the newly appointed head of Ukraine's secret service and before that the first deputy chairman of Tymoshenko's party, Batkivshchyna (Fatherland), said on 17 February that his agency would investigate 3,000 cases of alleged corruption in the privatization of state enterprises. In what is probably not a coincidence, Tymoshenko had earlier announced that her government would review 3,000 privatizations.
A bad example?
This policy has been dubbed "reprivatization" and stirred lively debate in the press and among policy-makers. Indeed, even Yushchenko seems to have been taken aback by the ambition of Tymoshenko, his main ally in the Orange Revolution. He responded to Tymoshenko's declarations by saying that at most 30 large enterprises would be reprivatized. But the intense and driven Tymoshenko has in the past proven hard to stop.
The danger is that "reprivatization" might become wild. Already, there is some sign that the Orange Revolution has introduced a new and disturbing element into Ukrainian business life. A case in point is the ownership of the football team Dynamo Kyiv, which was privatized in 1993 by the Surkis brothers, Hryhoriy and Ihor. Since then, it has expanded into a sports empire worth $200 million, according to Kostiantyn Grigorishin, a former business partner of the brothers'.
Grigorishin, a Russian businessman, began cooperating with the Surkises and their partners in 1998, when Ukraine's regional electricity distributors began to be privatized. But this cooperation stalled by 2002, when Grigorishin was briefly arrested at the instigation of another business partner of the Surkis brothers, Viktor Medvedchuk.
Medvedchuk is the former head of President Kuchma's administration. Hryhoriy Surkis is a member of the Social Democratic Party (United), a party led by Medvedchuk.
When the Orange Revolution was in full swing in November and December, Grigorishin declared publicly that he would "take back" Dynamo Kyiv. That threat took a tough form in mid-February when armed guards hired by Grigorishin tried unsuccessfully to seize two energy companies from the Surkis brothers. His attention has now turned to Dynamo Kyiv, although in a less violent fashion. An offshore company belonging to Grigorishin is now taking the football club to court for allegedly diluting the rights of minority shareholders. It has already won a court order prohibiting the sale of Dynamo Kyiv shares, though this might prove problematic in practice since court executors have been unable to locate the shares' registrar. All of this is worrying observers. Grigorishin clearly feels he has a chance to wrest control over companies belonging to the Surkis brothers at a time when their fortunes, long closely tied to the political scene, have taken a sharp downturn. Grigorishin knows that the new government will not interfere to protect the Surkises as it would have under Kuchma and Medvedchuk. Some fear Grigorishin may even have the backing of the current administration. During the Orange Revolution, Grigorishin made several appearances on stage with members of the opposition. He denies he offered any material help to the opposition or to Yushchenko.
How far Grigorishin is willing to go in his pursuit of the Surkis family's assets is unclear, but his strong-arm approach suggests he will not be meek. Tymoshenko, too, can be remorseless in pursuit of her goals. The danger is that a Tymoshenko-backed mass reprivatization might create a business and legal whirlwind in which men like Grigorishin will pursue their own wild reprivatization. A sense of a free-for-fall akin to the privatization of the 1990s is beginning to emerge. No detailed criteria about what companies might or might not be reprivatized have been announced. The possibility now is that some, like Grigorishin, will look at Tymoshenko's initiative and believe anything goes. Those may just be fears at this point, but already the atmosphere is unhealthy. What looks certain is that Ukraine's courts face a very busy period and a test of their malleability. " |
Good. I guess everyone who shouted about Yushenko being great Ukrainan liberal leader and about rapid changes in Ukriaine, during all those orange debates we had here, are happy now.
p.s. As for re-export, f*ckers they sell OUR oil we sell them for a low, Russian prices that a several times lower than European prices. We should turn-off the pipe and teach those bastards a lesson.
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Serb
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Siberia, Communist party of Apolyton
Nov 2001
time: 11:29
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quote:
Originally posted by lord of the mark
UPI
"Sergei Glazyev's neo-communist party Rodina (translated as "Motherland" or "Homeland") and Vladimir Zhirinovsky's misnamed party Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, or LDPR, will control approximately 20 percent of the seats in the new Duma. Both parties ran on platforms calling for a radical redistribution of wealth and an extreme interpretation of "law and order." The acute rhetoric employed by Rodina and the LDRP won them considerable popular support from voters outraged due to a strong sense of social displacement since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It remains very questionable, however, if that same rhetoric will be translated into independent and real political power.
Rodina ran on an anti-oligarch platform wrapped in heavy nationalist overtones, and was able carve off a sizeable portion of the Communist vote, emasculating the inheritor of the Soviet party. Rodina's leader, Sergei Glazyev, is an economist and one-time member of Yegor Gaidar's groundbreaking reformist administration of the early 1990s who later became disillusioned and joined the Communists only to break them in September. Rodina campaigned on the redistribution of profits from big business to the state to be paid to pensioners and state sector workers. He also advocated banning immigration.
Zhirinovsky doubled his party's 1999 vote -- to 11.6 percent -- with an outrageous campaign of antics especially made for prime-time television. The consummate performer ran a campaign demanding the arrest of all of Russia's oligarchs and calling for the return of Russia to its former super-power status in world affairs, with a couple of fistfights during TV debates thrown in for good measure. The result is Zhirinovsky's best since he burst onto the scene in 1993. His incendiary one-liners and down-to-earth cynical humor was the highlight of the campaign.
Both Rodina and the LDPR present themselves as independent and as a political alternative. However, this is seen as far from true. During the campaign, both parties relentlessly attacked Russia's two small liberal conservative parties -- Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces -- claiming their politics had impoverished over 30 percent of the population and charging that they are responsible for the creation of Russia's oligarchs. Interestingly enough, neither Rodina nor the LDPR attacked the pro-Kremlin United Russia that has controlled the Duma since Vladimir Putin was elected president in 2000. Refraining from criticizing the powers-that-be maybe the first indication of how Rodina and the LDPR will work with United Russia and the Kremlin in the next Duma.
It is widely believed that the Kremlin encouraged Glazyev to create a left-wing party bloc that would divide the Communist constituency. Glazyev succeeded in this endeavor; his next mission will most likely be to slowly sway other members of the Communist Party to join Rodina or to "invade" the Communist Party and take it over from within. Either way, Rodina is the Kremlin's appointed vehicle to create a loyal left opposition.
Moving forward, Glazyev may continue to call for a nationalist-populist platform, though he most certainly will do this without an all-out attack on United Russia or Putin. Glazyev certainly supports a leftist and nationalist agenda, but within the framework of support the state first. This is why the Kremlin agreed to quietly support Rodina's parliamentary election bid. " |
Zhirinovsky' is a clown and his so-called party is God damn circus of idiots. They have nothing common with Rodina. Glazyev is a thousand times more an economist that Chubais, Nemtsov or Hakkamada.
I vote both for Rodina nad Glazyev during last parliament and president elections, but as you all know I'm just a f*cking Russian nazi.
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Serb
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Siberia, Communist party of Apolyton
Nov 2001
time: 11:29
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quote:
Originally posted by lord of the mark
BTW. from Mosnews:
"United Russia (Yedinaya Rossiya) was formed as a party on December 1, 2001.
The party came into being as a result of the merger of three political organizations: Yedinstvo (Unity), led by crisis situations minister Sergey Shoigu; Otechestvo (Fatherland), led by Moscow mayor Yury Luzhkov; and Vsya Rossiya (The Whole Russia), led by the Republic of Tatarstan’s president Mintimer Shaimiev. The party list for the 2003 parliamentary elections was headed by Boris Gryzlov, Minister of Interior and former leader of Unity’s parliamentary group. "
So in fact United Russia IS the political heir of Unity, Yeltsin's party. Yet it has the chutzpah to use the unpopularity of the Yeltsin era privatizations as a weapon against liberals, even ones like Yavlinsky who broke with Yeltsin while Putin supported him. |
No way. Unity was created in 1999 as PUTIN's party, not Yeltsin's party. Nobody needed a party of Yeltsin then. Last Yeltsin's party was a Nash Dom Rossiya ("Our Home is Russia" or Our Home is Saddom as we joked here then).
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Serb
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Siberia, Communist party of Apolyton
Nov 2001
time: 11:29
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quote:
Originally posted by lord of the mark
his mistake, putin's benefit, and he becomes head of a powerful state-owned company. Maybe not a mistake after all? Better his current position than a powerless position in the Duma, where hed be subordinate to Yavlinsky anyway? |
Actually he became the chief of UES long before the last parliament elections. And he never was in Duma nor had intentions to work there in case of SPS victory. I know it sounds weird, but in Russia its a common practice when "leaders" of the party do not actually become a deputies after their party won the elections. I admit, it's a God damn stupid practice.
Last edited by Serb on 18-03-2005 at 02:29
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Serb
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Siberia, Communist party of Apolyton
Nov 2001
time: 11:29
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quote:
Originally posted by lord of the mark
Putin was Yeltsins PM at that time,
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True.
quote:
and IIUC Unity was supported by Yeltsin. |
Supported by Yeltsin? I'm not sure/ I can't recall any supportive statements of Yeltsin. In any case it doesn't mean it was a Yeltsin's party. Believe me, in case if this party supported Yeltsin course or in case if Yeltsin actively supported the Unity, it would never won elections of 1999. Yeltsin was TOOOOOOoooooo unpopular.
quote:
A little googling reveals that both Chubais AND Putin were proteges of Sobchak, in Leningrad. In fact Chubais brought Putin into the govt. These guys go back a LONG way. |
True.
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Apolyton Time is 00:29. |
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18-03-2005 00:15
Serb
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