22-02-2005 08:00									#31
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You're totally missing the point. The leaders of the insurgency are able to keep the support for the insurgency high by denying themselves representation, and saying "see, this is what you get under Shia rule." The insurgents would've been much weaker today if their boycott were unusuccessful.

	22-02-2005 08:23									#32
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So what the hell is the point of the insurgency besides maintaining the insurgency. That is the only end you have attached to their cause, and if this is the case they will take care of themselves.

	22-02-2005 08:28									#33
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The insurgents are fighting to take over the country, or at least prevent Shia governance over them.

The point of the boycott was to maintain the insurgency.

	22-02-2005 08:47									#34
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quote: Originally posted by Comrade Tassadar WE ARE TURNING THE CORNER!!!1

ZOMFG BRING IT ON!!!!111

	22-02-2005 08:48									#35
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But it's actually encouraging that the admin has grown a damn brain for once and is actually open to *GASP* diplomacy??????

Instead of just hunting down and killing "TEARAHRISTSS"


The dumbasses started the whole thing by disenfranchising most of the Sunni population, well duh of course they are going to be pissed off.

	22-02-2005 10:01									#36
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Bush is talking with other insurgents too!

Linky

	22-02-2005 11:41									#37
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quote: Originally posted by Ted Striker quote: Originally posted by Comrade Tassadar WE ARE TURNING THE CORNER!!!1 ZOMFG BRING IT ON!!!!111

OMG DID YOU SEE JON STEWART PWN TUCKER CARLSON?!?!?1//!?!?1?!

	22-02-2005 21:22									#38
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Allawi has been trying to talk to elements in the insurgency since he took power back in June of 2004. Apparently with little succes, apparently cause the insurgents thought they were winning. certainly not because of the influence of Chalabi, which was at its nadir at that point.

Now some insurgents are talking, per Time.

Explanations
1. Time is wrong (i would give this a high probability)
2. They really do think theyre losing - elections, attrition, Iraqi forces growing, etc.
3. The US is trying hard to make a deal, afraid that if a deal isnt made now the new UIA alliance will be incapable of it.

While sharing the general reluctance to declare a corner turned, and acknowledging the limited direct impact of the elections on the Sunni Arab community, explanation number 2 doesnt seem thoroughly implausible - there was also another statement today or yesterday of a number of tribal leaders urgently trying to negotiate a role. OTOH weve heard that before. I really think there simply isnt enough public source info to sort the wheat from the chaff here.

	22-02-2005 21:30									#39
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The insurgency has no central control and is basically a bunch of unemployed and disgruntled guys with nothing better to do. You can negotiate with a few individuals but those people only have control of insurgents in their village or portion of the city. There will be no break through like the Japanese surrendering or the Communist Chinese agreeing to a cease fire.

A better analogy would be the German government slowly hunting down key members of the Red Army Faction and getting them to rat each other out.

	22-02-2005 21:43									#40
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quote: Originally posted by Oerdin The insurgency has no central control and is basically a bunch of unemployed

IIUC alot of those unemployed are paid by the insurgency, as are some criminal types. Without the flow of funds theyd go home, or at least become less active. Also they rely on caches of weapons, many planted by the former regime - the locations being known to former regime elements. IIUC there are people high enough up that if they turned they could reveal alot about that caches, funds flows, etc.

	22-02-2005 21:44									#41
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I wonder the extent of the centralization of the insurgency. At a minimum, I would expect tribal leaders to have some sway over the actions of tribal members. Is this expectation correct?

	23-02-2005 02:50									#42
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quote: Allawi has been trying to talk to elements in the insurgency since he took power back in June of 2004. Apparently with little succes, apparently cause the insurgents thought they were winning. certainly not because of the influence of Chalabi, which was at its nadir at that point.

Allawi isn't the same thing as the US; I don't think we were doing anything like this in June '04. And I certainly didn't mean that only Chalabi has been responsible for that, I was referring the strong element in our gov't, particularly in Defense, that has refused to compromise with the insurgents.

	23-02-2005 02:54									#43
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BTW, if a President Kerry was doing this, the Repukes would be attackign him for it.

	23-02-2005 03:00									#44
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quote: Originally posted by Ramo quote: Allawi has been trying to talk to elements in the insurgency since he took power back in June of 2004. Apparently with little succes, apparently cause the insurgents thought they were winning. certainly not because of the influence of Chalabi, which was at its nadir at that point. Allawi isn't the same thing as the US; I don't think we were doing anything like this in June '04. And I certainly didn't mean that only Chalabi has been responsible for that, I was referring the strong element in our gov't, particularly in Defense, that has refused to compromise with the insurgents.

second point first - the nadir of Chalabi coincided with the takeover of Iraq policy by State/NSC from DoD. my impression is that the victory of UIA over Allawi may be seen by some as DoD's revenge.

first point - I doubt Allawi wasnt working with the US when he negotiated, and i have no evidence that current US negotiations arent coordinated with Iraqi authorities. I will have to read the article - it matters what level this is - after all US commanders in the field have been negotiation with local tribals for sometime I think - it would be quite logical for them to negotiate a surrender - I dont see how they could be authorized to negotiate political concessions wrt to Iraqi politics - thats almost out of US hands, more now than pre-election - and to negotiate a withdrawl would requite VERY high level involvement.

	23-02-2005 18:20									#45
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quote: second point first - the nadir of Chalabi coincided with the takeover of Iraq policy by State/NSC from DoD. my impression is that the victory of UIA over Allawi may be seen by some as DoD's revenge.

I don't know if State entirely took over, though. Negroponte and Allawi were important victories for them, granted, but I thought Fallujah for instance was more Defense's dawg than State's. As for Allawi, I thought Defense pretty much fell in line ever since the choice was made (certainly, neo-con critiques of Allawi have been sparse), but it is an amusing thought that a massive victory for Islamists could be considered a victory for Defense.

quote: first point - I doubt Allawi wasnt working with the US when he negotiated

That may be the case, but I haven't seen any evidence that the US particularly committed itself to the process.

quote: , and i have no evidence that current US negotiations arent coordinated with Iraqi authorities.

True, I'm not saying otherwise.

	23-02-2005 18:49									#46
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The question is, will the new Iraqi gov't, likely under Jaafari, continue these talks? Jaafari seems to be committed much more rigidly to de-Ba'athification than Allawi.

	23-02-2005 19:20									#47
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[QUOTE] Originally posted by Ramo

quote: I don't know if State entirely took over, though. Negroponte and Allawi were important victories for them, granted, but I thought Fallujah for instance was more Defense's dawg than State's.

well the execution was, it was a military campaign after all. If you mean that State or NSA or, for that matter, Allawi, thought it was a bad idea, i think youre incorrect. I think the consensus was that an insurgent sanctuary in Fallujah was unacceptable on numerous grounds.

quote: As for Allawi, I thought Defense pretty much fell in line ever since the choice was made (certainly, neo-con critiques of Allawi have been sparse)

you havent been reading Jim Hoagland in the Washington Post, have you? Granted Im not sure how much Hoagland writes based on his neocon contacts, and how much on his personal contacts with Iraqis, notably Chalabi, but hes been a strong voice. If youre interested in Iraq, intra - US govt politics, etc you really do owe it to yourself the read the WaPo regularly.

quote: , but it is an amusing thought that a massive victory for Islamists could be considered a victory for Defense.

These "islamists" aint salafists or Khomeinists. It is a victory for democracy promotion over "realism", for Debaathification, and for the Shiite-Kurdish alliance. Recall please that pre-war some at DoD wanted an "Afghan" strategy relying on US air allied with Peshmerga and exiles, as opposed to the State/CIA strategy that looked to Iraqi army types, like Allawis friends. It may not be a victory for long term US bases in Iraq, or having an Iraqi "puppet" but I dont think that was EVER DoD strategy.

quote: That may be the case, but I haven't seen any evidence that the US particularly committed itself to the process.

I dont think Allawi got enough response to justify US commitment.

	23-02-2005 19:24									#48
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quote: Originally posted by Ramo The question is, will the new Iraqi gov't, likely under Jaafari, continue these talks? Jaafari seems to be committed much more rigidly to de-Ba'athification than Allawi.

which is why I asked earlier, what is that the Sunni Arabs want? If they want to continue rebaathification of the security services, I dont think Jaafari will give them that. Indeed, given the evidence that the Iraqi state is highly penetrated by insurgent sympathizers, and that has been of significant benefit to the insurgents, debaathification may be a strategic necessity, not just a political position.

Im also not sure that the negotiations with insurgents are in the same category or cover the same areas as the political discussions expected to take place with AMS and IIP.

	23-02-2005 19:29									#49
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quote: , but it is an amusing thought that a massive victory for Islamists could be considered a victory for Defense.

It is a mistake, a profound mistake, to identify the strategizing of Wolfowitz, Feith, Rumsfeld, Bolton, etc with the rantings of an Anne Coulter, Michelle Malkin, or other islamophobes in the media. The right wing Islamophobes tend to defend the neocons largely from 1. a vicious hatred for the kinds of folks who tend to attack the neocons 2. an admiration for the use of American force 3. a refusal (shared on the left, BTW) to take the neocons strategy seriously

	25-02-2005 13:00									#50
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quote: well the execution was, it was a military campaign after all. If you mean that State or NSA or, for that matter, Allawi, thought it was a bad idea, i think youre incorrect. I think the consensus was that an insurgent sanctuary in Fallujah was unacceptable on numerous grounds.

I got a different reading from State. IIRC, there was a sharp reversal of policy regarding Fallujah (and other things). Something that can only signify turf wars over Iraq.

quote: you havent been reading Jim Hoagland in the Washington Post, have you? Granted Im not sure how much Hoagland writes based on his neocon contacts, and how much on his personal contacts with Iraqis, notably Chalabi, but hes been a strong voice. If youre interested in Iraq, intra - US govt politics, etc you really do owe it to yourself the read the WaPo regularly.

I generally look to TNR for that perspective. Thanks for the tip.

quote: These "islamists" aint salafists or Khomeinists.

Some are. From what I've heard, there are a dozen or two genuine Sadrists on the list (incidentally, I find it quite rediculous that not only did no one know who the candidates were before the election, no one seems to know a month after it).

In any case, they're almost certain to implement sharia as personal status law, and perhaps even extend it to economic relations, etc. Remember that they're trying to make Islam the sole source of legislation; while they may not be able to get that in the Constitution, they may get that informally for as long as they're in power.

quote: It is a victory for democracy promotion over "realism", for Debaathification, and for the Shiite-Kurdish alliance. Recall please that pre-war some at DoD wanted an "Afghan" strategy relying on US air allied with Peshmerga and exiles, as opposed to the State/CIA strategy that looked to Iraqi army types, like Allawis friends.

Sure, sure, I see how it can be seen as a victory for Defense, but the thought amuses me.

quote: It is a mistake, a profound mistake, to identify the strategizing of Wolfowitz, Feith, Rumsfeld, Bolton, etc with the rantings of an Anne Coulter, Michelle Malkin, or other islamophobes in the media. The right wing Islamophobes tend to defend the neocons largely from 1. a vicious hatred for the kinds of folks who tend to attack the neocons 2. an admiration for the use of American force

I'm not just talking about Coulter et al. There seems to be a bit of paranoia towards the "Islamo-fascist menace" in neocon circles.

quote: 3. a refusal (shared on the left, BTW) to take the neocons strategy seriously

That might be because the Admin neocons don't seem to take the "neocon strategy" seriously. Hence, when Musharraf refused to resign as head of the army, not a peep from these guys.

I was watching a Dean/Perle debate on foreign policy a week ago, and I was struck by precisely how poor Perle's connection to realty was. He's still trying to pass the Iraq war off as some victory for American national security against "the terrorists." Not in terms of a flowing of democracy, domino effect, etc., etc., but he still seems to think that Saddam was in cahoots with al-Qaeda. It's all Straussian doublespeak for these guys. Who the hell knows what they really think?

Practically, it seems like their support for real democracy is lukewarm at best. Wolfy, after all, was a supporter of Suharto, Chun and Marcos. "Democracy promotion" in Iraq has specifically excluded anything that might restrain corporatism, illustrated by the continued repression of unions, dissolution of any badly needed welfare, etc. (showing either a fundamental lack of understanding of, or apathy towards, opposing Islamist terror and supporting democracy).

quote: which is why I asked earlier, what is that the Sunni Arabs want?

I have no idea. As far as formal demands, the only one seems to be "end the occupation."

Incidentally, the AMS recently denied involvement in negotiations with Americans; rather that the American contacts are with "high leaders of the dissolved Baath Party." If that's the case, success of these negotiations would only have limited effect in stopping the insurgency:

quote: The following interesting excerpt from today's (Feb 23) Al-Hayat (my translation from Arabic): ' A member of the Association of Muslim Scholars [believed to be the most popular group among Arab Sunnis in Iraq] has denied that the contacts held by the American delegation wiith armed groups involved the Association. He declared to Al-Hayat that the practice of equating the "armed resistance" with the Sunnis is "a big mistake, and the contacts do not take place with Sunni groups but with high leaders of the dissolved Baath Party." He added that the Association is not concerned by these contacts, because it is "a Sunni religious authority opposed to the occupation through peaceful means, and even though it considers the resistance to be a legitimate right of every Iraqi, it rejects terrorism and the killing of innocents." He revealed that the contacts engaged with the Association in order to integrate it in the new government centered only around the procedure of writing the constitution, and were held with Iraqi political forces and with Ashraf Qadi, the representative of the UN General Secretary, and not with the Bush administration. He added that "these meetings will remain useless if the Americans keep betraying their promises, like carrying on the military operations and arrests." "The US administration, which is the occupying force, should have controlled the borders with the neighbouring countries that allow the infiltration of terrorist groups, and made a distinction [in their contacts] between the legitimate resistance and terrorism, unless they are the first beneficiaries of the instability of security conditions to guarantee that they will stay as long as possible." '

	25-02-2005 14:30									#51
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The irony is many insurgents dont want the US to leave soon, not because they want US targets, but because they want the US army to protect them from the Shia. Thats what the insurgency is really about, fear of reprisals from former victims of Saddam and the Sunnis.

	25-02-2005 14:43									#52
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quote: Originally posted by Berzerker The irony is many insurgents dont want the US to leave soon, not because they want US targets, but because they want the US army to protect them from the Shia. Thats what the insurgency is really about, fear of reprisals from former victims of Saddam and the Sunnis.

We should do as little as possible to disuade the Shia in this as we give them one last chance to negotiate before we leave.

	25-02-2005 21:51									#53
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quote: The irony is many insurgents dont want the US to leave soon, not because they want US targets, but because they want the US army to protect them from the Shia. Thats what the insurgency is really about, fear of reprisals from former victims of Saddam and the Sunnis.

Not really. The insurgents (mistakenly IMO) believe that they can win a civil war. That's their strategy - get the US to leave, then take over the country.