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Boris Godunov
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Portland, OR
Aug 2001
time: 00:20
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From the NY Times:
The Death of bin Ladenism
By AMIR TAHERI
PARIS — Osama bin Laden is dead. The news first came from sources in Afghanistan and Pakistan almost six months ago: the fugitive died in December and was buried in the mountains of southeast Afghanistan. Pakistan's president, Pervez Musharraf, echoed the information. The remnants of Osama's gang, however, have mostly stayed silent, either to keep Osama's ghost alive or because they have no means of communication.
With an ego the size of Mount Everest, Osama bin Laden would not have, could not have, remained silent for so long if he were still alive. He always liked to take credit even for things he had nothing to do with. Would he remain silent for nine months and not trumpet his own survival?
Even if he is still in the world, bin Ladenism has left for good. Mr. bin Laden was the public face of a brand of politics that committed suicide in New York and Washington on Sept. 11, 2001, killing thousands of innocent people in the process.
What were the key elements of that politics?
The first was a cynical misinterpretation of Islam that began decades ago with such anti-Western ideologues as Maulana Maudoodi of Pakistan and Sayyid Qutb of Egypt. Although Mr. Maudoodi and Mr. Qutb were not serious thinkers, they could at least offer a coherent ideology based on a narrow reading of Islamic texts. Their ideas about Western barbarism and Muslim revival, distilled down to bin Ladenism, became mere slogans designed to incite zealots to murder.
People like Mr. Maudoodi and Mr. Qutb could catch the ball and run largely because most Muslim intellectuals of their generation (and later) had no interest in continuing the work of Muslim philosophers. Our intellectuals were too busy learning Western ideologies of one kind or another — and they left the newly urbanized Muslim masses to the half-baked ideas of men like Mr. Maudoodi and Mr. Qutb and eventually Mr. bin Laden.
Now, however, many Muslim intellectuals are returning home, so to speak. They are rediscovering the philosophical heritage of Islam and the challenges of Muslim political thought. And Maudoodi-Qutbism is now being seen as a pseudo-Islamic version of Western fascism.
The second element that made Mr. bin Laden possible was easy money, largely from wealthy individuals in the Persian Gulf area who believed that they were buying a place in the hereafter while protecting themselves against political opposition in this world. Some paid because they believed they were helping poor and oppressed Muslims. Others paid so militants would go and spend their energies far away from home.
That easy money is no longer available, at least not in large quantities. Many donors have realized they were financing terrorists. Some have been forced to choose between the West, where they have the bulk of their wealth, and the troglodyte mujahedeen of the Hindu Kush.
The third element that made bin Ladenist terror possible was the encouraging, or at least complacent, attitude of several governments. The Taliban in Afghanistan began by hosting Mr. bin Laden and ended up becoming his life-and-death buddies. The Pakistanis were also supportive because they wanted to dominate Afghanistan and make life hard for the Indians by sending holy warriors to Kashmir. The Sudanese government was sympathetic, if not actually supportive, and offered at least a safe haven. This was also the case in Yemen, where in November 2000 I accidentally ran into a crowd of Qaeda militants who had flown in from Pakistan for a gathering.
We now know that Qaeda cells operated, often quite openly, in Muslim countries from Indonesia and Malaysia to Morocco and Tunisia, without being bothered by anyone. The fall of the Taliban means the gang no longer has a secure base. All the other countries are also closed, and in some cases even hostile.
The fourth element was the mistaken practice of many Western powers that sheltered the terrorists in the name of freedom of expression and dissent. We now know that London was a critical haven for Al Qaeda. The murder of the Afghan resistance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud was planned in London. Qaeda militants operated in Germany, Holland, Belgium, France, Spain and Italy without significant restraint.
The fifth element that made bin Ladenism possible was the West's, especially America's, perceived weakness if not actual cowardice. A joke going around militant Islamist circles until last year was that the only thing the Americans would do if attacked was to sue. That perception no longer exists. The Americans, supported by one of the largest coalitions in history, have shown they will use force against their enemies even if that means a long and difficult war.
The sixth element of bin Ladenism was the illusion in most Western nations that they could somehow remain unaffected by the violence unleashed by fanatical terrorists against so many Muslim nations from Indonesia to Algeria.
Mr. bin Laden could survive and prosper only in a world in which these elements existed. That world is gone. Mr. bin Laden's ghost may linger on — perhaps because Washington and Islamabad will find it useful. President Bush's party has a crucial election to win and Pervez Musharraf is keen to keep Pakistan in the limelight as long as possible.
But the truth is that Osama bin Laden is dead.
Amir Taheri, editor of the Paris-based journal Politique Internationale, is a frequent contributor to the "Arab News" of Jidda, Saudi Arabia.
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So...Bin Laden's death covered up for cynical politcal reasons? 
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DinoDoc
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AECCP loves Democracy
Sep 1999
time: 23:20
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quote:
The first was a cynical misinterpretation of Islam that began decades ago with such anti-Western ideologues as Maulana Maudoodi of Pakistan and Sayyid Qutb of Egypt. |
I can not comment on this part because I have no knowledge of the specifics surrounding it.
quote:
The second element that made Mr. bin Laden possible was easy money, largely from wealthy individuals in the Persian Gulf area who believed that they were buying a place in the hereafter while protecting themselves against political opposition in this world. |
This part is wrong due to the fact that the Saudi royal family still funds extremist, anti-Western madrasas around the world which is are a prime recruiting ground for terrorist organizations. They also had a telethon recently to provide monetary rewards to the families of suicide bombers. Iran and Syria still fund Hezbollah. The list goes on.
quote:
The third element that made bin Ladenist terror possible was the encouraging, or at least complacent, attitude of several governments. |
As far as I can tell Arab governments in the Middle East have not taken signifigant action against terrorist organizations opperating within territory under thier control, ex Syria.
quote:
The fourth element was the mistaken practice of many Western powers that sheltered the terrorists in the name of freedom of expression and dissent. |
I can not comment on this part because of a lack of knowledge.
quote:
The fifth element that made bin Ladenism possible was the West's, especially America's, perceived weakness if not actual cowardice. |
I will agree that this is likely no longer in place.
quote:
The sixth element of bin Ladenism was the illusion in most Western nations that they could somehow remain unaffected by the violence unleashed by fanatical terrorists against so many Muslim nations from Indonesia to Algeria. |
This is still largely in place outside of America if the comments on Apolyton are any real indication of the sentiments in Europe wrt this fact.
Last edited by DinoDoc on 11-07-2002 at 18:58
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Zevico
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Melbourne
Apr 2002
time: 15:20
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bin Laden attitudes are alive and well in Iran,Iraq, Pakistan, Indonesia, and any other Islamic country.
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MBD
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from an article by James S. Robbins on another site --
All of this has fueled the debate over whether Osama bin Laden is still alive. It is an intriguing question, but difficult to address beyond the level of speculation and of limited practical utility. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated recently that "trying to personify the problem is catchy for headlines, but it's not terribly useful in the global war on terrorism." He notes that al Qaeda is bigger than bin Laden, and the terrorist threat is bigger than al Qaeda. Focusing only on bin Laden could divert attention from U.S. strategic objectives in the war as a whole.
Yet the terrorists are trying to keep bin Laden the center of attention, whether he is alive or dead. Al-Sahab ("the clouds") productions is making something of a cottage industry of releasing al Qaeda videos. They produced the recently released suicide hijacker Ahmad al-Ghamidi's will, and promise to release footage shot last fall of bin Laden under fire in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, every time they release the old material, they implicitly raise the question, don't they have anything new, and if not, why?
Bin Laden has not made a verifiable statement since December, when he looked definitely the worse for wear. If he is alive he is under extraordinary pressure from Allied forces hunting him, and the reward money is still there for anyone clever enough to figure out a way to collect it. He could just be laying low. He has done it before. He disappeared for a time in 1999 when he temporarily lost confidence in his Taliban protectors. He might be holed up in a house somewhere in the mountains on the Afghan/Pakistan border, immobile, taking few visitors, recuperating, and planning his next attacks.
But the problem with staying publicly silent this long — assuming it is voluntary — is that it is hard to keep a highly decentralized global terrorist network up and running without its charismatic leader. Command, control, and coordination become difficult, though certainly not impossible. Al Qaeda seems adept at using the Internet, which is ironic since the network was invented was to facilitate communications between U.S. command nodes in the event of nuclear war or some other catastrophe. In this sense al Qaeda is using the system in the manner it was intended. Of course you can never know who is listening, so they probably also utilize the same halawa networks that allowed them to make invisible money transactions the old fashioned way — big wads of cash or bags of diamonds handled by trusted couriers going door to door.
Controlling the money must be another important concern. This is an organization composed of criminals with vast amounts of untraceable funds, and no accountability. A multimillion-dollar enterprise like this would have a natural propensity to loot itself. The Wall Street Journal's recent revelations of infighting in al Qaeda number-two man Ayman al-Zawahri's Egyptian Islamic Jihad is illustrative. He chastised an underling for buying a $470 fax machine, and the junior terrorist basically responded, "Take this jihad and shove it." My guess is the fax machine went with him. It is reasonable to suspect that some intermediaries in the al Qaeda network who have access to much larger sums of money would abscond with them the moment they knew the CEO had been forced into early retirement.
Finally, al Qaeda has to figure out how to inspire and motivate the troops. Maybe the terrorists expected a few reverses on the pathway to paradise, but they could not have thought they would be losing this badly. The Taliban overthrown; Afghanistan no longer a safe haven; follow-on attacks preempted; affiliated terror organizations on the run; important leaders captured or killed; thousands of their foot soldiers in custody; no sign of the U.S. being deterred or losing momentum. It cannot be easy for their side to go to work in the morning. In his most recent statement, Abu Gaith gamely noted that "war has ups and downs.... One day, the Muslims defeat the infidels, and another day the infidels defeat the Muslims.... Anyone who thinks that this road is easy and strewn with roses is mistaken." He sounds like the manager of a losing ball team trying to explain why they are 20 back at the All-Star break.
Bin Laden's response — he blames the team. After all, it can't be his fault. He sees himself as a messianic figure, a true holy warrior, an exemplar to his people, waiting for the Muslim ummah to unite behind him in his global jihad. But they just aren't cutting the mustard. In a recently posted (though undated) exchange of poems with his 14-year-old son Hamzah, his feeling of disappointment in his followers is explicit. His son asks about the dangers they face, the bombs falling, people dying; he seems bewildered that the golden future he had expected had not materialized. "What has happened for us to be chased by danger?" he asks. "Immortality is our destiny should God Almighty desire victory for us. Tell me father something useful and brief about what I see." His father, exasperated, responds, "Suffice it that I am full of grief and sighs. What can I say if we are living in a world of laziness and discontent? What can I say to a world that is blind in both sight and perception?" He goes on to wonder how long "real men will be in short supply."
It would be helpful if bin Laden made his presence among the living unambiguous — for example made a videotape holding a recent newspaper front page, or said something time-dependent like, "I am most gladdened that Allah willed that Germany shut out the United States in the World Cup quarterfinal." Better yet, he could hold a live press conference in a predetermined open-air location surrounded by his closest advisers. That would be a video worth watching, especially the feed from Predator-cam.
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11-07-2002 18:18
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