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gsmoove23
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Ned, assassination is only one vulnerability I was reffering to. Character assassination is another. I was also suggesting that the best way to combat a peace movement is to plant individuals with weapons or rabble rousers within demonstrations or the movement. I have heard countless examples of supposedly peaceful demonstrations in WB and Gaza where civilians were killed and IDF sources claim there was a gunmen in the crowd. While I believe the IDF must have been telling the truth in some, if not most, of these occasions I have to wonder about all of them.
quote:
Blessed are the peacemakers... |
My point being... they are also quite rare.
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Az
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MACEDONIA - It's the name of the sovereign country to the north of Greece
Apr 2000
time: 07:24
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quote:
what about the Palestinians in Israel proper? Or the Jews in Palestine? If the country gets split in two, there would be minorities in both nations. Also, the status of Jerusalem would be heavily contested. It's very much the same between India and Pakistan, with their minorities and the status of Kashmer.
Non violence by Arafat may have helped in creating a free Palestine, but it wouldn't end the violence. Like in India, fighting between the various minorities against the majority would still take place. Also, there would most likely still be violence and tension in Jerusalem, since both sides still claim it. Furthermore, certain Muslims groups have sworn to conquer all of Israel.
Non violence by Arafat, and for a while by the people, may certainly have helped the Palestinian cause. However, the non violence it would be silence before the storm, and within a few years violence would resume, an independent Palestinian state or not.
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 so what do you propose?
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chegitz guevara
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Ft. Lauderdale, FL Communist Party of Apolyton
Jun 2000
time: 00:24
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You do know that Arafat had nothing to do with the Six Day War, don't you? The combatants were Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. It was not until after the war that the PLO became a terrorist/combat organization. Another three hundred thousand plus refugees were made when the Israelis took over Gaza and the West Bank. Furthermore, the treatment of the newly conquered Palestinians is what really pushed them over the edge.
The Six Day War was an aggressive war on Israel's part. Syrian shelling (it's not as if Israel didn't provoke Syria either) and Egyptian closure of the Straits of Tiran were excuses, not reasons. Israel's goal was not self-preservation but expansion, Eretz Yisrael, Greater Israel.
If the Arafat acted like Ghandi, Israel would still have complete control of the occupied territories and there would be no PA. Israel is only giving up the territories because it grows sick of eternal war.
You should also remember that is during the periods when the PLO honored a ceasefire with Israel that Israel launched the bloodiest war in its history, the invasion of Lebanon, which killed upwards of twenty thousand people in Sidon and Tyre alone. The war was soley to evict the PLO from Lebanon, even though (or rather because) the PLO had honored an 18 month truce.
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gsmoove23
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quote:
Originally posted by Ned
Che, If Arafat had been like Ghandi, there would have been no Six Day War. He could have set up a state in the WB and Gaza and lived peacefully ever after with Israel.
But such was not his objective in '67, was it? Nor were his methods non violent. |
C'mon Ned, if Arafat had been like Ghandi he would have never gained power. Do you think if Ben Gurion was like Ghandi Israel would be where it is today? Plus, in India there was not such a single-minded attempt to divorce a people from their land. Try to convince somebody to turn the other cheek when their lands are in the process of being stolen. It won't work.
Whatever the case is today in 67 a large number of Israelis, certainly much of the Israeli leadership, saw the war as a chance to bring Israel to its historical boundaries, and as Che said they immediately began to act on this. 300,000 palestinians were expelled from the territories in 67, half of those were made refugees for the second time. All of Jerusalem was annexed soon after. Activists of all sorts were jailed, assassinated or expelled, it was illegal to have a palestinian flag up until Oslo. There was no time to form a real peace movement, which isn't to say that peaceful protest wasn't made. It just wasn't successful.
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gsmoove23
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I wasn't sure but I had thought in 67 that Arafat wasn't a major player. I found this in a history of the PLO from http://www.terrorism.com/terrorism/PLO.shtml
By 1967 the PLO had decided that their primary goal was the destruction of the state of Israel. For the next ten years, this goal was the primary focus of the massive terrorist campaign by which their reputation was formed. This war cost untold hundreds of casualties on both sides with very little to show in return. Therefore, in 1974 the PLO made a conscious decision to alter its focus from the purely terrorist to one that would include political elements, necessary for any meaningful dialogue. This created more unhappiness amongst some followers who felt that the PLO, while striking blows, was not truly finding its mark. This led to the creation of yet another splinter group called the Rejectionist Front. It was at this time that Yassir Arafat and his group al-Fatah took over the leadership role.
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gsmoove23
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quote:
Originally posted by Azazel
And your story that Israel has supposedly has attacked in 67' is ****ing tiresome. There is an Israeli govt. memorandum of the early 60s that calls for peace in exchange to the territorries captured in 67', still in the days of Eschol, and that proposition was rejected as state in the Khartum declaration. |
Could you please expand on this, offer references. Government memorandum? That doesn't sound like it carried much weight. Did it also include the annexed parts of Jerusalem?
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gsmoove23
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A proposition that wasn't followed through. Plus, I'm sure there were a few more qualifications?
We could argue forever about the 'generous' offer made by Barak. The fact is that Israeli and Palestinian ideas of a generous or just peace differ substantially.
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Ned
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of Aptos, CA
Oct 1999
time: 21:24
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As to Arafat's role in the '67 war, here is a bit from is bio. Certainly he was behind the terrorism coming from Gaza and Lebanon (I believe) in '67. But then he was only head of Fatah, not the PLO. When he took over the PLO in '68, the PLO promptly turned to terrorism. I wonder why?
"After the war[ '48], Arafat studied civil engineering at the University of Cairo. He headed the Palestinian Students League and, by the time he graduated, was committed to forming a group that would free Palestine from Israeli occupation. In 1956 he founded Al Fatah, an underground terrorist organization. At first Al Fatah was ignored by larger Arab nations such as Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, which had formed their own group — the Palestine Liberation Organization. It wasn’t until the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, when the Arabs lost the Gaza Strip, Golan Heights and West Bank, that Arab nations turned to Arafat. In 1968 he became the leader of the PLO."
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Ned
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of Aptos, CA
Oct 1999
time: 21:24
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quote:
Originally posted by chegitz guevara
Israel never allowed peacekeepers on its side of the border, and Egypt was tired of being the only ones with peacekeepers. Also, they hoped that it would worry Israel (which was threating to attack Syria, with whom Egypt had a defense treaty). Egypt did move a few divisions up to the border, but no one seriously considered Egypt a threat (as they had just spent the previous four years loosing to Yemeni tribesman). That the Egyptians weren't seriously considering war can be seen in the ease in which they were overrun (compared to Syria, who was expecting to be attacked). |
CyberGnu and Che, I remember the Six Day War and the events leading up to it. The history below accurately describes the situation just prior to war as I remember it.
quote:
XI. THE SIX-DAY WAR
INTRODUCTION
On 15 May 1967, Israel celebrated its 19th Day of Independence. The celebrations were attuned to a minor key. The economy had not yet recovered from a recession that had afflicted it the year before. Tension on the border with Syria had risen incessantly, sabotage was being committed in Israel's territory by terrorists from across the lines, settlements were being shelled by Syrian guns entrenched on the Golan Heights. The Soviet press waged a propaganda campaign against Israel, accusing it of aggressive designs against Syria.
During the Independence Day parade in Jerusalem, Israel's Government heard from the Chief of Staff the first news of large Egyptian troop movements, begun the previous day, in the direction of the Suez Canal and the Sinai peninsula (Document 1). There was, at first, an inclination to believe that the movements were no more than a propagandistic show. Egypt's fortunes at that time were at a low ebb. It was still entangled in the Yemen war, with little success, and consequently suffered from loss of prestige. Its relations with some of its Arab sister-States had deteriorated, those with Saudi Arabia were near the breaking point, those with Tunisia and Morocco strained, Jordan was considered an enemy (in a speech on 1 May Nasser had called King Hussein an 'agent and slave of the imperialists'). Syria indicted Egypt as not living up to its obligations as an ally. The Israelis did not yet know that the Soviet Union was urging Egypt to take an active stand alongside Syria against what was described as an impending Israeli aggression against Syria. On 13 May a Soviet parliamentary delegation visited Cairo and informed the Egyptian leaders that Israel had concentrated eleven to thirteen brigades along the Syrian border in preparation for an assault within a few days, with the intention of overthrowing the revolutionary Syrian Government. Similar information may have been given to Egypt by the Soviets somewhat earlier. There was, of course, not a grain of truth in the story, as the Soviets knew very well. The Egyptians were in a position to know it, too, in view of the authoritative denial issued by Secretary-General U Thant a few days afterwards. Later, U Thant reported that UNTSO observers "have verified the absence of troop concentrations and absence of noteworthy military movements on both sides of the [Syrian] line". But Nasser probably understood the Soviet information as a hint that the Soviet Union was persuaded that timing and circumstances were propitious for an assault on Israel, and obviously felt obliged to abandon the cautious policy that he had till then pursued and assume the leadership of the Arab campaign.
If Israel's leaders still told themselves on 15 May that there was no imminent danger of war, they were soon to be undeceived. On 16 May Radio Cairo declared: "The existence of Israel has continued too long. We welcome the Israeli aggression we welcome the battle we have long awaited. The peak hour has come. The battle has come in which we shall destroy Israel." On that day, Egypt asked for the withdrawal of the UN Emergency Force from Sinai and the Gaza Strip. U Thant acquiesced on the night of 18-19 May in what many considered unwarranted haste. Israel asserted that his precipitate compliance ran contrary to an express undertaking by his predecessor in 1957 (see Section IX, Document 35). UNEF ceased its functions on 19 May (Document 2). On the same day, Israel decided on partial mobilization, but was still hopeful that a dangerous escalation could be averted by stepped-up diplomatic efforts. It was indicative of this state of mind that, also the same day, President Zalman Shazar flew to Canada for a long-planned State visit, and that on 21 May Finland's Premier, Kustun Passio, was welcomed on a State visit to Israel. At the opening of the summer session of the Knesset on 22 May Prime Minister Eshkol emphasized Syrian aggression and incitement and called for a lessening of tension and the preservation of peace (Document 3).
In the meantime, unprecedented military escalation had taken place on the Egyptian border. By 20 May Nasser had massed over 80,000 men and about 900 tanks in Sinai, facing Israel. In the early morning hours of 23 May while U Thant was on his way to Cairo as a peace-maker, the world learned that Nasser had proclaimed the closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli and Israel-bound shipping some hours before. He was fully aware that Israel regarded the closure as an act of aggression justifying Israel's invocation of the right of self-defence. It was his declared aim to force Israel into action that would trigger off full-scale war. Speaking to Egyptian trade unionists on 26 May, he declared: "The battle will be a general one and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel" (Document 7). With the UNEF departed, Egypt planned to resume fidayun operations from the Gaza Strip against and into Israel. After more than ten years of repose, Israel's villages in the vicinity of the Egyptian border had, once more, to suffer shelling and mines. War frenzy swept Egypt and almost the entire Arab world. Nasser was at the zenith of his popularity, the hero of battle who would lead the Arabs to victory. On 29 May he delivered a speech proclaiming that he would erase the Arab defeat of 1948 (Document 8). On 30 May, King Hussein of Jordan visited Cairo unexpectedly, committed himself to take part in the war that loomed and placed his forces Under an Egyptian commander, General Riad. Iraq followed suit. During a visit to Moscow, Egypt's War Minister was assured of Soviet support by Prime Minister Kosygin.
On 24 May, the Security Council met, at the insistence of Canada and Denmark, to discuss the situation in the Middle East. The representatives of the Soviet Union and Bulgaria maintained that there was no reason for a discussion. After fruitless talks, the Council adjourned on 3 June; it had reached no decision (Document 10).
Foreign Minister Eban left Jerusalem on 24 May for Paris, London and Washington, to alert the Western leaders to the critical situation and seek of them action in accordance with their declarations ten years earlier, when Israel withdrew its forces from Sharm el-Sheikh and the Gaza Strip. In Paris, Eban found a completely changed situation. President de Gaulle suggested that the Big Four should work together for a de-escalation of the tension and decide on a solution to the questions of navigation through the Straits, the problem of the Arab refugees and the "conditions of proximity of the interested States". He urged that Israel should not be the first to open fire. Eban's protestations that Egypt had already started aggression were in vain. A statement in similar terms to the utterances of de Gaulle was issued on 2 June by the Council of Ministers of France (Document 11), and, on the following day, by the French representative in the Security Council (Document 10). It became apparent that France, which only three years earlier had hailed Israel as "friend and ally", had switched sides. On 3 June, it imposed an arms embargo on the Middle East, but in reality only Israel was affected.
President Lyndon Johnson and Prime Minister Harold Wilson assured the Israeli Foreign Minister of their support for free passage through the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba, but added that they needed some time to enlist the participation of other States and to assure the necessary approval by Congress and Parliament. The Foreign Minister returned to Jerusalem on the evening of 27 May. After a long and anxious session, the Government decided to give further chances to diplomatic efforts to prevent war. But, within a few more days, it was considered that there were no chances of resolving the crisis by international action. While a sympathetic but passive world watched Israel in its most perilous hour, Israel finished mobilization and prepared for the worst eventuality. On I June, the two major opposition parties, Gahal and Rafi, joined the Government coalition in a Government of National Unity. Lieutenant-General Moshe. Dayan (Rafi), Chief of Staff during the Sinai campaign, replaced Levi Eshkol as Minister of Defence, and Gahal leaders Menachem Begin and Yosef Sapir became Ministers without portfolio. On 4 June, the Cabinet authorized the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence to decide on appropriate steps to defend the State (Document 12).
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02-12-2002 23:39
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