 |
|  |
 |
|
MichaeltheGreat
|
|
Apolyton Grand Executioner
|
 |
mooning the house that Ruth built.
Oct 1999 time: 21:26
|
|
Rumsfeld's read too many Clancy novels. 
That's another reason I can't stand Shinseki, as well - his notable contribution to the US Army is giving everyone black berets so they feel all cute. Franks is one of those guys who just salutes and does what he's told - he isn't political, and he isn't a prima-donna like Schwarzkopf.
Powell is out of the loop, since State doesn't actually do anything in this administration. 
Last time, you had a much more forceful presence in the Army - Schwarzkopf was vocal, he was backed by Carl Vuono, another no-**** soldier who spoke his mind, and Powell as CJCS was very effective with Bush sr. in getting the Army point of view across wrt realistic ground combat timelines and force requirements.
Now you've got an Airedale (although a good one, you just don't expect mudmovers to think like or understand groundpounders), a Shinseki, who gets crapped on by Wolfowitz and others when he does say anything, and Franks, who just follows orders to the best of his (considerable) abilities.
This level of forces, and the timeframe, is even more scaled down and faster than the ridiculous December plan by the first generation chickenhawks. That plan was derailed by Schwarzkopf and Powell, and they got VII Corps and M1A1's added to the mix and a realistic timeframe with most control under CentCom.
|
|
|  |
 |
|  |
 |
|
MichaeltheGreat
|
|
Apolyton Grand Executioner
|
 |
mooning the house that Ruth built.
Oct 1999 time: 21:26
|
|
The trouble with "new generations" of warfare (and yeah, this is one, but.... ), is that old problems of warfare don't go away, they just take on different forms.
Human factors and FUBARs happen, fatigue, tension and task saturation get to be issues, and since there's no real doubt we can squash the bastards like bugs, why hurry faster than necessary? The more you require simultaneity for your plans to work, the more chances you introduce for them not to work - at least not in the way intended.
To me, there should be two absolutes with civilian "control" of the military - civilians must control if forces are used, and in what circumstances, but military professionals must control the operational level details for achieving the civilian policy goals once the "if" and "starting when" are decided.
Hitler made force dispositions and set timelines, and it didn't do much for him. And he at least had some military experience. 
|
|
|  |
 |
|
DanS
|
 |
Kickball Capital of the World
Jan 1970 time: 00:26
|
|
To be fair, at least we aren't cowboying it like Clinton did so many times. And Afghanistan has turned out to be very successful from a military standpoint so far.
I'm more concerned about the diplomacy. Powell is a very forceful figure, and one of the best politicians in Washington, but this is learning on the job for him. It's true that he's been undercut by Rumsfeld et al.
Hopefully, Powell is giving good military advice to Bush and is making himself valuable in a number of ways. It seems like Bush is willing to listen to Powell outside what the Pentagon is giving to him.
Last edited by DanS on 16-03-2003 at 10:52
|
|
|  |
 |
|
MichaeltheGreat
|
|
Apolyton Grand Executioner
|
 |
mooning the house that Ruth built.
Oct 1999 time: 21:26
|
|
quote: Originally posted by chegitz guevara
40,000 fighting troops is enough? What if the Iraqis actually fight this time? The former general I saw on some channel said we have don't have enough troops to hold the rear.
Last time we bombed them for a month and a half beofer moving on them. This time we have to deal with frequent sandstorms, which will slow both the advance and the bombing campaign. Then, the Iraqis may very well resist.
It's gonna take more than two months. |
We have more than 40,000 combat troops (counting CS and CSS pukes). We don't have enough to hold the rear, IF we bypass pockets of resistance, but the Iraqis are royally ass-****ed if they try to fight mobile, so they'll be unable to exploit on a large scale any openings that do occur. What will happen in the rear is that there will be a number of small areas where nominal Iraqi resistance is present, but effectively immobile and unable to project force much beyond the range of what weapons we have. We will just clear security zones around our lines of supply and forward resupply areas, and let the rest of those pockets of resistance rot on the vine, until they tire of holing up or we get around to dealing with them, whichever comes first.
Most of the outward deployed Iraqi divisions are conscript units, so their fighting motivation will be next to none. Cracking the Baghdad will be the tough problem.
|
|
|  |
All times are GMT. The time now is 05:26. Apolyton Time is 00:26. |
top of page
|
| archivepost |
|
Forum Rules:
You may not post new threads
You may not post replies
You may not post attachments
You may not edit your posts
|
HTML code is ON
vB code is ON
Smilies are ON
[IMG] code is ON
|
|
|
|
|
|