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Sir Og
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Lurking in Stara Zagora, Bulgaria
Jun 2001
time: 07:27
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The Iraqi command should have a clue as to what the US is trying to achieve (surrounding the Medina division) it’s been mentioned on CNN even. They are probably going to try to withdraw it to Baghdad or to outmaneuver the US forces in some way so that don’t get surrounded.
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DanS
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Kickball Capital of the World
Jan 1970
time: 00:27
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Looks like the 4th Infantry Division might be available earlier than we thought.
http://asia.reuters.com/newsArticle...storyID=2453114
Yesterday, I heard a report from a guy in Baghdad that rumors in the city is that we were approaching from the West. This would fit MtG's take on the battle, so far.
Last edited by DanS on 27-03-2003 at 01:26
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MichaeltheGreat
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Apolyton Grand Executioner
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mooning the house that Ruth built.
Oct 1999
time: 21:27
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So much good stuff, so little time. 
Drake: re "transportation difficulties"  When a division gets deployment orders to a combat theater, you don't have transportation difficulties. Worst case is you relieve a bunch of loggies, promote some subordinate loggies, and move the ****ing show down the road. Worst case is a shortage of dock capacity and traffic issues out of KC, which is why clearing Umm Qasr's port facilities and getting Seabees and the RN equivalent in there will be nice.
Dan, Ned, et al. Apparently nowhere's near 1000 vehicles, but weather is only an issue for CAS missions. If you have JSTARS and B-52's loitering for interdiction missions, wind and weather simply means the bastards hear absolutely nothing before the bombs impact.
Re V Corps. 1 AD got its deployment orders out of Germany before 1 CD got orders to move out from Hood. If you look at the raw numbers of ground forces reported to be in theater, and the attachments to the identified divisions (all of the divisions are reinforced and/or "fat" from their standard TO&Es), there are a lot of forces claimed in theater that are not accounted for in the units mentioned in the news so far.
Re air deployment of armored divisions, etc.
Except for the light and airborne/airmobile divisions, the rest of the US divisions pretty much have the same TO&E - there's not much that distinguishes an infantry from a cav from an armored division, at the divisional level. How you break down and mix and match subordinate units, is different, as is the fighting and movement posture (does armor support the infantry, or infantry support the armor? ). From an airlift standpoint, it's about the same. A full scale divisional airlift can be made in around 1400 C5B sorties, which takes a while because there's not that many of them, they have traffic limits on airfields, and you have to figure in maintenance hours for the aircraft. With C17s, it's about 2300 sorties for the full division.
As far as equipment goes, M1's are a pain in the ass - you can move one and a little extra stuff in a C17, or you can move two in a C5B with a little extra mid-air refueling, since two M1's are very close to the operational weight limit of the C5. M2's and M109's are lighter, but they take up a lot of space, so efficient loading and palletizing of supplies takes time, so you can reduce the total number of airlift sorties.
If you have the airfield(s) that can take the aircraft at close to the maximum traffic levels, and if you don't have a lot of other demands on your air transport capacity, air deployment of the entire division plus a reasonable level of supplies can be accomplished in less than two weeks, but it's a real ***** of a job.
Dan - no, it's not coherent, but that's the great generalship of the Saddamites for you. They've bought into this hooey about how they're kicking our asses, they've managed a group self-delusion about the last war, at least at the top command levels, and they give in to the natural reflex of most armies to try to strike back. Nobody likes to be under siege, nobody likes to be on the strategic, operational and tactical defensive, and handling an army under those conditions requires extraordinary discipline, not only of the troops, but of the tendency of the troops and the leaders to want to get in a few blows and take at least part of the fight to the enemy. The Ardennes offensive didn't make any sense, either. 
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spiritof1202
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Agreed about the JSTARs and the B52's, but weren't F15's also participating in close air support? They're capabable in an all-weather role, plus can target distinct targets independently. Not sure if crosswinds in the southern bases would have grounded them, though.
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MichaeltheGreat
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Apolyton Grand Executioner
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mooning the house that Ruth built.
Oct 1999
time: 21:27
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They talked tough even at the cease fire last time, on D+4
Then they **** their pants when the subject of POW exchange came up, and we said we had over 80,000.
There is an analogy to be made to Hitler here, although those are usually groaners, no matter who you apply them to, but in this case, it's really the closest one.
A couple of cool Hitler stories are really illustrative of the Iraqi senior command mindset. In the first one, during the early planning for Operation Barbarossa, the army high command told Hitler that 20 panzer divisions would be needed to invade Russia. At the time, the Germans had 10. Addi's solution? Easy, just take half the armor establishment from each of the first ten, add some infantry and other stuff, and you've got your 20. Never mind that you have the same number of tanks overall, and the same number of infantry and other stuff, you've just shoved things around and made smaller units. You've got your 20 panzer divisions, so problem solved. 
Late in the war, in the southern portion of the western front (around Metz, IIRC), Hitler was micromanaging unit placements, and he and his sycophants in Wolfsschanze assigned a then-typical frontage of seven miles to a particular infantry division. Never mind readiness and casualty reports that had been ever so dutifully reported and recorded all the way up the line. Never mind that this "division" consisted of 14 self-propelled guns and four infantry "battalions" of about 80 men each. The "division" was less than true battalion strength, but it was called a division, so it would be deployed as a division.
The same type of self-delusion permeates the Iraqi command. Pessimistic assessments, or reports of failure get you shot, so the senior commanders learn to talk tough and massage the numbers and reports. Then they have to act out the roles, as if all the BS was true.
Saddam's lackeys will be portraying themselves as beating our asses right up until the very end.
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flash9286
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i predict a mini-stalingard
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26-03-2003 03:53
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