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Sirotnikov
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<--- Yes, It's a "kitty" in a boot.
Feb 2000 time: 07:27
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quote: Siro, so you were saying you think that Jewish religion changed around 1700, or that various brands of Christianity, etc changed but Jewish religion didn't? I think the tie between nationality and religion among us Goyim was still fairly solid, except in America. In England there was the CofE. In Scotland there was Presbyterianism. In Germany and Norway(?) Lutheranism. In major Swiss cities, Holland, and various other places Calvinism. RCism and EOxy held in West, South, and East Europe, etc. |
I'm not saying that all Jews must have followed Judaism. But judaism was followed by jews and usually not other peoples.
Judaism is a 'closed society' type of religion (actually there was lots of debate on this during the hellenic occupation of Judea, and apparently the anti-universalists won), as opposed to Islam and Christianity which are very universalist and their goal is to be spread to people.
Judaism doesn't have that goal in mind - Judaism strives to be a religion of a selected few (selected not because of any superiority, but for a random tie with Abraham) that can prove the world that if people want - they can follow strict moral standards.
quote: Well, no matter. The tie between the Jews and their religion was fomented by separation from the Holy Lands, but not in 70 AD. During the exile in Babylon the Jews would leave one wall of the house unfinished, symbolizing their unwillingness to call anything but the Promised Land their home, in acknowledgment of the prophecy of Jeremiah that said the exile would be for 70 yrs. |
I agree. And yet when they returned there still were times of following foreign gods. During the building of the 2nd temple, many foreign women were deported out of Judea, for they were accused of diluting the jewish nationality and drawing people to other gods.
quote: After the return to Jerusalem they even changed their name. Before the exile they were usually referred to as "Hebrew" (as a race) but after they used the name "Juda" (or "Jew" in anglicized form) in honor of Judah (the smaller of the divided kingdoms/the larger of the 2 faithful tribes). They never again dabbled in idolatry. This change held fast for 300-400 years!
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I remember pretty well that they did idolized and Nehemia kicked out foreign women just for that reason.
But I agree it was among the first steps that made Jews so tied to their religion.
quote: What happened in the diaspora was a change in the way the religion was reckoned. No Temple, no sacrifice, no Land = dilemma. They had to allegorize all rituals, recreating their religion from the ancient foundation. Without the tempering of the Exile they would not have had the mettle to survive losing the Promised Land again and without prophetic promise of return.
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So you basically agree with me that the diaspora had a huge impact on making jews adopt their religion into their national culture - beyond normal people-religion relationships which existed in the rest of the world.
quote: For example, the Romani ("Gypsies") were originally from India and practiced some form of Hinduism. Some might have picked up Zoroastrianism. But once they arrived in Europe they adopted RCism (maybe EOxy in the East?) and stuck with it. The Jews might have done the same, still retaining unique cultural attributes and separation, dumping Hebrew religion. |
Thus they have developed a tie with judaism that just isn't there when you talk about followers of christianity, islam (well islam actually is very strong, but it's universal and not limited to people of a singe ethnical descent) etc.
That is why I think that you can't categorize Judaism into being purely religion. By now it has infiltrated the "Hebrew/Jewish" culture and nationality so much, that it exists as a cultural national component even for non-judaist or atheistic peoples.
quote: Many of us Christians are glad they didn't, because without the Jews, and especially the Masoretes, we wouldn't have nearly as reliable OT manuscripts or nearly as much understanding of ancient Hebrews. |

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CyberGnu
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of the Virtual Serengeti
Apr 1999 time: 05:27
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quote: I think we did, but the search function is limited in scope. |
I have never had an opinion on whether Israel has or has had chemical weapons, and I know I haven't debated it.
quote: Gnu: Has nothing to do with it. The question was whether Arafat was democratically elected. Jimmy Carter, as head of the the UN election observers, declared that the election was fair and democratic.
Good attempt of weasling out of admitting you were wrong though. Not succesful, but good. If I remember correctly, in the original thread you just disappeared...
Siro: I wasn't wrong.
You tell me: If prior to the 2000 elections, Bush had received 1.5 years of free presidency, with no balances for his executive power, and no media coverage for his opponent - Al Gore.
Would you call that "fair" and "democratic"?
I'm sure you'd be one of the first people to accuse him of dictatorship.
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What I think doesn't matter. And what you think certainly don't. The appointed UN observer, Jimmy Carter, declared the election fair and democratic.
So yes, you were wrong. Still are, apparently.
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Sirotnikov
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<--- Yes, It's a "kitty" in a boot.
Feb 2000 time: 07:27
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quote: Who's the avatar: gf or wishful thinking??  |
Straybow - it's my gf 
quote: I have never had an opinion on whether Israel has or has had chemical weapons, and I know I haven't debated it. |
then i appologize.
quote: What I think doesn't matter. And what you think certainly don't. The appointed UN observer, Jimmy Carter, declared the election fair and democratic.
So yes, you were wrong. Still are, apparently. |
Yes, we know how very reliable they are. Both the UN and Jimmy Carter.
Do you recall the time in 1990 when UN inspectors declared Iraq had no nuclear program?
It so happenned, that following the Allied invasion, it was discovered they were very wrong, and the nuclear program was quite advanced.
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CyberGnu
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of the Virtual Serengeti
Apr 1999 time: 05:27
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thank you
quote: Yes, we know how very reliable they are. Both the UN and Jimmy Carter. |
In order, quite and very, I would say. The only peope who claims the UN is unreliable are Israeli or US, as far as I know. Furthermore, I've never even heard of a reason to doubt the word of Jimmy Carter.
quote: Do you recall the time in 1990 when UN inspectors declared Iraq had no nuclear program? |
Actually, I don't. In 1990? Seems very premature, that close to the Gulf War. Are you referring to 1998, perhaps?
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/meast/9804/13/iraq.un.nuclear/
quote: It so happenned, that following the Allied invasion, it was discovered they were very wrong, and the nuclear program was quite advanced. |
Are you talking about the aluminum tubing, that the US eventually admitted wasn't suitable for nuclear weapons after all? Well, I guess it served its purpose, as I'm sure it fooled some people into accepting Bush's ficticious claims for war...
Funny, even in the intensely jingoistic US media there is a complete lack of information about an Iraqi nuclear program... On the other hand, there have been several stories about how so far, no weapons of mass destruction have been found. These stories only mentions biological and chemical weapons, indicating that the nuclear part is so far removed from the realms of possibility that it doesn't even deserve mentioning.
For example: http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/news...a-chemical.html
I've said it before, I'll say it again: You really should start reading real news for a change.
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Sirotnikov
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<--- Yes, It's a "kitty" in a boot.
Feb 2000 time: 07:27
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quote: Actually, I don't. In 1990? Seems very premature, that close to the Gulf War. Are you referring to 1998, perhaps?
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/meast/9804/13/iraq.un.nuclear/
quote:
It so happenned, that following the Allied invasion, it was discovered they were very wrong, and the nuclear program was quite advanced.
Are you talking about the aluminum tubing, that the US eventually admitted wasn't suitable for nuclear weapons after all? Well, I guess it served its purpose, as I'm sure it fooled some people into accepting Bush's ficticious claims for war...
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no no no.
infact there was a UN inquiry into Iraqi WMDs in late 1990 and they, after an inspection decided that the iraqis had no nuclear program, when infact they did.

quote: Bibliography: NEW YORK TIMES, 18 November 1990, PP. 1, 17-18, by Malcolm W. Browne
Headline: UNLESS STOPPED, IRAQ COULD HAVE A-ARMS IN 10 YEARS, EXPERTS SAY
Orig. Source:
Abstract:
Intelligence experts from the US, UK, and Israel have concluded that Iraq could have nuclear weapons within 10 years. Iraq has acquired information, tools, electronics components, machinery for processing, computers, uranium ore and other nuclear materials from foreign sources. Donald Kerr, analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, UK, said Iraq would have nuclear weapons in "five to seven years."
In 1981, Israel destroyed the nuclear breeder reactor at Tuwaitha in Iraq. An intelligence analyst of the UK said Israel might bomb a uranium enrichment plant if it was found in Iraq. Iraq salvaged some highly-enriched uranium fuel from the breeder reactor after Israel bombed it.
In November 1990, Iraq invited the IAEA to inspect the highly-enriched uranium in Iraq. In March 1990, customs officials in the UK seized a shipment of special capacitors that were destined for Iraq. On 15 July 1990, customs officials, in the FRG seized a shipment of items that were destined for Iraq. The items were fabricated from a special high-strength, corrosion-resistant steel that is used to make gas centrifuge parts.
These centrifuge-related items were manufactured in Switzerland. Michael Eisenstadt, of the US Washington Institute for New East Policy wrote a study that stated that Iraq bought 250 tons of yellowcake from Brazil, Portugal, and Niger in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Engineers from Poland, who were held as human shields by Iraq, said that Iraq has a chemical plant, located at Al Qaim near Baghdad, where the first steps of converting yellowcake into uranium hexafluoride gas are being performed. The Simon Wiesenthal Foundation in Los Angeles, circulated a list of more than 200 firms in Europe, Asia, and the US that supplied nuclear weapons-related materials and technology to Iraq. In the 1970s and 1980s Iraq failed in its efforts to smuggle plutonium and weapons-grade uranium. Iraq decided to manufacture its own weapons-grade materials.
Leonard S. Spector, director of the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, said Iraq is years from making nuclear weapons. Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project of Nuclear Arms Control, said that if Iraq had only 26 centrifuges they couldn't make a bomb in at least one life time. Intelligence reports show no gas centrifuge plant construction in Iraq. Pakistan reportedly has built 14,000 gas centrifuges, of which only 1000 can operate at a time because of constant breakdowns, based on a design from Europe. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace said Pakistan has enough fuel to build fewer than a dozen nuclear bombs.
In 1986, Pakistan acquired enough material for a nuclear bomb. Dr. Sidney Drell, a physicist at the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center in the US, said he "would be very surprised if Iraq were to deploy implosion warheads without testing at least one of them." Mr. Donald Kerr said Iraq would find it difficult to hide a nuclear test.
General Yehoshua Saguy, who until 1986 commanded the military intelligence apparatus of Israel, said Iraq was two years away from nuclear capability. Saguy warned that Saddam Hussein would build an entire nuclear arsenal if he isn't stopped.
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quote: At the time of the Gulf War, most Western analysts -- with the notable exception of the French -- believed that the chemical enrichment facility at Tuwaitha "Building 90" was not yet operable. Subsequent inspections by the IAEA, under auspices of the UN Security Council Resolution 687, found lab-scale experiments in chemical enrichment, but no evidence of success or any plans for a production plant. Since the French technology is both proprietary and subject to export controls, the Iraqis reportedly resorted to clever negotiation tactics to garner considerable amounts of design information on the process, ostensibly with the goal of licensing the technology at some point in the future. Their techniques reportedly included pressing for more and more technical details during a contract negotiation and then breaking off discussions just before closing a deal.
In light of the state of affairs in Iraqi nuclear technology, the implementation of a possible nuclear-weapons development program was believed to be unlikely to succeed prior to 1995 without significant support from abroad. As of early 1990 there was no evidence of direct support of Iraq in its development of nuclear weapons.
The Iraqi nuclear program was massive, for most practical purposes it was fiscally unconstrained, was closer to fielding a nuclear weapon, and was less vulnerable to destruction by precision bombing than coalition air commanders and planners or US intelligence specialists realized before DESERT STORM. The target list on 16 January 1991 contained two nuclear targets; but after the war, inspectors operating under the United Nations Special Commission eventually uncovered more than twenty sites involved in the Iraqi nuclear program; sixteen of the sites were described as “main facilities.” Overall, the United States did not fully understand the target arrays comprising Iraqi nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic missile capabilities before DESERT STORM. |
from http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/nuke/when.htm
This text from early 1991 demonstrates that IAEA thought that Iraq had almost no nuclear weapons:
quote: Iraq said it does not possess nuclear weapons; nuclear- weapons-usable materials; or research and development facilities to produce nuclear weapons.
However, Ekeus said at a recent press conference that the commission estimates that Iraq has about 600 tons of chemical weapons and the commission has indications "from some governments that there are more chemical weapons than Iraq has disclosed."
The plans for the third stage -- long-term monitoring and verification that Iraq does not resume manufacture of the destroyed weapons -- will be submitted after the commission has a complete picture of Iraq's capabilities and what must be destroyed. But the commission said the verification
GE 3 POL108 will be by "full and effective on-site inspections including those on short notice." The frequency of on-site inspection will vary for each type of weapon and "will be contingent on previous findings and also on Iraq's clear and continuous demonstration of compliance with Resolution 687."
The commission will have a small staff at U.N. headquarters in New York to plan the Iraqi field operations, such as the composition of the teams of experts, their movements and activities. A field office will be located in Bahrain where the teams will assemble, be briefed before entering Iraq, and return for debriefing and initial sample and data analysis.
The IAEA conducted its first on-site inspection of Iraqi nuclear facilities May 15. The 34-person team included IAEA officials, experts, and members of the special commission.
The nuclear material is located in the Tuwaltha area, 30 kilometers north of Baghdad where there are two research reactors, the report said. According to Iraq's statement, the facilities "contain fresh or irradiate fuel assemblies" and "appears to be stored in accessible conditions."
The material cannot be destroyed or rendered harmless in Iraq, the IAEA said, so the agency will have to take custody.
Other direct-use material is buried under the rubble of a reactor building and "a complex and costly decommissioning operation will be needed to render this material accessible for removal and disposal," according to the IAEA.
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quote: United Nations -- The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said October 8 that its inspectors found "dramatic" new evidence of an "advanced and sophisticated nuclear weapons program" in Iraq, including work to produce a powerful thermo-nuclear bomb.
In a report to the Security Council, IAEA director Hans Blix said that the documents found by the IAEA's sixth inspection team in Baghdad indicated that Iraq was in the process of producing several kilograms of lithium 6, whose only known use is in hydrogen bombs.
"The key result of the sixth inspection is the uncovering of documents that show conclusively that Iraq was very well advanced in a program to develop an implosion-type nuclear weapon and that links existed to a surface-to-surface missile project," Blix said.
The program was "so advanced," Blix said, "that the time needed to reach bomb-making capacity seems to have been determined by the time required for the enrichment activities rather than the weapons design activities."
"Contrary to Iraq's claims of having only a peaceful nuclear program the team found documents showing that Iraq had been working on the revision of a nuclear weapons design and one linking the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission to work on a surface-to-surface missile project -- presumably the intended delivery system for their nuclear weapons," the IAEA preliminary report to the council said.
The inspection unit -- which was in Iraq in late September and remained trapped in a parking lot under Iraqi guards rather than give up the documents it found -- also uncovered evidence of a "broad-based Iraqi international procurement effort," the IAEA director said.
"It is quite possible -- even probable -- that some of the procurement that has taken place, e.g., of sensitive equipment or material, has occurred in violation of laws of states from which the export originated," he said.
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http://www.fas.org/news/iraq/1991/911008-200107.htm
Then again :
quote: How close Iraq was to completing a bomb is still open to debate. At the request of the IAEA, a group of nuclear weapon designers from the United States, Britain, France, and Russia met in April 1992 to assess the progress of Iraq’s nuclear program prior to the Persian Gulf War, based on documents that had been obtained through subsequent inspections. These designers reportedly concluded that bottlenecks in the program could have delayed completion of a working bomb for at least 3 years, assuming Iraq had continued its multifaceted strategy and design approach.
However, several experts familiar with the inspections believe that lraq could also probably have produced a workable device in as little as 6 to 24 months, had they decided to seize foreign-supplied HEU from under safeguards and focus their efforts on a crash program to produce a device in the shortest possible amount of time.
Iraq had a very well-funded nuclear weapons program aimed at the indigenous development and exploitation of technologies for the production of weapon-usable nuclear material and the development and production of nuclear weapons, with a target date of 1991 for the first weapon. [S/1997/779] It is reasonable to suppose that the first device, containing indigenously produced HEU, would not have been available before late 1992. Equally, if it is accepted that Iraq's strategy was to acquire a small nuclear arsenal before testing, it is likely that the need to demonstrate a delivery capability would not have occurred until 1994. [GC 40-13]
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http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/w...uke-program.htm
Last edited by Sirotnikov on 06-04-2003 at 05:27
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Sirotnikov
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<--- Yes, It's a "kitty" in a boot.
Feb 2000 time: 07:27
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Dear Cyber-gnu, with regards to your doubting of the truthfullness and accountability of Israeli Intelligence sources:
quote: NEW YORK TIMES, 18 November 1990, PP
...
General Yehoshua Saguy, who until 1986 commanded the military intelligence apparatus of Israel, said Iraq was two years away from nuclear capability. Saguy warned that Saddam Hussein would build an entire nuclear arsenal if he isn't stopped.
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A year later:
quote: (October 8th 1991)
The program was "so advanced," Blix said, "that the time needed to reach bomb-making capacity seems to have been determined by the time required for the enrichment activities rather than the weapons design activities."
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Two years later:
quote: (April 1992)
However, several experts familiar with the inspections believe that lraq could also probably have produced a workable device in as little as 6 to 24 months, had they decided to seize foreign-supplied HEU from under safeguards and focus their efforts on a crash program to produce a device in the shortest possible amount of time.
Iraq had a very well-funded nuclear weapons program aimed at the indigenous development and exploitation of technologies for the production of weapon-usable nuclear material and the development and production of nuclear weapons, with a target date of 1991 for the first weapon. [S/1997/779] It is reasonable to suppose that the first device, containing indigenously produced HEU, would not have been available before late 1992. |
It took 2 years of serious inspections for the inspectors to come to the same conclusion Israeli intelligence sources "invented" in 1990.
Obviously a tough blow to the reliability and accountability of Israeli intelligence sources 
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CyberGnu
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of the Virtual Serengeti
Apr 1999 time: 05:27
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quote: Dear Cyber-gnu, with regards to your doubting of the truthfullness and accountability of Israeli Intelligence sources:
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It took 2 years of serious inspections for the inspectors to come to the same conclusion Israeli intelligence sources "invented" in 1990.
Obviously a tough blow to the reliability and accountability of Israeli intelligence sources |
First off: Did you mean "accuracy" instead of "accountability"?
Second: What is this supposed to prove? That Israeli intelligence can both be competent and tell the truth when it serves Israels interests? Well, duh.
The problem is that this doesn't even tangentially touch on whether they are trustworthy in general.
quote: You prove nothing more than ignorance and prejudice in each post you make.
you slam israeli sources, and then are again and again proven wrong. |
Once, AFAIK. You, on the other hand, have been proven wrong TWICE in just this thread alone... And I'm not even counting your evasion of Kroeses posts.
quote: you claim your ignorance as your shield - whenever i raise an issue that isn't comfortable to you (IAEA predictions failing / palestinian massacares aimed at kids) you claim you never heard of it, and make me go through tons of pages proving your ignorance yet again.
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I'm terribly sorry. I assumed that your claim of failed UN inspections would have some kind of bearing on the subject. Since UN inspections started AFTER the war (which was in 1991) the only possible way for that to happen would have been if the 1998 report had been shown to be false.
Instead, it appears you intended something completely different and irrelevant.
Summarized from your post: Just before Desert Storm the IAEA conducted their semi-annual inspection of Iraqs uranium stockpile. The IAEA concluded that "Iraq did not have a weapons program". After the war, the UN inspected again, and found that Iraq did have a weapons program.
You seem to have a missed a few crucial points, however. The intention of the IAEA's routine inspections is to make sure that the uranium in the stockpile has not been diverted for other uses, i.e. been sold or used for a weapons program.
Furthermore, according to the bulletin for atomic scientists:
The IAEA had made a routine inspection in November 1990-after the invasion of Kuwait but before the initiation of the Coalition bombing campaign. The inspectors found that the safeguarded material was intact.
http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/1...5.albright.html
So it appears that the IAEA did exactly what they were supposed to do - report on Iraqs uranium stockpile. At no point was the IAEA authorized to inspect facilities that was not connected to the uranium stockpile - That is actually the job of intelligence agencies.
After the war, when UN inspection in accordance with resolution 637 (I think) started, the UN inspectors uncovered and completely dismantled Iraqs nuclear program. Again the IAEA did their job: they were charged with finding out if and how Iraqs nuclear program worked or even existed, which they did. In fact, they managed to completely dismantle the program, including the hidden enriched uranium Iraq had managed to salvage from the reactor Israel blew up.
So where is the untrustworthy part? That the IAEA did their job before the war? They they did their job afterwards? Thet even though Iraq deliberately tried to hinder their inspections they still managed to get the job done?
Of course, maybe these tiny details never appeared in Israeli "news"papers. Maybe you really believed that the UN was somehow to blame for not knowing about Iraqs nuclear program.
Either way, I suggest you start reading some real news for a change.
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Edan
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quote: Originally posted by CyberGnu
Since UN inspections started AFTER the war (which was in 1991) the only possible way for that to happen would have been if the 1998 report had been shown to be false. |
No, there were IAEA inspections before the war as well (every six months), as you even state in your post.
quote:
An example is that before the Gulf War Iraq - unbeknownst to the world -- had enough highly-enriched uranium to make a bomb. Nobody knew that. The reason for that was that the IAEA took the position that as long as the material was not all at one site then it wasn't enough to make a bomb or at least it wasn't enough to make a bomb quickly enough so that the IAEA had to inspect it every three weeks, which their rules require if a country has enough material to make a bomb.
They were inspecting only every six months because their rules provided that if it were not all at the same place, then they didn't have to inspect it so often.
That's just one example of the way the IAEA has defined its mission. And it's really defined its mission because it has another job, which is to promote nuclear power. And so and there are other cases.
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http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/midd.../blix_2-13.html
But then, there were UN inspections in North Korea, too, and that didn't hinder NK from getting the bomb.
Last edited by Edan on 06-04-2003 at 19:50
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CyberGnu
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of the Virtual Serengeti
Apr 1999 time: 05:27
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quote: No, there were IAEA inspections before the war as well (every six months), as you even state in your post. |
This is semantics. You are basing your argument on the fact that the word "inspections" is used in both instances, even though they purpose and the methods of those inspections were very different.
For either set of inspections to "fail", they would have to fail in their own mission. Thus, since the IAEA inspections prior to resolution 637 concluded that the stockpiled Iraqi nuclear material was intact, the only way the pre-Desert Storm inspections could have failed would be if the stockpiles were, in fact, not intact.
As the subsequent inspections and Iraqi testimony showed, this wasn't the case. The Iraqi plan was to keep the stockpile intact for the 1990 inspection, and then enrich it in the following months. That this would be an engineering impossibility should naturally be considered - even if the allies hadn't started the war in early 1991, the missing uranium would have been detected in the next scheduled inspection.
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panag
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MY WORDS ARE BACKED WITH BIO-CHEMICAL WEAPONS
Oct 2000 time: 07:27
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quote: Originally posted by CyberGnu
?
North Korea has the bomb? I was under the impression that they had a weapons program, which they recently took out of mothballs. While withdrawing from the NPT, btw, thus implicitly showing that the IAEA inspections apparently IS a deterrent to the development of nuclear weapons. |
hi ,
reading the OT ones in a while would have brought the facts to ya
they even have a couple ICBM's , .....
what they are doing now is just going true a large "re-scaling" program , .....
and if they keep it up the way they are going now , well we get war within 100 days there , .....
the info below is a low count ( one or two weapons ) but it could be that there are as many as 24 , .....
Since the 1950s, the DPRK has been proceeding with a nuclear development program. It seems that North Korea is engaged in one of two things. Either they are building weapons to give them up for a new relationship with the United States. Or the down side and very dangerous side is that they're trying to build-up a nuclear arsenal for deterrence.
Some observers call it "diplomacy by extortion." They say the communist north is building atomic weapons in order to secure economic aid and special trade agreements with its neighbors and the West in exchange for curtailing its nuclear weapons program.
Pyongyang maintains that it needs a deterrent to possible South Korean, Japanese and American military aggression against North Korea. But this argument has lost its credibility. The north has always argued that while they're interested in economic reform, they need to leverage the security threat because they're not certain that the intentions of the rest of the world are really benign in terms of negotiating with North Korea. The problem, though, is that since 1994 there is a record of engagement with North Korea by South Korean, Japan, the United States, Europe and Australia. It would be very difficult to survey all of these countries that have engaged North Korea and argue that they have not credibly communicated that their intentions are benign. So this argument that the north continues to put forward, while it still may be credible to them, is becoming less credible to the rest of the world.
The nuclear program can be traced back to about 1962, when the DPRK government committed itself to what it called "all-fortressization," which was the beginning of the hyper militarized North Korea of today. In the mid-1960s, it established a large-scale atomic energy research complex in Yongbyon and trained specialists from students who had studied in the Soviet Union. Under the cooperation agreement concluded between the USSR and the DPRK, a nuclear research center was constructed near the small town of Yongbyon. In 1965 a Soviet IRT-2M research reactor was assembled for this center. From 1965 through 1973 fuel (fuel elements) enriched to 10 percent was supplied to the DPRK for this reactor.
North Korea maintains uranium mines with four million tons of exploitable high-quality uranium.
In the 1970s, it focused study on the nuclear fuel cycle including refining, conversion and fabrication. In 1974, Korean specialists independently modernized Soviet IRT-2M research reactor in the same way that other reactors operating in the USSR and other countries had been modernized, bringing its capacity up to 8 megawatts and switching to fuel enriched to 80 percent. Subsequently, the degree of fuel enrichment was reduced. In the same period the DPRK began to build a 5 MWe research reactor, what is called the "second reactor." In 1977 the DPRK concluded an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], allowing the latter to inspect a research reactor which was built with the assistance of the USSR.
The North Korean nuclear weapons program dates back to the 1980s. In the 1980s, focusing on practical uses of nuclear energy and the completion of a nuclear weapon development system, North Korea began to operate facilities for uranium fabrication and conversion. It began construction of a 200 MWe nuclear reactor and nuclear reprocessing facilities in Taechon and Yongbyon, respectively, and conducted high-explosive detonation tests. In 1985 US officials announced for the first time that they had intelligence data proving that a secret nuclear reactor was being built 90 km north of Pyongyang near the small town of Yongbyon. The installation at Yongbyon had been known for eight years from official IAEA reports. In 1985, under international pressure, Pyongyang acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). However, the DPRK refused to sign a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an obligation it had as a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
In September 1989 the magazine JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY stated that North Korea "could manufacture nuclear devices in five years' time, and the means to deliver them soon afterward." In July 1990 THE WASHINGTON POST reported that new satellite photographs showed the presence in Yongbyon of a structure which could possibly be used to separate plutonium from nuclear fuel.
The Joint Declaration on denuclearization was initialed on December 31, 1991. It forbade both sides to test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons and forbade the possession of nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities. A procedure for inter-Korean inspection was to be organized and a North-South Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) was mandated with verification of the denuclearization of the peninsula.
On January 30, 1992, the DPRK also signed a nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA, as it had pledged to do in 1985 when acceding to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This safeguards agreement allowed IAEA inspections to begin in June 1992. In March 1992, the JNCC was established in accordance with the joint declaration, but subsequent meetings failed to reach agreement on the main issue of establishing a bilateral inspection regime.
As the 1990s progressed, concern over the North's nuclear program became a major issue in North-South relations and between North Korea and the US. The lack of progress on implementation of the joint nuclear declaration's provision for an inter-Korean nuclear inspection regime led to reinstatement of the US-South Korea Team Spirit military exercise for 1993. The situation worsened rapidly when North Korea, in January 1993, refused IAEA access to two suspected nuclear waste sites and then announced in March 1993 its intent to withdraw from the NPT. During the next 2 years, the US held direct talks with the DPRK that resulted in a series of agreements on nuclear matters.
It is estimated that North Korea has completed the nuclear fuel cycle from acquisition to reprocessing of nuclear fuel and is on the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether it has actually produced or possesses nuclear weapons due to difficulties in developing detonation devices and delivery vehicles, which require high-tech and precision technologies. According to various sources of information, North Korea seems to have reprocessed enough plutonium to produce one or two nuclear weapons. In addition, sufficient plutonium for another six nuclear weapons remains in fuel removed from the reactor at Yongbon but stored under international supervision, under the provisions of the 1994 Agreed Framework. By taking possession of the 8,000 spent fuel rods in late December 2002, the North could conceivably begin producing plutonium-based bombs in as little as six months -- by late June 2003.
In an announcement that shocked the world, Washington said on 16 October 2002 that North Korea had admitted to secretly developing uranium enrichment technology for nuclear weapons, in violation of the 1994 agreement with the US.
Publicly available evidence does not permit an assessment of the extent of this uranium program, and there is a considerable range of uncertainty. It is generally agreed that North Korea has attempted to acquire technology related to uranium enrichment from sources in several countries, including China, Russia and Pakistan. It is also generally agreed that, compared to the plutonium program, the precise status of the uranium program would be difficult to assess using sources such as satellite imagery. In contrast to the large and distinctive plutonium production reactors, a uranium enrichment program could be dispersed and hidden underground. There are no credible public reports suggesting that North Korea has in fact produced nuclear weapons using uranium.
By the end of 2002 North Korea said it was lifting the freeze on facilities frozen under the agreed framework between the United States and North Korea, including a nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. Furthermore, North Korea asked the International Atomic Energy Agency to remove its cameras from the Yongbyon facility. North Korea defied world opinion on 21 December 2002 by removing United Nations seals and cameras at a nuclear power plant suspected of making weapons-grade plutonium. North Korea tampered with surveillance devices the UN nuclear watchdog installed at the Yongbyong complex. The agency said the North cut most of the seals on equipment and tampered with cameras at the five-megawatt reactors. North Korea says the agency did not respond to Pyongyang's requests that it remove the equipment. The International Atomic Energy Agency said it was trying to keep communications open with Pyongyang. IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei said it was deplorable North Korea had ignored requests for talks.
On or about 24 December 2002 North Korea moved fresh fuel to the 5MWe reactor. North Korea reportedly estimates that the 5-megawatt reactor could be up and running in one to two months, while the IAEA reportedly believed it could take longer. As of 26 December 2002 the IAEA reportedly estimated that North Korea will have the five-megawatt reactor operational by the end of February 2003. A senior South Korean official concurred with that estimate. "We believe it will take one or two months to restart the reactor," said the official, Chun Young Woo, director general for international institutions at the Foreign Ministry. The IAEA said North Korea could start removing about 8,000 spent fuel rods stored in a special pond at the Yongbyon plant. North Korea's purpose might be to move the spent fuel rods to sites around the country where they could be weaponized, in order to convince the US that there could be no pre-emptive strike. The plutonium reprocessing plant at Yongbyon could be ready to begin producing fissile material for bombs within a few months, according to the director general of the IAEA. By taking possession of the 8,000 spent fuel rods in late December 2002, the North could conceivably begin producing plutonium-based bombs in as little as six months -- by late June 2003. US Senator Joe Biden said he believed North Korea's restarting of the Yongbyon nuclear reactor poses a greater threat than Iraq. He said within months Pyongyang could have enough material for five more nuclear weapons. The incoming chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Republican Senator Richard Lugar, said Washington must actively engage its allies in the region.
Western assessments of futher steps that the DPRK might take included asking the IAEA inspectors to leave the country, starting up the plutonium reprocessing line, formally withdrawing from the Nonproliferation Treaty, declaring themselves a nuclear power [with a `Korean bomb' intended to protect the whole of the Korean people by keeping the Americans from starting a war], resumption of long-range missile testing, and conducting an actualy nuclear test.
bye
edit ; PS , not to mention about the large amounts of other WMD's they have in stock , ......
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CyberGnu
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of the Virtual Serengeti
Apr 1999 time: 05:27
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Siro:
quote: There's nothing evasive about my points to S Kroeze.
To the contrary - he keeps evading huge parts of my posts which he feels uncomfortable to answer. |
quote: Kroese: Please decide what encyclopaedias to consult, which bibliographies, which historical reviews!
Perhaps you can teach me how to start a historical investigation?
It is nice to notice that you have finally given some titles of books you consider to be reliable. Thank you!
Siro: I don't have time to actually begin a scholarship level argument with you.
If that is what you wish - I again state - I don't have the energy or time.
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Of course, if you had even a shred of integrity, you would either actually answer Kroeze, or accept his sources as-is.
Instead, you continually answer every single post he makes with "your books are biased", and then refer to some TV show, a handpuppet production, Israeli newspapers or something equally relevant. While it does make me laugh, it also reveals the source of your problem: you really have no idea how to think critically about sources. Poor Kroeze tried to teach you, but you reply with juvenile denials and insults.
I sincerely hope that university will cure you of this. Maybe the first couple of F's will jar you enough to understand what sources are all about.
quote: The IAEA has proven that it is unreliable on it's own. The whole goal of the IAEA is to monitor country's nuclear programs without invading them and using absolute force to inspect every little possible hideout.
Obviously if a country is defeated, the victors can send anyone they like to discover nuclear weapon programs.
IAEA should be able to do that without the need to actually invade rogue countries, but have clearly failed this point. |
The IAEA can only do what it is mandatet to do. Claiming this makes it "unreliable" is ridiculous. Less effective, surely, which the IAEA has addressed several times. The conclusion has always been that the discovery of clandestine nuclear programs falls within the jurisdiction of intelligence agencies, and apparently the UN body has not been comfortable about the UN having its own intelligence agency.
quote: And Jimi Carter has been making all kinds of statements as of lately, regarding cuba and arab nations iirc. |
Well, care to enlighten us? A few specific examples, perhaps?
*The gnu betting service is now open, and is giving 2:1 odds of specifics not forthcoming*
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Edan
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quote: Originally posted by CyberGnu
North Korea has the bomb? I was under the impression that they had a weapons program, which they recently took out of mothballs. While withdrawing from the NPT, btw, thus implicitly showing that the IAEA inspections apparently IS a deterrent to the development of nuclear weapons. |
From what I understand, the nuclear program was never "in mothballs", it was merely well hidden. US intelligence believed that it already had one to two bombs by last summer. Indeed, when confronted with the accusation of a working nuclear weapons program, North Korea admitted it back in October two months before it expelled the IAEA.
Last edited by Edan on 07-04-2003 at 06:54
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Edan
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quote: The United States believes North Korea already has two nuclear bombs to complement its massive army, potent ballistic-missile force and stockpile of biological and chemical weapons | http://www.washtimes.com/world/20030117-25255995.htm
quote:
The North is suspected of already having at least one or two nuclear bombs, and experts say it could make several more within six months if it extracts weapons-grade plutonium from spent fuel rods at the Yongbyon facilities. |
http://www.guardian.co.uk/korea/art...,872125,00.html
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Edan
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quote: Originally posted by CyberGnu
Edan, "mothballed" or "hidden and thus serverly retarted" are nuances, I think. the point is that withdrawing from the NPT (and consequently expelling the IAEA) enabled them to scale up their program to 1991 levels. |
Perhaps, but if there 1994-2002 levels were enough to produce at least one to two nuclear weapons, thats hardly makes the IAEA very effective, does it?
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panag
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MY WORDS ARE BACKED WITH BIO-CHEMICAL WEAPONS
Oct 2000 time: 07:27
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quote: Originally posted by CyberGnu
Panag, did you read your own post?
It says that NK has enough plutonium to make one or two bombs, not that it has actually made them. Sure, getting weapons grade plutonium has always been one of the harder tasks in making a nuclear weapon, but that is only one of several daunting engineering issues. |
*gnu* did you read the side note's with it ?
its a "low count" , the high count is plus 24 , .....
not to mention of the other stuff they have , .....
and if they really need more bombs , well simple , put a team at work with the rod's from the powerplants and they should have about 10 bombs within 2 weeks , ......
bye
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Edan
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quote: Originally posted by CyberGnu
Edan: from Panags post:
On January 30, 1992, the DPRK also signed a nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA, as it had pledged to do in 1985 when acceding to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This safeguards agreement allowed IAEA inspections to begin in June 1992.
Prior to 1992 the IAEA wasn't present in NK, so how could they have prevented it?
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Prevented what? North Koreas program from the mid 90s onwards? Thats what I'm talking about.
The IAEA are far from a guarantee of a nuclear free state, given the way Iraq and North Korea have run rings around them.
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Edan
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quote: Originally posted by CyberGnu
Panag: I still don't see it. There is nothing in there thatn indicates that NK actually has a finished bomb. |
Except for US intelligence reports, the same reports that got the North Koreans to admit (quite suprisingly) that they had a nuclear weapons program.
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