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Ned
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of Aptos, CA
Oct 1999
time: 21:33
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"There's no requirement to have any doctrine here. I mean this is simply a longstanding right of the United States and other nations to take the actions they deem necessary in their self defense," Clark told Congress on September 26, 2002.
"Every president has deployed forces as necessary to take action. He's done so without multilateral support if necessary. He's done so in advance of conflict if necessary. In my experience, I was the commander of the European forces in NATO. When we took action in Kosovo, we did not have United Nations approval to do this and we did so in a way that was designed to preempt Serb ethnic cleansing and regional destabilization there. There were some people who didn' t agree with that decision. The United Nations was not able to agree to support it with a resolution."
"There's no question that Saddam Hussein is a threat... Yes, he has chemical and biological weapons. He's had those for a long time. But the United States right now is on a very much different defensive posture than we were before September 11th of 2001... He is, as far as we know, actively pursuing nuclear capabilities, though he doesn't have nuclear warheads yet. If he were to acquire nuclear weapons, I think our friends in the region would face greatly increased risks as would we."
"And, I want to underscore that I think the United States should not categorize this action as preemptive. Preemptive and that doctrine has nothing whatsoever to do with this problem. As Richard Perle so eloquently pointed out, this is a problem that's longstanding. It's been a decade in the making. It needs to be dealt with and the clock is ticking on this."
"I think there's no question that, even though we may not have the evidence as Richard [Perle] says, that there have been such contacts [between Iraq and al Qaeda]. It' s normal. It's natural. These are a lot of bad actors in the same region together. They are going to bump into each other. They are going to exchange information. They're going to feel each other out and see whether there are opportunities to cooperate. That's inevitable in this region, and I think it's clear that regardless of whether or not such evidence is produced of these connections that Saddam Hussein is a threat."
http://www.drudgereport.com/mattwc.htm
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yaroslav
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Madrid, Spain, Europe
Jun 2001
time: 06:33
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I take a look at his entiry testimony, not only that part:
See for instace that quote
quote:
We have to work this problem in a way to gain worldwide legitimacy and understanding for the concerns that we rightly feel and for our leadership. This is what U.S. leadership in the world must be. We must bring others to share our views not be too quick to rush to try to impose them even if we have the power to do so. I agree that there's a risk that the inspections would fail to provide evidence of the weapons program. They might fail, but I think we can deal with this problem as we move along, and I think the difficulties of dealing with this outcome are more than offset by the opportunities to gain allies, support, and legitimacy in the campaign against Saddam Hussein.
If the efforts to resolve the problem by using the United Nations fail, either initially or ultimately, then we need to form the broadest possible coalition including our NATO allies and the North Atlantic Council if we're going to have to bring forces to bear. We should not be using force until the personnel, the organizations, the plans that will be required for post conflict Iraq are prepared and ready. This includes dealing with requirements for humanitarian assistance, police and judicial capabilities, emergency medical and reconstruction assistance and preparations for a transitional governing body and eventual elections, perhaps even including a new constitution.
Ideally, the international/multinational organizations will participate in the readying of such post conflict operations, the United Nations, NATO, other regional organization, Islamic organizations, but we have no idea how long this campaign could last, and if it were to go like the campaign against the Afghans, against the Taliban in which suddenly the Taliban collapsed and there we were.
We need to be ready because if suddenly Saddam Hussein's government collapses and we don't have everything ready to go, we're going to have chaos in that region. We may not get control of all the weapons of mass destruction, technicians, plans, capabilities; in fact, what may happen is that we'll remove a repressive regime and have it replaced with a fundamentalist regime which contributes to the strategic problem rather than helping to solve it.
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Or this other quote
quote:
HUNTER: But now, General Clark, if we embark on these inspections and we accept inspections as the answer, as the end, and we embark on these inspections and we must presume that Saddam Hussein is as successful as he's been in the past at hiding the evidence from the inspection teams, evidence that we knew existed, how are we going -- you've mentioned that if we do these inspections, we're somehow going to galvanize the community of nations on our side.
Now if we do inspections and we don't find that which we know is there, but Saddam Hussein has allowed us to come into the country and absorb the inspectors successfully, how does that galvanize a community of nations to rally behind the United States?
CLARK: Well, I think you have to have an echelon series of inspections. I think you start small and I think you expand the intrusiveness, the scope and the scale of the inspections, and I think you do that until you are either satisfied and the nation which brings the complaint to the United Nations, i.e. the United States, is satisfied, or you cross and trip a red line in which Saddam says no and you move to the next stage.
But I'm not presuming that inspections will be successful. What I'm asking you to consider is the United States overall leadership responsibilities in the world and how we move ahead collectively with our allies and friends around the world to deal with this problem. What inspections are useful in doing is they're useful in highlighting the nature of the Iraqi regime, and we may deter him, impede him, undercut him, get warning and establish a trigger and build our legitimacy from this, and this is one way of proceeding.
HUNTER: Would you recommend very aggressive, very intrusive inspections, which would be accompanied by forces which could, in cases where inspectors are denied entry, literally force their way into Iraqi facilities?
CLARK: I would like to see a program like that established but it would not be the initial program.
HUNTER: But what if the United Nations does not end up ordering those inspections but nonetheless, but instead orders inspections which to some degree replicate those that went in the past, those which were not successful in removing this program? What would you recommend at that point?
CLARK: I think we need to give the president the strongest possible leverage to get the right program put in place at the United Nations, and that leverage...
HUNTER: But that would require consensus from other members of the United Nations. That's not a unilateral instrument for the United States.
CLARK: That's correct and one of the difficulties that we have...
HUNTER: Let me finish my question. Don't you think that it is not reasonable to expect that the United Nations is going to produce an extremely aggressive, backed by force, inspection regime?
CLARK: I think that the president's determination has given us strong leverage to get the kind of commitment from the United Nations that we need, but every country has its own domestic problems, and this requires the energy and imagination of our diplomats to work through this. I don't consider this case lost at this point. I think it's very much up in the air. I think the actions of this body are very important to determining the outcome.
But I will say this, that the administration has not proceeded heretofore in a way that would encourage its friends and allies to support it.
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The full text can be read in
http://www.iraqwatch.org/government...c-092602.htm#WC
I found it very interesting and somewaht different of what drugereport could you make to believe.
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MichaeltheGreat
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Apolyton Grand Executioner
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mooning the house that Ruth built.
Oct 1999
time: 21:33
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quote:
Originally posted by Ned
His commanders and his fellow, Franks, all seem to have a highly negative view of Clark in terms of character. Perhaps he has a problem with the truth. |
The highest ranks in the military have long tended to have people with strongly negative views of each other. To get to be an O-10, you have to have a lot of luck, a very forceful personality one way or another, some broken subordinates and people who got passed over for slots you got, different styles of dealing with peers, superiors and subordinates, and you have to have rabbis along the way who help your career along.
From O4 on up, every successively higher rank has between 1/3 and 1/2 the total available slots as the rank immediately below, and from O6 on, every promotion also has to run through Congress.
Powell, Schwarzkopf, Tommy Franks, Fred Franks (O9 commander of US VII Corps in gulf war, O10 commander of TRADOC after), McCaffrey, Fred Woerner, Max Thurman, (the latter two CinC's of Southcom during the runup to the Panama invasion) all have had people with very negative reactions to them, and some very unflattering views. Several of that group have had senior officers who nearly or clearly hated their guts. So bad blood from other senior officers isn't surprising, nor is it particularly meaningful.
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Ned
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of Aptos, CA
Oct 1999
time: 21:33
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yaroslav, and it, appears, we actually did everything Clark suggested. We went for inspections. When they were rebuffed by Saddam by failing to account for missing WMD, we went to the UN and to our allies. Only when this failed, did we form a coalition, etc, etc., etc.
So, since we did everything Clarks said we should do, in the order he suggested, where does his disagreement begin?
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yaroslav
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Madrid, Spain, Europe
Jun 2001
time: 06:33
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quote:
Originally posted by Ned
yaroslav, and it, appears, we actually did everything Clark suggested. We went for inspections. When they were rebuffed by Saddam by failing to account for missing WMD, we went to the UN and to our allies. Only when this failed, did we form a coalition, etc, etc., etc.
So, since we did everything Clarks said we should do, in the order he suggested, where does his disagreement begin? |
Umm, not sure (after all, I'm not american and english is not my main language) but the Clark's testitomy appears to differ with Bush in that Clark thinks Bush didn't work hard enough to get more allies 
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DinoDoc
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AECCP loves Democracy
Sep 1999
time: 23:33
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quote:
Originally posted by MichaeltheGreat
Powell, Schwarzkopf, Tommy Franks, Fred Franks (O9 commander of US VII Corps in gulf war, O10 commander of TRADOC after), McCaffrey, Fred Woerner, Max Thurman, (the latter two CinC's of Southcom during the runup to the Panama invasion) all have had people with very negative reactions to them, and some very unflattering views. |
IIRC, most of them weren't fired for character & integrity issues.
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The Emperor Fabulous
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Apolyton's Resident Actor-in-Training
Aug 1999
time: 00:33
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"General Wesley Clark Outlines Success Strategy in Iraq
South Carolina
November 6, 2003
Thank you for inviting me here this afternoon.
For more than a hundred years, graduates of South Carolina State University have gone on to serve this country - as teachers, lawyers, doctors, of course, soldiers. Your ROTC -- the Bulldog Battalion -- has commissioned more than 1,900 officers, including more minority officers than any other school in the country. You should all be very proud.
I want to talk to you today about the events unfolding a world away in Iraq, and my success strategy - a strategy that will make it possible for our soldiers to come home with both Iraq and America standing strong.
This morning I visited with the family of Darius Jennings, a courageous young man who gave his life this week in Iraq. He is the third graduate of Orangeburg-Wilkinson High School to give his life for our country in Iraq. It's clear that Darius was a caring man, who loved his family and his country. We are all grateful for his service and we should honor it today.
The number of US soldiers killed in Iraq is increasing at an alarming rate. Last Sunday, 15 of our soldiers were killed and 27 wounded when their helicopter was brought down. Another two were killed today. Our troops are stretched too thin. Other countries have been asked to send reinforcements. They have refused. And now more young American men and women are being asked to do one-year tours in a foreign land than at anytime since Vietnam.
Let me be clear: there has been some real progress in Iraq. Iraqis have a better future with Saddam Hussein out of power. In many areas, life is improving. It is inspiring to see brave Iraqis working with Americans to rebuild their country. But seven months after the fall of Saddam; violence is growing, and the enemy's morale and momentum is increasing with each deadly attack.
Saddam Hussein did pose a national security challenge. There is no dispute about that. He was in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. If he didn't still have weapons of mass destruction, he was trying to acquire them. He remained hostile to his neighbors. But it was clear then and it is even clearer today that Saddam Hussein posed no imminent threat to the region or the world.
I have always believed that before initiating military action, crucial tests must be met: For example, every diplomatic option should be explored and exhausted. We must do everything possible to gain international and domestic support. And there must be a realistic post-war plan.
The Bush Administration failed every one of these tests. Instead of basing life and death decisions on hard-headed realism, they were guided by wishful thinking. They were convinced that if only we could get rid of Saddam, democracy would bloom in Iraq and across the Middle East.
We are now more deeply involved in Iraq than we have been in any foreign country since Vietnam. Failure in Iraq will not only be a tragedy for Iraq. It will be a disaster for America and the world. It would give the terrorists of Al Qaeda a new base of operations, and a victory against America. It would weaken our moral authority, destroy respect for our power in the Middle East, and throw this region, the source of so many of the world's problems, into greater turmoil. No matter how difficult it will be, we cannot shirk from our duty. There can be no substitute for success.
Today, I want to discuss the decisions that propelled us into Iraq; what we should do now, and how we make sure this never happens again.
Number one: How did we get into Iraq?
Mr. Bush made a series of strategic mistakes that have put us in danger and plunged us into Iraq. After September 11, all Americans understood that fighting terror was America's number one national security priority. All Americans understood it was crucial that we keep weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists.
Just as important - the world agreed with this approach. That is why we had international support for our war to overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan. But after the Taliban fell, instead of finishing off Al Qaeda, the very terrorists that continued to threaten us, the Administration began laying the ground work for a different war - a war in Iraq.
Our focus should have been on winning the war on terrorism - working with our allies to track down the terrorists themselves; to develop new initiatives in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to rip out the roots of radical terror, stop radical schools indoctrinating a new generation of terrorists day after day. That's how you win the war on terrorism.
Instead, the Bush Administration coined a new phrase - the axis of evil -- which essentially declared three dangerous nations enemies that we would deal with only by ultimatum. This phrase increased the threat it was designed to reduce - by encouraging these nations to speed up their programs to develop nuclear weapon to deter US action.
The Administration then offered the notion of pre-emption. American Presidents have always had the option of striking preemptively - it is inherent in the right of self-defense. And I would not hesitate to use that right if America was in imminent danger. But this policy was intended to be more -- much more. They made preemption the centerpiece of this Administration's national security strategy.
The Administration zeroed in on Iraq. But focusing on Iraq made no sense -- if the real goal was to protect the US either from weapons of mass destruction or terrorism. The hundred tons of loosely guarded nuclear bomb-making material and bioweapons in Russia presents a far more tempting target for terrorists. But this Administration has not made that a priority. The nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea were more advanced and more threatening than Iraq's, but for months they paid little attention. Their actions made no strategic sense; they downplayed the greater threats, and exaggerated the lesser one.
Finally, after training our forces on Iraq, the Administration essentially declared - we're going it alone. Instead of using diplomacy backed by force - as we did so effectively in the Balkans - this Administration's diplomacy was only a fig leaf. The United States was going to war no matter what. The Administration went to the UN with a "take it or leave it offer," which reflected a combination of indifference and disdain. It did not explore every diplomatic option; it did not do everything possible to bring allies with us.
The Administration compounded its error by failing to plan realistically for post-war Iraq. Instead of listening to the experts at the State Department and throughout the government, who predicted the danger of chaos and looting, the Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and his aides ignored their advice. Instead they relied on hope, hope that the Iraqi exiles would be accepted as legitimate, hope that the Iraqi police and military would provide security; hope that Iraqi oil revenues would finance reconstruction; and hope that we would be treated as liberators. How wrong they were - you can't build a plan on hope....
Meanwhile, the President rejected the advice of the uniformed military that we deploy enough troops not only to defeat Saddam's military but also to secure Iraq after Saddam's defeat.
As a result, we saw chaos, we lost the trust of the Iraqi people - and the enemy was emboldened.
When running for President, Mr. Bush assured voters he would have strong advisors in national security. But he didn't say what would happen if his advisors disagreed. Now we know. The advisors feud; the policy fractures, and our security suffers. In a Clark Administration, there won't be any question about whether the State Department drives policy, or the Pentagon drives policy, or the national security advisor drives policy. In a Clark Administration, the President will drive the policy. "
Seems to me he explained exactly why the change in heart.
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Ned
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of Aptos, CA
Oct 1999
time: 21:33
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"Saddam Hussein did pose a national security challenge. There is no dispute about that. He was in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. If he didn't still have weapons of mass destruction, he was trying to acquire them. He remained hostile to his neighbors. But it was clear then and it is even clearer today that Saddam Hussein posed no imminent threat to the region or the world.
I have always believed that before initiating military action, crucial tests must be met: For example, every diplomatic option should be explored and exhausted. We must do everything possible to gain international and domestic support. And there must be a realistic post-war plan.
The Bush Administration failed every one of these tests. Instead of basing life and death decisions on hard-headed realism, they were guided by wishful thinking. They were convinced that if only we could get rid of Saddam, democracy would bloom in Iraq and across the Middle East."
In the above, Clark makes the assumption that
1) Saddam had no chemical or bio weapons -- which varies from his testimony;
2) That Saddam would not employ terrorists to deliver the weapons -- which implies that Saddam had no links to terrorists that were hostile to the US and which too varies from his testimony, which reads
"There's no question that Saddam Hussein is a threat... Yes, he has chemical and biological weapons. He's had those for a long time. But the United States right now is on a very much different defensive posture than we were before September 11th of 2001..."
"I think there's no question that, even though we may not have the evidence as Richard [Perle] says, that there have been such contacts [between Iraq and al Qaeda]. It' s normal. It's natural. These are a lot of bad actors in the same region together. They are going to bump into each other. They are going to exchange information. They're going to feel each other out and see whether there are opportunities to cooperate. That's inevitable in this region, and I think it's clear that regardless of whether or not such evidence is produced of these connections that Saddam Hussein is a threat."
Clark asserts that Iraq was a preemptive war. His testimony varies,
"And, I want to underscore that I think the United States should not categorize this action as preemptive. Preemptive and that doctrine has nothing whatsoever to do with this problem. As Richard Perle so eloquently pointed out, this is a problem that's longstanding. It's been a decade in the making. It needs to be dealt with and the clock is ticking on this."
Without getting into detail, Clark ignores the months of diplomacy with our allies and with the UN. He dismisses this as take it or leave it, when anyone who saw the diplomacy knows that this is not true. Bush did say that he would disarm Saddam if the UN would not, but did everything in his power to get real and effective action from the UN and from our allies. It was only after Saddam was offered one last chance to cooperate and failed that we went to war. Even on the very eve of war, Saddam was offered a chance to avoid it by simply leaving Iraq.
Clark paints an unreal caricature of his own prior positions and is very unfair to Bush on his diplomatic efforts to resolve the situation short of war.
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Edan
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quote:
Originally posted by MichaeltheGreat
"Diplomatic efforts?" 
OK boys, we're puttin' together a posse to go string up Saddam because he's a bad guy. You're either with us or you're against us.
Bush jr.'s diplomatic exercise was certainly impressive compared to his fathers. Buying banana countries as "allies" despite a lack of substantial commitment, banking on the Turks allowing deployment of your forces, then having them mispositioned when the Turks (predictably) wouldn't play ball unless you paid their 25 billion price tag instead of the 15 you were willing to bribe them, and having your Euro allies consist of your perennial lapdog, and two pseudo-right wing minor countries who probably figured they were getting screwed in the EU, so why not cozy up to the US? Most impressive. |
Indeed. Galvinizing support against a ruthless dictator like Saddam, with his history, should have been downright easy. Instead, Bush bafooned his way through the diplomacy  (Though some of that blame certainly lies at the feet of Powell, as Secratary of State)
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yaroslav
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Madrid, Spain, Europe
Jun 2001
time: 06:33
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TCO, I don't think it's about democrat/republicans, and I bet that there's a lot of people in my country who are not very sure about who is who (my sister for instance), and even then, they dislike Bush.
There are some people in the goverment, like Rumsfeld (sorry for the typos), who are not very liked in Europe and should have mantained a lower profile while the NU discuss. And many people had the feeling that the war was going to be unstoppable and that Bush'll attack Iraq no matter what Iraq did or didn't do.
As I told you, that feelings could be wrong, but I believe that many europeans feel the same last year and I wonder why the US didn't make a better, well, "campaign" to convince European population
That's just my humble opinion and I'm not telling you to be respected or not - I'm telling you because it's my opinion
EDIT:Grammatic.
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Ned
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of Aptos, CA
Oct 1999
time: 21:33
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What more could Bush have done to convince France and Germany to put real teeth into the UN resolutions. It appears to me and to a lot of Americans that the French and Germans were insincere and were doing everything in their power to avoid war at any cost which only incented Saddam to continue to delay and deny any real response to UNSC 1441. Just as it may appear to Europe that Bush was hell bent on war regardless of what Saddam did, it appears to us that France and Germany were hell bent on blocking war regardless of what Saddam did or did not do.
If someone could have done something to convince France and Germany to be serious about Saddam, what was it?
Clark to me seems to be saying either of three things:
1) I, Clark, could have convinced France and Germany to support our efforts to get Saddam to comply with UN resolutions; or
2) I, Clark, would have made no serious effort to get Saddam to comply; or
3) even if Saddam was not in compliance and was a security threat to the United States (as he stated in his testimony), I, Clark will not go to war without a UN resolution.
But, he advocated just the opposite of 3 in the case of Kosovo, did he not? So is real position is either 1 or 2.
I am sure that Clark will not argue that he would not have made a serious effort to get Saddam to comply with UN resolutions. Which means that Clark is saying 1.
But, then, one would ask, what would Clark have said to the French and Germans that is different from what Bush said?
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