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Whaleboy
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Please make all cheques payable to Whaleboy
Jan 2003
time: 05:23
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I was bored, thought I'd give my own take on the question. Theres random stuff from my readings in there with my own reasoning. A lot of that is probably similar to people I haven't read so hey  .
I was asked the initial question on another forum...
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What do you think about the cosmological, ontological, and inductive telelogical arguments for the existence of God?
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The cosmological, a posteriori or causal argument for God (Aquinas) works on the basis that everything that moves has a mover. That something cannot exist in a state of potentiality and actuality, so a potential property can only be actualised by something that already has that property. Ice has the potential to become water if it is hot, but in order for that potential to be realised, you might place an ice cube in a fire, which in actuality has the property of being hot. To avoid an infinite regress of consequences and their causes, there must be a first cause, which is supposedly God. On the face of it, this is obviously a very weak argument, since its conclusion contradicts one its premises, thus making it absurd.
Aquinas answers this by introducing the notion of “horizontal” and “vertical” causes. Similar to what an existentialist may refer to as a context or a metaphysicist a dimension (sic). Instead, this argument advocates a cause “in esse” as opposed to “in fieri”. God is needed as a constant determination (vertical) to keep the horizontal causal chains working nicely. This seems a neat little side-step from the stark conclusion of infinite regress (no God) and absurdity.
Aquinas also put forward, as part of his cosmological argument, an argument of contingency. That is to say, things may exist now but they needn’t necessarily exist. A book on my desk might exist now, but it hasn’t always existed, and in the future it may not exist. It contingently exists. If you suppose that everything is contingent then once there was a time when nothing existed. However, according to this logic, that would surely mean that nothing would exist now, since every consequence has a cause. No cause (nothing) = no consequence (we, and this universe, wouldn’t exist). There must be something non-contingent therefore, something that would exist necessarily, and that would be God.
My favourite refutation of this is Russell’s sufficient reason principle. I especially like it because I thought of it independently and was rather pissed off when I found someone had thought of it 21 years before I was born but hey c’est la (mal) vie. That’s the idea that nothing happens without a sufficient reason/condition. (I personally find it very similar to Hume’s is-ought gap, if you reconcile is-ought with necessary and sufficient conditions and the nature of deductive and inductive reasoning, but I digress). Put very simply, sufficient reason answers the question of the possible existence of the universe with “the universe is there, it exists”. If you want to explain why something is, you have to look at its premises, and theirs, and everything in the universe that might affect that outcome. That would require infinite knowledge, and the reconstruction of the entire universe in order just to make a critical point, which obviously is too demanding. God therefore, as infinity is unknowable and in our case, cannot rationally exist. This is basic determinism.
Also, the notions of cause and consequence are pretty distinct, in your mind you can think of something’s existence without the idea of something that caused it, as Hume calls it, “a productive principle” if I recall. If the mind can do it and so if it can be done logically there is no absurdity (internally inconsistent) in claiming that something can exist without a cause. The key term is absurd, it is self-evidently an easily refutable position, but since the cosmological argument relies upon the assumption that a cause with no consequence is absurd, then the argument itself falls.
As for the ontological argument:
This is deductive a priori so it’s kinda significant… if this is true, God has to exist. The two proponents are Anselm and Descartes, so here goes! I think I can address Descartes’ here too, since his is essentially very similar.
You could start with Anselm who defines God as something “than which nothing greater can be thought”. You can think of such a perfect being in your mind, but you can conceive of it in your mind. Assuming existence to be a property, the only thing greater than that in your mind is for the being in your mind to exist in reality, thus it has taken on another property making that perfect being more perfect than the conception of it in your mind. Thus it must exist. So basically, if God by his definition exists as a concept in your mind, you must be forced to conclude that it exists in reality.
That still doesn’t mean it has to necessarily exist… you can conceive of pretty much anything. Assuming God exists you ask could it be conceived of him existing from nothing beforehand, or his existence ending? Assuming that existence is a property, it follows according to this reasoning that existence is greater than non-existence and so you cannot think of something of which nothing greater can be thought going out of existence, because you can think of it being unable to go out of existence which is greater. That works for going in to and coming out of existence. This argument reaches the conclusion that god exists necessarily, everything else exists contingently.
This is easily criticised by refuting the assumption that existence is a property, or say that existence is not a predicate as Kant calls it. I personally have a problem with that because you’re idea of an object or a person changes whether or not they exist. If I could meet Captain Ahab from Moby Dick, my conception of him would be altered from my reading the book. However, that does not make his existence an objective property, more something subject to my interpretation, and relative to others and “reality”. You’d also note that something “than which nothing better can be thought” is also highly subjective. If you come at it from a religious point of view where morality and a view of perfection is transcendent that’s not going to be a problem for you, but for me that is. It seems to lend itself therefore as existence of God unto us, but not objectively in “reality”. To say, for example, that we each have our own personal god, a function of our own minds. You could call it a consequence of subjective existentialism, which I kinda like  . That may make it closer to deontology, inconsistent as ontology but that’s sidetracking at this stage I think.
As for the teleological argument, or the argument from design, it works on the principle that the universe is constructed to a design, it’s ordered, governed by very simple laws that we humans can understand and use to predict the future, say, gravity for example. Such an intelligent design appears highly unlikely to have developed randomly and thus a designer is entailed and this is god.
I have numerous problems with this argument, and it’s not just me, Hume being the most significant. My mobile phone, with which I have experience (not just with mine but I’ve encountered lots of phones in my time etc) had a designer… I have experience with that phone being designed, manufactured, used etc. I have no such objective experience with this universe. I have not experienced other universes, and only this universe to which I have been subjected – I cannot see it from the outside. To suppose that there is a designer is a rather large assumption… we cannot logically say that therefore there is a God since there is no intrinsic evidence in that “design” for God.
As for the design itself, the sufficient reason principle applies. A million monkeys at a million typewriters will write a hell of a lot of gibberish. Eventually, if they keep writing for a sufficient length of time, you will get all the works of Shakespeare as the saying goes.. But if you are already the works of Shakespeare that probability is now defunct and determinism applies.
For the complexity in the universe, it isn’t so incredible if you follow it through logically. Subatomic particles join together, atoms join together, stars are born, elements are created, galaxies, other stars and planets form, nitrogen, carbon, oxygen, etc form increasingly complex molecules, amino acids, DNA, single celled life. Multi-celled life, larger and larger, more complex forms evolve, until we have us. We look at ourselves now and see such extraordinary complexity but that came about through a series of benign and simple steps, a cascade effect. To go from step 1 to step “us” is pretty significant, and if that were the case there would be a strong argument for God’s existence but that has not been the case thus far and we can reason accordingly - you don’t build a house by starting with the roof.
Now, the teleological argument can counter this and point to the second law of Thermodynamics, or entropy. That states that in a given system with no energy input, where an energy transfer occurs, the system will always loose energy. That’s why you can never have a completely efficient machine, or can never invent a perpetual motion machine… it loses energy, always has an incumbent inefficiency. This follows to order. An ordered system will always break down into a disordered system. If you have a box of water dyed red, and a box of water dyed blue, and place them side by side, you have order, both sets are apart and defined. If you remove the divide between the two boxes, they start to mix, become disordered. There are vast numbers of combinations the molecules can take, and only one of them would lead to order – it is highly unlikely that both sets of coloured water would end up randomly in their respective box. With the flow of time and entropy, disorder is created in the universe, according to that law. However the teleologist will point to the creation of order in living things. For example, random scattered atoms leading to human life, the works of Shakespeare and you reading this at your computer, is a system with more order than that it began with.
However, this is a system with energy going into it, so to speak. Imagine I break my coffee cup on the floor. It’s a nice cup, so I decide to put the bits of china back together. I use my hands and superglue. To do that, the glue needs to dry, and I burn energy to do so. The disorder I create by repairing the cup is greater than the order I create. Similarly, the disorder in the universe had a net increase through the albeit ordered construction of life on Earth. It seems that the teleological argument is thus refuted.
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Kuciwalker
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of Schmooism
Feb 2001
time: 00:23
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I come hither, O ye Athenians, to justify in your assembly what I maintained in my school, and I find myself impeached by furious antagonists, instead of reasoning with calm and dispassionate enquirers. Your deliberations, which of right should be directed to questions of public good, and the interest of the commonwealth, are diverted to the disquisitions of speculative philosophy; and these magnificent, but perhaps fruitless enquiries, take place of your more familiar but more useful occupations. But so far as in me lies, I will prevent this abuse. We shall not here dispute concerning the origin and government of worlds. We shall only enquire how far such questions concern the public interest. And if I can persuade you, that they are entirely indifferent to the peace of society and security of government, I hope that you will presently send us back to our schools, there to examine, at leisure, the question the most sublime, but at the same time, the most speculative of all philosophy.
The religious philosophers, not satisfied with the tradition of your forefathers, and doctrine of your priests (in which I willingly acquiesce), indulge a rash curiosity, in trying how far they can establish religion upon the principles of reason; and they thereby excite, instead of satisfying, the doubts, which naturally arise from a diligent and scrutinous enquiry. They paint, in the most magnificent colours, the order, beauty, and wise arrangement of the universe; and then ask, if such a glorious display of intelligence could proceed from the fortuitous concourse of atoms, or if chance could produce what the greatest genius can never sufficiently admire. I shall not examine the justness of this argument. I shall allow it to be as solid as my antagonists and accusers can desire. It is sufficient, if I can prove, from this very reasoning, that the question is entirely speculative, and that, when, in my philosophical disquisitions, I deny a providence and a future state, I undermine not the foundations of society, but advance principles, which they themselves, upon their own topics, if they argue consistently, must allow to be solid and satisfactory.
You then, who are my accusers, have acknowledged, that the chief or sole argument for a divine existence (which I never questioned) is derived from the order of nature; where there appear such marks of intelligence and design, that you think it extravagant to assign for its cause, either chance, or the blind and unguided force of matter. You allow, that this is an argument drawn from effects to causes. From the order of the work, you infer, that there must have been project and forethought in the workman. If you cannot make out this point, you allow, that your conclusion fails; and you pretend not to establish the conclusion in a greater latitude than the phenomena of nature will justify. These are your concessions. I desire you to mark the consequences.
When we infer any particular cause from an effect, we must proportion the one to the other, and can never be allowed to ascribe to the cause any qualities, but what are exactly sufficient to produce the effect. A body of ten ounces raised in any scale may serve as a proof, that the counterbalancing weight exceeds ten ounces; but can never afford a reason that it exceeds a hundred, If the cause, assigned for any effect, be not sufficient to produce it, we must either reject that cause, or add to it such qualities as will give it a just proportion to the effect. But if we ascribe to it farther qualities, or affirm it capable of producing other effects, we can only indulge the licence of conjecture, and arbitrarily suppose the existence of qualities and energies, without reason or authority.
The same rule holds, whether the cause assigned be brute unconscious matter, or a rational intelligent being. If the cause be known only by the effect, we never ought to ascribe to it any qualities, beyond what are precisely requisite to produce the effect: Nor can we, by any rules of just reasoning, return back from the cause, and infer other effects from it, beyond those by which alone it is known to us. No one, merely from the sight of one of Zeuxis's pictures, could know, that he was also a statuary or architect, and was an artist no less skilful in stone and marble than in colours. The talents and taste, displayed in the particular work before us; these we may safely conclude the workman to be possessed of. The cause must be proportioned to the effect; and if we exactly and precisely proportion it, we shall never find in it any qualities, that point farther, or afford an inference concerning any other design or performance. Such qualities must be somewhat beyond what is merely requisite for producing the effect, which we examine.
Allowing, therefore, the gods to be the authors of the existence or order of the universe; it follows, that they possess that precise degree of power, intelligence, and benevolence, which appears in their workmanship; but nothing farther can ever be proved, except we call in the assistance of exaggeration and flattery to supply the defects of argument and reasoning. So far as the traces of any attributes, at present, appear, so far may we conclude these attributes to exist. The supposition of farther attributes is mere hypothesis; much more the supposition, that, in distant regions of space or periods of time, there has been, or will be, a more magnificent display of these attributes, and a scheme of administration more suitable to such imaginary virtues. We can never be allowed to mount up from the universe, the effect, to Jupiter, the cause; and then descend downwards, to infer any new effect from that cause; as if the present effects alone were not entirely worthy of the glorious attributes, which we ascribe to that deity. The knowledge of the cause being derived solely from the effect, they must be exactly adjusted to each other; and the one can never refer to anything further, or be the foundation of any new inference and conclusion.
You find certain phenomena in nature. You seek a cause or author. You imagine that you have found him. You afterwards become so enamoured of this offspring of your brain, that you imagine it impossible, but he must produce something greater and more perfect than the present scene of things, which is so full of ill and disorder. You forget, that this superlative intelligence and benevolence are entirely imaginary, or at least, without any foundation in reason; and that you have no ground to ascribe to him any qualities, but what you see he has actually exerted and displayed in his productions. Let your gods, therefore, O philosophers, be suited to the present appearances of nature: and presume not to alter these appearances by arbitrary suppositions, in order to suit them to the attributes, which you so fondly ascribe to your deities.
When priests and poets, supported by your authority, O Athenians, talk of a golden or silver age, which preceded the present state of vice and miscry, I hear them with attention and with reverence. But when philosophers, who pretend to neglect authority, and to cultivate reason, hold the same discourse, I pay them not, I own, the same obsequious submission and pious deference. I ask; who carried them into the celestial regions, who admitted them into the councils of the gods, who opened to them the book of fate, that they thus rashly affirm, that their deities have executed, or will execute, any purpose beyond what has actually appeared? If they tell me, that they have mounted on the steps or by the gradual ascent of reason, and by drawing inferences from effects to causes, I still insist, that they have aided the ascent of reason by the wings of imagination; otherwise they could not thus change their manner of inference, and argue from causes to effects; presuming, that a more perfect production than the present world would be more suitable to such perfect beings as the gods, and forgetting that they have no reason to ascribe to these celestial beings any perfection or any attribute, but what can be found in the present world.
Hence all the fruitless industry to account for the ill appearances of nature, and save the honour of the gods; while we must acknowledge the reality of that evil and disorder, with which the world so much abounds. The obstinate and intractable qualities of matter, we are told, or the observance of general laws, or some such reason, is the sole cause, which controlled the power and benevolence of Jupiter, and obliged him to create mankind and every sensible creature so imperfect and so unhappy. These attributes then, are, it seems, beforehand, taken for granted, in their greatest latitude. And upon that supposition, I own that such conjectures may, perhaps, be admitted as plausible solutions of the ill phenomena. But still I ask; Why take these attributes for granted, or why ascribe to the cause any qualities but what actually appear in the effect? Why torture your brain to justify the course of nature upon suppositions, which, for aught you know, may be entirely imaginary, and of which there are to be found no traces in the course of nature?
The religious hypothesis, therefore, must be considered only as a particular method of accounting for the visible phenomena of the universe: but no just reasoner will ever presume to infer from it any single fact, and alter or add to the phenomena, in any single particular. If you think, that the appearances of things prove such causes, it is allowable for you to draw an inference concerning the existence of these causes. In such complicated and sublime subjects, every one should be indulged in the liberty of conjecture and argument. But here you ought to rest. If you come backward, and arguing from your inferred causes, conclude, that any other fact has existed, or will exist, in the course of nature, which may serve as a fuller display of particular attributes; I must admonish you, that you have departed from the method of reasoning, attached to the present subject, and have certainly added something to the attributes of the cause, beyond what appears in the effect; otherwise you could never, with tolerable sense or propriety, add anything to the effect, in order to render it more worthy of the cause.
Where, then, is the odiousness of that doctrine, which I teach in my school, or rather, which I examine in my gardens? Or what do you find in this whole question, wherein the security of good morals, or the peace and order of society, is in the least concerned?
I deny a providence, you say, and supreme governor of the world, who guides the course of events, and punishes the vicious with infamy and disappointment, and rewards the virtuous with honour and success, in all their undertakings. But surely, I deny not the course itself of events, which lies open to every one's inquiry and examination. I acknowledge, that, in the present order of things, virtue is attended with more peace of mind than vice, and meets with a more favourable reception from the world. I am sensible, that, according to the past experience of mankind, friendship is the chief joy of human life, and moderation the only source of tranquillity and happiness. I never balance between the virtuous and the vicious course of life; but am sensible, that, to a well-disposed mind, every advantage is on the side of the former. And what can you say more, allowing all your suppositions and reasonings? You tell me, indeed, that this disposition of things proceeds from intelligence and design. But whatever it proceeds from, the disposition itself, on which depends our happiness or misery, and consequently our conduct and deportment in life is still the same. It is still open for me, as well as you, to regulate my behaviour, by my experience of past events. And if you affirm, that, while a divine providence is allowed, and a supreme distributive justice in the universe, I ought to expect some more particular reward of the good, and punishment of the bad, beyond the ordinary course of events; I here find the same fallacy, which I have before endeavoured to detect. You persist in imagining, that, if we grant that divine existence, for which you so earnestly contend, you may safely infer consequences from it, and add something to the experienced order of nature, by arguing from the attributes which you ascribe to your gods. You seem not to remember, that all your reasonings on this subject can only be drawn from effects to causes; and that every argument, deducted from causes to effects, must of necessity be a gross sophism; since it is impossible for you to know anything of the cause, but what you have antecedently, not inferred, but discovered to the full, in the effect.
But what must a philosopher think of those vain reasoners, who, instead of regarding the present scene of things as the sole object of their contemplation, so far reverse the whole course of nature, as to render this life merely a passage to something farther; a porch, which leads to a greater, and vastly different building; a prologue, which serves only to introduce the piece, and give it more grace and propriety? Whence, do you think, can such philosophers derive their idea of the gods? From their own conceit and imagination surely. For if they derived it from the present phenomena, it would never point to anything farther, but must be exactly adjusted to them. That the divinity may possibly be endowed with attributes, which we have never seen exerted; may be governed by principles of action, which we cannot discover to be satisfied: all this will freely be allowed. But still this is mere possibility and hypothesis. We never can have reason to in infer any attributes, or any principles of action in him, but so far as we know them to have been exerted and satisfied. Are there any marks of a distributive justice in the world? If you answer in the affirmative, I conclude, that, since justice here exerts itself, it is satisfied. If you reply in the negative, I conclude that you have then no reason to ascribe justice, in our sense of it, to the gods. If you hold a medium between affirmation and negation, by saying, that the justice of the gods, at present, exerts itself in part, but not in its full extent; I answer, that you have no reason to give it any particular extent, but only so far as you see it, at present, exert itself.
Thus I bring the dispute, O Athenians, to a short issue with my antagonists. The course of nature lies open to my contemplation as well as to theirs. The experienced train of events is the great standard, by which we all regulate our conduct. Nothing else can be appealed to in the field, or in the senate. Nothing else ought ever to be heard of in the school, or in the closet. In vain would our limited understanding break through those boundaries, which are too narrow for our fond imagination. While we argue from the course of nature, and infer a particular intelligent cause, which first bestowed, and still preserves order in the universe, we embrace a principle, which is both uncertain and useless. It is uncertain; because the subject lies entirely beyond the reach of human experience. It is useless; because our knowledge of this cause being derived entirely from the course of nature, we can never, according to the rules of just reasoning, return back from the cause with any new inference, or making additions to the common and experienced course of nature, establish any new principles of conduct and behaviour.
In short, "God" is simply the cause of the universe as we perceive it, no more, no less. And that assumes you need such a cause, which is somewhat silly.
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Ben Kenobi
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McGregornobi!
Oct 2002
time: 21:23
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The cosmological, a posteriori or causal argument for God (Aquinas) works on the basis that everything that moves has a mover. That something cannot exist in a state of potentiality and actuality, so a potential property can only be actualised by something that already has that property. Ice has the potential to become water if it is hot, but in order for that potential to be realised, you might place an ice cube in a fire, which in actuality has the property of being hot. To avoid an infinite regress of consequences and their causes, there must be a first cause, which is supposedly God. On the face of it, this is obviously a very weak argument, since its conclusion contradicts one its premises, thus making it absurd.
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Why is it absurd? It is a good question. If everything that moves, must first have a mover, then eventually you come to the point, where you have an infinite regress of causation. If this is so, and we know that the universe is not infinite, then this is an absurd conclusion. Therefore, since the preposition that everything that moves must have a mover, yet we know there cannot be an infinite regress of causes, then something must exist that has not, nor could be moved, yet is the first mover of everthing else. That is the only way to resolve this paradox of a finite universe yet an infinite regression of causation.
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the stark conclusion of infinite regress (no God) and absurdity.
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The problem is if you devote yourself to the cause of an infinite regression, then you must explain how this works inside a finite universe.
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If you suppose that everything is contingent then once there was a time when nothing existed. However, according to this logic, that would surely mean that nothing would exist now, since every consequence has a cause. No cause (nothing) = no consequence (we, and this universe, wouldn’t exist). There must be something non-contingent therefore, something that would exist necessarily, and that would be God.
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Or something. Aquinas has only postulated another source for a First Mover. What form this first mover may take requires further information.
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God therefore, as infinity is unknowable and in our case, cannot rationally exist. This is basic determinism.
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You and Russell are clever, to say that there must first be a contingent condition, and that to create the universe, requires knowledge of the universe that we do not possess.
Just because we cannot know infinity does not put infinity out of reach of God. Essentially, you have added a rationale for the third characteristic of God.
Aquinas first argued for God's omnipotence, in being the First Mover. Then he argued for his Eternal existance, as there could not have been a time before him. You and Russell have provided the rational for God's omniscience, as he would require knowledge of infinity in order to create the necessary conditions to produce the universe.
Very clever Whaleboy. 
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Also, the notions of cause and consequence are pretty distinct, in your mind you can think of something’s existence without the idea of something that caused it,
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No, I ask you to try that again. It's not clear to me that anything comes into being without thinking of it's cause.
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You could start with Anselm who defines God as something “than which nothing greater can be thought”. You can think of such a perfect being in your mind, but you can conceive of it in your mind. Assuming existence to be a property, the only thing greater than that in your mind is for the being in your mind to exist in reality, thus it has taken on another property making that perfect being more perfect than the conception of it in your mind. Thus it must exist. So basically, if God by his definition exists as a concept in your mind, you must be forced to conclude that it exists in reality.
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For if we could think of something greater, we would consider such an entity God. I don't usually use Anselm to prove the existence of God from our thoughts, rather his principles are useful in refuting other conceptions of God, because they do not meet his priniciples.
One case would be polytheists. For if we can conceive of many different gods, if we could conceive of one god higher than all the others in the pantheon, then it makes sense that we would call this one god God.
Essentially, he gives some necessary conditions for what constitutes 'God'.
I agree with your critiques, and for that reason I don't use Anselm in this manner.
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This is easily criticised by refuting the assumption that existence is a property, or say that existence is not a predicate as Kant calls it.
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I think that existence is a property, but then I am also a objectivist. Regardless of whether we feel, things exist, the universe is not contigent upon us for it's existence, nor is our existence determined by subjective assessements.
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I personally have a problem with that because you’re idea of an object or a person changes whether or not they exist.
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Yes, but this does not change the fact that Ahab still is a character in a book. Your opinion may change, but his existence does not.
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If you come at it from a religious point of view where morality and a view of perfection is transcendent that’s not going to be a problem for you, but for me that is. It seems to lend itself therefore as existence of God unto us, but not objectively in “reality”.
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Interesting. I find that as an objectivist, only those things that transcend our perceptions can really constitute universal qualities. They are, in a sense, more real than we.
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As for the teleological argument, or the argument from design, it works on the principle that the universe is constructed to a design, it’s ordered, governed by very simple laws that we humans can understand and use to predict the future, say, gravity for example. Such an intelligent design appears highly unlikely to have developed randomly and thus a designer is entailed and this is god.
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Many of these functions of the universe seem to be constructed in such a way that chance cannot provide an adequate explanation. One adjunct to the design argument comes from the weak anthropic principle, which examines the significance of our physical constants.
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My mobile phone, with which I have experience (not just with mine but I’ve encountered lots of phones in my time etc) had a designer… I have experience with that phone being designed, manufactured, used etc. I have no such objective experience with this universe.
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This puts you in the same position as a savage looking at a watch washing up in shore. Which is, by the way, a very old analogy.
Just because one is a savage, does not mean that one cannot recognise the elements of design in the object that do not seem to pertain to chance.
For in our watch case, let us look at a normal pocketwatch, one of those snap-cases. Even if one had never see a watch, just the workmanship in the watch could easily be seen, the smoothness of the edge, and the fine moments of the timepiece. The precision of these moments could also be noted, without having any previous understanding of a clock, or seeing the innards.
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we cannot logically say that therefore there is a God since there is no intrinsic evidence in that “design” for God.
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Hold on. Now, don't the similarities between the savage and ourselves speak to the truth of the analogy? Do we not recognise the peculiar regularities and structure of the universe as similar to the precise movements of the watch?
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As for the design itself, the sufficient reason principle applies. A million monkeys at a million typewriters will write a hell of a lot of gibberish. Eventually, if they keep writing for a sufficient length of time, you will get all the works of Shakespeare as the saying goes.. But if you are already the works of Shakespeare that probability is now defunct and determinism applies.
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The key word being 'eventually'.
You do not have infinite time, whaleboy. Astronomers give you about 12 billion years to give chance the capability of performing all these miraculous wonders we see around us today. The sheer implausibility of just one of the components of the universe forming in such a way as to assist life, is vastly outside of the time period.
Consider just the binding energy of an electron. If it moves only slightly greater or less, that change influences so many other chemical and physical processes. Slightly less, and you do not get enough energy from the chemical reactions. Slightly more, and the activation energy will be too great to start the reactions.
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We look at ourselves now and see such extraordinary complexity but that came about through a series of benign and simple steps, a cascade effect.
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We barely understand simple molecules, and even then, we have difficulty with even the smallest objects. Look at the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. Just that alone should prove to you the impossibility of a totally deterministic structure of the universe.
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However, this is a system with energy going into it, so to speak. Imagine I break my coffee cup on the floor. It’s a nice cup, so I decide to put the bits of china back together. I use my hands and superglue. To do that, the glue needs to dry, and I burn energy to do so. The disorder I create by repairing the cup is greater than the order I create. Similarly, the disorder in the universe had a net increase through the albeit ordered construction of life on Earth.
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True, my bad. I misread what you wrote.
Your point doesn't prove one thing or another. So entropy causes everything to decay, and scientists, and theists alike understand that people are an increase to the disorder in the universe, even as they try to order things.
Entropy cannot prove nor disprove the existence of God, unless we start to see highly ordered systems that are very unlikely to have formed.
One of these would be all the gas molecules ending up in one side of a room, and none of them being on the other.
Last edited by Ben Kenobi on 19-09-2004 at 23:58
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loinburger
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Sweet Sauce Jones
Jul 1999
time: 00:23
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I've never seen much point in trying to prove the existence of god(s) unless that proof also entails that god(s) must take a given form or have a given set of (dis)likes or whatever. I mean, otherwise the proof of the existence of god(s) doesn't really get you anywhere meaningful, unless you're willing to resort to some fantastic leaps of logic, e.g., "God is the First Cause, therefore, God hates fags," or "There can be nothing greater than God, therefore, I shouldn't eat pork," etc.
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Drake Tungsten
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Knee deep in alien womyn...
Oct 2001
time: 14:23
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quote:
Originally posted by loinburger
I've never seen much point in trying to prove the existence of god(s) unless that proof also entails that god(s) must take a given form or have a given set of (dis)likes or whatever. I mean, otherwise the proof of the existence of god(s) doesn't really get you anywhere meaningful, unless you're willing to resort to some fantastic leaps of logic, e.g., "God is the First Cause, therefore, God hates fags," or "There can be nothing greater than God, therefore, I shouldn't eat pork," etc. |
That's what I said... 
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Neutrino
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Austin, Texas, USA
Jun 2002
time: 23:23
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Carbon molecules are very versatile and capable of forming the many molecules required for life on Earth. Given that the Earth has significant amounts of C, H, N, O, and P, there is a good chance of self-replicating molecules (e.g. the precursors of ribonucleic acids).
Given current knowledge it is impossible to prove or disprove the existence of god(s). However, I feel that god(s), if they exist, surely are not the anthropocentric incarnations of current mainstream religions.
My 2 cents.
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19-09-2004 22:44
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jk) still do it.
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