 |
| |
|
|
Jaakko
|
 |
in Yellow
Jan 2000
time: 07:28
|
|
quote:
Originally posted by lord of the mark
but we're NOT denying the actual political situation. This whole thread has been about the political situation. And BTW, i didnt focus on bodycounts alone, but on the loss of the sanctuary at Fallujah, and the capture of several insurgent leaders (some of whom seem to have been caught with info from locals, a very good sign).
And at the heavy Iraqi involvement in securing the elections. |
The bodycount mentality has been expressed by US military instances though, which makes my Vietnam comparison valid. Yours, however, remains a bald assertion.
As for Fallujah and the captures, it's like squeezing jelly. The insurgency is not organised according to ordinary chains of command, and thus can't be crippled by such events. In Fallujah, they only left young hotheads and fanatics to fight back, along with those too stubborn to leave their homes. The leadership and the bulk of their forces left to join the fighters in other cities. 4th generation warfare, I believe it's called by some.
|
|
| |
|
|
|
BlackCat
|
|
quote:
Originally posted by Jaakko
The bodycount mentality has been expressed by US military instances though, which makes my Vietnam comparison valid. Yours, however, remains a bald assertion.
As for Fallujah and the captures, it's like squeezing jelly. The insurgency is not organised according to ordinary chains of command, and thus can't be crippled by such events. In Fallujah, they only left young hotheads and fanatics to fight back, along with those too stubborn to leave their homes. The leadership and the bulk of their forces left to join the fighters in other cities. 4th generation warfare, I believe it's called by some. |
So what do you suggest ? That we just roll over, let them take over and sacrifice ordinary Irauqs to their mercy ?
|
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
lord of the mark
|
 |
FUKCOV - Former United Kingdom Colony of Virginia
Dec 2000
time: 00:28
|
|
from Dan Darling at Winds of Change
"It should also be noted, though it hasn't really registered yet in the eyes of many observers, just how big a number the US has succeeded in doing to Zarqawi's organization in Iraq in recent months since the much-criticized assault on Fallujah. Just based on open-source information (with backgrounders supplied by yours truly) in descending order from the date of their capture or killing, here is a sample of some of the guys that Zarqawi has lost in recent months:
1) Abu Sayyaf (Sayf), aka Salah Salman Idaaj Matar al-Luhaybi - I'm unfamiliar with the al-Luhaybi tribe off-hand, so no clue as far as ethnic origins are concerned but my guess would be Iraqi or Jordanian since there's been an Abu Sayyaf among the mid-level al-Tawhid for quite awhile now. His kuniyat/nom de guerre suggests a familiarity with Abdurajak Abu Bakar Janjalani, a Filipino Moro who fought in the Afghan War using the kuniyat of Abu Sayyaf and later formed an al-Qaeda satellite group in the Philippines under the same name. He's like the second or third emir that Zarqawi had in place in Baghdad since the beginning of the insurgency according to Schanzer's work on al-Tawhid (some of which I want to say ended up in the Weekly Standard?) and my al-Tawhid flow chart has him as a mid-level commander who is in charge of insurgent activities in the greater Baghdad area and answers directly to Zarqawi. Per Deputy Prime Minister Saleh, he met with Zarqawi at least 4 times in December to set up planning for attacks during the elections and to discuss the al-Qaeda reorganization inside Iraq post-Fallujah.
2) Abu Omar al-Kurdi, aka Sami Mohammed Ali Said al-Jaaf - Iraqi Kurd, formerly the top deputy of Ayyub Afghani (aka Ayyub Hawleri), who was Ansar al-Islam's chief bombmaker and a veteran of al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan who had a picture of himself meeting with Osama bin Laden. Afghani was apprehended by coalition forces in Baghdad in March 2004 and it appears that al-Kurdi took over as top bombmaker in Baghdad afterwards. He's confessed to involvement in 32 car bombings, but what is likely to be far more interesting is his description of the terror triumvirate that was carrying out attacks in Baghdad and providing bombmaking skills to the insurgents during their opening attack on the Jordanian embassy until Ayyub Afghani's capture.
3) Abu Hassan, aka Ali Hamid (Hamad) Ardani Yassin (Yasin) al-Isawi - This guy's going to be a real diamond in the rough once he starts talking, he's a member of the al-Tawhid ruling council together with Zarqawi, Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, Sheikh Abdullah Janabi, and the apparently recently deceased Omar Hadid. Not much on him except that he's part of the original al-Tawhid core going all the way back to the days of the Millennium Plot in Jordan and maybe before that - I'd need to see the GID records on who was in jail with Zarqawi again to make sure. Per Saleh, he'd met with Zarqawi over 40 times in the last 3 months and was captured west of Baghdad, which would seem to confirm speculation that al-Tawhid leadership broke into two groups after losing Fallujah, once of which was headed towards Mosul to join Abu Talha with the other half heading south towards Baghdad.
4) Abu Walid al-Iraqi, aka Anad Mohammed Hamid al-Qais - He's part of the original group of Iraqi al-Qaeda who left the country with Abu Hajir al-Iraqi back in the 1980s to go join the jihad in Afghanistan and he's the only one of these guys who's actually part of the al-Qaeda, not al-Tawhid, which means that he's probably had a lot more combat experience at guerrilla warfare than most of the insurgent leaders. Al-Qaeda's military commander, Saif al-Adel, was originally a special forces colonel in the Egyptian military back when Egypt was part of the Soviet Bloc and he sets up al-Qaeda support for its satellite terrorist groups like al-Tawhid pretty much the same way the Soviets used to their client states: mostly logistical support, with only a handful of actual seasoned al-Qaeda members to serve as military advisors and to provide strategic direction in concert with the network's global strategy as well as to pick out several dozen to several hundred to become part of the core network, which is what the 2025 CIA report was actually referring to. My guess is that Abu Walid was one of these advisors and the reference to him as being a money man would also be consistent with that - it'll be a good idea to pump him for everything they can with respect to the Golden Chain operations inside Iraq.
5) Hassan Hamid Abdullah Mohsen al-Dulaimi - A Fallujah native and the head of propaganda operations for al-Qaeda in Iraq, al-Dulaimi wrote most of the leaflets and statements used by al-Tawhid and may well have had a role in Zarqawi's decision to take an anti-Shi'ite bent in his letter to bin Laden that was found on Hassan Ghul in January 2004.
6) Abu Marwan - The logistical chief of the Mosul al-Qaeda cell, Abu Marwan was responsible for serving as the on-scene terrorist commander in Mosul as well as purchasing weapons with money supplied by Abu Talha. He also helped to coordinate the underground railroads and networks of safe houses that brought foreign fighters into Iraq from Syria and Iran. He had extensive ties to the local criminal element as well as to many of the northern Iraqi Islamist groups.
7) Abu Ahmed, aka Abdul Aziz Sadun Ahmed Hamduni - The top deputy of Abu Talha, the emir of Mosul who returned to Iran during the fighting in Fallujah and left Abu Ahmed in charge of al-Qaeda operations in the city in his absence, receiving money and weapons from Abu Talha as well as coordinating with local insurgent groups such as Ansar al-Sunnah and Ansar al-Islam to mount attacks on US forces. He told US interrogators about the pressure that Zarqawi was under from the higher-ups in al-Qaeda as well as his Baathist allies to thwart the Iraqi elections and shed light on the scope of al-Qaeda activities in northern Iraq.
8) Saleh Arugayan Khalil - A commander of al-Qaeda fighters in Fallujah and Ramadi who attempted to flee into rural Anbar and stir up trouble for US forces in the southeastern region of the province.
9) Bassim Mohammed Hazim - The head of one of Zarqawi's kidnapping and assassination cells, he organized several mass killings of Iraqi security forces after being forced to flee Fallujah.
10) Omar Hadid - A former electrician and a member of al-Tawhid wal Jihad's military committee, Hadid served as the day-to-day ruler of Fallujah and other insurgent-ruled areas of Iraq from April to November 2004. A Salafist from Fallujah, he was recruited to join al-Qaeda by a fellow Iraqi al-Qaeda veteran of the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and Chechnya despite his high status among the local Baathists (Saddam tried to integrate as many Islamists as possible into the regime following the Gulf War) but eventually had a falling out with the regime and being forced to travel to al-Qaim, Syria, and Saudi Arabia where he became even more radicalized and was sent to northern Iraq to join what was then the Second Souran Unit under Aso Hawleri and eventually hooking up with Zarqawi. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, he returned to Fallujah with a force of 1,500 largely Iraqi, Saudi, and Syrian al-Qaeda fighters he called the Black Banners Brigade and established himself as the emir of the city's Julan neighborhood. His leg was injured during the course of the US assault on the city and he has not been heard
11) Abu Harith Mohammed Jassem al-Isawi - Omar Hadid's second-in-command and partner in crime in the Julan area of Fallujah.
12) Abu Hafs al-Libi - The Libyan spiritual leader of Ansar al-Sunnah who issued fatwas justifying the organization's actions.
13) Abu Anas al-Shami, aka Omar Yousef Jumah - The Palestinian Jordanian spiritual leader of al-Tawhid wal Jihad and a leader among the Jordanian Salafists, al-Shami received religious schooling in Saudi Arabia (where else?) and lived in Kuwait before being expelled during the post-Gulf War pogroms against Kuwaiti Palestinians and returning to Jordan to preach Salafism at a mosque in Amman. The mosque was closed following the Millennium Plot on the grounds that it was promoting a fanatical interpretation of Islam and he left to join Zarqawi in Afghanistan.
14) Hussein Salman Mohammed al-Jabburi - The Mosul cell leader of Ansar al-Sunnah.
Now granted, there are other insurgent leaders still active and they are likely to be continued threat for some time to come, but I don't think it's any stretch to say that Zarqawi's capabilities, while still lethal, are nevertheless being severely curtailed by the continued actions against them by US authorities. While we are not at the end or even the beginning of the end of the insurgency, it now appears that there is something of a light that is starting to form at the end of tunnel with respect to looking for the day when Zarqawi will hang from a gibbet for the sport of his own crows (the reference, lest I be taken too seriously here, is to Theoden's remark to Saruman)."
|
|
| |
|
|
|
Jaakko
|
|
in Yellow
Jan 2000
time: 07:28
|
|
quote:
Originally posted by Oerdin
There have been tons of threads showing that electricity production far exceeds pre-war levels and several new power plants are being built. Why are there power outages then? Anwser: Because prior to the war almost no one had a TV or radio or air conditioning or most other consumer goods but now it seems like EVERYONE has these things. Demand has spiked way beyond the infastructures ability to cope and since electricty is totally free consumers have no incentive to conserve. That means everyone leave their lights on 24/7 or at least it seems that way when you're there.
Unemployment continues to be a problem but compared to the 70%-80% unemployment pre-war 30%-60% is remarkable progress. Please feel free to keep whining about how Iraq isn't a first world country but if you'd be honest then you'd admite that economically things are much better then three years ago. |
How about compared to '91 levels of electricity? How about foreign investment, how is that going?
A slightly lesser mess is still a mess.
Last edited by Jaakko on 03-02-2005 at 02:53
|
|
| |
|
|
|
Oerdin
|
 |
of Internet Music.
Sep 2001
time: 21:28
|
|
quote:
Originally posted by Jaakko
For starters, the US stops stomping around like a bull in a china shop. No 500 pound bombs in urban areas, strict RoE. Bleed for the Iraqis sake, don't make the Iraqis bleed for your sake. |
I'm tired of responding to your complete ignorance of all things Iraqi so this shall be the last time.
There are no 500lb bombs being dropped in urban areas and the Rules of Engagement are extremely strict. I know this based upon being a soldier there who lived under those RoE and observing that there were no 500lb bombs being dropped.
Edit: In major offensives like Fallujah there were bombs dropped but the city wast pretty much vacated and everyone was given fair warning.
Last edited by Oerdin on 03-02-2005 at 04:11
|
|
| |
|
|
|
BlackCat
|
|
You haven't proved your point wich was :
quote:
Houses are routinely blown up with 500 pound bombs (about 90kg of explosives), with a lethal shrapnel radius of about 400 metres. The dynamics are different in an urban area, but you can be sure that it's doesn't discriminate.
|
Those attacs was directed against specific targets and sadly some hit the wrong. There are no routinely bombing of common Iraquis.
|
|
| |
|
|
|
BlackCat
|
|
quote:
Originally posted by Jaakko
Here's the full quote of what I said, which you didn't even bother to include in its entirety in your previous post:
Houses are routinely blown up with 500 pound bombs (about 90kg of explosives), with a lethal shrapnel radius of about 400 metres. The dynamics are different in an urban area, but you can be sure that it's doesn't discriminate.
These actions are undertaken often under shady intel obtained through Iraqi informants, without pre- or post-attack recon to determine who was actually hit. In once case, an USAF spoke how they had bombed a kebab restaurant that was suspected of being a insurgent meeting place. How can you not hit large numbers of civilians with those methods?
Kindly go peddle your BS somewhere else. |
As yourself write "These actions are undertaken often under shady intel", then I assume that all the others in your view are random.
|
|
| |
|
|
|
BlackCat
|
|
quote:
Originally posted by Jaakko
Right, because the first things that US airstrikes bring to mind is "random". Do you really process this stuff on some cretinous level where the absurd is on the same level of plausibility as the established and well-known doctrine of precision bombing?
If anything, I overestimated your grasp of what constitutes an airstrike. For that I apologise, naturally. |
No, it was your ranting that made me think that you meant that.
|
|
| |
|
| |
All times are GMT. The time now is 05:28.
Apolyton Time is 00:28. |
top of page
|
|
|
Forum Rules:
You may not post new threads
You may not post replies
You may not post attachments
You may not edit your posts
|
HTML code is ON
vB code is ON
Smilies are ON
[IMG] code is ON
|
|
|
|
|
|
03-02-2005 02:24
|