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lord of the mark
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FUKCOV - Former United Kingdom Colony of Virginia
Dec 2000
time: 00:18
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[QUOTE] Originally posted by GePap
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NO ending is inevitable, but the Vietnam war was a marvelous example of stupidity.
As for the Domino notion: it is an inherently moronic idea, always has been, always will, whether the dominos are supposed to be falling for communism or democracy.
The Vietnam war did nothing to "stabilize" any of the South East Asian states around Vietnam: Local murderous thugs did that (I guess the muder of 500,000 people will do a lot to "stabalize" a country  ). |
The argument is that the war bought time for the states of South East to do the things they needed to do to stabilize themselves. IE they WOULD have fallen like dominoes SV had falled in 1965, instead of 1975. Obviously thats a what if that cant be proven. A serious exploration of it would require a detailed analysis of the politics of each SE Asian country. Also, I think, the pattern of politics in each country was different.
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If anything, Cambodia fell to the murderous Khmer Rouge regime thanks to our invasion of that country and the chaos we created trying to stop the North Vietnamese. Its a sad truth that it then took the Vietnamese regime to remove the Khmer Rouge form power. |
Its possible that if we hadnt intervened in SV, and SV had falled in 1965, the Sihanouk regime would have survived. Its also quite possible that it would not have, and other events would have happened.
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The sad fact was that when it came to it, the 'South" Vietnamese were not willing to put up a to the death fight for their own country. Did any ARVN units fight as courageously for their own "state" as fellow Southeners in the VC fought for a reunited comunist Vietnam? |
While many South Viet Namese fought for their country, its undeniable that the VC had an edge in motivation and morale. Its not clear that the side with an edge in motivation always wins wars, however. Its also not clear if the VC motivation matters much after Tet, when most cadres were dead the war on the Communist side was fought largely by NVA regulars.
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Its does not seem so- in the final offensive SV fell like a house of cards. |
At least in part because they were denied support by the US congress. In fact they held their own for 2 years after the US withdrawl - in 1975 they attempted to execute a strategic withdrawl from the central highlands, and this turned into a rout. It hardly indicates that the defeat, even after 1973, was inevitable.
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Its hard to think how one state can save another when the very members of that state don't themselves fight for it to the death. |
Most military units will break and run after a certain point. The point varies from army to army, unit to unit, and time to time. Its not clear that theres a magic degree of unit cohesion and morale that dictates victory or defeat, independent of other factors/
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GePap
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of the Big Apple
Nov 2001
time: 23:18
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quote:
Originally posted by lord of the mark
The argument is that the war bought time for the states of South East to do the things they needed to do to stabilize themselves. IE they WOULD have fallen like dominoes SV had falled in 1965, instead of 1975. Obviously thats a what if that cant be proven. A serious exploration of it would require a detailed analysis of the politics of each SE Asian country. Also, I think, the pattern of politics in each country was different. |
If you need to study the invidicual patterns of each state to know what mighyt happen individually, then what is the valididty of a "domino" theory in the first place??
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Its possible that if we hadnt intervened in SV, and SV had falled in 1965, the Sihanouk regime would have survived. Its also quite possible that it would not have, and other events would have happened. |
The "who knows" arguement is a perenially weak one.
"Domino" theories are weak because they assume some sort of generality accross vast areas, and necessarily ignore local political differences, the sort of differences that make ALL the difference. The Domino theory was wrong with communism, it will be wrong with any ideology. States are individual conditions that can't be reproduced elsewhere.
What we do know is that in the failed and fruitles attempt to "save" South Vietnam we did huge damage to Cambodia.
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While many South Viet Namese fought for their country, its undeniable that the VC had an edge in motivation and morale. Its not clear that the side with an edge in motivation always wins wars, however. Its also not clear if the VC motivation matters much after Tet, when most cadres were dead the war on the Communist side was fought largely by NVA regulars. |
That's not the point-the point is that had ARVN forces fought as viciously as VC cadres did, we would have had a much, MUCH more effective ally, and one that might, perhaps, have stood by itself.
As for "edge ion motivation", a side with little to none can NEVER win a war.
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Its does not seem so- in the final offensive SV fell like a house of cards. |
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At least in part because they were denied support by the US congress. In fact they held their own for 2 years after the US withdrawl - in 1975 they attempted to execute a strategic withdrawl from the central highlands, and this turned into a rout. It hardly indicates that the defeat, even after 1973, was inevitable. |
They were getting hundreds of million a year, and had the lagcy of tens of billions that had been spent. Was the USSR giving more aid to the NOrth than the US was in 1974? I would like to see the figures, but I doubt it. And you know what? The VC fought the United States Military for 4 years with far less than the ARVN had. As for the comedy of errors that was the campaign in 1975, I thin exposing the extreme weakness of the ARVN military command only shows how weak a force it was.
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Most military units will break and run after a certain point. The point varies from army to army, unit to unit, and time to time. Its not clear that theres a magic degree of unit cohesion and morale that dictates victory or defeat, independent of other factors/ |
And this had **** to do with the point. Units that break easy are obviously inferior to units that stand fast.
Did any ARVN unit, when faced with the NV attack, fight as long as say the isolated Cadres who battled with Marines for Hue?
I doubt the NV army ever had as much firepower to dish as the Marines did in hue, and still some VC cadres fought on for weeks, in a very vicious battle.
I don't think even a single ARVN unit put up that kind of tooth and nail defense for their own country. Its not like the North had some immense technical or numerical superiority inherent vs. the South, yet their last offensive, which the North planned to conduct over 2 years, took less than 2 months.
Last edited by GePap on 27-05-2005 at 00:00
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lord of the mark
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FUKCOV - Former United Kingdom Colony of Virginia
Dec 2000
time: 00:18
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[QUOTE] Originally posted by GePap
quote:
If you need to study the invidicual patterns of each state to know what mighyt happen individually, then what is the valididty of a "domino" theory in the first place?? |
It depends if we are dealing with a straw man domino theory, or a realistic one. A realistic one would posit that the political evolution of a given state is a function of whats going on in neighboring states AND of a variety of internal factors. Thus a fall of Saigon in 1965 would have increased the probabilities of communist success in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, etc. Whether any would in fact have become Communist, and which ones, would depend on the nature of the politics in each state. For example its possible that a victorious Viet Nam would have supported the Communist insurgency in Thailand, and this would have been enought to tip the balance, while at the same time the events in Indonesia might have proceeded as they did in OTL. Again, to determine that, one needs to analyze Thai politics in 1965 in detail, to see how close the knife edge the situation actually was. Clearly by 1975 the situation was NOT close the knife edge, which is why the dominoes did NOT fall in 1975. Its not possible to read the situation back to 1965 without analysis. A realistic domino theory does NOT posit all states are identical - which is why folks worried about communists winning a civil war in Thailand, but not in, say, Australia.
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Its possible that if we hadnt intervened in SV, and SV had falled in 1965, the Sihanouk regime would have survived. Its also quite possible that it would not have, and other events would have happened. |
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The "who knows" arguement is a perenially weak one. |
Its perfectly valid against an argument that blames everything bad that happened somewhere for particular changes, assuming things would have remained exactly as they were.
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domino" theories are weak because they assume some sort of generality accross vast areas, and necessarily ignore local political differences, the sort of differences that make ALL the difference. The Domino theory was wrong with communism, it will be wrong with any ideology. States are individual conditions that can't be reproduced elsewhere. |
So its just coincidence that a revolution occured in Romania, which wasnt even part of the Soviet block, a couple of months after the changes in Hungary, Czecho, etc? Its just a coincidence that there democratic changes occured in S. Korea and Thailand shortly after the people power revolution in the Phillipines? Its just a coincidence that a revolution occured in Georgia, which its leaders frankly admit was inspired by what happened in Serbia, and had advice from Serbian students?
In fact there are cultural and geographic groupings of states that have much in common politically, culturally, economically etc. and in which political actors routinely look across borders for political inspiration, and even form cross border alliances.
This is not to say that Iraq in particular will lead to a domino effect. In fact the failure to establish stability and security in Iraq may be having a negative impact (at least for now) - theres a recent article in i think the wapo on the impact of this in Syria. OTOH the impact of Lebanon on Syria is in the other direction.
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At least in part because they were denied support by the US congress. In fact they held their own for 2 years after the US withdrawl - in 1975 they attempted to execute a strategic withdrawl from the central highlands, and this turned into a rout. It hardly indicates that the defeat, even after 1973, was inevitable. |
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They were getting hundreds of million a year, and had the lagcy of tens of billions that had been spent. Was the USSR giving more aid to the NOrth than the US was in 1974? I would like to see the figures, but I doubt it. And you know what? The VC fought the United States Military for 4 years with far less than the ARVN had. As for the comedy of errors that was the campaign in 1975, I thin exposing the extreme weakness of the ARVN military command only shows how weak a force it was. |
while they were getting the vast amounts, they held. The material edge apparently balancing the NVA advantages. They lost the subsidy, then they lost the war.
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And this had **** to do with the point. Units that break easy are obviously inferior to units that break fast. |
I dont think thats what you meant to say. Slow down.
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Did any ARVN unit, when faced with the NV attack, fight as long as say the isolated Cadres who battled with Marines for Hue? |
I dont know the detailed history of the ARVN enough to say.
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lord of the mark
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FUKCOV - Former United Kingdom Colony of Virginia
Dec 2000
time: 00:18
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quote:
Originally posted by GePap
During the first offensive? No, but as the years went by, the performance of ROK units improved dramatically. BUt of course, North Korea was the richer, more advanced Korea in 1948.
Plus, there is a crucial difference, that the conflict in South Vietnam began as an insurgency and only after almost a decade became fully conventional. There was no insurgency of any kind in Korea-it was a purely conventional war, and one in which no **** sherlock the Richest country in the world and the most technologically advanced would beat a third world state.
You can't compare with any honesty the first performance of the ROK army to the first performance of the NK army in 1950- to the condition of two military forces that had been on the field for at least 10 years by 1975, cause the ARVN had that much time to form itself into some semblence of a fighting force. |
we were no longer on the field in 1975 - i was responding to why the US could not "save VN" while we could save SK. Do you think the difference was the quality of SK troops? My sense is that the principle difference is that while the VN war in 1970, and the K war in 1953, were conventional wars, the VN war was one where it impossible to establish a front line, and so NVA infantry could always penetrate where it wished, and given that it outnumbered US troops, could gain local infantry superiority sufficient to always keep the US off balance. In Korea, given the GEOGRAPHY of the peninsula, it was possible to establish a front line, and apply US material strength more effectively.
Thought experiment. Its 1969. Laos and Cambodia are suddenly submerged beneath an arm of the sea. The US wins or loses the war in VN? They win, easily, I think.
Alternatively, you might respond, leave the geography alone, and make ARVN fighters as good as NVA fighters, and we win. I suppose.
This shows that NV victory required both the superiority to ARVN troops, AND the geographic situation to make that superiorty effective, even against US material superiority.
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MichaeltheGreat
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Apolyton Grand Executioner
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mooning the house that Ruth built.
Oct 1999
time: 21:18
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quote:
Originally posted by lord of the mark
Did ROK units fight as hard as NKOR units during the Korean war? AFAIK, no. Yet we did save ROK. The key differences lie in the strategic geography. |
If and when they were half-decently equipped and trained, yes, sometimes against hopeless odds.
The DPRK forces were initially well trained, well equipped, had a huge, modern, Soviet trained armored spearhead and a lot of prior planning with Soviet advisors. The ROKs started out woefully unprepared, so given the disparity of training, equipment, and initial leadership, the ROKs certainly held their own.
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MichaeltheGreat
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Apolyton Grand Executioner
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mooning the house that Ruth built.
Oct 1999
time: 21:18
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quote:
Originally posted by GePap
Did any ARVN unit, when faced with the NV attack, fight as long as say the isolated Cadres who battled with Marines for Hue?
I doubt the NV army ever had as much firepower to dish as the Marines did in hue, and still some VC cadres fought on for weeks, in a very vicious battle.
I don't think even a single ARVN unit put up that kind of tooth and nail defense for their own country. |
The ARVN Rangers, ARVN Marines, and LDNN forces were generally well equipped, well trained, well led, and were solid, tough fighters. Most of the rest of the ARVN forces relied on conscripts and on officers who were there more for political reasons than skill.
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Dr Strangelove
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I might point out that during the 22 year existence of the Republic of (South) Vietnam it's government was controlled by a small minority, the Catholics. Prior to the extension of US involvement one of its presidents, Diem, attempted to exterminate the minority religion, Buddhism. The appearence of Buddhist monks immolating themselves on American TV was probably the American public's first hint that South Vietnam was not a good investment of American manpower and economic assistance. Diem's successor, Ky, continued the policy of having an all-Catholic government in a country >90% Buddhist. His successor Thieu finally appointed a few token non-Catholics and allowed some non-Catholics to take seats in the legislature. By that time though I believe that the US backed government had lost any hopes of establishing credibility among the Vietnamese people.
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GePap
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of the Big Apple
Nov 2001
time: 23:18
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quote:
Originally posted by lord of the mark
It depends if we are dealing with a straw man domino theory, or a realistic one. A realistic one would posit that the political evolution of a given state is a function of whats going on in neighboring states AND of a variety of internal factors. Thus a fall of Saigon in 1965 would have increased the probabilities of communist success in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, etc. |
And why wopuld what is happening in South Vietnam have anythin to do with what was happening in Thailand or Malasyia, neither sharing a border with Vietnam, nor a culture, nor even a common history, ditto for Indonesia? After all, all these states "survived" the "fall of China". If China going communist in 1950 did not all of a sudden force all of Asiua communist, why should the unification of Vietnam all of a sudden do it??
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Whether any would in fact have become Communist, and which ones, would depend on the nature of the politics in each state. For example its possible that a victorious Viet Nam would have supported the Communist insurgency in Thailand, and this would have been enought to tip the balance, while at the same time the events in Indonesia might have proceeded as they did in OTL. Again, to determine that, one needs to analyze Thai politics in 1965 in detail, to see how close the knife edge the situation actually was. Clearly by 1975 the situation was NOT close the knife edge, which is why the dominoes did NOT fall in 1975. Its not possible to read the situation back to 1965 without analysis. A realistic domino theory does NOT posit all states are identical - which is why folks worried about communists winning a civil war in Thailand, but not in, say, Australia. |
Why would Vietnam do it, but not, say, China? The USSR? (both of which had much more resources anyways)
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So its just coincidence that a revolution occured in Romania, which wasnt even part of the Soviet block, a couple of months after the changes in Hungary, Czecho, etc? |
The Romanian communist dictatorship was as much a foreign import as in all the other Waswa Pact members, so Romania was NOT as independent of the changes in other parts of Eastern Europe as you would make it seem. That only in Romania was the revolt violent is what shows the greater indegenous power of the Romanian regime.
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Its just a coincidence that there democratic changes occured in S. Korea and Thailand shortly after the people power revolution in the Phillipines? Its just a coincidence that a revolution occured in Georgia, which its leaders frankly admit was inspired by what happened in Serbia, and had advice from Serbian students? |
And yet why South Korea and Thailand, but not Indonesia and Burma (Myanmar?) Why not Cuba and Vietnam after Eastern Europe?
I would posit that NO, the collapse of the Marcos dictatorship in '86 was NOT a crucial event for the end of authoritarian rule in either SKOrea nor Thailand. That similar economic forces might have been in play that exerted pressures on these authoritarian regimes at the same time might have revelaed the different abilities of regimes to survive.
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In fact there are cultural and geographic groupings of states that have much in common politically, culturally, economically etc. and in which political actors routinely look across borders for political inspiration, and even form cross border alliances. |
And yet, there is no actual method to the madness from which one can posit a worthwhile theory like a "Domino theory". Costa Rica survived the violence all its neighbors had, and the early Costa Rican example did not radiate to any of its neighbors either.
Overall, Southeast Asia is not anywhere as culturally cohesive as say Eastern Europe, so even if one admits (which I am willing to do) some sort of weak interconnectiveness, which does not amount to anything enough to posit a "Domino effect" in which change in one place forces similarly radical change elsewhere (which is exactly what happens to Dominoes), South East Asia is a very weak place to posit this, given that all these states have very distinct cultures and histories that as not so intertwined. The fate of Viet Nam has had little i anything to do historically with the fate of Java, for example.
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while they were getting the vast amounts, they held. The material edge apparently balancing the NVA advantages. They lost the subsidy, then they lost the war. |
They were still getting significant amounts in 1974-5. That they were seemingly utterly incapable of investing aid into things that would help them, survive long term is a huge indictment on the very Viability of South Vietnam.
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26-05-2005 23:28
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