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Capt Dizle
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Was Lee correct to try this? Was it not the best and maybe only chance for Southern independance?
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Albert Speer
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Puerile Polemic
Mar 1999 time: 00:21
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Lee could have easily won at Gettysburg, despite his numerical inferiority, except with Stuart going around like a mercenary who know's where, Lee did not have sufficient reconnaisance to gauge his best strategy, and lacked the cavalry that would've been able to outflank the Union troops.
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Albert Speer
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Puerile Polemic
Mar 1999 time: 00:21
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Oh yeah... if Lee would have been able to gain much from a victory at Gettysburg is doubtful though. Once Philly or DC was threatened, the Union would probably muster a force that the invading Confederates would not have been able to hold off, let alone manage to besiege the northern capital.
thanks
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Capt Dizle
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Longstreet was of the opinion that the Federals would have attacked the ANV even if it had entrenched on favorable terrain but Meade was a cautious general and he could have simply refused to offer battle.
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Capt Dizle
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And it is clearly established that the opening of the battle occured when one of Lee's generals advanced thinking that he was opposed by only cavalry and/or milita. When the initial clash broadened into a major engagement Lee appraished the situation and ordered an attack that resulted in a Confederate victory on the first day.
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Capt Dizle
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Longstreet was accused of not prosecuting the attack vigorously because he was opposed to it. This in fact could have been a case of self-fulfilling prophesy.
But the issue to me is not whether or not Lee managed the battle correctly. It's whether he should have been in Pennslyvania in the first place.
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Capt Dizle
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Veracity? This article uses facts to present an opinion of Lee and not a favorable one at that.
I disagree with the conclusions.
Example: The author compares Lee with Patton and concludes that Lee was a bad general because he took heavy casualties. This is flawed on its face because in the 1860s warfare favored the defense and this continued through WW1, but by WW2 the offense had the advantage and warfare was much more mobile.
The author also pans Lee for giving his commanders the freedom of inititive and for not being able to ensure that the attacks on the 2nd and 3rd day of the battle were properly coordinated. This is cheap and ignorant Monday morning quarterbacking.
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Capt Dizle
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Oh please tell us more of your impressions of the Devil's Den?
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Capt Dizle
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At the time of the war there was a lot more farmland than there is now.
There are more trees now. Fancy that.
I understand that on many battlefields the streams would run red with blood. I don't suppose they should simulate that do you?
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Dr Strangelove
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The North began winning the Civil War within the six months of the conflict. People don't realise that. The north followed the general strategy called 'The Anaconda Plan" outlined by General Winfield Scott early in 1861. The plan called for the isolation of the Confederacy by the blockade and occupation of its ports, then the slicing of the Confederacy into pieces by securing corridors along the Mississippi and from Tennessee to the Georgia coast. The war in Virginia was a side show, yet as predicted, the Confederacy squandered their resources defending this area. The invasion of Pennsylvannia was a desperate gambit that never really had a chance of succeeding at anything more than feeding Lee's army on yankee victuals for a few months.
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Capt Dizle
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Good post. I don't agree that there was no chance of success but I do agree that it was a desperate gambit. In your mind, would the South have had a chance of winning by following the strategic defensive Dr. Stranglove?
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Chris 62
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But I'm feeling MUCH better now
Jan 2001 time: 00:21
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quote: Originally posted by DinoDoc
Can someone give me an opinion on the veracity of this article: Lee and Gettysburg? | The article is factual, and does present a decent case against a true scared cow, RE Lee.
The comparison is NOT unfair, as Lee fought on the defensive for good portions of the war, and did incur needless losses attacking when he should have consolidated (the Gettysburg campaign is a major flaw, he should have pressued Washington DC, not invaded Penn, a MAJOR error), whereas Patton fough an offensive war.
Lee was heavily critised early in the war (he was called "The king of spades", a derogitory term, meaning he was to defensive in west virgina in 1861).
Lee botched Gettysburg, there is no doubt of this, he should have concentrated on the Union right, which was 'hanging on the air", instead of a frontal assault on the center.
From Grant's invasion in 64 till the end, there was nothing Lee could have done to stop the union, the war was lost in the west, not the east, it was just a matter of time.
I would rate Lee high, but not a true great, the US civil war lacked a truly great general.
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Dr Strangelove
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quote: Originally posted by jimmytrick
Good post. I don't agree that there was no chance of success but I do agree that it was a desperate gambit. In your mind, would the South have had a chance of winning by following the strategic defensive Dr. Stranglove? |
The cpaital should never have been moved to Virginia. The Confederate forces should have had the ability to manuever between the eastern front and the western front, thereby not allowing the Union forces the opportunity to consolidate their advances. Unfortunately the rail system in the South was set up in the wrong way. The only east-west line ran from Lynchburg, Virginia to Chattanooga, Tennessee. Once it was cut the Confederate forces no longer had the ability to support each other.
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Capt Dizle
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quote: Originally posted by Chris 62
The article is factual, and does present a decent case against a true scared cow, RE Lee.
The comparison is NOT unfair, as Lee fought on the defensive for good portions of the war, and did incur needless losses attacking when he should have consolidated (the Gettysburg campaign is a major flaw, he should have pressued Washington DC, not invaded Penn, a MAJOR error), whereas Patton fough an offensive war.
Lee was heavily critised early in the war (he was called "The king of spades", a derogitory term, meaning he was to defensive in west virgina in 1861).
Lee botched Gettysburg, there is no doubt of this, he should have concentrated on the Union right, which was 'hanging on the air", instead of a frontal assault on the center.
From Grant's invasion in 64 till the end, there was nothing Lee could have done to stop the union, the war was lost in the west, not the east, it was just a matter of time.
I would rate Lee high, but not a true great, the US civil war lacked a truly great general. |
Lee always attacked when he could, he did not wage a defensive campaign except where he had no other option. This in fact may be the best grounds to criticize him. But you must understand that you simply could not attack without suffering heavy casualties in this time frame. The comparison is unsound.
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Capt Dizle
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As for your conclusion that the war did not have a truly great general, what in the world is that based on?
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Jon Miller
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quote: Originally posted by Chris 62
I would rate Lee high, but not a true great, the US civil war lacked a truly great general. |
I disagree on the last, I consider Stonewall Jackson to be a truly great general.
Jon Miller
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Capt Dizle
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The Anaconda Plan (Scott to McClellan)
Union Correspondence, Orders, And Returns Relating To Operations In Maryland, Eastern North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Virginia (Except Southwestern), And West Virginia, From January 1, 1861, To June 30, 1865.--#3
O.R.--SERIES I--VOLUME LI/1 [S# 107]
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, May 3, 1861.
Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN,
Commanding Ohio Volunteers, Cincinnati, Ohio:
SIR: I have read and carefully considered your plan for a campaign, and now send you confidentially my own views, supported by certain facts of which you should be advised.
First. It is the design of the Government to raise 25,000 additional regular troops, and 60,000 volunteers for three years. It will be inexpedient either to rely on the three-months' volunteers for extensive operations or to put in their hands the best class of arms we have in store. The term of service would expire by the commencement of a regular campaign, and the arms not lost be returned mostly in a damaged condition. Hence I must strongly urge upon you to confine yourself strictly to the quota of three-months' men called for by the War Department.
Second. We rely greatly on the sure operation of a complete blockade of the Atlantic and Gulf ports soon to commence. In connection with such blockade we propose a powerful movement down the Mississippi to the ocean, with a cordon of posts at proper points, and the capture of Forts Jackson and Saint Philip; the object being to clear out and keep open this great line of communication in connection with the strict blockade of the seaboard, so as to envelop the insurgent States and bring them to terms with less bloodshed than by any other plan. I suppose there will be needed from twelve to twenty steam gun-boats, and a sufficient number of steam transports (say forty) to carry all the personnel (say 60,000 men) and material of the expedition; most of the gunboats to be in advance to open the way, and the remainder to follow and protect the rear of the expedition, &c. This army, in which it is not improbable you may be invited to take an important part, should be composed of our best regulars for the advance and of three-years' volunteers, all well officered, and with four months and a half of instruction in camps prior to (say) November 10. In the progress down the river all the enemy's batteries on its banks we of course would turn and capture, leaving a sufficient number of posts with complete garrisons to keep the river open behind the expedition. Finally, it will be necessary that New Orleans should be strongly occupied and securely held until the present difficulties are composed.
Third. A word now as to the greatest obstacle in the way of this plan--the great danger now pressing upon us--the impatience of our patriotic and loyal Union friends. They will urge instant and vigorous action, regardless, I fear, of consequences--that is, unwilling to wait for the slow instruction of (say) twelve or fifteen camps, for the rise of rivers, and the return of frosts to kill the virus of malignant fevers below Memphis. I fear this; but impress right views, on every proper occasion, upon the brave men who are hastening to the support of their Government. Lose no time, while necessary preparations for the great expedition are in progress, in organizing, drilling, and disciplining your three-months' men, many of whom, it is hoped, will be ultimately found enrolled under the call for three-years' volunteers. Should an urgent and immediate occasion arise meantime for their services, they will be the more effective. I commend these views to your consideration, and shall be happy to hear the result.
With great respect, yours, truly,
WINFIELD SCOTT
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