 |
| |
|
|
HershOstropoler
|
|
GP:
"This is true. But very hard for the stakeholder weenies to embrace. watch Roland get all spun up about this. he wants a Euro-style economy full of sinceures and office politics and similar silliness. I know."
You know ****.  Funny twist-attempt, but the only point I've made about this is that most comparisons in this regard are crap, and that it's for employers and employees, not the nannystate to settle this. But if you insist, let's have a debate on labour market institutions/regulations.
Dan:
"A couple of years ago, Roland pointed out that the US spends a lot on health care, which at that time I agreed with. I'm surprised by looking at those numbers, though, as it's roughly in line with what is produced in Europe--5.8% of GDP."
Well healthcare spending is about 15 % of GDP in the US, 8-10 % in Europe. So if you believe the fluffy PPP conversions for GDP/capita, you spend twice as much per capita as we do.
To add to what Ef said, I'm not sure how the BEA breaks down that set of figures, but part of health services should be government created (the 5.8 % is just private sector). Also I assume the 100.000 $ something legal costs per doctor appear under legal services, for example....
"Also, housing as a %-age of GDP hasn't moved much over the last 10 or 15 years. Where's that bubble again?"
On the asset side, not so much the output side.
|
|
| |
|
|
|
HershOstropoler
|
|
Hello Herr Flugsicherheitsdesaster. Shouldn't you be asleep ?
|
|
| |
|
|
|
HershOstropoler
|
|
Composita are good for you. Can turn you into a crazy psychiatrist or philosopher.
|
|
| |
|
|
|
Sten Sture
|
 |
SF, CA don't call it frisco... Striker!!
Mar 1999
time: 21:23
|
|
(edit: please ignore the rash of spelling errors - I was edumakated in Amerika)
On US productivity, the tech boom and leveraging equity prices higher:
(that sounds as enthrawling as the slope of Britney's yield curve)
In partial response to Colon's posts several pages back, but also as a general posit, I would contend that the gains in US productivity were only indirectly because of the technology improvements, but were due to job cuts in the manufacturing and service industries in a vain attempt to bolster flagging relative equity performance.
I haven't examined the raw data to see if any of this can be supported so feel free to disparage my remarks with vigor...
In the mid and late 90s when US productivity was showing its most profound growth, new technologies, and the successful implementation of recent technologies were being given credit for driving productivity growth. This credit was being improperly tranmutated to technology industries by the popular media because of the share appreciation of technology stocks. In effect, investors thought that productivity gains were being driven by sales at Microsoft instead of staff cuts at Ford.
In reality, the technology and telecom industries did enjoy some productivity improvements, but the source of the spectacular gains in worker productivity came from industries whose relative stock performance was falling behind the hyperappreciation of rapid growth companies.
In the mid to late 90s, growth stocks consistently outperformed value stocks by a significant margin. Value stock companies, representing a much larger portion of domestic production than growth companies, were enjoying decent top-line sales growth, but were having difficulty expanding bottom-line margins enough to attract capital at the same level as the small hyper-growth companies.
One of the main ways these value companies tried to push bottom-line margins was to reduce staffing. Curiously, staffing reductions at value companies further reinforced the market perception that value companies should be avoided, exacerbating the p/e gap between value and growth stocks.
Another way the value companies attempted to improve their relative stock performance was to increase leverage by increasing borrowings, buying back stock, or occasionally a combination of the two. These efforts were met with very limited success as market forces generated sufficient natural sellers to overwhelm attempts to bolster value company stock prices.
If the Fed had kept money tighter during this time, it may have discouraged borrowing by value companies, but it would have had little effect on the expensive growth companies that were not borrowers in the debt markets. An area where it may have had an impact was in the telecom space where companies borrowed extensively for 3G licensing and laying fiber. Since both of those outlays were percieved to be essential for continued existence by telecoms, it is speculative to believe that marginally higher borrowing costs would have significantly affected company behavior in this space.
|
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
el freako
|
 |
Bristol, European Union
Oct 1999
time: 05:23
|
|
quote:
Originally posted by DanS
Well then what table should I be looking at for spending?
|
I can't find a table specifically related to this, but....
I can create one using data I have at hand (specifically OECD in figures 2002 which has health spending as % of GDP in 1999 for the member countries, and data I have for GDP at PPPs)
United States:
Total Health Spending: $4,290 per head (13.0% of GDP)
Public Health Spending: $1,880 per head (5.7% of GDP)
Private Health Spending: $2,410 per head (7.3% of GDP)
European Union:
Total Health Spending: $2,010 per head (8.6% of GDP)
Public Health Spending: $1,500 per head (6.4% of GDP)
Private Health Spending: $510 per head (2.2% of GDP)
Japan:
Total Healh Spending: $1,850 per head (7.4% of GDP)
Public Health Spending: $1,430 per head (5.7% of GDP)
Private Health Spending: $430 per head (1.7% of GDP)
As you can see the discrepancy is in private spending on healthcare - it's pretty damning that the US's spending on Medicare and Medicaid (which covers only the old or poor) is around the same share of GDP as Europe's or Japan's universal systems (and the universality of those systems probably accounts for much of the difference in private spending between the US and them as well).
|
|
| |
|
|
|
TCO
|
 |
Richmond, VA
Jan 1970
time: 00:23
|
|
quote:
Originally posted by el freako
I can't find a table specifically related to this, but....
I can create one using data I have at hand (specifically OECD in figures 2002 which has health spending as % of GDP in 1999 for the member countries, and data I have for GDP at PPPs)
United States:
Total Health Spending: $4,290 per head (13.0% of GDP)
Public Health Spending: $1,880 per head (5.7% of GDP)
Private Health Spending: $2,410 per head (7.3% of GDP)
European Union:
Total Health Spending: $2,010 per head (8.6% of GDP)
Public Health Spending: $1,500 per head (6.4% of GDP)
Private Health Spending: $510 per head (2.2% of GDP)
Japan:
Total Healh Spending: $1,850 per head (7.4% of GDP)
Public Health Spending: $1,430 per head (5.7% of GDP)
Private Health Spending: $430 per head (1.7% of GDP)
As you can see the discrepancy is in private spending on healthcare - it's pretty damning that the US's spending on Medicare and Medicaid (which covers only the old or poor) is around the same share of GDP as Europe's or Japan's universal systems (and the universality of those systems probably accounts for much of the difference in private spending between the US and them as well). |
What is damning? Should we cut medicare? Or do you want us to have socialized medicine?
|
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
Colon
|
 |
Antwerp, Colon's Chocolate Canard Country
Jan 1970
time: 06:23
|
|
quote:
Originally posted by DanS
BFD. Do we need to go through all of this comparative GDP pissing contest again? |
Well, as long you keep insisting something exceptional is going on in the US economy, the likes of me and EF will keep bugging you with data to prove the opposite.
quote:
The whole point is that US Productivity gains averaged 1.5% from the '70s through '91. '92 forward we're averaging something north of that (or we aren't). This is indeed a productivity miracle (or it isn't), and contains a lot of what Sten detailed. |
(be prepared for another rehash  )
Firstly, the US doesn't exist in isolation, differences in productivity growth affect capital flows and currency movements. The US has been able to run a huge current account deficit for years because its economy and asset returns have been perceived to be superior.
The US relies on foreign capital to fund its investments which makes the economy very vulnerable to a crash of the greenback. When foreigners stop funding US' investments, households will have to start saving more and consuming less.
And secondly, there's nothing unique about such an acceleration, the US had a similar bout before 1973 and Japan had it end 80's.
More spectacular productivity performances didn't save other economies from their imbalances so I'm mystified why you are putting so much stock on an acceleration of what, like 0.5%?
And regarding housing, the problem is not just that prices are outpacing household incomes (I don't see why you should use a ratio with GDP) it's also that a lot consumption spending hinges on mortgage refinancing. A mortgage refinancing allows only a one-time increase in consumption and you'd need mortgage rates to keep on dropping to allow this pattern to repeat itself.
Even without falling real estate prices or higher interest rates, consumption spending would stall.
|
|
| |
All times are GMT. The time now is 05:23.
Apolyton Time is 00:23. |
top of page
|
| archivepost |
|
Forum Rules:
You may not post new threads
You may not post replies
You may not post attachments
You may not edit your posts
|
HTML code is ON
vB code is ON
Smilies are ON
[IMG] code is ON
|
|
|
|
|
|
13-01-2003 07:48
No, we used AI so I wouldn't have to do that gross stuff.
|
|