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HershOstropoler
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Ok, the rest is "the elites hate us because we're oh so powerful, but the poor masses worship us".
Germany seems to be the only western european country in this survey... I'd say that in western Europe, there is little gap between the elites (whatever that may be in detail) and the masses. In Egypt or China that may have some merit...
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Gatekeeper
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United States of America
Feb 2000
time: 23:25
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quote:
Originally posted by Agathon
What Allies?  |
Britain, Spain, Portugal, Italy ... those are the ones I can name off the top of my head. There are a few others as well, but since I'm typing this on the fly, I can't remember their names right now.
quote:
The notion of Iraq being a threat to the US or a supplier of terrorists is risible. Hussein, as a secular Arab leader, is detested by Al Quaedi for a start. |
Ah, yes, that *old* argument that Saddam Hussein could *never* get together with Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaida organization 'cause they're MORTAL ENEMIES.
Tell me, son, have you ever heard of the old saying that "The enemy of my enemy is my friend"?
Furthermore, I bet folks back in the mid- to late 1930s never would've believed it if someone told them that, hey, Adolf Hitler and Josef Stalin got together — MORTAL ENEMIES! — and came up with a nice plan to divvy up a conquered Poland. These men were leaders of two opposing views of governance who would later come to blows that killed millions of people, yet they managed to agree on how to carve up Poland.
And you don't think Saddam and al-Qaida couldn't come to a similiar agreement, except instead of carving up conquered territory it's to combine their strength together to effect terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, targets and, of course, those nations that stand with us?
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But I guess you just think a towel head is a towel head, right? |
The bolding is mine, folks, because I just wanted to show you all how G*DD*MN DUMB Agathon proved himself to be with this general assertion in regards to how I view others in the world.
Get lost, you f*ck*ng newbie.
Unpleasantly yours,
Gatekeeper
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Lazarus and the Gimp
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Whale-raping abomination
Aug 2000
time: 05:25
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This is my favourite bit from the full article.
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The Pew Global Attitudes Project's recent gargantuan survey, which stretched its tentacles across 44 countries and included some 38,000 people |
Looks promising so far, doesn't it?
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While the Pew project focused on the masses, ....We analyzed more than 4,000 articles from the 10 largest newspapers in China, Colombia, Egypt, Germany, India and Russia, most of them published Sept. 12-15, 2001.
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Ah. That's nothing like as impressive.
Then note that....
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The Pew Global Attitudes Project's recent gargantuan survey.....found that America's rating has slipped, but "a reserve of goodwill toward the country still remains."
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....which is rather different to the inflammatory findings of the 5-day research (not one year, DD, not according to the article you quote) of selectively chosen nations you focus on.
You get a "D" for at least providing a source. To move up to a "C" try getting a credible one.
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Gatekeeper
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United States of America
Feb 2000
time: 23:25
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quote:
Originally posted by Ramo
Gatekeeper:
Al-Qaeda has been trying to destroy Saddam's regime. He wouldn't give WMD's to them. That's the most idiotic and suicidal thing he could possibly do. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed to buy time for an invasion of each other. OTOH, Saddam doing such an idiotic thing makes his regime not only threatened by al-Qaeda which would love to put an end to it, but it would be threatened by the US, when al-Qaeda finally does decide to kill a bunch of Americas or when the US finds evidence that this is going on. Furthermore, Saddam would gain precisely squat from the destruction of an American city. Besides a few hundred thousand American soldiers visiting his country, which might give the Iraqi tourist industry a boost. 
But most importantly, there is absolutely no evidence there's any cooperation between the two groups going on. |
You have valid points, Ramo. Of course, that's assuming that Saddam is still being rational about things; from what I've heard and read, he's a power-mad individual who's quite paranoid about threats to him ... which begs the question: Does he view al-Qaida as less of a threat to him *now* than the thousands of U.S. troops sitting near the Iraqi border? If so, and if he assumes he's going to lose no matter what, I'd bet he'd be willing to deal with the Devil, i.e. al-Qaida, just to spite the Americans.
It just seems to be a vicious circle, with no "cut-and-dried" answer. If we don't deal with him now, we may have him pulling a "North Korea" on us in three to five years; if we do deal with him now, he might very well begin distributing as much of his stuff as possible to terrorist groups (his version of a death blow); if the status quo is maintained, the Iraqi people will continue to suffer under the sanctions while Saddam's regime keeps furitively (sp) making illegal armaments and WMD; if the sanctions are lifted and no invasion takes place, Saddam and his ilk across the world can rightly say that the U.N. has no teeth, that all it takes is patience and perseverance to eventually win the sympathy of the world ...
This is how I view the whole thing; there's no clear-cut winning strategy. It sucks. And, unfortunately, it's REALITY. It must be a "fun" time to be a national leader with today's state of world affairs.
Gatekeeper
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MichaeltheGreat
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Apolyton Grand Executioner
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mooning the house that Ruth built.
Oct 1999
time: 21:25
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quote:
Originally posted by Urban Ranger
What is the basis of this assertion? |
Past history, of not only of the first Gulf War, but the "enthusiasm" after the Iran / Iraq war, the extraordinary measures the Iraqi military and security apparatus takes towards deterring deserters and draft evaders, and the fact that the vast majority of the Iraqi army is poorly paid and trained conscripts, who distrust and/or detest their leaders.
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I reckon the real commanders get quite a bit of money. It will take a lot to bribe anybody in any position of power. |
Not so much - if the door is open that "you can stay and die, or you can take a million or two and set yourself up nicely as a guest of our friends the Saudis" that's a pretty good motivator. Considering that these people have offshore accounts, etc., that they'll be able to retain, and that most of them are very aware of what happened 11 years ago, and that this time, there's no arbitrary restriction on US goals and operational areas.
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Maybe, maybe not. There's only one way to find out.  |
Yeah, there is. I was trying to be charitable though, I figure the real number is more than 95%. 
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MichaeltheGreat
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Apolyton Grand Executioner
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mooning the house that Ruth built.
Oct 1999
time: 21:25
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quote:
Originally posted by Sandman
It's silly because it's a strawman argument. I did not suggest anything like what you say. |
Well, perhaps you should be clear on what is your alleged basis of comparison? Single round al-Hussein D missile with conventional vs. CW munition? Single round 152 mm arty, conventional ground-burst HE vs. CW?
A battery of rocket artillery or tube artillery with a sustained fire mission across a divisional front or against a point target?
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Assuming that there's not much wind or rain. Assuming that the enemy doesn't have any gas masks or antidotes. Assuming that the enemy forces haven't been vaccinated or haven't got medical supplies close at hand. |
Assuming that you use non-persistent, low adhesion, low level agents that are more subject to wind and rain effects. There's a fairly wide variety of available choices. Gas masks are meaningless against agents that can be absorbed by skin contact, and full suits take time to deploy. Both have severe effects on situational awareness, so they degrade combat capability to a great degree. Full suits, depending on weather, have a high propensity to cause heat and fatigue cases, further degrading combat capability, which is almost paralyzed with persistent, adhesive agents like VX.
Medical supplies close at hand is a non-issue for mass casualty situations involving high lethality agents like VX. Many forward medics would also be casualties, there aren't enough medics in the force, and their ability to move to and treat casualties effectively when suited up (assuming they're not casualties themselves). Casualties wouldn't survive long enough to get evac'd to a batallion aid station, and the main priority of all troops wouldn't be casualty evacuation (from a contaminated area to a clean area with persistent agents), it would be docontamination and scrubdown procedures in place.
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And even then, I'd bet that explosives would do more damage. |
Yeah, if you had tons, delivered over a sustained period of time, you'd eventually rack up major casualties. Maybe as many as 10-15% of the troops you bombed the hell out of, unless they were just strolling in the open with no cover available. Come to think of it, they'd be screwed geese if they were hit by CW munitions in that situation too. 
You'd be fairly amazed at how many troops can survive intense bombardment, if reasonably dug in. Even if you're talking multiple B-52 bombloads in a saturation pattern, you still have survivors, even if they're deaf and have **** their pants - that fact was demonstrated repeatedly in Afghanistan. Anything close to that delivery of even low-grade CW agents would have had a 100% casualty effect over a wider area.
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And what about the risk of blowback to your own forces? |
What about it? You're not going to deliver these things with 120mm mortars. Rocket artillery against area targets like airfields, or compounds like KKMC in Saudi, against port areas and supply points, with persistent, adhesive agents, and you've got exactly what you want in terms of effect - and it's not like there's a shortage of those types of targets.
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Now show me a vaccine for getting blown apart, or an antidote for getting shot. |
How about armor, cover, air defenses, counterbattery arty, etc. for starters.
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Arrian
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Kneel before Grog!
Jul 2001
time: 00:25
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I apologize if this has been posted before, and even if not, for its length But I found it interesting:
quote:
By Thomas E. Ricks
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, January 28, 2003; Page C01
TAMPA--Norman Schwarzkopf wants to give peace a chance.
The general who commanded U.S. forces in the 1991 Gulf War says he hasn't seen enough evidence to convince him that his old comrades **** Cheney, Colin Powell and Paul Wolfowitz are correct in moving toward a new war now. He thinks U.N. inspections are still the proper course to follow. He's worried about the cockiness of the U.S. war plan, and even more by the potential human and financial costs of occupying Iraq.
And don't get him started on Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.
In fact, the hero of the last Gulf War sounds surprisingly like the man on the street when he discusses his ambivalence about the Bush administration's hawkish stance on ousting Saddam Hussein. He worries about the Iraqi leader, but would like to see some persuasive evidence of Iraq's alleged weapons programs.
"The thought of Saddam Hussein with a sophisticated nuclear capability is a frightening thought, okay?" he says. "Now, having said that, I don't know what intelligence the U.S. government has. And before I can just stand up and say, 'Beyond a shadow of a doubt, we need to invade Iraq,' I guess I would like to have better information."
He hasn't seen that yet, and so -- in sharp contrast to the Bush administration -- he supports letting the U.N. weapons inspectors drive the timetable: "I think it is very important for us to wait and see what the inspectors come up with, and hopefully they come up with something conclusive."
This isn't just any retired officer speaking. Schwarzkopf is one of the nation's best-known military officers, with name recognition second only to his former boss, Secretary of State Powell. What's more, he is closely allied with the Bush family. He hunts with the first President Bush. He campaigned for the second, speaking on military issues at the 2000 GOP convention in Philadelphia and later stumping in Florida with Cheney, who was secretary of defense during the 1991 war.
But he sees the world differently from those Gulf War colleagues. "It's obviously not a black-and-white situation over there" in the Mideast, he says. "I would just think that whatever path we take, we have to take it with a bit of prudence."
So has he seen sufficient prudence in the actions of his old friends in the Bush administration? Again, he carefully withholds his endorsement. "I don't think I can give you an honest answer on that."
Now 68, the general seems smaller and more soft-spoken than in his Riyadh heyday 12 years ago when he was "Stormin' Norman," the fatigues-clad martinet who intimidated subordinates and reporters alike. During last week's interview he sat at a small, round table in his skyscraper office, casually clad in slacks and a black polo shirt, the bland banks and hotels of Tampa's financial district spread out beyond him.
His voice seems thinner than during those blustery, globally televised Gulf War briefings. He is limping from a recent knee operation. He sometimes stays home to nurse the swelling with a bag of frozen peas.
He's had time to think. He likes the performance of Colin Powell -- chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Gulf War, now secretary of state. "He's doing a wonderful job, I think," he says. But he is less impressed by Rumsfeld, whose briefings he has watched on television.
"Candidly, I have gotten somewhat nervous at some of the pronouncements Rumsfeld has made," says Schwarzkopf.
He contrasts Cheney's low profile as defense secretary during the Gulf War with Rumsfeld's frequent television appearances since Sept. 11, 2001. "He almost sometimes seems to be enjoying it." That, Schwarzkopf admonishes, is a sensation to be avoided when engaged in war.
The general is a true son of the Army, where he served from 1956 to 1991, and some of his comments reflect the estrangement between that service and the current defense secretary. Some at the top of the Army see Rumsfeld and those around him as overly enamored of air power and high technology and insufficiently attentive to the brutal difficulties of ground combat. Schwarzkopf's comments reflect Pentagon scuttlebutt that Rumsfeld and his aides have brushed aside some of the Army's concerns.
"The Rumsfeld thing . . . that's what comes up," when he calls old Army friends in the Pentagon, he says.
"When he makes his comments, it appears that he disregards the Army," Schwarzkopf says. "He gives the perception when he's on TV that he is the guy driving the train and everybody else better fall in line behind him -- or else."
That dismissive posture bothers Schwarzkopf because he thinks Rumsfeld and the people around him lack the background to make sound military judgments by themselves. He prefers the way Cheney operated during the Gulf War. "He didn't put himself in the position of being the decision-maker as far as tactics were concerned, as far as troop deployments, as far as missions were concerned."
Rumsfeld, by contrast, worries him. "It's scary, okay?" he says. "Let's face it: There are guys at the Pentagon who have been involved in operational planning for their entire lives, okay? . . . And for this wisdom, acquired during many operations, wars, schools, for that just to be ignored, and in its place have somebody who doesn't have any of that training, is of concern."
As a result, Schwarzkopf is skeptical that an invasion of Iraq would be as fast and simple as some seem to think. "I have picked up vibes that . . . you're going to have this massive strike with massed weaponry, and basically that's going to be it, and we just clean up the battlefield after that," he says. But, he adds, he is more comfortable now with what he hears about the war plan than he was several months ago, when there was talk of an assault built around air power and a few thousand Special Operations troops.
He expresses even more concern about the task the U.S. military might face after a victory. "What is postwar Iraq going to look like, with the Kurds and the Sunnis and the Shiites? That's a huge question, to my mind. It really should be part of the overall campaign plan."
(Rumsfeld said last week that post-Saddam planning "is a tough question and we're spending a lot of time on it, let me assure you." But the Pentagon hasn't disclosed how long it expects to have to occupy Iraq, or how many troops might be required to do that.)
The administration may be discussing the issue behind closed doors, Schwarzkopf says, but he thinks it hasn't sufficiently explained its thinking to the world, especially its assessment of the time, people and money needed. "I would hope that we have in place the adequate resources to become an army of occupation," he warns, "because you're going to walk into chaos."
The Result of a Bad Ending?
Just as the Gulf War looks less conclusive in retrospect, so has Schwarzkopf's reputation diminished since the glory days just after the war, when, Rick Atkinson wrote in "Crusade," Schwarzkopf "seemed ubiquitous, appearing at the Kentucky Derby, at the Indianapolis 500, on Capitol Hill, in parades, on bubblegum cards."
Twelve years and two American presidents later, Saddam Hussein is still in power, and the U.S. military is once again mustering to strike Iraq.
Some strategic thinkers, both inside the military and in academia, see Schwarzkopf's past actions as part of the problem. These experts argue that if the 1991 war had been terminated more thoughtfully, the U.S. military wouldn't have to go back again to finish the job.
"Everyone was so busy celebrating the end of the Vietnam syndrome that we forgot how winners win a war," says one Gulf War veteran who asked that his name not be used because he hopes to work in the administration.
Schwarzkopf in particular draws fire for approving a cease-fire that permitted the Iraqi military to fly helicopters after the war. Soon afterward, Iraqi helicopter gunships were used to put down revolts against Hussein in the Shiite south and the Kurdish north of Iraq. Only later were "no-fly zones" established to help protect those minority populations.
"It's quite clear that however brilliant operationally and technologically, the Gulf War cannot be viewed strategically as a complete success," says Michael Vickers, a former Special Forces officer who is now an analyst for the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a defense think tank.
Added one Pentagon expert on Iraq, "With benefit of hindsight, the victory was incomplete, and the luster of the entire operation has faded."
When Army colonels study the Gulf War at the Army War College nowadays, notes one professor there, "a big part of the class is discussing war termination."
For all that, few experts contend that Schwarzkopf is really the one to blame for the way the Gulf War ended. "Insofar as Gulf War 1 didn't finish the job, blame is more likely and appropriately laid on Bush 41 and, to a somewhat lesser extent, on Colin Powell," says John Allen Williams, a political scientist who specializes in military affairs at Loyola University Chicago.
Schwarzkopf himself doesn't entirely disagree with the view that the war was ended badly. "You can't help but sit here today and, with 20/20 hindsight, go back and say, 'Look, had we done something different, we probably wouldn't be facing what we are facing today.' "
But, he continues, Washington never instructed him to invade Iraq or oust Saddam Hussein. "My mission, plain and simple, was kick Iraq out of Kuwait. Period. There were never any other orders." Given the information available back then, the decision to stop the war with Saddam Hussein still in power was, he says, "probably was the only decision that could have been made at that time."
'Tell It Like It Is'
Schwarzkopf was never as lionized in military circles as he was by the general public. Like a rock star, he shuns commercial air travel mainly because he can barely walk through an airport without being besieged by autograph seekers and well-wishers. But his reputation inside the Army has "always been a bit different from the outside view," notes retired Army Col. Richard H. Sinnreich, who frequently participates in war games and other military training sessions.
Sinnreich doesn't think that many in the armed forces blame Schwarzkopf for the inconclusive ending of the Gulf War. "I know of no Army officer, active or retired, who holds such a view," he says. "The decision to suspend offensive operations clearly was a political decision that I suspect the relevant principals now profoundly regret, even if they're loath to admit it."
But what did sour some in the Army on Schwarzkopf, says Sinnreich, was his "rather ungracious treatment of his Gulf War subordinates."
Schwarzkopf raised eyebrows across the Army when, in his Gulf War memoir, he denounced one of his generals, Frederick Franks, for allegedly moving his 7th Corps in a "plodding and overly cautious" manner during the attack on the Iraqi military. He elaborated on that criticism in subsequent rounds of interviews. This public disparagement of a former subordinate rankled some in the Army, which even more than the other services likes to keep its internal disputes private.
"I think his attack on Franks was wrong," says Army Maj. Donald Vandergriff, in a typical comment.
"It wasn't meant to be an attack on Fred Franks," Schwarzkopf responds in the interview. Rather, he says, he was trying to provide an honest assessment, in the tradition of the Army's practice of conducting brutally accurate "after-action reviews." "No matter how painful it is, [when] you do your after-action review, tell it like it is."
The other behavior that bothered some was Schwarzkopf's virtual absence from the Army after the Gulf War. Many retired generals make almost a full-time job of working with the Army -- giving speeches at West Point and at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pa., visiting bases to mentor up-and-coming officers, sitting on Pentagon advisory boards, writing commentaries in military journals.
"The fact that Schwarzkopf . . . did not make himself available to speak to the many, many Army audiences anxious to listen to him won him no friends in the Army," notes retired Army Brig. Gen. John Mountcastle.
Adds Earl H. Tilford Jr., a former director of research at the War College's Strategic Studies Institute: "You never saw him at Carlisle, never."
Likewise, a professor at West Point recalls repeatedly being brushed off by Schwarzkopf's office.
Schwarzkopf says he avoided those circles for good reason. After the Gulf War, he says, he decided to take a low profile within the Army because he didn't want to step on the toes of the service's post-Gulf War leaders. There were sensitivities about overshadowing those generals, he says, especially after word leaked that he had been considered for the post of Army chief of staff but had declined the position.
Seeing that "open wound," he says, "I purposely distanced myself for a reasonable time."
The Army War College's location in rural Pennsylvania makes it difficult to reach from his home in the Tampa area, he says. And he notes that he has done much other work behind the scenes on behalf of the Army, including meeting with presidential candidate Bush to lobby him on military readiness issues.
He also has been busy with nonmilitary charities. After a bout with prostate cancer in 1994, he threw himself into helping cancer research; no fewer than 10 groups that fight cancer or conduct other medical research have given him awards in recent years.
No More Heroes?
Perhaps the real reason that Schwarzkopf's reputation has shrunk has more to do with America and less to do with Schwarzkopf's actions. American wars used to produce heroes such as Washington, Grant and Eisenhower, whose names were known by all schoolchildren, notes Boston University political scientist Andrew Bacevich.
But in recent decades, Bacevich says, "military fame has lost its durability." Sen. John McCain may appear to be an exception, he says, but he is someone noted less for what he did in the military than for what he endured as a prisoner of war.
More representative, Bacevich notes, may be Army Gen. Tommy R. Franks, the officer who would lead U.S. forces in any new war with Iraq. Franks "has not ignited widespread popular affection," says Bacevich, himself a retired Army colonel.
It may be that American society no longer has an appetite for heroes, military or otherwise, says Ward Carroll, a recently retired naval aviator and author of "Punk's War," a novel about patrolling the no-fly zone over southern Iraq. American society may not be making the kinds of sacrifices that make people look for heroes to celebrate. "You don't have rationing, you don't have gold stars in the window, and the other things that made [war heroes] a part of the fabric of American life" in the past, he says.
Even Schwarzkopf's own Gulf War memoir was titled "It Doesn't Take a Hero."
Or it just may be that America no longer puts anyone up on a pedestal. "Even our sports heroes aren't heroes anymore, in the way that Lou Gehrig and Mickey Mantle were," says Carroll. "The picture is a lot more blurred nowadays." |
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Dr Strangelove
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quote:
Originally posted by chegitz guevara
Given the US performance in Somolia, it is unreasonable to think that casualties will be very low for either side. |
IIRC the casualty ratio in the botched operation in Mogadishu was something like 50 to 1. The type of equipment and number of troops deployed to Somalia was severely limited by certain political considerations. These considerations are not in effect in Iraq, so US troops should perform much better.
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Sandman
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Sinister Penguin
Aug 2001
time: 05:25
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quote:
Well, perhaps you should be clear on what is your alleged basis of comparison? Single round al-Hussein D missile with conventional vs. CW munition? Single round 152 mm arty, conventional ground-burst HE vs. CW? |
Conventional scuds versus chemical or biological scuds.
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Assuming that you use non-persistent, low adhesion, low level agents that are more subject to wind and rain effects. There's a fairly wide variety of available choices. Gas masks are meaningless against agents that can be absorbed by skin contact, and full suits take time to deploy. Both have severe effects on situational awareness, so they degrade combat capability to a great degree. Full suits, depending on weather, have a high propensity to cause heat and fatigue cases, further degrading combat capability, which is almost paralyzed with persistent, adhesive agents like VX. |
Even the effectiveness of persistant chemical weapons is blunted by wind and rain, and high temperatures decrease the persistance as well, as it boils off quicker.
Gas masks protect the most vulnerable part of the body from absorbing chemical agents; the lungs. Whilst some gases can be absorbed through the skin, the gas mask buys vital time to administer antidotes, put on a suit or move to clearer air.
Combat capability is not so important when dealing with chemicals, since the enemy is not going to send out troops in chem suits, since they would also be at an even worse disadvantage.
quote:
Medical supplies close at hand is a non-issue for mass casualty situations involving high lethality agents like VX. Many forward medics would also be casualties, there aren't enough medics in the force, and their ability to move to and treat casualties effectively when suited up (assuming they're not casualties themselves). Casualties wouldn't survive long enough to get evac'd to a batallion aid station, and the main priority of all troops wouldn't be casualty evacuation (from a contaminated area to a clean area with persistent agents), it would be docontamination and scrubdown procedures in place. |
An injection is all that's needed to not immediately die from a serious dose of VX. Medics are not strictly necessary; the troops can use the antidote themselves (long term side-effects could be nasty though). To produce a highly lethal dosage that could quickly produce mass casualties would also be pretty difficult, given the unpredictability of chemical weapons.
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Yeah, if you had tons, delivered over a sustained period of time, you'd eventually rack up major casualties. Maybe as many as 10-15% of the troops you bombed the hell out of, unless they were just strolling in the open with no cover available. Come to think of it, they'd be screwed geese if they were hit by CW munitions in that situation too. |
I admit I was overexaggerating the ineffectiveness of gas compared to explosives on this point. Against poorly equipped, poorly trained, densely packed troops it will be very effective, that's why Iraq invested in it.
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What about it? You're not going to deliver these things with 120mm mortars. Rocket artillery against area targets like airfields, or compounds like KKMC in Saudi, against port areas and supply points, with persistent, adhesive agents, and you've got exactly what you want in terms of effect - and it's not like there's a shortage of those types of targets. |
Well, you've been hinting at a frontline situation in your earlier paragraphs. But attacking supply depots with nerve gas seems like a waste when explosives would cause more lasting damage. What effect would nerve gas have on a runway or a loading bay? A massive nerve gas attack on a base would be nasty for the inhabitants, but not the base itself. Why not go for a massive conventional attack and put the base out of action for good?
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How about armor, cover, air defenses, counterbattery arty, etc. for starters. |
Ok, you've got me there. But I'd still rather face a gas shell than an explosive one.
And what about biological weapons?
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MichaeltheGreat
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Apolyton Grand Executioner
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mooning the house that Ruth built.
Oct 1999
time: 21:25
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quote:
Originally posted by Sandman
Conventional scuds versus chemical or biological scuds.
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The only Scud (actually, an al-Hussein, B model IIRC, since the Iraqi missiles are fairly extensively modified from the USSR original) which did appreciable damage did so accidentally - the one that dropped on the Dhahran barracks after the engine got blown off by a Patriot hit. The alteration of the ballistic trajectory took a missile that would have missed anything by a mile or two and dropped it's warhead right in the middle of a barracks. Given the Scud / al Hussein's notorious inaccuracy, I wouldn't be worried much about any with conventional explosives - it's pure accident if they hit anything in the first place, and the warhead mass ( 500 or 1,000 lbs, depending on al-Hussein model) isn't much for wide area damage. It'll ruin your day if it practically drops on top of you, but that's true of anything.
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Even the effectiveness of persistant chemical weapons is blunted by wind and rain, and high temperatures decrease the persistance as well, as it boils off quicker.
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Yes, but you're talking hours (infinite amount of time in a battlefield or direct combat support situation), and you have to proceed from the assumption that anything potentially contaminated, is contaminated. The clean-up procedures effectively paralyze the normal function of whatever the target is, until NBC detectors and tests report negatively.
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Gas masks protect the most vulnerable part of the body from absorbing chemical agents; the lungs. Whilst some gases can be absorbed through the skin, the gas mask buys vital time to administer antidotes, put on a suit or move to clearer air. |
If you get to employ it in time. A smart SOB (with accurate weapons, which the Iraqis don't have) would first put in a few HE rounds to get everyone to ground, then CW - then back to HE to restrict movement in the attack area. Minimizing casualties for CW is dependent on almost immediate awareness of a CW attack.
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Combat capability is not so important when dealing with chemicals, since the enemy is not going to send out troops in chem suits, since they would also be at an even worse disadvantage.
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Combat capability is always important. Anything from responding to later attacks by conventional munitions artillery, or the jitteriness troops would have after chemical exposure and their tendency to rapidly suit up if in doubt regarding later attacks. Or take the simple inability of a unit to respond effectively for some time. It's a little tougher to see the point, since we're talking US vs Iraq, than US vs a competent enemy with modern equipment and doctrine, but being able to render a given unit ineffective for a period of time, or a given area unusable for a period of time, is a nice capability to have.
Also, once suited up, and confirmed that you're under a CW attack, you have to remain suited up until the appropriate units can detect and isolate the specific CW agent(s) (which can be a real pain if you slip in the occasional VX round in an attack primarily with GA or GB type agents), and make sure that the appropriate decon procedures have been followed. It's not like you can just drive away and take off your MOPP-IV's by hand.
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An injection is all that's needed to not immediately die from a serious dose of VX. Medics are not strictly necessary; the troops can use the antidote themselves (long term side-effects could be nasty though). To produce a highly lethal dosage that could quickly produce mass casualties would also be pretty difficult, given the unpredictability of chemical weapons. |
If there's indications of VX gaseous exposure to the lungs (as opposed to liquid droplets or contact exposure) the Atropine injection has to be given directly in the heart, and very quickly after exposure.
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I admit I was overexaggerating the ineffectiveness of gas compared to explosives on this point. Against poorly equipped, poorly trained, densely packed troops it will be very effective, that's why Iraq invested in it.
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More of the effects are indirect and secondary - the avoidance of mass casualties entails procedures and actions that are difficult, time consuming, and effectively impedes the target unit's performance of it's mission.
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Well, you've been hinting at a frontline situation in your earlier paragraphs. But attacking supply depots with nerve gas seems like a waste when explosives would cause more lasting damage. What effect would nerve gas have on a runway or a loading bay? A massive nerve gas attack on a base would be nasty for the inhabitants, but not the base itself. Why not go for a massive conventional attack and put the base out of action for good?
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Area denial is always a function of time - you don't need to wipe out a base (which may be useful to you later), if you can simply prevent an enemy from making use of it. Attacking supply depots with nerve agents means the depot shuts down and ceases to function as such until everything in it is decontaminated and cleared.
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Ok, you've got me there. But I'd still rather face a gas shell than an explosive one. |
Deal, you get the VX, I'll take my chances with HE.
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And what about biological weapons? |
Bioweapons are much more variable than CW, because of the range of possible agents and the ways they can be released. Given the dust inherent in a battlefield situation, and the delay in onset of symptoms, anthrax spores could be real handy - way beyond direct effects. Think about it - how aggressive do you think troops would be (or they'd spend their whole time fighting in MOPP-IV's) moving into areas and occupying buildings, etc., after anthrax spores had been discovered in some previously occupied area?
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28-01-2003 20:04
(Hint: If you're going to try to kidnap the biggest warlord and his staff, you probably can't do much more to piss his supporters off, ever in a million years, so don't sweat being "provocative")
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