 |
|  |
 |
|
Japher
|
 |
Ook! Ook! Ack! Ack! Ack!
Jun 2002 time: 05:26
|
|
I agree with a lot of what Asher is getting at.
Today philosophy is a lot of hindsight, and explinations for what occured. Their explinations, however, address the thought process that occured to obtain such results, more so on the "actual" methods, or performed actions, that obtained those results.
I will agree that back in the day, ya know yore, that philosophy was a sensible field. In fact, as I look over the ancients I see a lot of philosophers that were also scientists (i.e. Pythagoras, the Sulva Sutras, etc. to name a couple). It was a time were logic was overcoming religious dogma, where reason was battling against theocracy. There was a time of great discovery. I would contribute scientific method, the mergance of modern science, and the application and or emergance of scientific method to development of many great discoveries in nature.
However, and there always is a 'but', what is it that philosophy has become today? Mainly, in my opinion, it has become what I mentioned above; rhetoric and regurgitation. Even Jung presents nothing new to what already happens. Stating the obvious does nothing, proving and understanding the obvious so that one may learn how to control it gives the world.
Whereas the development of logic, or nonreligious though to explian the world, allowed one to develop a method by which to control the world, redefining or rehashing such old ideas does nothing.
I must interject on the matter of the "laughing philosopher", Democritus. I think he was a kook, who just threw out random ideas. The fact that one of them was actually true is no surprise. If you believe that he was a genius you might as well believe that Nostradamous was seer.
Philosophy has gone the way of the wind, and like the ancient kingdoms it set the stage for the way things are today, yet doesn't exist as an independent state anymore. It has been fused and meshed within the applicable sciences, it has taken new forms within laws and theories of these sciences, and in all regards has vanished.
Today it is no more than a history lesson, and an explination for what will happen once it has occured.
There are three types of people:
1. Those who make things happen - hard scientist
2. Those who watch things happen - social scientist
3. And those who wonder what happened - philosophers
|
|
|  |
 |
|
The Vagabond
|
 |
of realpolitik and counterpropaganda
Jan 1970 time: 05:26
|
|
quote: Originally posted by Frogger
quote: The best philosophers come from physics. Philosophers coming from the humanities are usually not so bright, although there are exceptions. |
What a ridiculous statement when used to "prove" the claim that philosophy is useful in physics.
you do understand the difference between a->b and b->a, don't you? |
It was just a statement per se. It was not intended to serve as a proof.
Last edited by The Vagabond on 25-02-2003 at 22:29
|
|
|  |
 |
|
Japher
|
 |
Ook! Ook! Ack! Ack! Ack!
Jun 2002 time: 05:26
|
|
quote: And so what? Someone has to try to find the sense of what happened. It's part of the process. |
So what? Exactly.
quote: First of all Dalton merely took over most of the Democritean theory and added to it a few things that he had discovered by observation. Nevertheless there is no reason why he should have chosen the theory he did - there's a small matter called the underdetermination of theory by evidence.
|
A few things? I don't want to argue that conception is more important than application, but there was a lot more than just a few things added. Also, there was a lot more to Dalton coming to a conclusion that just happened to coincide with something a Greek had happened to mention. I see nothing about Dalton going "hey I wonder if that kook was right" and then going out with this theory in hand in attempt to prove/disprove it. His discoveries came through scientific advancement in measurements, and an analysis of such results. Need I point out that atomic theory is still just a theory? Yet, is one based on physical evidence, not on rational/irrational thought.
quote: Secondly, this silly argument doesn't apply to the Platonic discovery as reported by Penrose. That is the sort of idea that cannot be discovered by empirical observation. No one has said anything worthwhile against this yet.
|
Platonic discovery? You mean theory, don't you? Penrose is a putz, who is grasping at straws. Not until a credible measuring system is established for separating mind activity from brain activity will he be anything but. It is a great theory, but what does it help with? What does he plan to do with this idea? These are the question we have been asking, and all we get in response are theories, more ideas, more thoughts. All of which are swimming in a sea of ambiguity. Anyone can say there are diamonds in those hills, wait a few thousand years, and be right. Perhaps Penrose may be right, or maybe Hofstadter is, but debating over issues such as these is worthless.
I stick with this review of his book.
quote: Thirdly, philosophers are currently doing work that no one else is doing. Stuff like the attempt at the nomological reduction of mental operations to physical laws. Some of the work on this is done by neuroscientists, some by philosophers. It's an interesting topic.
|
I know nothing of this, but it seems if they are working with neuroscientist that they are looking for "hard" evidence and not just abstract views on the topic. I am sure this is interesting and will look into it.
quote: Jung isn't a philosopher. |
Touche
Rebutt:
I think I have adequatly expressed my admiration for philosophers of the past, and perhaps I am ignorant of the role of todays philosophers. Yet, I hold firmly to my idealogy, being a "hard science" guy and all, that without proof a theory is worthless. Most modern day theories have hard evidence one way or the other of natural occurances. When we begin arguing abstract ideas, that is where I draw the line. Philosophy may have its place but should not exist as its own entity anymore. Rather, it should lie within fields such as theoretical physics, classical chemistry, and other various social sciences. For being able to come up with believable ideas lends nothing towards its application. Thus, a PhD in such a field should lend way towards applications of a thought, and not just the creation of one. Of course I am speaking without any understanding of what is taught at that level of instruction, merely speaking from that which have read and experienced.
|
|
|  |
 |
|
Agathon
|
 |
Leafs 4TW!! - CPA
Dec 2002 time: 00:26
|
|
quote: Originally posted by Japher
A few things? I don't want to argue that conception is more important than application, but there was a lot more than just a few things added. Also, there was a lot more to Dalton coming to a conclusion that just happened to coincide with something a Greek had happened to mention. I see nothing about Dalton going "hey I wonder if that kook was right" and then going out with this theory in hand in attempt to prove/disprove it. His discoveries came through scientific advancement in measurements, and an analysis of such results. Need I point out that atomic theory is still just a theory? Yet, is one based on physical evidence, not on rational/irrational thought. |
It is also underdetermined by the evidence which is why conceptual creation a la Democritus is important. Science (and philosophy) also made much use of the Atomist's distinction between primary and secondary qualities.
quote: Platonic discovery? You mean theory, don't you? |
How about invention? It doesn't make much of a difference. If you think that scientists just sit down and conduct a theory neutral investigation of "real facts" without any invention you are sorely mistaken. Theories are underdetermined by evidence.
quote: Penrose is a putz, who is grasping at straws. Not until a credible measuring system is established for separating mind activity from brain activity will he be anything but. |
The quality of Penrose's thought notwithstanding the point being made was about Plato. I notice you haven't said anything worthwile about that. One problem philosophers of mind are thinking about is that it may be the concepts that we are using that prevent us from establishing such a measuring system.
quote: It is a great theory, but what does it help with? What does he plan to do with this idea? These are the question we have been asking, and all we get in response are theories, more ideas, more thoughts. All of which are swimming in a sea of ambiguity. Anyone can say there are diamonds in those hills, wait a few thousand years, and be right. Perhaps Penrose may be right, or maybe Hofstadter is, but debating over issues such as these is worthless. |
Eh? Sometimes the problems we have are not ones that hard evidence can solve; sometimes they are the results of conceptual confusion. That is where many philosophers work.
quote: I know nothing of this, but it seems if they are working with neuroscientist that they are looking for "hard" evidence and not just abstract views on the topic. I am sure this is interesting and will look into it. |
No they aren't. They are trying to work out whether it is possible to perform a reduction of mental concepts to physical ones without losing anything worthwhile in the reduction. This is, in my view a conceptual problem since I tend to think that mental states are identical with physical states and that it might be worth just dumping our mental vocabulary. This is a conceptual problem and not an empirical one.
quote: I think I have adequatly expressed my admiration for philosophers of the past, and perhaps I am ignorant of the role of todays philosophers. Yet, I hold firmly to my idealogy, being a "hard science" guy and all, that without proof a theory is worthless. |
Godel?
quote: Most modern day theories have hard evidence one way or the other of natural occurances. |
The hard evidence doesn't count the way you think it does. An infinite number of theories can fit the facts. The choice between them is largely pragmatic. Philosophical problems are hard to solve, if not impossible but acknowledging this doesn't make them go away, nor does it mean that we should stop thinking about them.
Anyway, until someone comes up with a solution to the problem of induction, science will always be to some extent a matter of faith.
Philosophers are good at what could be called "conceptual inquiries" (although there is a lot more to be said on this). Science deals with empirical results not conceptual inquiries (this used to be called the a priori, although that description of it has somewhat fallen out of favour).
For example, last year I went to a talk by Elliot Sober who is a philosopher who works in the Philosophy of Science. It was well attended by philosophers, scientists and interested members of the university community. What he did was show us that the hypothesis of natural selection was not testable unless it assumed common ancestry. Now some people had assumed this but not proved it and some people had regarded it as false. Many of the science people there thought that he must be right, so did many of the philosophers. Sober didn't have to perform an experiment - this was more like a mathematical proof and most people would accept a mathematical proof. At a practical level, then, philosophers can help other thinkers with conceptual matters, using the tools and concepts that are germane to philosophy.
quote: When we begin arguing abstract ideas, that is where I draw the line. Philosophy may have its place but should not exist as its own entity anymore. |
Why? Can't we argue about the intelligibility of concepts? This is a matter with practical implications. We aren't talking about strange metaphysical theories here, which are largely the province of the history of philosophy.
quote: Rather, it should lie within fields such as theoretical physics, classical chemistry, and other various social sciences. For being able to come up with believable ideas lends nothing towards its application. |
This would be silly. There is good reason to put the historians of philosophy together with the philosophers of science, epistemologists, ethicists and the rest as they have a lot in common. It is not as if they don't have anything in common with the others, but they have more in common with each other. Likewise there are some people in other disciplines who have a lot in common with philosophy (pure mathematicians are a good example) but it is just convenient to put them somewhere else.
quote: Thus, a PhD in such a field should lend way towards applications of a thought, and not just the creation of one. |
It does - a friend I spoke to today is doing a thesis on mental representation. This is of interest to all sorts of people - particularly those who study AI and the brain. It is not as if this topic is radically cut off from other disciplines.
What about historians of philosophy like me? You can't put us in the history department because the methods of the history of philosophy and plain old history are rather different. It would be like lumping in Classics with history, which would be a nightmare where I am. Similarly one could make a case for me to be relegated to the Classics department. But I lean more towards the interests of philosophers. Departmental boundaries are for the most part pragmatic and historical. You try telling the people in religious studies that they should be merged with philosophy and vice versa. Most won't like the idea.
quote: Of course I am speaking without any understanding of what is taught at that level of instruction, merely speaking from that which have read and experienced. |
Undergraduate courses in philosophy and introductory books are not representative of the work that professional philosophers do. We all teach people about God and Free will in first year, but people that do graduate work often do it in the topics of logic, reductionism, philosophy of language, philosophy of science and other such boring and technical areas. Some of us even work in AI or Cognitive Science or Linguistics. In all these topics there is a dialogue between philosophy and science - science provides experimental results and philosophy attempts to clear up conceptual confusions (which can lead to new and exciting ways of thinking about scientific discoveries).
This is why many scientists turn up at philosophy talks and vice versa.
Here's what I am going to do. I am going to write a thesis on Plato's conception of mental representation. No one has done this before and it might be of use to all sorts of people. Hopefully, it will be of use to historians of philosophy who want to understand Plato's thought, it will be of use to those in the history of ideas, it may also be of use in sparking a revision of our view of Plato (here's hoping). People who want to write about mental representation will find in it an account of what the first person to really think about it thought. An analysis of Plato's account might even provide new ways of thinking about it which might help solve some problems that current work is dealing with. That's a big ask and I'd be overjoyed if it acheived even one of these goals.
|
|
|  |
 |
|  |
 |
|  |
All times are GMT. The time now is 05:26. Apolyton Time is 00:26. |
top of page
|
| archivepost |
|
Forum Rules:
You may not post new threads
You may not post replies
You may not post attachments
You may not edit your posts
|
HTML code is ON
vB code is ON
Smilies are ON
[IMG] code is ON
|
|
|
|
|
|