08-03-2003 05:34									#151
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quote: But this capacity also exists in a singular sperm/egg. True, the sperm/egg requires assistance in order to mature into a sentient being (namely a counterpart egg/sperm with which it can fuse, in addition to a uterus etc.), but at the same time the zygote/embryo also requires assistance in order to mature into a sentient being (namely a uterus etc.).

quote: namely a counterpart egg/sperm with which it can fuse,

How does this compare with the zygote? Look at the genetics involved. Your sperm or a woman's egg will bear the same genetic code as their respective donors; it is a part of your body.

Zygotes differ because they already contain all the instruction that they need to grow, as a diploid cell. This combination differs from the parents, unlike that of the sperm or the egg.

It is true, that by themselves, zygotes will not grow, as they require nourishment and shelter, no different from any other person. Deprive zygotes of either, they will die. Deprive newborns, and they will die as well.

As for percentages, things happen to born people as well. The failure of the zygote to implant, or to grow and develop, will usually come from either errors within the cell, or other extraneous factors.

We can discard extraneous factors, because they have no bearing on the personhood of the zygote.

	08-03-2003 05:48									#152
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I am ProChoice but I'm ambivilent towards the Death Penalty. The poll is designed badly.

	08-03-2003 09:01									#153
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quote: Originally posted by obiwan18 We can discard extraneous factors, because they have no bearing on the personhood of the zygote.

Look, there's one thing that has bearing on the personhood of the zygote -- whether or not it is sentient. The zygote has no brain, we've agreed to that. Sentience means "The quality or state of being sentient; consciousness" or "Feeling as distinguished from perception or thought" -- a zygote is not conscious (since it has no brain) and it doesn't think or perceive (since it has no brain), therefore, regardless of what other caveats are included into this definition, a zygote is not sentient. It might develop sentience at some future date, but sentience is defined as whether or not a being is conscious/thinking, not whether or not a being may become conscious/thinking at some future date.

So, are you arguing that sentience does not require thought/consciousness? Then you'll need to explain why the dictionary is wrong. Are you arguing that a non-sentient being is ethically equivalent to a sentient being? Then you'll need to explain why this particular non-sentient being is a "person" while another non-sentient being (say, an ape, or a computer) is not a "person" -- in particular, it is conceivable that my computer could attain sentience by merely changing its programming (no physical change would even be necessary, which is more than can be said for the zygote), so if a non-sentient zygote is a person then my computer must also be a person (unless, of course, you can prove that a computer could never be sentient).

Yes, the zygote may develop into a sentient being, but that means that aborting the zygote is the act of killing a person who doesn't even exist nor will ever exist, which is a pretty bizarre crime IMO. I also still fail to see the distinction between killing a person who doesn't even exist who will develop from a zygote and killing a person who doesn't even exist who will develop from a sperm/egg -- the zygote is a new organism while the sperm/egg are not, but the zygote is every bit as non-sentient as the sperm/egg (and thus is every bit as much of a non-person as the sperm/egg), and is also every bit as necessary for the development of sentience as the sperm/egg.

	08-03-2003 14:00									#154
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quote: Originally posted by obiwan18 What about pain sensation? Would this count as well for sentience? Here's a source with the cited medical journals. Pain can be detected when nociceptors (pain receptors) discharge electrical impulses to the spinal cord and brain. These fire impulses outward, telling the muscles and body to react. These can be measured. Mountcastle, Medical Physiology, St. Louis: C.V. Mosby, pp. 391-427 "Lip tactile response may be evoked by the end of the 7th week. At 11 weeks, the face and all parts of the upper and lower extremities are sensitive to touch. By 13 1/2 to 14 weeks, the entire body surface, except for the back and the top of the head, are sensitive to pain." S. Reinis & J. Goldman, The Development of the Brain C. Thomas Pub., 1980

I don't think the ability to feel pain is indicative of sentience. It seems that sentience originates from the cerebral cortex, while pain is a much, much more primitive function for the survival of the organism. IIRC, pain short circuits at the brain stem, that's where you get the conditional reflexes from.

	08-03-2003 14:09									#155
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quote: Originally posted by obiwan18 Zygotes differ because they already contain all the instruction that they need to grow, as a diploid cell. This combination differs from the parents, unlike that of the sperm or the egg.

I found this qualification to be a bit arbitrary. Why is it necessarily for it to have "different combination" genetic information from its parents? What if it doesn't, e.g. a clone from a single parent? What if the mother is not the parent, i.e. a cloned cell in a surrogate mother? What about identical n-lets? Are these all right to abort because their DNA is not unique?

	08-03-2003 15:18									#156
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I oppose the death penalty (life in jail is much worse, I would think).

I am pro-life, though I wouldn't wish it to be made into law. It is just how I wish the world could work (but it couldn't...povery and the like make pro-life sometimes unreasonable).

	08-03-2003 16:29									#157
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Rapists, Muderers shoud get fried.
Abortion in cases where pregnancy is life threatening or the child will have no quality of life.

Circumstances would dictate though.

	09-03-2003 10:55									#158
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Loinburger:

I agree the zygote by your definition is not currently sentient. That I do not dispute.

What I do dispute is the necessity of current sentience for personhood.

The zygote if left alone will develop sentience.

What about a coma, where one is temporary non-sentient? Are you then no longer a person?

UR:

quote: I found this qualification to be a bit arbitrary. Why is it necessarily for it to have "different combination" genetic information from its parents? What if it doesn't, e.g. a clone from a single parent? What if the mother is not the parent, i.e. a cloned cell in a surrogate mother? What about identical n-lets? Are these all right to abort because their DNA is not unique?

Treating each example in turn.

3) Identical (n) lets differ from their parents, and so fall under my old definition. Notice I do not use the word 'unique'.

1&2)

Show me a living clone. Can we create a living clone, who bears all the genetic information of one person?

Do you consider a cloned zygote to be a person, UR?

	09-03-2003 12:26									#159
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quote: Originally posted by obiwan18 I agree the zygote by your definition is not currently sentient. That I do not dispute.

Fair enough. I'd thought that you might have been extending sentience to the zygote.

quote: What I do dispute is the necessity of current sentience for personhood. The zygote if left alone will develop sentience. What about a coma, where one is temporary non-sentient? Are you then no longer a person?

1. If you're claiming that an unthinking entity is ethically equivalent to you and I by virtue of the fact that it may obtain the capacity to think at some future date, then you need to explain a. why a sperm/egg is excluded from being a person and b. why my computer is excluded from being a person. You've addressed the sperm/egg contention previously by claiming that a sperm/egg cell is not ethically equivalent to a zygote simply because of the differences in the genetic codes of the two entities, but I fail to see how genetics can be the determiner of personhood -- are you claiming that only non-cloned humans are capable of being persons? More importantly, you'll also need to explain c. why it is that we ought to treat an unthinking entity as our ethical equivalent even when this entity is fundamentally incapable of moral behavior -- we don't treat very young children as being ethically equivalent to us (e.g. parents will send a misbehaving child to "time out" or whatever have you, but they won't send a misbehaving spouse to "time out") since they're less capable of understanding reason than we are, so why, if we don't treat children as our equivalents based on the assumption that "someday they'll understand reason so we ought to treat them as though they understand reason right here and now," ought we to treat a zygote (an entity that is fundamentally incapable of reason) as being ethically equivalent to the unborn child's mother, or even as being ethically equivalent to a newborn or a third-trimester fetus? In other words, if a non-sentient entity is capable of being morally equivalent to you and I, then why does sentience matter at all (e.g. when determining whether it is moral to take a brain-dead patient off of life support)? It just strikes me as being inconsistent to apply a sentience argument to justify taking a brain-dead patient off of life support, while at the same time rejecting a sentience argument being used to justify aborting an entity that is no more capable of thought than the brain-dead patient. Who is being killed by an early-term abortion? Not what, but who -- I just don't see how you can apply a "who" to an entity with no capacity for reason, with no identity, with no "self."

2. There is no certainty attached to the zygote's future sentience -- it doesn't have much better than even odds at attaining sentience. Furthermore, "if left alone" is a bit of a fudge term, since the whole point is that the zygote can't develop sentience on its own -- otherwise an abortion would be nothing more than the mother preemptively disowning her child.

3. If the brain completely shuts down, then the person has lost sentience. If the brain is functional then there is no more reason to deny the person's sentience than there would be to deny a sleeping person's sentience. A comatose patient is not equivalent to a zygote, since the zygote hasn't even got a brain, whereas a comatose patient's brain retains at least some functionality.

	09-03-2003 15:38									#160
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quote: Originally posted by obiwan18 3) Identical (n) lets differ from their parents, and so fall under my old definition. Notice I do not use the word 'unique'.

What is the rationale behind this?

quote: Originally posted by obiwan18 1&2) Show me a living clone. Can we create a living clone, who bears all the genetic information of one person?

Ethics is about what should be, not what is. Why do you consider X to be unethical? Possibly because what is happening is not what should be happening?

quote: Originally posted by obiwan18 Do you consider a cloned zygote to be a person, UR?

Clearly, a cloned zygote is no different from one that is formed naturally. Both contain human DNA but posess no sentience. Is it a person to you?

	10-03-2003 03:19									#161
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I'll deal with UR first, since I expected these arguments.

quote: What is the rationale behind this?

I have two choices.

1. I can say the zygote is a unique, living, human person and make two exceptions by saying clones and twins are special cases where the genetic code is not unique.

2. I can do away with the unique qualifier, as I have done here by specifying a genetic code differing from the parents to clarify the difference between sperm & egg and the zygote.

There are tactical reasons why it makes no sense to extend 2. to include an exception clause for cloned people:

First of all, we cannot make clones without destroying other embryos in the process. By stating that embryos are persons, one is not justified in killing embryos to create clones. Until scientists devise a procedure creating clones without killing another embryo, then I will have no problem.

Secondly, why would one abort a clone? Since we have to go through so much trouble to make a clone, no one who is pregnant with a clone will wish to abort.

Agreed, these are merely tactical objections. I used 2) before to clarify the difference between sperm & egg and the zygote, whereas 1 is superior to account for clones.

Loinburger:

quote: b. why my computer is excluded from being a person.

No human DNA. It may function as a person, though it cannot be human.

quote: we don't treat very young children as being ethically equivalent to us (e.g. parents will send a misbehaving child to "time out" or whatever have you, but they won't send a misbehaving spouse to "time out") since they're less capable of understanding reason than we are,

You're confusing two concepts here.
'ethically equivalent,' with personhood.

Do you believe children should be considered persons, just like adults? Should we legalise infanticide because infants cannot currently function as a person?

Just because a child cannot act as a moral person, this does not excuse us as moral persons from acting immorally to children.

quote: Who is being killed by an early-term abortion? Not what, but who -- I just don't see how you can apply a "who" to an entity with no capacity for reason, with no identity, with no "self."

If you follow my definition, you come to one conclusion, that abortion kills a living human person, no different from ourselves. You were once a zygote, an embryo and a fetus, but were lucky enough not to have been aborted.

	10-03-2003 15:40									#162
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quote: Originally posted by obiwan18 I have two choices. 1. I can say the zygote is a unique, living, human person and make two exceptions by saying clones and twins are special cases where the genetic code is not unique.

How is a zygote a person since it seems implausible that is has sentience?

quote: Originally posted by obiwan18 2. I can do away with the unique qualifier, as I have done here by specifying a genetic code differing from the parents to clarify the difference between sperm & egg and the zygote. There are tactical reasons why it makes no sense to extend 2. to include an exception clause for cloned people: First of all, we cannot make clones without destroying other embryos in the process. By stating that embryos are persons, one is not justified in killing embryos to create clones. Until scientists devise a procedure creating clones without killing another embryo, then I will have no problem. Secondly, why would one abort a clone? Since we have to go through so much trouble to make a clone, no one who is pregnant with a clone will wish to abort. Agreed, these are merely tactical objections. I used 2) before to clarify the difference between sperm & egg and the zygote, whereas 1 is superior to account for clones.

It remains unclear that why a unique set of chromosomes is a necessary condition for a human to be a person. The entire reason for pointing out clones is not whether they are feasible without destroying existing embryoes, but rather separate persons can have identical DNA. Same with identical n-lets.

	10-03-2003 19:27									#163
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quote: Originally posted by obiwan18 You're confusing two concepts here. 'ethically equivalent,' with personhood.

"Personhood" is an ethical concept -- somebody is a person if there exists a moral imperative to (at least attempt to) treat them as we'd like them to treat us. A zygote is fundamentally incapable of moral behavior.

quote: Do you believe children should be considered persons, just like adults? Should we legalise infanticide because infants cannot currently function as a person?

That's a strawman. A child is not ethically equivalent to you or I (which is why e.g. they're not allowed to vote), but a child is also not ethically equivalent to a zygote, by virtue of the fact that the child is sentient while the zygote is not. My point is that we don't treat children based on their behavior ten years from now ("Well, in ten years Bobby will be able to take care of a pony, so I'll buy him a pony now"), so by the same token, why treat a non-sentient zygote as though it were sentient?

quote: If you follow my definition, you come to one conclusion, that abortion kills a living human person, no different from ourselves. You were once a zygote, an embryo and a fetus, but were lucky enough not to have been aborted.

"I" did not exist when I was a zygote or an embryo -- my immature body may have existed, but "I" did not. "I" am not my DNA, nor my cell structure, nor any other incidental feature that makes me a human, but rather "I" am my mind -- y'know, the part that does the thinking, the sentient part, the part that is able to make the claim "I think therefore I am." My DNA can't make that claim, since my DNA can't think, therefore my DNA doesn't have a concept of self like I do. My body may at one point have been in the form of a zygote or an embryo, but "I" never existed in that form.

Are you claiming that what makes you "you" is not your mind, but rather your physical body? If somebody were to damage your physical body in such a way that your mind remains intact, would you no longer be "you"? I certainly don't feel like I've lost a part of my soul when I e.g. cut my finger... Heck, change my DNA in such a way that my mind isn't affected (f'rinstance, I've got crooked fingers, and I doubt that the section of DNA that dictates that my fingers are crooked is also the same section of DNA that dictates how my brain functions) and "I" will still me "me," I'll simply be a me with straighter fingers.

	11-03-2003 02:47									#164
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quote: The entire reason for pointing out clones is not whether they are feasible without destroying existing embryoes, but rather separate persons can have identical DNA. Same with identical n-lets.

UR:

I'll be brief.

Yes, I believe one can have DNA identical to someone else, in the case of clones and still be an individual human person.

quote: How is a zygote a person since it seems implausible that is has sentience?

See my coma example. We consider a person who is in a coma to still be a person, despite current non-sentience. What counts for personhood is not the current function, but the capacity to function as a person, possessed by zygotes as well as everyone else.

loinburger:

quote: "I" am not my DNA, nor my cell structure, nor any other incidental feature that makes me a human, but rather "I" am my mind.

Does your mind remain the same over time?

quote: Are you claiming that what makes you "you" is not your mind, but rather your physical body? If somebody were to damage your physical body in such a way that your mind remains intact, would you no longer be "you"? I certainly don't feel like I've lost a part of my soul when I e.g. cut my finger... Heck, change my DNA in such a way that my mind isn't affected (f'rinstance, I've got crooked fingers, and I doubt that the section of DNA that dictates that my fingers are crooked is also the same section of DNA that dictates how my brain functions) and "I" will still me "me," I'll simply be a me with straighter fingers.

Just the opposite. Who you are does not depend on the current state of your body, but on the capacity of your body to attain sentience. As you grow, you do not become another person, since what was to grow comes from part of you earlier. You start with a bucket, and while the bucket may vary in the amount filled, the intrinsic capacity will not.

quote: Heck, change my DNA in such a way that my mind isn't affected.

So change the mind and you change the person?

quote: That's a strawman.

Yet you ignore the other much more substantive point.


As moral persons we should act moral even to those who are currently incapable of acting morally.

Do you believe this to be true?

	11-03-2003 03:13									#165
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quote: Originally posted by obiwan18 Does your mind remain the same over time?

I learn new things, if that's what you're referring to... I'm the same "me" whether or not I know how to e.g. numerically solve the Heat Equation, though...

quote: Just the opposite. Who you are does not depend on the current state of your body, but on the capacity of your body to attain sentience.

"I" am not my body, though, regardless of the potential sentience of that body! Take away my body but leave my mind (I dunno, put my brain in a jar or something), and "I" still exist. Take away my brain (or don't give me a brain), and "I" do not exist, even if my body is kept as a living husk capable of having a new brain transferred into it (thus giving my body "the capacity to attain sentience"). Why else would it be ethical to take a brain-dead patient off of life support, if the patient's "self" weren't the patient's mind?

quote: As you grow, you do not become another person, since what was to grow comes from part of you earlier.

Sure, but I've first got to grow into or become a person. If your brain were destroyed, would your "self" be gone? If so, then how can you claim that your "self" could exist before your brain even formed in the first place? If you have no self without a brain, then who the heck is being harmed by an early-term abortion? A "self-that-might-have been"? A nonexistent person? If my parents had never had any children, then I'd be in the exact same state of non-existence now than I'd be in if they'd aborted me as a zygote -- in either case my "self" would have never even existed.

quote: So change the mind and you change the person?

Give me a different brain/mind, and I'd no longer be me -- I'd be the guy whose brain/mind now occupies my body.

quote: Yet you ignore the other much more substantive point.

Your "other point" is just a more generalized version of the infanticide strawman.

quote: As moral persons we should act moral even to those who are currently incapable of acting morally. Do you believe this to be true?

No, which is why I'm in favor of locking up murderers despite the fact that they may at some future date become reformed. This is also why I'm in favor of not allowing a 5-year-old to vote despite the fact that the 5-year-old will somebody be an 18-year-old. Locking people up and not allowing people to fully express their opinions can hardly be regarded as "moral behavior" with all things being equal, but all things are not equal -- the murderer is a murderer and the 5-year-old is immature.

	11-03-2003 09:02									#166
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quote: Originally posted by obiwan18 See my coma example. We consider a person who is in a coma to still be a person, despite current non-sentience. What counts for personhood is not the current function, but the capacity to function as a person, possessed by zygotes as well as everyone else.

The coma example doesn't compare. A person who is in a coma was sentient before. A zygote has never been sentient. As I pointed out before, theoretically, all your body cells can develop into new individuals. Hence, they all can have sentience potentially.

	11-03-2003 09:38									#167
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quote: A person who is in a coma was sentient before. A zygote has never been sentient.

UR:

If current capacity for sentience determines personhood, why should we care about the previous state of the person in a coma? What does the person in the coma retain?

I'll try to break this down.

First you say sentience is required for personhood.
Now you say sentience must be acquired previously to be considered a person.

How can anyone ever attain personhood if previous sentience becomes the prerequisite?

quote: As I pointed out before, theoretically, all your body cells can develop into new individuals.

Lacking evidence, 'theoretical' is the key word.

Loinburger:

quote: If your brain were destroyed, would your "self" be gone.

Yes, because the brain cannot be restored.

quote: Why else would it be ethical to take a brain-dead patient off of life support, if the patient's "self" weren't the patient's mind?

Because the condition is irreverseable, as I have said before.

quote: Give me a different brain/mind, and I'd no longer be me.

quote: I learn new things, if that's what you're referring to... I'm the same "me" whether or not I know how to e.g. numerically solve the Heat Equation, though...

Ahh, you start to see. Everyday, your brain deteriorates physically after you reach adulthood. Physically, you have a different brain than you had the day before.

Now, what is it about your brain that allows you to retain your identity from one day to the next?

Your memories change, as do your experiences, yet you would never say that 'loinburger' no longer exists.

Why is this? What stays the same?

quote: This is also why I'm in favor of not allowing a 5-year-old to vote despite the fact that the 5-year-old will somebody be an 18-year-old.

Now we've moved on to a different question.

What rights should all persons have?

I argue that it makes sense to give to the unborn child, only the right to life, because they are incapable of acting morally, just as we keep children from voting.

Therefore, if the unborn child as a person should receive the right to life, we have a moral obligation not only to stop killing but to prevent others from killing unborn children.

	11-03-2003 11:33									#168
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quote: Originally posted by obiwan18 Now you say sentience must be acquired previously to be considered a person.

UR didn't use the word "must."

quote: Ahh, you start to see. Everyday, your brain deteriorates physically after you reach adulthood. Physically, you have a different brain than you had the day before. Now, what is it about your brain that allows you to retain your identity from one day to the next? Your memories change, as do your experiences, yet you would never say that 'loinburger' no longer exists. Why is this? What stays the same?

In all likelihood it is merely an illusion of continuity, similar to the illusion of wholeness experienced by severe epileptics who have had the two loaves of their brain separated (such that no communication between the loaves is possible, essentially meaning that they have two brains rather than one brain) who nevertheless continue to believe that (and act as though) they are one person, one "self," rather than two. The change from one brain state to the next is so subtle (much more subtle than having the halves of your brain separated) that it isn't difficult to fathom how such an illusion of continuity could be created -- my brain isn't being entirely recreated from one moment to the next, but rather the changes it undergoes are quite gradual. (It is speculated that if an artificial neuron were developed, that it would be possible to completely replace somebody's brain with an artificial brain so long as the change were gradual enough that the old tissue was able to integrate the new "tissue." Obviously this hasn't been tested out.)

If you're driving at the point that I was somehow "me" before I even had a brain, then I disagree. No illusion of continuity is possible between such drastically different brain states (and "self" states) as "capable of thought" (when the brain begins to function) and "non-existent" (prior to the brain beginning to function). Any way you cut it, the zygote isn't sentient, and for that matter the zygote isn't even capable of basic (non-sentient) thought -- attributing a "self" to such a non-thinking entity is ludicrous, unless a "self" is nothing more than a DNA chain (in which case it is immoral to take a brain-dead patient off of life support).

quote: I argue that it makes sense to give to the unborn child, only the right to life, because they are incapable of acting morally, just as we keep children from voting. Therefore, if the unborn child as a person should receive the right to life, we have a moral obligation not only to stop killing but to prevent others from killing unborn children.

If the unborn child is a person then clearly it has a right to life. I still don't understand how an entity (the zygote) that isn't sentient, can't even think, and has no "self" can be considered a person, while at the same time another entity (the brain-dead patient) that isn't sentient, can't even think, and has no "self" isn't a person. Is it possible that the zygote will develop a self? Sure, but until that time, there is no self to protect, thus there is no person to protect -- if we start protecting non-existent selfs/persons then we must also protect sperm and egg cells. Is it possible that the zygote has a self despite being incapable of thinking? Only if you make the claim that the self is somehow bound up in DNA (in which case the brain-dead patient has a right to life, and for that matter so does every cell in the human body) or in the zygote's potential to develop sentience (in which case the sperm/egg has a right to life, and in which case you are also mixing definitions -- either the self is bound up in the brain and the capacity for thought [in which case the zygote has no self and is therefore not a person], or the self is independent of brain function [in which case the brain-dead patient has the same self as he/she had prior to brain-death and thus is still a person]. You can't have it both ways).

There are many organisms that don't have the capacity for thought -- do they have a right to life as well? Can you prove that these organisms will never attain sentience? Granted that the probability of them doing so is rather small, but there's only a 60% probability of the zygote attaining sentience -- why accept an organism with one probability as a person while rejecting another organism with a different probability? What's the cut-off probability -- 10%? 20%? How is this cut-off probability determined?

	11-03-2003 12:05									#169
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quote: Originally posted by obiwan18 If current capacity for sentience determines personhood, why should we care about the previous state of the person in a coma?

Because a person in a coma has not lost the capacity for sentience. That person is still capable of sentience, even though at that very moment he isn't. Contrast that to a zygote, which has no capacity of sentience at all. Can you not see the difference?

quote: Originally posted by obiwan18 What does the person in the coma retain?

The knowledge of himself. The person in a coma still retains everything in his brain that makes him an indivdual, even at that moment he is not accessing that storage.

quote: Originally posted by obiwan18 First you say sentience is required for personhood. Now you say sentience must be acquired previously to be considered a person.

I didn't say that.

I was saying a human in a coma can be considered a person because of his previous demonstration of sentience, which is not what a zygote is capable of.

quote: Originally posted by obiwan18 Lacking evidence, 'theoretical' is the key word.

But aren't we talking about ethics, which is what should be?

	11-03-2003 12:31									#170
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UR:

quote: Contrast that to a zygote, which has no capacity of sentience at all. Can you not see the difference?

The man in the coma retains the intrinsic capacity to function as a person, as does the zygote. Both are currently non-functional, but still persons because of this intrinsic capacity.

quote: I was saying a human in a coma can be considered a person because of his previous demonstration of sentience, which is not what a zygote is capable of.

As loinburger comments as well, without the word must, your definition is not exclusive.

Sure, one could be a person, but you can't exclude the zygote unless you say previous experience is necessary for personhood.

quote: The knowledge of himself. The person in a coma still retains everything in his brain that makes him an indivdual, even at that moment he is not accessing that storage.

Will this change over time? A person's experiences will change how he perceives himself.

quote: But aren't we talking about ethics, which is what should be?

We are doing meta-ethics, in establishing the definition of personhood. Properly, we should consider all future modes and possibilities, but practically, we should limit ourselves to problems immediately at hand.

I'd be happy with a definition that defends the unborn child, in the cases that women abort in such a way as not to leave loopholes.

I don't know much about the mutability of cells that you allude to, so perhaps you could enlighten us all?

Going to split my post since this is getting kind of long.

	11-03-2003 13:16									#171
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quote: In all likelihood it is merely an illusion of continuity, similar to the illusion of wholeness experienced by severe epileptics who have had the two loaves of their brain separated (such that no communication between the loaves is possible, essentially meaning that they have two brains rather than one brain) who nevertheless continue to believe that (and act as though) they are one person, one "self," rather than two.

That's a big concession.

Continuity of self does not exist except as an illusion?

What did you mean then, when you said:

quote: I certainly don't feel like I've lost a part of my soul when I e.g. cut my finger...

If a continuous self is merely an illusion, then we have no objective base for personhood. You are no longer 'loinburger' from one moment to the next because of the changes your body undergoes.

quote: attributing a "self" to such a non-thinking entity is ludicrous, unless a "self" is nothing more than a DNA chain (in which case it is immoral to take a brain-dead patient off of life support).

Good question. I don't get asked this very often, so I will try to be more precise in my terms.

Before, I have said that the DNA provides the instructions assisting the zygote's growth and development. DNA by itself, cannot drive the growth, it directs the growth.

The zygote requires two things to meet my definition of personhood - it must be living, and it must be human. Humanness comes from the DNA- and can be expressed, as I have here, as the intrinsic capacity to attain sentience. Living? All living things possess this quality. What makes the zygote differ from gamete cells, and dead cells is that the zygote is both alive and
human.

quote: Can you prove that these organisms will never attain sentience?

By your definition, these other species will not reach the proper amount of sentience within their current lifespans.

By mine, I could say, they are not human, therefore they are not persons. All humans should under my definition equal all persons.

	11-03-2003 14:28									#172
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The coma arguement is the best thing you've got, obiwan, push it through.

( sorry UR, and loinburger, just want to spice up the debate. )

	11-03-2003 20:12									#173
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quote: Originally posted by obiwan18 The man in the coma retains the intrinsic capacity to function as a person, as does the zygote.

The man in the coma is a thinking entity (although his thinking is currently stunted) and is thus capable of sentience in his present state, the zygote is not a thinking entity and is thus incapable of sentience in its present state. As I've said previously and as I reiterate below, ethics does not generally deal with potentials, but only with actuals.

quote: If a continuous self is merely an illusion, then we have no objective base for personhood. You are no longer 'loinburger' from one moment to the next because of the changes your body undergoes.

I'm still "loinburger" because from one moment to the next the number of "loinburger" cells I've got far outweigh the number of "non-loinburger" (i.e. new) cells I've got, and those new cells are integrated by my loinburger cells so that they too become loinburger cells. The problem arises when too many of my loinburger cells are removed at once, e.g. if somebody shoots me in the head. This isn't really germane to the topic at hand, though -- what matters is that the brain's the thing that does the thinking, thinking is a necessary prerequisite for one to acquire a "self," the zygote doesn't think, therefore "I" did not exist when my body was a zygote/embryo.

quote: The zygote requires two things to meet my definition of personhood - it must be living, and it must be human. Humanness comes from the DNA- and can be expressed, as I have here, as the intrinsic capacity to attain sentience. Living? All living things possess this quality. What makes the zygote differ from gamete cells, and dead cells is that the zygote is both alive and human.

1. If an entity must merely be alive and human to qualify as a person, then the brain-dead patient is a person, since the patient's DNA has not changed and the patient is alive (albeit alive on a respirator, but this shouldn't make any difference unless you want to claim that people with artificial hearts are not alive).

2. Ethics does not generally deal with capacities or potentials -- we don't treat a 5-year-old as an 18-year-old even though the 5-year-old has the potential to grow into an 18-year-old, we don't treat a convicted murderer as a reformed convict even though the murderer has the potential to be reformed, we don't lock up non-murderers for the crime of murder even though they have the potential to commit murder, and we don't treat non-sentient entities as sentient even if they have the potential to acquire sentience at some future date.

quote: By mine, I could say, they are not human, therefore they are not persons. All humans should under my definition equal all persons.

Are you therefore claiming that no other species in the universe is capable of sentience? Or are you claiming that there is no moral imperative to reciprocate with any other sentient species in the universe?

My definition of personhood ("sentience is a necessary and sufficient condition for personhood") allows us to treat non-human sentient entities as persons, as our ethical equivalents. Your definition ("alive and human") is anthropocentric to the extreme.

	12-03-2003 09:57									#174
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quote: Originally posted by obiwan18 The man in the coma retains the intrinsic capacity to function as a person, as does the zygote. Both are currently non-functional, but still persons because of this intrinsic capacity.

This is a false analogy. A person in a coma is similar to a person who is sleeping: both are capable of sentience. A zygote has no intrinsic capacity to function as a person. How? It cannot eat, it cannot breathe, it does not have a brain, it doesn't have any limbs, it doesn't have lungs or other vital internal organs. I ask you, how can a zygot compare with a person?

quote: Originally posted by obiwan18 As loinburger comments as well, without the word must, your definition is not exclusive. Sure, one could be a person, but you can't exclude the zygote unless you say previous experience is necessary for personhood.

If a zygot is not sentient, it is not a person. What else do you need?

quote: Originally posted by obiwan18 Will this change over time? A person's experiences will change how he perceives himself.

A person in a coma? How would that change?

quote: Originally posted by obiwan18 We are doing meta-ethics, in establishing the definition of personhood. Properly, we should consider all future modes and possibilities, but practically, we should limit ourselves to problems immediately at hand.

Actually, defining a person has nothing to do with ethics. What to do about a person is what ethics is about.

quote: Originally posted by obiwan18 I don't know much about the mutability of cells that you allude to, so perhaps you could enlighten us all?

I didn't say anything about that.

I was saying that a person's body cells can be theoretically be caused to grow into clones of that person.

If sentience is what makes a person, will you be against destroying sentient robots?

	12-03-2003 10:03									#175
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Loinburger:

quote: The man in the coma is a thinking entity (although his thinking is currently stunted) and is thus capable of sentience in his present state,

Yet UR concedes:

quote: That person is still capable of sentience, even though at that very moment he isn't.

Now, are you working from the same definition of sentience as UR?

If so, both of you cannot be right.

quote: I'm still "loinburger" because from one moment to the next the number of "loinburger" cells I've got far outweigh the number of "non-loinburger" (i.e. new) cells I've got, and those new cells are integrated by my loinburger cells so that they too become loinburger cells.

So weight is the ultimate determinant? Suppose we cut off your head, and leave the rest of the body. Clearly, more than half of your body remains, yet do you stay loinburger?

quote: 1. If an entity must merely be alive and human to qualify as a person, then the brain-dead patient is a person, since the patient's DNA has not changed and the patient is alive (albeit alive on a respirator, but this shouldn't make any difference unless you want to claim that people with artificial hearts are not alive).

Alive = intrinsic capacity to function as a person. The brain-dead patient, though he may breathe, has lost this capacity.

quote: 2. Ethics does not generally deal with capacities or potentials -- we don't treat a 5-year-old as an 18-year-old even though the 5-year-old has the potential to grow into an 18-year-old,

Both the 5 year old and the 18 year old have a right to life, that is not abrogated by their lack of current function. The zygote may not currently function as a person, but instead possesses the intrinsic capacity to function. The zygote is not potentially a person, but already is a person.

quote: Are you therefore claiming that no other species in the universe is capable of sentience? Or are you claiming that there is no moral imperative to reciprocate with any other sentient species in the universe?

Sure, they can be capable of sentience. If we run across a sentient species, then we should reciprocate. It still does not mean they qualify as human persons.

quote: My definition of personhood ("sentience is a necessary and sufficient condition for personhood") allows us to treat non-human sentient entities as persons, as our ethical equivalents. Your definition ("alive and human") is anthropocentric to the extreme.

Anthropocentric?
Do you believe a mollusc is sentient? What about a pig, or a dolphin?

Secondly, why would aliens we meet have the equivalent amount of sentience we do? What if they are vastly more advanced than we? By your definition, they should treat us as cattle, and have every moral right to do so.

	12-03-2003 10:11									#176
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quote: A zygote has no intrinsic capacity to function as a person. How? It cannot eat, it cannot breathe, it does not have a brain, it doesn't have any limbs, it doesn't have lungs or other vital internal organs. I ask you, how can a zygot compare with a person?

You are confusing intrinsic capacity with current capacity.

Given time, and a comfortable womb, the zygote will develop those features you require for personhood.

A man in a coma does not currently function as a person, though he retains the capacity to function. This is why we treat, and take care of him as opposed to the brain-dead patient.

quote: Actually, defining a person has nothing to do with ethics. What to do about a person is what ethics is about.

That is normative ethics. First you need to know what a person is, before one can apply ethical principles to persons.

quote: I was saying that a person's body cells can be theoretically be caused to grow into clones of that person.

Then show me the money!

	12-03-2003 11:02									#177
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quote: Originally posted by obiwan18 Now, are you working from the same definition of sentience as UR?

I'm not sure. Maybe he and I will have a debate over our definitions in a coupla years or so, if Poly gets too slow. All that is germane to the discussion at hand is that we both agree (as does the dictionary) that thought is a necessary condition for sentience.

quote: So weight is the ultimate determinant? Suppose we cut off your head, and leave the rest of the body. Clearly, more than half of your body remains, yet do you stay loinburger?

For pity's sake. At no point have I ever claimed that a non-thinking entity has a self -- that's your claim, not mine. I've claimed just the opposite many times. If my head is removed then obviously I become a non-thinking entity, therefore I cease to be loinburger.

quote: Alive = intrinsic capacity to function as a person. The brain-dead patient, though he may breathe, has lost this capacity.

If this is your definition of "alive" then you're simply begging the question -- you're defining a "person" to be a human who is alive, and you're defining somebody to be "alive" if they are a human person. Don't you see the blatant circularity here?

quote: The zygote is not potentially a person, but already is a person.

I'm not going to address this until you give me a reasonable definition of the term "person." You've essentially rendered the term meaningless.

quote: Sure, they can be capable of sentience. If we run across a sentient species, then we should reciprocate. It still does not mean they qualify as human persons.

Obviously they wouldn't qualify as human persons, seeing as how they're not human. According to your definition of personhood they would not be persons of any kind, though, and we would therefore be under no obligation to recipricate with them. Under my definition they would be considered persons, as is their due.

quote: Anthropocentric? Do you believe a mollusc is sentient? What about a pig, or a dolphin?

You've quoted me out of context (by quoting and addressing two related paragraphs as separate independent paragraphs) in order to throw a pack of strawmen my way. Obviously I wasn't referring to molluscs or pigs, seeing as how in the paragraph directly above the quoted paragraph I was referring to all species in the universe, not merely all species in the world.

quote: Secondly, why would aliens we meet have the equivalent amount of sentience we do? What if they are vastly more advanced than we? By your definition, they should treat us as cattle, and have every moral right to do so.

1. I don't see sentience as being a quality of which somebody can possess a greater or lesser quantity. Either one is self-aware or one is not.

2. I don't see where you're deriving this "treat us like cattle" strawman, seeing as how I've never claimed that we ought to treat any persons as cattle (unless you believe that locking up murderers or denying five-year-olds the right to vote are tantamount to treating murderers or five-year-olds as cattle...)


C'mon, that's one case of completely missing the point of what I've been posting for the past umpteen pages, one blatantly circular argument, and two strawmen, not to mention one use of the much-despised "lol" argument. Is there any point to my continuing in this debate? Should I just throw up my hands in despair and be done with it?

	13-03-2003 07:47									#178
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quote: Originally posted by obiwan18 Now, are you working from the same definition of sentience as UR? If so, both of you cannot be right.

Check carefully the wordings of the two quotes. It seems that both of us agreed that a man in coma is capable of sentience.

quote: Originally posted by obiwan18 You are confusing intrinsic capacity with current capacity.

I am not confused, you are.

The opposite of intrinsic is not current, it is extrinsic. An "intrinsic" ability is one that is built-in, a native ability so to speak. A man who is sleeping has the intrinsic ability of vision, even though he is not currently using it. A man in a coma has the intrinsic capability of sentience, even though at that moment he is not using it.

quote: Originally posted by obiwan18 Given time, and a comfortable womb, the zygote will develop those features you require for personhood.

You are arguing about potential here, not about intrinsic ability per se. Show me a zygote is intrinsically capable of sentience, and we will continue in this direction.

As I pointed out before, each and every body cell has the potential to become a person.

quote: Originally posted by obiwan18 A man in a coma does not currently function as a person, though he retains the capacity to function. This is why we treat, and take care of him as opposed to the brain-dead patient.

Exactly. As opposed to a zygote, an embryo, or a fetus, which has no capacity of sentience.

quote: Originally posted by obiwan18 That is normative ethics. First you need to know what a person is, before one can apply ethical principles to persons.

I am rather sure that we agreed on using sentience as the measuring stick. If that's not your definition, speak up.

quote: Originally posted by obiwan18 Then show me the money!

Just because in theory it is the case doesn't mean we can do it now. Consider fusion. In theory, we can build fusion reactors. It is just that we haven't been able to do so.

	14-03-2003 03:55									#179
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Sorry guys, I didn't know that you responded.

Loinburger:

quote: I've claimed just the opposite many times. If my head is removed then obviously I become a non-thinking entity, therefore I cease to be loinburger.

Good So then it doesn't matter what happens to the cells in your body. Something in you stays loinburger regardless of the turnover as your cells die and renew. I was trying to pull you off the position that there is nothing we retain over time.

quote: Don't you see the blatant circularity here?

One can be alive and not necessarily a person, or even a human. One can possess human DNA, yet not be a person. I'm trying to account for both sides at the same time.

quote: If this is your definition of "alive" then you're simply begging the question.

Indeed. Perhaps a better definition is that if it wiggles, it's alive. Defining life is hard, which is why it is much easier to define personhood given that the zygote is already alive, in that living things can only come from other living things.

quote: According to your definition of personhood they would not be persons of any kind, though, and we would therefore be under no obligation to recipricate with them.

We're going to have to work out sentience as a boolean value first. Why would an advanced alien race care about the application of human rights?

Why is sentience a boolean value? Do you consider self-awareness = sentience?

If so, do we know that producing brain waves = self-awareness?

I don't like anthropocentric, because according to what we know now, your argument is less broad than mine.

	14-03-2003 04:09									#180
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UR:

quote: I am rather sure that we agreed on using sentience as the measuring stick. If that's not your definition, speak up.

Part of what makes us people is the capacity for sentience, but other qualities can be included as well. My definition states person as the intrinsic capacity to function as a person, and I go with whatever people believe people need to function.

quote: Show me a zygote is intrinsically capable of sentience, and we will continue in this direction.

Intrinsic:

1 a : belonging to the essential nature or constitution of a thing.

That's the definition I've been using throughout.

Part of the essence of the zygote includes the DNA inherited at conception. This DNA provides the instructions needed for the zygote to grow a heart/lungs/brain, etc. This DNA is inside of the one-celled zygote, and is therefore a part of the constitution of the zygote. Without the diploid DNA, you cannot have a zygote, so therefore, this DNA is part of the essential nature of the zygote.

Any clearer?

quote: Just because in theory it is the case doesn't mean we can do it now. Consider fusion. In theory, we can build fusion reactors. It is just that we haven't been able to do so.

I meant show me the theory.
Never heard of this before.