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Jon Miller
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are yuo on the east coast Frogger?
I always thought you were central...
Jon Miller
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The Vagabond
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of realpolitik and counterpropaganda
Jan 1970
time: 05:26
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quote:
Originally posted by Ramo
Sure, but then math isn't based "exclusively" on logic either. In both cases, you start with assuming precepts not based on logic. But "good" philosophy and good math doesn't contradict itself after that, and doesn't make conclusions not following from the assumptions.
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Well, to judge by the above quote, at least you recognize that there exists a good philosophy. 
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I suppose it depends on what you mean being something being good or something being bad. If you say moderate alcohol is good for your heart but bad for your liver, there isn't a contradiction. If you say moderate alcohol is good for you and bad for you, you're being logically ambigous and that's a problem with human language.
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This may be ambiguous, but still correct statement. And human language is unfortunately how we deal with cognitive process. Not everything can be mathematized.
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1. Gegel? Who's he? Do you mean Hegel (honest question, not ribbing you  )?
2. What's the second law of dialectics? |
1. Oops, sorry. He is indeed spelled "Hegel" 
2. Actually it is not called "second law" by Hegel himself.
quote:
Even more than Aristotle and the Stoics, Hegel believed that the study of logic is an investigation into the fundamental structure of reality itself. According to Hegel, all logic (and, hence, all of reality) is dialectical in character. As Kant had noted in the Antinomies, serious thought about one general description of the world commonly leads us into a contemplation of its opposite. But Hegel did not suppose this to be the end of the matter; he made the further supposition that the two concepts so held in opposition can always be united by a shift to some higher level of thought. Thus, the human mind invariably moves from thesis to antithesis to synthesis, employing each synthesis as the thesis for a new opposition to be transcended by yet a higher level, continuing in a perpetual waltz of intellectual achievement.
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Last edited by The Vagabond on 02-03-2003 at 16:36
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Peter Triggs
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Gone Fishin, Canada
Jan 2000
time: 05:26
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Asher, tinyp3nis
What was covered in these philosophy of logic courses that you found so boring?
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spartak
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Has the "filosfy" thing been tried out yet?
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Agathon
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Leafs 4TW!! - CPA
Dec 2002
time: 00:26
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quote:
Originally posted by Frogger
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This is motivated by the problem of accounting for error |
No it isn't, at least not in my mind. It's motivated by the fact that I have no basis for believing anything else. |
What basis do you have for believing this?
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We also collapse "seems" and "is" because we have no right to make the inferences about extra mental entities that are required to support claims of seeming (i.e the distinction between appearance and reality). |
Huh? This is the sort of thing that casts doubt on the whole of philosophy for me. You've bootstrapped your argument by claiming that we have to actively reject information; I'm simply claiming that there is no evidence to force me to accept information. And my view doesn't hold that the internal evidence is infallible either... |
I'm claiming that the Cartesian conception of mental representations doesn't account for error or hallucination or anything like that on its own terms. I haven't bootstrapped at all. I've just claimed, and I think rightly, that the usual motivation for positing such mental entities makes them a poor candidate for explaining what they claim to explain (namely error).
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By the way, your "linguistic analysis" of is and seems is utterly full of crap. |
Ah diddums. Is that the best you can do?
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You assume that the default state must be "is" and that "seems" only comes into play later. On the contrary, as any good skeptic will tell you, they only believe in varying degrees of seems. "Is" is the nonincluded limit point of seems, and does not exist in a reasonable space. |
What a load of rubbish. "Is is the nonincluded limit point of seems". That's just a load of old rubbish. "Is" and "seems" are ordinary words that people use every day. I think it is better practice when one wants to understand the meaning of terms to look at their use by competent speakers - not some hypostasied logicians account of them.
Anyway, your argument doesn't work. What reasons do I have for believing that my scepticism about, say, the bent stick, has anything to do with limits or noninclusion. I gave the reason for not endorsing the claim - and it was a perfectly OK reason (light travelling through different mediums).
Anyway, you've contradicted yourself hilariously.
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"Is" is the nonincluded limit point of seems. |
What explanation are you going to give of how "seems" statements work, without making some assumption about the way things are (like you just did). "Is" statements are prior to "seems" statements. Get used to it.
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Agathon
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Leafs 4TW!! - CPA
Dec 2002
time: 00:26
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quote:
Originally posted by Frogger
quote:
I'm claiming that the Cartesian conception of mental representations doesn't account for error or hallucination or anything like that on its own terms. I haven't bootstrapped at all. I've just claimed, and I think rightly, that the usual motivation for positing such mental entities makes them a poor candidate for explaining what they claim to explain (namely error). |
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Anyway, your argument doesn't work. What reasons do I have for believing that my scepticism about, say, the bent stick, has anything to do with limits or noninclusion. I gave the reason for not endorsing the claim - and it was a perfectly OK reason (light travelling through different mediums). |
You're being thick as a brick. I'm sceptical about everything, not just stuff I know is wrong. That's the meaning of the word "skepticism" |
Sure it is, but what reasons can I have for being a skeptic? You are sceptical, so what? Why should I be sceptical about everything? Should I be sceptical about scepticism? You need to do better than this otherwise you are just a dogmatist.
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Instead of attacking the motivations of a theory, attack the theory itself. I haven't read any cartesian reasoning. |
Well I haven't read any reasoning from you as to why you believe in Cartesian mental entities. You've just said in effect, "there is no alternative". I don't believe you, I can't detect them, convince me.
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By the way, it's usually considered bad form in arguments to make statements that are as utterly open to personal interpretation and which have no supporting evidence as your original statement "We also collapse "seems" and "is" because we have no right to make the inferences about extra mental entities that are required to support claims of seeming (i.e the distinction between appearance and reality)."
Demonstrate from base principles that this is true. Define the terms "extra mental entities" "appearance" "reality". Demonstrate that "extra mental entities" are required to differentiate between appearance and
reality. |
I thought this would have been obvious to anybody who thought about it.
An extra mental entity is an entity that exists outside a person's mind, like a chair or a dog.
Appearance. I don't think that appearances are entities although the Cartesians do (this is the mistake I suggest they make). I suppose they would say that an appearance is a mental entity which represents some external state of affairs or object.
Reality. In the Cartesian tradition this is just the sum total of extra mental physical entities.
OK. I postulate that my knowledge of the world is solely based on private mental representations. There is no other datum from which to infer anything about the reality that they represent. In fact based on the representations we have no basis for claiming that there in fact is a noumenal reality behind them. In order to prove there was a reality behind appearances I would have to have some other data other than appearances (specifically data about the relation between mental representations and reality), but I don't and by dictates of the theory itself I can't, so I have no reason to assume that such a relation exists. So the reasonable thing to be is a phenomenalist or an idealist and say that there is no external world, there are just phenomenal events. The usual move after this is to say that we construct the world from appearances, but I don't see why we have to start down that road in the first place.
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Your argument doesn't even provide the semblance of a formal proof. It "seems" to be on par with most of the other philosophical crap I've read. |
And you are just a man who's operating with an antiquated 17th and 18th century conception of mental states. 
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Talk to any physicist. I'll bet you that almost every last one of them is a cartesian in one form or another. And it's not because they've been poring over 16th century philosophical texts; it's because the conclusion is obvious to any thinking being. So your big move away from the antiscientific principle of Cartesianist duality is sort of laughable on its face. |
Maybe physicists are just stupid or perhaps they need to take more philosophy of mind courses to stop them talking about entities which have the scientific respectablility of fairies. Talk to people who work on the brain or in cognitive science or psychologists and you might find a different story (not necessarily all in agreement with me, but agreement that this is an open question). Look, behaviourists disputed the existence of such states precisely because they weren't observable - so mine is not a weird or totally unheard of position.
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02-03-2003 15:09
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