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ravagon
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Australia
Sep 1999 time: 13:27
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quote: Originally posted by Joseph
Well I stop reading after the tank statement. We have to many reporter in the field with our troops for them to lie to us. Now I was at work all day but yet to hear that we lost any tanks. To my knowledge either one or two AH-64 in combat. Between 7 and 12 POWs, and some 26 dead to all causes. |
To some extent this may be true but don't forget that the only reason the story about the RPG hit on a Bradley came to the surface was due to the casualties sustained as a result. If a number of US M1's were disabled due to tread hits or somesuch, without casualties, then it might not actually make the news.
Of course the idea of large numbers of US tanks actually being lost in armoured engagements against Iraqi tanks, as "reported" by Iraqi leaders, is rather laughable.
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ravagon
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Australia
Sep 1999 time: 13:27
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quote: Originally posted by Dissident
but why would they focus so much on what has gone wrong in the war? There has been a lot of focus on U.S. failures and POW's. |
This is always the case and probably always will be. A combination of journalists inherent suspicion about information "volunteered" and the "negative news sells" aspect.
Unfortunately they aren't nearly as discriminating wrt the "other" side, but then, any discretion there would probably get them banned, thrown in jail or worse.
ie: They operate under strict principles when reporting from the western POV but when on the other side and under threat they're prepared to ... compromise a bit.
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MichaeltheGreat
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Apolyton Grand Executioner
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mooning the house that Ruth built.
Oct 1999 time: 21:27
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quote: Originally posted by Urban Ranger
First of all, I don't think the Russians are completely off-base. I am not a SIGINT expert, but even I know there are a whole lot of methods/processes/etc. that can be used to extract information. Secondly, there are good reasons to believe that the "embeddeds" are own and controlled by the military, i.e., coalition command. They rely on the information given to them by the military, and they can't go everywhere they feel like. That's why Qatar's al-Jazeera televison has been such a success in the Arab world, since it provides a counterbalance to Western media, esp. in a wartime situation like this. |
The Russian site is off base. The short range comm nets used by the allies all rely on encrypted communications, and timely intercept and decryption is very difficult - they'd have to have people with the technical means right there, close in to a fluid fight, or simply scattered all up and down the probable line of advance, AND they'd have to have totally compromised our systems, which rely on both time values and bitstrength. They could record signals and decrypt them - in days or weeks, depending on the computing power applied, so that isn't the ticket.
The bit about having satellite info is dodgy as well - the transit times of Russian military satellites is known, so if they have that source of info, they have static data a couple of times a day, in only a few areas - they can't photograph everything, so they have to pick and choose. That makes their claim as to their sources suspect in the extreme.
The factual inaccuracies alone make the site suspect - if you understand US movement doctrine and unit training, plus nomenclature, plus Iraqi capabilities, you get the idea that they really have no idea what's going on. The Iraqis have yet to demonstrate that they can take out an allied "tank" at all. Misidentifying IFVs as tanks is an amateur mistake, (something the Iraqis would do), and getting 13 IFV's in a day would be a miraculous occurence, for one simple reason - US doctrine.
The Iraqis are the ones who like to pack things in tightly - at 73 Easting, along their main line of resistance for the 7th Armored and 50th divisions, with IRG Medina, Hammurabi and Tawakalna - just about everywhere you saw Iraqi AFVs, you saw them packed closely. The US does the opposite, dispersing vehicles and relying on depth and overwatch, except in road movement in secure areas. 200 meter separation between IFV's on the move is common, and when hostiles are expect, the dispersal in width and depth gets wider, not narrower, with point vehicles up front.
Based on the way Army and Marine forces move and deploy, the CNN and other US media accounts at An Nasiriyah are more realistic - once a vehicle gets taken out by an RPG, there is wide dispersal, infantry dismounts, etc. - so taking out 13 is impossible for the Iraqis, because we won't have 13 in their range, ever.
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Sikander
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Boulder, Colorado, United Snakes of America
Jan 2000 time: 22:27
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A lot of things to touch upon. Firstly, I tend to doubt reports of surrenders and collaberations by Iraqi command personnel such as the Tariq Azziz story that broke at the beginning of the war. While some of it is perhaps true, it seems obvious that the Coalition is trying to foment as much distrust between various members of the regime as possible, especially when the coalition's first move was an attempt to eliminate the top figures in the regime. This attempt almost certainly includes a bit of disinformation, so caveat emptor.
MtG and Kirnwaffen are both absolutely correct about the limitations of SIGINT. I find it hard to believe that they are getting all that much from it even if they have complete access to everything the Iraqis could provide. The U.S. is as far ahead of the Russians in communications and communications intercept technology as they are ahead of the Iraqis in tank capability. While there may be some signals sent in the clear, there aren't going to be very many, and the amount of information gleaned from these signals is likely to be very limited.
Again I agree with MtG about the information stated in the report. Much of it is plainly implausable, and it does sound like the sort of thing that the Iraqis would put out. This information seems to contradict reports we have had from western reporters on the scene. While they aren't everywhere, it seems like it would be hard for them to miss regimental scale operations, even if these ever managed to do more than assemble before they were rapidly dispatched by coalition air assets.
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MichaeltheGreat
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Apolyton Grand Executioner
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mooning the house that Ruth built.
Oct 1999 time: 21:27
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OK, now for "embedded" journalists and US "propaganda." 
The military does own and control the embedded journalists, in a particular way, but not what anti-US types and conspiracy theorists expect. They don't tell the journalists what to report, but they can, under the embedding agreement, tell them that they can't report anything. A good example over the weekend was Bob Woodruff from CNN, embedded with 1 MEF, talking about how the unit he was with had passed through a graveyard of Iraqi armor. Without saying it, although a CNN analyst picked up on it, he was referring to where IRG Tawakalna and other units were slaughtered trying to withdraw their heavy equipment to Basra - what he said gave anyone who had a clue about the old war an exact location that Marine unit had passed through.
Certain units have embedded reporters, and certain units don't. That tells you something, because units with highly sensitive movement orders won't have them.
There are reports from all over about troop movements north, west and south of Baghdad. Is there a direction we're not talking about? Just how much of 1 MEF and the Brits have gone past an Nasariyah? Gee, we haven't heard from 3 ID for a couple of days, with only a very limited exception.
What we do is control what info we don't give out. The info we do give out is accurate, as far as what we actually give out, but that's done with awareness of the fact that the Saddamites watch the news as well. If they want to think they're kicking our asses in Basra and an Nasiriyah, we don't really mind them thinking that. If they expect us to attack IRG Medina head on with V Corps, we don't really mind them thinking that either. We're not responsible for flawed conclusions other people draw. 
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Urban Ranger
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Apolyton Duke of Off-Topic
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quote: Originally posted by MichaeltheGreat
The Russian site is off base. The short range comm nets used by the allies all rely on encrypted communications, and timely intercept and decryption is very difficult - they'd have to have people with the technical means right there, close in to a fluid fight, or simply scattered all up and down the probable line of advance, AND they'd have to have totally compromised our systems, which rely on both time values and bitstrength. They could record signals and decrypt them - in days or weeks, depending on the computing power applied, so that isn't the ticket. |
Since all communications will eventually make its way back to the Command Centre in Kuwait, there is no need to be right at the front - they just have to be somewhere along the line. Besides, don't forget this information goes back to Washington D.C. and probably a few other places. In this process, the information will be deciphered and enciphered many times. The Russians just have to be somewhere in this net.
quote: Originally posted by MichaeltheGreat
The bit about having satellite info is dodgy as well - the transit times of Russian military satellites is known, so if they have that source of info, they have static data a couple of times a day, in only a few areas - they can't photograph everything, so they have to pick and choose. That makes their claim as to their sources suspect in the extreme. |
I found this assertion suspicious in itself. Clearly, the Russians will also try to hide such information from outsiders, it's a game of hide and seek. It seems reasonable that Russian sats can relay between themselves. It is also reasonable that perhaps they do have spy sats somewhere that haven't been found - or at least not known to the general public.
quote: Originally posted by MichaeltheGreat
The factual inaccuracies alone make the site suspect - if you understand US movement doctrine and unit training, plus nomenclature, plus Iraqi capabilities, you get the idea that they really have no idea what's going on. The Iraqis have yet to demonstrate that they can take out an allied "tank" at all. Misidentifying IFVs as tanks is an amateur mistake, (something the Iraqis would do), and getting 13 IFV's in a day would be a miraculous occurence, for one simple reason - US doctrine.
The Iraqis are the ones who like to pack things in tightly - at 73 Easting, along their main line of resistance for the 7th Armored and 50th divisions, with IRG Medina, Hammurabi and Tawakalna - just about everywhere you saw Iraqi AFVs, you saw them packed closely. The US does the opposite, dispersing vehicles and relying on depth and overwatch, except in road movement in secure areas. 200 meter separation between IFV's on the move is common, and when hostiles are expect, the dispersal in width and depth gets wider, not narrower, with point vehicles up front.
Based on the way Army and Marine forces move and deploy, the CNN and other US media accounts at An Nasiriyah are more realistic - once a vehicle gets taken out by an RPG, there is wide dispersal, infantry dismounts, etc. - so taking out 13 is impossible for the Iraqis, because we won't have 13 in their range, ever. |
You are assuming that the Iraqi haven't adapted to the US modus operandi. This clearly isn't the case from what I have seen on the news. It seems that the coalition forces have been bogged down at various strategically locations such as Basra. I don't find it so unreasonable that tanks were lost when they were used to assist in attacking strongpoints.
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Sikander
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Boulder, Colorado, United Snakes of America
Jan 2000 time: 22:27
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quote: Originally posted by Urban Ranger
Since all communications will eventually make its way back to the Command Centre in Kuwait, there is no need to be right at the front - they just have to be somewhere along the line. Besides, don't forget this information goes back to Washington D.C. and probably a few other places. In this process, the information will be deciphered and enciphered many times. The Russians just have to be somewhere in this net. |
All communication are not passed up the net. What are you thinking? What the hell are the relatively few people at HQ going to do with the thousands of lateral communications generated every hour?
Of course the higher up the ladder you climb, the harder it becomes to intercept communications. Let's assume that you are correct about the Russians though, and let's say that they have some bugs and / or good sources in Wahington or elsewhere. Why would they risk these assets in order to formulate news stories? That one is a non-starter, especially when the Head Honcho in Moscow is a KGB man.
quote: Originally posted by Urban Ranger
I found this assertion suspicious in itself. Clearly, the Russians will also try to hide such information from outsiders, it's a game of hide and seek. It seems reasonable that Russian sats can relay between themselves. It is also reasonable that perhaps they do have spy sats somewhere that haven't been found - or at least not known to the general public. |
Lateral communication between satelites would avail the Russians nothing in the collection process. In order to image the area the satelite has to be above it. The same is true of any satelites that intercept radio communications. As for the Russians having secret satelites, that too is fiction. Everything in orbit is tracked in order to protect satelites from space junk. Anyone who launches a satelite (including private companies) is aware of at least the locations of the objects in orbit, if not their capabilities.
quote: Originally posted by Urban Ranger
You are assuming that the Iraqi haven't adapted to the US modus operandi. This clearly isn't the case from what I have seen on the news. It seems that the coalition forces have been bogged down at various strategically locations such as Basra. I don't find it so unreasonable that tanks were lost when they were used to assist in attacking strongpoints. |
I would like to know how the Iraqis could knock out so many tanks. There are few enough weapons capable of this in their inventory as it is, and many of these weapons aren't that easy to employ against the Americans. Artillery is the most numerous, but it has to get a direct hit using very slow targeting methods against U.S. doctrine that doesn't let anyone in range get too comfy in one place. Take a look at that firefight on CNN. If ever there was a good case for the Iraqis using artillery the Marines sure provided one. But nothing at all was fired aside from direct fire weapons in two hours.
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MichaeltheGreat
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Apolyton Grand Executioner
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mooning the house that Ruth built.
Oct 1999 time: 21:27
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quote: Originally posted by Urban Ranger
Since all communications will eventually make its way back to the Command Centre in Kuwait, there is no need to be right at the front - they just have to be somewhere along the line. Besides, don't forget this information goes back to Washington D.C. and probably a few other places. In this process, the information will be deciphered and enciphered many times. The Russians just have to be somewhere in this net. |
Unit tactical comm nets don't go back to Washington, or even up to Division level. There's a lot of time delay and filtration up the chain of command, and only very summary, critical information important to the chain of command's decision making processes goes up quickly. Nothing that anyone's reported anywhere has touched on this kind of sensitive info.
A lot of detailed reportage won't make it up the chain of command until after the war is over, or at least well along in it, and it'll go into the form of formal after-action reports.
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I found this assertion suspicious in itself. Clearly, the Russians will also try to hide such information from outsiders, it's a game of hide and seek. It seems reasonable that Russian sats can relay between themselves. It is also reasonable that perhaps they do have spy sats somewhere that haven't been found - or at least not known to the general public.
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I don't know the intercommunication ability of current Russian sats, but everybody's orbital hardware is known to everybody. If you get Starry Night Pro or The Sky (Level III or Level 4) you can get updated track info. There's too many amateur and professional astronomers and tracking ground stations around the world, and international concern about collisions. What somebody won't know for a short while (minutes to a few hours) is about track changes right as they're initiated, and where the satellite is actually looking at high magnification within it's total field of view.
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You are assuming that the Iraqi haven't adapted to the US modus operandi. This clearly isn't the case from what I have seen on the news. It seems that the coalition forces have been bogged down at various strategically locations such as Basra. I don't find it so unreasonable that tanks were lost when they were used to assist in attacking strongpoints. |
Well, I do know a little bit about how the Iraqis fight. US doctrine has evolved far more than the Iraqi's has. The nature of the Iraqi political leadership is such that frank self-examination of one's faults and weaknesses is not encouraged. 
Basra isn't strategic, it's an operational detail, in that we need to keep the Iraqis thinking about it, and we need to block any recon force or interdiction force coming out of it, but by and large, it's irrelevant to the outcome of this war.
Same with an Nasariyah - we need to push the *******s away from the road and bridges, but our emphasis there is tying them up, blinding them, and shoving as much hardware up that road as fast as we can while they are in that blinded state.
The problems with losing tanks is that the Iraqis don't have anything that can frontally kill tanks at the ranges we'll use them to engage targets. Strongpoints have to be taken with HE munitions, which are equally effective regardless of range. We don't need to close with any target, and will have dismounted infantry out around any tanks to secure them from possible ATGM or sapper teams that may be concealed. Simple fact is that last war, the Iraqis didn't take out a single M1 or M60 tank, although we took out a few of our own in night fighting FUBARs.
We did lose that LAV-25, but the next one to it was probably more than 100 meters away (I see them train at Camp Pendleton almost every other time I go up to the Los Angeles-Orange County area. Once RPG's or ATGM teams are out, we redeploy our armor, dismount infantry and put up a hell of a lot of suppression fire, to get control of the tactical situation. Losing two wouldn't be out of the question, but more than that becomes improbable in the extreme, because we simply retire the vulnerable vehicles out of range and bring in heavy firepower.
Believe me, if they were there in enough force to even engage 13 armored vehicles at the same time, there'd be nothing but smoking rubble there - we'd flatten the place with every aircraft the coalition owns, then work it with arty, then clean it out with about 10,000 infantry. If we have a large, aggressive enemy force in plain contact like that, we will take the opportunity to wipe it off the planet, because you can't contain a force like that with a security zone. The intensity of fighting would be far higher than what any side has reported.
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Ned
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of Aptos, CA
Oct 1999 time: 21:27
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MtG as a point about the embedded reporters. They are not with every unit. Further, there are large gaps in time between reports. This seems to indicate is that there is a pattern of enbedding intended to deceive the Iraqis. For example, the reporter with the 7th Cav. clearly is telling the world that the 7th Cav. is approaching Karbala. But the reporter also indicates that they were stalled before Karbala for 30 hours. However, the 3rd infantry, which was trailing the 7th Cav., continued to move. Even so, there is no indication that the 3rd infantry contacted the 7th Cav.. What does this mean? It seems indicate that the 3rd infantry may actually be flanking or bypassing Karbala where the the Medina division of the were Republican Guard is dug in.
Onto the Russian news. It seems to me that the Russians are reporting as fact information they been given by the Saddam Government. They maybe also reporting as fact information given to them by al Jazeera. The Saddam Government, of course, is very much interested in creating the illusion of an effective resistance. They perhaps do so by adding a lot of pro-Iraqi fiction to events. Al Jazeera, on the other hand, reports only pro-Iraqi or anti-American news.
It appears that both the US and Russian medias are reporting government releases without questioning the truth of those releases. The US government seems to be trying to deceive the Iraqis by releasing "incomplete" information. The Iraqis, however, appear to be guilty of wholesale fabrication and embellishments.
Al Jazeera is so blatantly biased against United States that is hard to believe anybody can believe anything they say.
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MichaeltheGreat
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Apolyton Grand Executioner
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mooning the house that Ruth built.
Oct 1999 time: 21:27
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quote: Originally posted by LaRusso
okay here is the deal about the russian site
1) my guess is that they are relying on their liman spy ship, whatever it may do. it was in adriatics during kosovo war
2) during kosovo war a similar type of site provided very accurate information regarding the war
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The Russians were a lot closer, and had much better contacts on the ground. US coverage of that conflict was abysmal.
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3) news on this site appear usually 12 -24 hrs earlier than they appear on western media. they reported clash in nassiriya the minute it was reported it was taken with no resistance on skynews, etc
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Early news from any source is always wrong, barring a miracle.
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4) a lad there did a piece a couple of days ago on interception capabilities. perhaps gru can pull it out
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I'd be really interested in what the Russians think they can do with respect to our short range encrypted lateral and tactical comms. It might be possible that a deception campaign is in place using plaintext or poorly encrypted comms. Operational deception is a big part of US doctrine.
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5) i am really surprised that so many american posters actually believe that pentagon would not lie to them. every military lies in every war and americans are no exception
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It's not whether they "lie," it's the style of lie. The US has a peculiar relationship between senior officers, the press and politicians. The Senate has to approve all officer promotions to O6 and above. As the Bob Stumpff situation showed, the Senate Armed Services Committee is a bunch of gutless bastards, so they won't touch the promotion of anyone vaguely controversial with the press, lest it become an unwelcome reelection issue. So the form of lying becomes more subtle, and it's more based on omitting things, or not telling all the truth, rather than making stuff up entirely.
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LaRusso
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appendix of Europe
May 2001 time: 06:27
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again, i can provide the link but the text is in serbian. he is our most experienced war correspondent (and a real bastard, i really really do not like him). he is generally rather pro-american and often makes documentaries about west point, anneheim and the like. he is sponsored by one of the biggest tv stations here to report from iraq.
currently he is based in kuwait and travels often to southern portions of the front. he repeated the claim in two subsequent live reports from kuwait...'abrams were penetrated in front by some AT weapon' and that 'that has caused a great concern among the allies'
meanwhile, i listened to all tv channels here and one of the big things was putin-bush spat over GPS jammers and AT weapons. mind you, serbs are 99% against this war but the officials and the media are very very cautious and, if i may say, at least on the surface neutral, if not pro-american.
as for american news, here's the example. big battle reported at najaf. 150, 300, 500, who knows how many iraqis killed. biggest battle so far. no data on american casualties reported, but some vehicles may be damaged. too hard to count your own ranks, but enough time to count dead iraqis in a sandstorm. go figure...
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LaRusso
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appendix of Europe
May 2001 time: 06:27
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okay, here's the piece someone wrote on interception. me, i do not have a clue, i am just a lawyer, so the only thing i can assure you of is that this is a war of agression and in violation of many principles of international law i expect mtg to say that all of this is BS....anyway as i promised...
How military radio communications are intercepted?
21.03.2003 [17:57]
The US military is using SINCGARS (Single Channel Ground And Airborne Radio System) frequency-hopping radios in the field. These radio sets are categorized as Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) transceivers. The FHSS method is not new: it originated from the Second World War and, simply stated, it employs a narrow band carrier, shifting frequency in a pattern known only to the transmitter and the receiver. The frequency can be changed several hundred times per second.
The FHSS military radios are synchronized daily to use the same frequency modulation algorithm. The synchronization process occurs either through a direct physical connection of the radio sets to each other or to a special device known as the programmer. Some radios can also synchronize frequency modulation algorithms via an encrypted transmission of the frequency modulation algorithm in a non-frequency-hopping mode, although this method is generally considered to be less secure.
The military radios in the US armed forces commonly use encryption and the frequency hopping methods provide an additional layer of security during transmission of the encrypted signal. An example of a frequency-hopping field VHF/FM transceiver used by US Special Forces would be the Caracal RPM 4740 manufactured by Thales Communications of France.
The Caracal covers the 30 to 87.975 MHz frequency range. It also has 10 programmable simplex or half-duplex channels out of its repertoire of 2,320. Hopping in narrowband (6.4 MHz) and wideband (30 to 87.975 MHz) orthogonal modes, Caracal contains high-grade internal digital encryption and has an output of 1 W. Insertion of frequency and security codes is accomplished using the MA 4073B programmer or MA 4083B fill gun. A reset switch on each radio is used to erase codes rapidly. The synchronization function is broadcast, requiring about 6 seconds. Other features include receive-only selective calling, frequency barring and `hailing' by fixed-frequency radios when in the hopping mode.
However, security afforded by frequency-hopping methods is very dependant on the strict adherence to protocols for operating such radios. The US troops and other operators of frequency-hopping radio sets frequently disregard these protocols. An example would be an artillery unit passing digital traffic in the frequency-hopping mode, which would enable an unauthorized listener to determine the frequency-hopping algorithm and eavesdrop on the transmission.
Even when proper protocols for using frequency-hopping radios are being adhered to interception and decryption of these signals is still possible. The frequency-hopping interceptors are special advanced reconnaissance wideband receivers capable of simultaneously tracking a large number of frequency-hopping encrypted transmissions even in high background noise environments. An example of such a reconnaissance device would be the FH-1 frequency-hopping interceptor manufactured by VIDEOTON-MECHLABOR Manufacturing and Development Ltd of Hungary. The FH-1 frequency-hopping interceptor is a modern reconnaissance system based on parallel signal processing technology.
The equipment has 160 independent receiving channels covering a 4 MHz wide IF band with 25 kHz channel spacing, 60 dB channel selection and 60 dB intermodulation suppression. The 4 MHz wide IF band is the IF output of a special high-speed front-end receiver which has a 20 to 1,000 MHz frequency range. The digitized output signals of the channels are multiplexed and fed as 1 Mbits/s data to a fast dedicated signal-processing computer. As the processing time of the 160 channels is 200 µs with the front-end receiver 4 MHz frequency setting time, the processing speed of this interceptor is 4 MHz/200 µs or 20 GHz/s. This high speed makes it possible to process the complete 30 to 80 MHz ground-to-ground VHF band within a 2.5 ms time slot.
The system's processing algorithm filters out noise spikes and stationary transmissions and in this way hopping transmissions can be classified either in the traditional frequency versus amplitude mode or in a waterfall-like frequency versus time display mode. Optional software modules are available for direction-finding the FH transmission and for controlling a remote follower/jammer.
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