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Tingkai
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To find the Northwest Passage
Aug 2001
time: 13:27
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Interesting that the Army Times article that was linked provided a better picture of what happened out there then anything from the mainstream media.
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Tingkai
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To find the Northwest Passage
Aug 2001
time: 13:27
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It is easy to crap all over the western journalists in the Iraq and with the US military, but they are in a difficult situation.
First, they have a natural tendency to believe their own government, just as any other person would. Most Americans would believe their government while rejecting comments from the Iraqi government. Even if they want to be neutral, it is not an easy thing to accomplish.
Journalists are also confined in terms of the information they receive. The US military keeps them on a short leash. They could try going out on their own, but to do so means becoming a potential target for both sides.
Then there is the pressure from the editors back home. The reporters in the field are told which stories should be covered. No matter what story they file, it is up to the editor at home to decide what goes on air or in print.
If a reporter had talked to Iraqi people five days ago and then reported that they were planning to fight for their country, the editors back home would have squashed the story because they believe they know better.
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MichaeltheGreat
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Apolyton Grand Executioner
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mooning the house that Ruth built.
Oct 1999
time: 21:27
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quote:
Originally posted by LaRusso
as for american news, here's the example. big battle reported at najaf. 150, 300, 500, who knows how many iraqis killed. biggest battle so far. no data on american casualties reported, but some vehicles may be damaged. too hard to count your own ranks, but enough time to count dead iraqis in a sandstorm. go figure... |
Other than the news being weenies and reporting the first thing they hear, there's a couple of reasons - one, you may have (likely have) vehicles out of comms, so you don't know if they're killed, damaged, or just out of comms for some other reason. If you don't know a vehicle is lost, you just put it in the unaccounted for column until you figure out what happened.
Enemy casualties are estimates, of course, not hard counts, and the first thing you want to know is who and what you're up against, so everybody gives their assessment and estimate, and those numbers and info get tallied pretty quickly at battalion and higher.
Subsequent reports confirmed destruction of 2 Abrams, without crew casualties, and revised the estimate of Iraqi casualties down to between 150 and 200, which is still an estimate, of course. (and probably high)
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My Wife Hates CIV
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Michigan
Jan 1970
time: 05:27
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"superior Iraqi forces"... that was a laugh.
The Russians, France and Germans... all scum. We'll see in the end who should be kicked out of the UN. France - I expected more from those people. Saying we're allied with France is a slap in the face for Britain.
I really don't understand why the US cant conduct a war just like Russia or China would. If you're going to bomb a city, bomb it - the whole damn thing! There would be no capital to HAVE to take.
Who ever said the US needs to set any examples???
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spiritof1202
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If the Iraqi's really are attriting the coalition in any meaningful way, why aren't there more visible signs of it?
The 7th cav is the tip of the spear, and has 200 M1A1's, so would have been first to contact with defenders. If the Iraqi's really have been putting up meaningful defenses, and sent the coalition packing, why haven't we seen pictures of multiple pieces of coalition armor destroyed.
All we've seen from Iraqi TV are a couple of dubious AFV's (look like BMP's not Coalition AFV's,) a couple of downed Predator drones (and isn't the point that some of these *can* be shot down,) and an Apache that they liked so much, that they showed it twice, claiming it was two different helicopters.
The Iraqi's sure haven't been shy showing what they could... where are the other destroyed units?
Secondly... if the Iraqi's really are able to operate in any meaningful way, and that the Coalition have just avoided any contact, why haven't the Iraqi's trapped the Coalition troops by blowing up the bridges?
This would trap them in the valley, and allow them to pick them off.
All the stories we've read of coalition losses, ignore prior stories, and move innevitably towards Baghdad.
If you are winning a war, then you push the opposition back, and the stories of victory move further away from your capital, not closer and closer.
I can understand that its in the interests of both Russia, and Iraq, for the coalition to be viewed in a losing position, since the only way for them to gain victory, is for the US public to view this as a Vietnam.
The US public are seeing an inevitable trend towards Baghdad, and insignificant numbers of body bags.
Those who claim that the numbers of reported combat deaths are underreported need to provide some actual proof of such. The Pentagon has never been shy of notifying the press of combat casualties.... they've done so in WWII, Korea, Vietnam, Kosovo, Somalia and Gulfwar I, and I see zero physical evidence that they are failing to do so here.
Last edited by spiritof1202 on 06-04-2003 at 02:37
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MichaeltheGreat
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Apolyton Grand Executioner
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mooning the house that Ruth built.
Oct 1999
time: 21:27
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quote:
Originally posted by LaRusso
okay, here's the piece someone wrote on interception. me, i do not have a clue, i am just a lawyer, so the only thing i can assure you of is that this is a war of agression and in violation of many principles of international law  i expect mtg to say that all of this is BS....anyway as i promised...
How military radio communications are intercepted?
21.03.2003 [17:57] |
Actually, it's not all BS, just a little of it, and a little of it is a bit "fuzzy," shall we say... 
quote:
The US military is using SINCGARS (Single Channel Ground And Airborne Radio System) frequency-hopping radios in the field. These radio sets are categorized as Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) transceivers. The FHSS method is not new: it originated from the Second World War and, simply stated, it employs a narrow band carrier, shifting frequency in a pattern known only to the transmitter and the receiver. The frequency can be changed several hundred times per second.
The FHSS military radios are synchronized daily to use the same frequency modulation algorithm. The synchronization process occurs either through a direct physical connection of the radio sets to each other or to a special device known as the programmer. Some radios can also synchronize frequency modulation algorithms via an encrypted transmission of the frequency modulation algorithm in a non-frequency-hopping mode, although this method is generally considered to be less secure.
The military radios in the US armed forces commonly use encryption and the frequency hopping methods provide an additional layer of security during transmission of the encrypted signal. An example of a frequency-hopping field VHF/FM transceiver used by US Special Forces would be the Caracal RPM 4740 manufactured by Thales Communications of France.
The Caracal covers the 30 to 87.975 MHz frequency range. It also has 10 programmable simplex or half-duplex channels out of its repertoire of 2,320. Hopping in narrowband (6.4 MHz) and wideband (30 to 87.975 MHz) orthogonal modes, Caracal contains high-grade internal digital encryption and has an output of 1 W. Insertion of frequency and security codes is accomplished using the MA 4073B programmer or MA 4083B fill gun. A reset switch on each radio is used to erase codes rapidly. The synchronization function is broadcast, requiring about 6 seconds. Other features include receive-only selective calling, frequency barring and `hailing' by fixed-frequency radios when in the hopping mode. |
This part is correct, although I'm not familiar with the model Caracal transeiver listed, so I don't know if that's in current use or with who. The general description of SINGCARS is correct, though.
quote:
However, security afforded by frequency-hopping methods is very dependant on the strict adherence to protocols for operating such radios. |
Correct.
quote:
The US troops and other operators of frequency-hopping radio sets frequently disregard these protocols. An example would be an artillery unit passing digital traffic in the frequency-hopping mode, which would enable an unauthorized listener to determine the frequency-hopping algorithm and eavesdrop on the transmission. |
Here's where there's a few problems.
1): In order to "effectively" disregard the protocols, it has to be done essentially endemically throughout the unit. i.e. for comms to work laterally or in a particular command net (say arty FO to arty battery, scout platoon to battalion HQ, lateral comms within a given battalion, etc.), everyone has to do the same things, either following or disregarding procedures.
When battalions go through their rotations at the National Training Center at Ft. Irwin, or inspections / exercises from brigade or divisional level, that sort of practice stands out, and battalion commanders who tolerate that sort of **** won't be around long in today's army and USMC. It's very competitive. A typical US Army "heavy" division TO&E has 80 Majors (O4) in it. There's less than 20 battalion (O5) command slots available, and a few O5 staff or educational postings outside the division, but the weeding out process from O4 to O5, and then from O5 to O6 (regimental or brigade commands, senior divisional or corps staff, Pentagon staff, etc.) are the two most brutal steps in the career ladder. About one in six O4's make it to O6, so the tolerance for O5's who don't follow procedures and enforce the following of procedures within their battalions is about zero. There's a shitload of equally qualified replacements waiting for that promotion and battalion CO's slot.
(2) Passing digital traffic isn't a good example, since all traffic passed will be encrypted separately from the frequency hopping.
quote:
Even when proper protocols for using frequency-hopping radios are being adhered to interception and decryption of these signals is still possible. The frequency-hopping interceptors are special advanced reconnaissance wideband receivers capable of simultaneously tracking a large number of frequency-hopping encrypted transmissions even in high background noise environments. An example of such a reconnaissance device would be the FH-1 frequency-hopping interceptor manufactured by VIDEOTON-MECHLABOR Manufacturing and Development Ltd of Hungary. The FH-1 frequency-hopping interceptor is a modern reconnaissance system based on parallel signal processing technology.
The equipment has 160 independent receiving channels covering a 4 MHz wide IF band with 25 kHz channel spacing, 60 dB channel selection and 60 dB intermodulation suppression. The 4 MHz wide IF band is the IF output of a special high-speed front-end receiver which has a 20 to 1,000 MHz frequency range. The digitized output signals of the channels are multiplexed and fed as 1 Mbits/s data to a fast dedicated signal-processing computer. As the processing time of the 160 channels is 200 µs with the front-end receiver 4 MHz frequency setting time, the processing speed of this interceptor is 4 MHz/200 µs or 20 GHz/s. This high speed makes it possible to process the complete 30 to 80 MHz ground-to-ground VHF band within a 2.5 ms time slot.
The system's processing algorithm filters out noise spikes and stationary transmissions and in this way hopping transmissions can be classified either in the traditional frequency versus amplitude mode or in a waterfall-like frequency versus time display mode. Optional software modules are available for direction-finding the FH transmission and for controlling a remote follower/jammer. |
This is also correct, but problematic. These aren't portable units - Videoton / Mechlabor are well known in the shortwave and digital comms field. The FH1 is a pig, and it needs a fairly robust power supply. Depending on the signal strength of the comms you're trying to intercept, you also need to be reasonably close to the transceivers you're listening to.
The Iraqis don't have this capability, and it would be pretty politically risky (not to mention the risk of getting popped by US forces) for Russia or anyone else to put specialty vehicles in the field to grab this stuff.
Another point is that even if you get the FH algorithm (actually a multistep process, because the algorithm relies on input seeds to vary it's output), that takes time, because you originally get the hops based on particular input seeds, so you have to get a lot of those, using different seeds, and apply some fairly serious computational power to back into the base algorithm.
Then, after you've done all that, you get to match up the recorded signals, sort them out by transmitting unit, and you've got the encrypted crap to work on. Yes, it can be done, but not in the sort of near-real-time mode suggested by the website's claim that they're getting their info from signals intercepts.
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26-03-2003 14:36
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