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Ned
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of Aptos, CA
Oct 1999 time: 21:35
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It looks like Sadr is going to be as hard to capture as OBL and Saddam. Someone ought to put a bounty on his head and see how long it takes to find him holed up in a rat hole.
I have no idea why anyone thinks they can make a deal with this guy that is worth anything. These Muslims appear to have no honor.
Last edited by Ned on 21-08-2004 at 02:35
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DanS
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Kickball Capital of the World
Jan 1970 time: 00:35
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Actually, I like the fact that the Iraqi Shiites' first instinct is to negotiate. However, sometimes it seems they take this too far and it is used to pin blame on the other guy for not negotating. When that happens, the core issues in dispute aren't even addressed.
Last edited by DanS on 21-08-2004 at 01:32
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lord of the mark
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FUKCOV - Former United Kingdom Colony of Virginia
Dec 2000 time: 00:35
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from AP
"BAGHDAD, Iraq - Radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has emerged from a bloody, two-week showdown with U.S. forces with his militia intact but his heroic image in question.
Now that the fighting is over, some Shiites are criticizing al-Sadr as a dangerous maverick who threatened one of their faith's most-cherished shrines.
Battles between al-Sadr supporters and American troops erupted in Najaf on Aug. 5 but eased substantially Friday as al-Sadr's Mahdi Army militia withdrew its weapons from the holy city's Imam Ali Shrine, which they used as a refuge for launching attacks on U.S. and Iraqi forces.
Al-Sadr — young and street-smart — was never popular in Najaf, where older clerics including Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Husseini al-Sistani, Iraq (news - web sites)'s most influential Shiite cleric, hold sway.
Now, after devastating violence that killed scores of civilians and chipped a wall surrounding the beloved, gold-domed shrine, the firebrand cleric is liked even less.
"Najaf ... now serves as an example of war and destruction. This is all because of Muqtada and his followers," said 37-year-old Najaf resident Mohammed Saad. "They have brought us destruction. We hope they'll leave the city as soon as possible."
During the standoff, Iraq's interim government threatened to raid the shrine compound and destroy al-Sadr's militia as an example to other insurgents throughout the country. But such a raid would have been risky; any serious damage would infuriate the world's 120 million Shiite Muslims and could turn even moderate, middle-class Shiites who shun the radical cleric against the government.
But al-Sadr is a legend among impoverished Shiites who see him as a champion of the underdog. His star shines brightest in the slums of Baghdad's Sadr City — named for his late father — and in poor areas of the Shiite south.
His survival after a second bout with U.S. forces — he led a two-month uprising in the spring — could only increase his following.
"Without any doubt, it's making him a hero," Juan Cole, a University of Michigan expert on Iraqi Shiites. "He's become a symbol of opposition to the continuing American occupation of Iraq."
But even in Sadr City, support for al-Sadr may be slipping.
Backed by helicopter gunships, U.S. forces have battled Mahdi Army fighters in the district for nearly two weeks in fighting that has left dozens dead and cut off most electricity.
"His followers are hiding among our houses and causing a lot of damage by their random shooting," said Jassim Mohammed, a 27-year-old college student. "Nobody respects him now."
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Ramo
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Austin, Texas, USA
Oct 1999 time: 23:35
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lotm, I don't know what you're getting at WRT Cole. The people of Najaf never liked Sadr much, his base has always been in Baghdad. Sadr's occupation of the Imam Ali Shrine of course is going to piss off the people of Najaf (besides the threat of US/gov't response and Sadr's thugs in the streets, there's the very substantial loss of income from the end of pilgrims to the shrine). No, Sadr's gain is in the rest of Iraq. Not only has he outmaneuvered gov't forces with regards to the Shrine (turning over the Shrine to Sistani doesn't mean leaving the Shrine - and indeed Sistani was too smart to play into Sadr's hands by sheltering his men - so we're back to the status quo before the supposed handover), we have bombed the very sacred cemetery next to the Shrine (as well as parts of Najaf), playing straight into Sadr's hands. The end result is that the Shia hate the occupation gov't that much more, and we've gained absolutely nothing (expect possibly the departure of Sadr from the Shrine, which may or may not be a good thing). Sadr knows how to play the game very well.
Last edited by Ramo on 22-08-2004 at 01:20
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Ramo
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Austin, Texas, USA
Oct 1999 time: 23:35
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quote: Dawa cant run an elected govt without significant support from either fundie Sunnis, or secularist Shia, either of which makes the govt unreliable to Teheran. And worse the very existence of a democratic Iraq is a threat to the Expediency council, though NOT to Khatami. Which is the point I think. A Dawa govt, assuming its free of the Americans, is still an ally of the Khatami reformers against the Expediency Council - while Sadr is not. |
Good point.
But let's suppose that the Shia Islamist parties have to be in a coalition with some some other parties. The foreign ministry (being one of the biggest prizes, it usually goes to the strongest members of the coalition) is going to either Da'wa or SCIRI. Neither parties (especially SCIRI) have demonstrated any love for democracy. I very much doubt that these people would help the Reformists in any significant way (even if they weren't politically marginalized); really the main threat to Tehran would be revolutionary forces, and I find it even more unlikely that Da'wa or SCIRI would have a hand in fostering that sort of thing. And that's assuming that the gov't is unable to legislate clerical rule.
Now, let's suppose Sadr is able to succeed in de-stabilizing the country. The end result would be a very long civil war, without a doubt. If the Sadrists are able to beat the other Shia factions, the Sunni Arabs and Kurds, Iran gets a nationalistic regime with posssibly a mentally unstable leader on its borders. And it gets a mighty pissed off US, which is less willing to forgive Iran's crushing of Reformists.
quote:
I dont know whether muqtys financial support from Teheran makes up 5% of his budget or 50% or 95%. I doubt we'll know for some time. |
As I said, I haven't seen any evidence for anything but token support. Do you?
I think that the media is too quick to blame single men and external forces over home-grown popular movements. That's why we have "Saddam's loyalists" and "foreign fighters" instead of "Arab Nationalists," (especially prevalent in the beginning of the occupation) or "Iranians" and "Sadr" instead of the "Sadrists."
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In this we are in agreement. But to GET to economic development the security situation must be addressed first. The immediate question is whether letting Sadr getting away is less damaging than arresting him, or at least driving him by force from the Shrine. |
Yes, and I have said that letting him get away is probably less dangerous. It's not good by any means, but at least it won't start a second guerilla war of the order of the war against the Arab Nationalists.
If we can force him to leave without an assault, that's obviously the best solution, but I don't thing that's a possibility.
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I dont think we know for sure what would think, |
I haven't heard of anyone assert that Sadr was passing himself off as the Mahdi. Have you?
quote: or what actions this would motivate |
The Sadrists get a martyr and a sign that all hell's breaking loose. Again, these are folks that believe the the end of the world is at hand. Do you honestly believe that this would quiet the rebellion?
quote: if killing a mahdi army member leads to their cousins et al joining up, than the deaths of thousands in April and May should have led to lost of new Sadrist recruits. Doesnt appear consistent with Sadrs weaker military performance now. |
I don't know what you mean. From what I can tell, Sadr has a seemingly endless stream of recruits. I don't think his military forces are particularly lacking for men; they're not as effective as the other guerilla insurgency, but that's to be expected since it's yet to reach full scale rebellion and they're simply not as experienced.
quote: I dont know, but im not an infantry officer. I think Iraqi light infantry, probably at night, using lots of night vision equipment. Possibly a sequence of raids rather than one big attack. But certainly not by leveling the place. |
I think that the Sadrists are too smart not to use barricades and whatnot to force the use of artillery, and killing them inside the Shrine without damaging it very much isn't exactly a great PR opportunity either.
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