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Ned
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of Aptos, CA
Oct 1999
time: 21:32
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First?
Read this:
"The second reason for our near universal misunderstanding of the twin nuclear holocausts stems from an equally human, but more socially harmful motivation. We have been collectively blocked from a critical understanding of the A-bombings because of a lack of public criticism in the face of a powerful and purposeful historical misrepresentation that began with President Harry Truman in the years following 1945 and is only ending now, albeit very slowly.
The ongoing declassification of U.S. government documents and officials' diaries have fairly recently revealed evidence that the history lessons that we were taught after the end of the Pacific War were false. To wit:
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and every other high military official, as well as all Truman's key advisers, save one, were against the use of the A-bombs against the Japanese. Many were particularly concerned about the impact to America's moral stature for using bombs that they considered barbaric, especially upon a nation that they knew was beaten. After all, the U.S. military had already gained complete domination of Japanese airspace and waterways. They were simply waiting for the terms of surrender to be formulated between the U.S. and Japanese governments.
Truman repeatedly delayed acceptance of the Japanese government's conditional surrender attempts until after both types of A-bomb had been used.
Truman's physical target for the A-bombs were the Japanese, but the political target was his ally, but ideological opposite, Joseph Stalin.
Hiroshima's city center was targeted because its high population and building density would maximally display to the Soviets the killing and destructive power of America's new weapon.
The deciding factors for the Japanese government's capitulation were the entry of the Soviet Union into the Pacific War coupled with America's post-bombing acceptance of conditional surrender.
The story of a million American lives (and many more Japanese lives) saved by the A-bombs was a complete fabrication designed to eliminate public criticism of the president's decision.
Thus, the twin destructive forces of "Fat Man" and "Little Boy" were of political, but not military, utility. In other words, the nuclear holocausts were used for the purpose of "atomic diplomacy" with the Soviets rather than to bring a swift end to the war."
http://www.commondreams.org/views02/0806-05.htm
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Ned
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of Aptos, CA
Oct 1999
time: 21:32
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Here is advice by the Joint Chiefs to accept Japan's surrender conditioned on retention of the Emperor. This advice was made on July 6, prior to the bombs.
"The ideas of foreign occupation of the Japanese homeland, foreign custody of the person of the Emperor, and the loss of prestige entailed by the acceptance of `unconditional surrender' are most revolting to the Japanese. To avoid these conditions, IF POSSIBLE, and, IN ANY EVENT, to insure the survival of the institution of the Emperor, the Japanese might well be willing to withdraw from all the territory they have seized on the Asiatic continent and in the southern Pacific, and even to agree to the independence of Korea and to the practical disarmament of their military forces. A conditional surrender by the Japanese government along the lines stated above might be offered by them at any time from now until the time of the complete destruction of all Japanese power of resistance." [Emphasis added. 8 July 1945, "Estimate of the Enemy Situation (as of 6 July 1945). Reported by the Combined Intelligence Committee." C.C.S. 643/3]"
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Ned
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of Aptos, CA
Oct 1999
time: 21:32
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Another rendition that illustrates that the sequence was this
1) offer to surrender but keep the Emperor;
2) Potsdam declaration that was silent on the status of Emperor;
3) two atom bombs dropped;
4) Japans acceptance of Potsdam, but subject to keeping the Emperor;
5) Truman's acceptance, but subject to Allies during occupation;
6) Japan acceptions of Truman's condition.
"Clearly the time to surrender had come. Incredibly, many in the military wanted to fight on, preferring death to capitulation. The cabinet, made up of elder statesmen, tried to send out peace feelers through neutral Sweden, Soviet Union, and Switzerland as early as June 1945. The only condition was the continued existence of the of Imperial Throne. Unwilling or unclear of the Japanese offer, the Allies refused and issued the Potsdam Declaration on July 26th.
The Emperor was sympathetic to the peacemakers. The Army members of the cabinet were not willing to give up, and Prime Minister Suzuki had to move carefully. If there was a perceived weakness in the cabinet, even the Emperor might be assassinated. The idea that the Emperor would support surrender was inconceivable to many in both the Army and the Navy. Suzuki cautiously sought out others on the cabinet, finding all but two generals in support. On July 28, the government issued a carefully worded response to the Potsdam Declaration, which unfortunately used a word with a double meaning. English-language broadcasts used the word "ignore" and the Western press picked up that sentiment. Truman announced he had rejected the peace offer and dropped the atomic bombs.
The Emperor ordered a surrender document be sent accepting the Potsdam declaration. Through Swiss channels, it was sent to the United States, but it added that the Emperor must be left on the Imperial Throne. The Allies replied that the Emperor would be subject to the Allied Occupation Commander."
http://www.worldwar2database.com/ht...ansurrender.htm
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Q Cubed
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t3h y3ll0w p3ril
Apr 1999
time: 23:32
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quote:
Q-Cubed, placing the war criminals on trial and executing them (I am sure that you would prefer that penalty in the case of the Japanese) is quite a bit different that mass slaughter of hundreds of thousands of innocent women and children in revenge. |
actually, no, i wouldn't. even though they did execute plenty of koreans, my treatment of them would be no different from my treatment of kim jong-il--or saddam. let them spend time in the 3x3x3 box. let them walk barefoot around korea begging forgiveness. korea's a lot more rocky than iraq, too.
also, i've mellowed out a bit. i don't think so much that they deserved it, but to ask me to take pity on them, to apologize for something which happened in the midst of a brutal war to a population that was complicit in the brutalization of other peoples...
to humor their seeming belief that they were the only ones who suffered an atrocity during this war?
forget it.
the japanese are not taught about their brutal war history. they are taught that they suffered under the atomic bomb.
it is true, they suffered. but they brought suffering to countless others, and for them to pretend otherwise, for them to imagine that they can get by without confronting that past, asking for apologies and political correctness from america...
it's bullshit, and it's hypocritical.
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Boris Godunov
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Portland, OR
Aug 2001
time: 00:32
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quote:
Originally posted by Ned
The following,
"We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction."
from the Potsdam declaration called for the unconditional surrender of the armed forces, a change from the Cairo declaration that called for an unconditional surrender of Japan.
The Japanese acceptance of Potsdam did not require it to remove the emperor. Even the "reply" by Truman to the condition was interpreted by the Japanase an not requiring removal of the Emperor. Otherwise, the war would have continued.
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/hando/hando.htm |
Ned, can't you see how this is proving OUR point, not yours? Nowhere in Potsdam did the Allies say, one way or another, what the fate of the Emperor would be. Japan wanted a guarantee that he'd be kept safe and free from any charges of war crimes. The Allies NEVER granted that request, saying only "He's going to be subject to the authority of the Supreme Commander." After the bombs, the Japanese accepted Potsdam unconditionally, and did NOT get the guarantee they wanted. In order for a surrender to be conditional, the surrendee has to get the condition it wanted in the peace terms. Japan got no such thing--as it's condition was a promise of the Emperor's continued sovereignity.
The Japanese condition was thus:
"The Japanese Government are ready to accept the terms enumerated in the joint declaration which was issued at Potsdam on July 26th, 1945, by the heads of the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and China, and later subscribed by the Soviet Government, [3] with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler."
Now, show me where in the peace terms or in any subsequent telegrams where such an "understanding" was agreed to. In fact, by saying that the Supreme Allied commander would have authority over the Emperor, the Allies were explicitely rejecting this condition. Byrnes reply:
"From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms...
The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people."
That's not remotely accepting Japan's condition--it's an outright rejection of it. When it is said that 1) the Emperor will be under someone else's command, and that person can decide the fate of the Emperor as he sees fit, and 2) the Japanese people will democratically get to choose their form of government, I'm curious as to how anyone (ok, except maybe a lawyer) could construe this as somehow accepting the Japanese condition that there be a guarantee of Hirohito's retained sovereignity.
Last edited by Boris Godunov on 19-12-2003 at 18:05
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Ned
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of Aptos, CA
Oct 1999
time: 21:32
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Spencer, in reading the historical material yesterday in conducting this debate I have come the conclusion that Truman only reluctantly agreed to the use of the bomb because he all along was concerned about deliberately killing women and children. His notes taken during the Potsdam conference confirm this. He even told his subordinates to bomb only a military base so as to avoid killing women and children. Originally I thought that this was just a self-serving statement as a cover for history. Now I believe that he believed that they were going to bomb a military base and not a city. His subordinates apparently were not telling him the full truth about the potential targets.
Apparently Truman was at the center of a struggle between the War Department and the State Department. State, led by Secretary James F. Byrnes, wanted an unconditional surrender of Japan so as to arrest, try and execute Hirohito as a war criminal. The War Department wanted Hirohito and the government Japan intact for two reasons:
-- they did not have enough troops to govern Japan alone; and
-- they feared a guerrilla war of resistance if they were to overthrow Hirohito.
Truman took office in mid-April with the death of Roosevelt. He was completely unfamiliar with war policy and originally took advice primarily from Secretary Byrnes. As can he seen from the quote from the combined Chiefs of Staff, the military wanted to accept Japan's conditional surrender offer because that was highly consistent with their need to maintain the Emperor and rule Japan through the government of Japan. We can see from events that Truman followed the advice of Secretary Byrnes up to and through the dropping of the bombs. When, however, Japan sent its note to the United States after the second bomb offering to accept the Potsdam declaration on the condition that it maintain Emperor, Secretary Byrnes was the only one continuing to insist on an unconditional surrender. This time Truman said that he would accept the conditional surrender because he was sickened by killing so many kids -- exactly the reservation be made in his diary during the Potsdam conference in July.
The reply to the Japanese government was worded in a way to allow both parties to claim they had achieved their objective. The Japanese believe that they had maintained their Emperor and therefore their surrender condition was accepted. The American side consistently pointed to the fact that the surrender of the Japanese Armed Forces was unconditional to maintain that their demand for unconditional surrender was accepted. But in truth, the War Department's position was finally accepted by Truman. This ended the war in a way that made Douglas MacArthur a hero to the Japanese rather than a hostile occupying general that may have and probably would have led to a resistance that would make both Iraq and Vietnam look mild by comparison.
I am reminded by Secretary Byrnes zeal to arrest, try and execute Hirohito even at the risk of inciting a guerrilla of resistance with the debate between the Lincoln faction and the Radical faction at the close of the US Civil War. That debate ended with the assassination of Lincoln. The Radicals ruled the South with oppression of the white majority that set off a guerrilla resistance in the form of the Ku Klux Klan that has had a lasting effect even to this day.
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19-12-2003 09:03
I love it
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