 |
| |
|
|
Ned
|
 |
of Aptos, CA
Oct 1999
time: 21:27
|
|
quote:
Originally posted by Zkribbler
That was inaccurate of me. Sorry.
There were of course Communists in the South that opposed the Diem regime. And it was those guys who formed the Viet Cong.
There was also a huge portion of the population in the South that was Buddist, was neutralists and pacifist. I don't know whether you're old enough to remember the horrific incidents of Buddists monks burning themselves to death in protest of the Viet Cong-Diem regime conflict.
Diem took the position that those who were not for him were against him, and his regime began oppressing the Buddists, which pushed them into the Viet Cong camp. |
Yeah, I do remember the Buddists burning themselves. Diem was then overthrown, probably justifiably. But that was the beginning of the end of legitimate goverment in SV.
1954 was the crucial year where the critical mistakes were made. The French were surrounded at Dienbienphu. They begged for American air support and help. Our carriers and marines were there and could have helped. Nixon was in favor. Churchill and General Ridgeway were against. So we stayed out. The Frendh lost and then left. Had we instead helped our "ally" the French, well, history might be quite different.
I wonder what Churchill said to Eisenhower? I wonder what Ridgeway said. Could it be that they feared Chinese intervention?
The problem of course, was that we had been heavily against colonnialism. Helping the French would have been against this basic policy. I think this is why, in the end, we did not help the French.
|
|
| |
|
|
|
gsmoove23
|
|
quote:
Originally posted by Joseph
At the time, only we had the bomb, and we should have used it.
And before you say the Soviet had the bomb think. The Russian had to used their in their test and was building the next one, but had not finnish it yet. |
Sorry, the first Soviet test was July 1949, announced in September. Considering a few years before the US went from exploding its first in May of 45 to dropping the bomb in Japan in July I think it would have been quite reasonable to think it was a possibility in 1950. The idea that people on this thread would have been willing to use nuclear weapons willy nilly just because we were the sole nuclear powers is pretty disgusting. Especially, considering this wasn't clearly a case of the security of our nation being compromised but had to do with fiddling in the affairs of a nation far away.
|
|
| |
|
|
|
gsmoove23
|
|
quote:
Originally posted by Joseph
I Think the North started the war, by invading the South and then and only then did the US sent Troops, Planes, and Ships.
Wrong again, Johnson escalated the war in 65. |
I think you know what I meant by Truman starting the war, as in authorizing a significant US presence in the conflict.
Kennedy also escalated the war during his presidency, but thank you for helping to illustrate my point about Democratic presidents.
|
|
| |
|
|
|
Joseph
|
 |
Ca. USA
Feb 2000
time: 21:27
|
|
quote:
Originally posted by gsmoove23
Sorry, the first Soviet test was July 1949, announced in September. Considering a few years before the US went from exploding its first in May of 45 to dropping the bomb in Japan in July I think it would have been quite reasonable to think it was a possibility in 1950. The idea that people on this thread would have been willing to use nuclear weapons willy nilly just because we were the sole nuclear powers is pretty disgusting. Especially, considering this wasn't clearly a case of the security of our nation being compromised but had to do with fiddling in the affairs of a nation far away. |
If I was the President in 1950/1 and saw a Million Chinese Soldiers on the border, you bet I would have used it. One Million soldiers gone in an instance.
Another thing, 20 years from now, I may no longer be here, but a lot of you young guys will be. I believed very strongly that one day we will have to face the Chinese. They may not be strong enough in my life time, but will be very strong in your life time, and they will be trouble one day.
China is concern about us for sure, but also about India. China and India has this little thing about borders. They both claim the same territory, and one day that is going to a major problem.
China today is about 1,300,000 million and India is about 850,000 million and is expected to pass China about 2010 to 2015.
India is now as China building up it's military with modern weapons.
|
|
| |
|
|
|
Ned
|
|
of Aptos, CA
Oct 1999
time: 21:27
|
|
I don't think Truman was worried about Soviet nukes so much as he was worried about 1) a full scale conventional war with China that could escalate into a war in 2) Europe with the Russians. In either case, the US has to mobilize. As someone here said earlier, Truman believed if he did that, reinstitute conscription, he would not be re-elected.
As it turned out, his weak, half-war approach to Korea was what cost him his popularity and any chance of re-election. The same thing happened to Johnson 16 years later.
In the words of Joe Lieberman last night, no Democrat is going to get elected president in 2004 who is weak on defense. The lessons of history for US politician is that American will sacrafice a lot for victory, but not for defeat.
Hopefully, the Democrat party has learned something from Iraq. It failed to learn anything from Korea, Vietnam, and Gulf War I.
|
|
| |
|
|
|
gsmoove23
|
|
Ned, the war in Korea cost him his popularity, not the fact that it was weak but the fact that people just didn't like the war. Eisenhower won his election with the promise he would end it. The fact that you call Truman's war approach weak just shows that you don't understand what our aims were or should have been. It wasn't to unify Korea but to protect South Korea from a war of aggression.
|
|
| |
|
|
|
Ned
|
|
of Aptos, CA
Oct 1999
time: 21:27
|
|
quote:
Originally posted by gsmoove23
Ned, the war in Korea cost him his popularity, not the fact that it was weak but the fact that people just didn't like the war. Eisenhower won his election with the promise he would end it. The fact that you call Truman's war approach weak just shows that you don't understand what our aims were or should have been. It wasn't to unify Korea but to protect South Korea from a war of aggression. |
When MacArthur made his fairwell address in Congress, Truman's fate and legacy were sealed. His legacy was that of an appeaser. His fate was to be the most unpopular president in our nation's history. Like Johnson who quit the race in '68, he would not run again in 1952 even though everyone expected him to in 1950.
In war there is no substitute for victory.
April 19, 1951
Mr. President, Mr. Speaker and distinguished members of the Congress:
I stand on this rostrum with a sense of deep humility and great pride - humility in the wake of those great architects of our history who have stood here before me, pride in the reflection that this home of legislative debate represents human liberty in the purest form yet devised.
Here are centered the hopes and aspirations and faith of the entire human race.
I do not stand here as advocate for any partisan cause, for the issues are fundamental and reach quite beyond the realm of partisan considerations. They must be resolved on the highest plane of national interest if our course is to prove sound and our future protected.
I trust, therefore, that you will do me the justice of receiving that which I have to say as solely expressing the considered viewpoint of a fellow American.
I address you with neither rancor nor bitterness in the fading twilight of life, with but one purpose in mind: to serve my country.
The issues are global, and so interlocked that to consider the problems of one sector oblivious to those of another is to court disaster for the whole. While Asia is commonly referred to as the gateway to Europe, it is no less true that Europe is the gateway to Asia, and the broad influence of the one cannot fail to have its impact upon the other.
There are those who claim our strength is inadequate to protect on both fronts, that we cannot divide our effort. I can think of no greater expression of defeatism.
If a potential enemy can divide his strength on two fronts, it is for us to counter his efforts. The Communist threat is a global one. Its successful advance in one sector threatens the destruction of every other sector. You cannot appease or otherwise surrender to communism in Asia without simultaneously undermining our efforts to halt its advance in Europe.
Beyond pointing out these general truisms, I shall confine my discussion to the general areas of Asia...
While I was not consulted prior to the President's decision to intervene in support of the Republic of Korea, that decision, from a military standpoint, proved a sound one. As I say, it proved a sound one, as we hurled back the invader and decimated his forces. Our victory was complete, and our objectives within reach, when Red China intervened with numerically superior ground forces.
This created a new war and an entirely new situation, a situation not contemplated when our forces were committed against the North Korean invaders; a situation which called for new decisions in the diplomatic sphere to permit the realistic adjustment of military strategy. Such decisions have not been forthcoming.
While no man in his right mind would advocate sending our ground forces into continental China, and such was never given a thought, the new situation did urgently demand a drastic revision of strategic planning if our political aim was to defeat this new enemy as we had defeated the old.
Apart from the military need, as I saw it, to neutralize the sanctuary protection given the enemy north of the Yalu, I felt that military necessity in the conduct of the war made necessary --
(1) The intensification of our economic blockade against China.
(2) The imposition of a naval blockade against the China coast.
(3) Removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of China's coastal area and of Manchuria.
(4) Removal of restrictions on the forces of the republic of China on Formosa, with logistical support to contribute to their effective operations against the Chinese mainland.
For entertaining these views, all professionally designed to support our forces committed to Korea and to bring hostilities to an end with the least possible delay and at a saving of countless American and Allied lives, I have been severely criticized in lay circles, principally abroad, despite my understanding that from a military standpoint the above views have been fully shared in the past by practically every military leader concerned with the Korean campaign, including our own Joint Chiefs of Staff.
I called for reinforcements, but was informed that reinforcements were not available. I made clear that if not permitted to destroy the enemy built-up bases north of the Yalu, if not permitted to utilize the friendly Chinese force of some six hundred thousand men on Formosa, if not permitted to blockade the China coast to prevent the Chinese Reds from getting succor from without, and if there were to be no hope of major reinforcements, the position of the command from the military standpoint forbade victory.
We could hold in Korea by constant maneuver and at an approximate area where our supply-line advantages were in balance with the supply-line disadvantages of the enemy, but we could hope at best for only an indecisive campaign with its terrible and constant attrition upon our forces if the enemy utilized his full military potential.
I have constantly called for the new political decisions essential to a solution.
Efforts have been made to distort my position. It has been said in effect that I was a warmonger. Nothing could be further from the truth.
I know war as few other men now living know it, and nothing to me is more revolting. I have long advocated its complete abolition, as its very destructiveness on both friend and foe has rendered it useless as a means of settling international disputes.
Indeed, on the second day of September, 1945, just following the surrender of the Japanese nation on the battleship Missouri, I formally cautioned as follows:
"Men since the beginning of time have sought peace. Various methods through the ages have been attempted to devise an international process to prevent or settle disputes between nations. From the very start workable methods were found in so far as individual citizens were concerned, but the mechanics of an instrumentality of larger international scope have never been successful.
"Military alliances, balances of power, leagues of nations, all in turn failed, leaving the only path to be by way of the crucible of war. The utter destructiveness of war now blocks out this alternative. We have had our last chance. If we will not devise some greater and more equitable system, our Armageddon will be at our door. The problem basically is theological and involves a spiritual recrudescence, an improvement of human character that will synchronize with our almost matchless advances in science, art, literature, and all material and cultural developments of the past two thousand years. It must be of the spirit if we are to save the flesh."
But once war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end. War's very object is victory, not prolonged indecision.
In war there is no substitute for victory.
There are some who for varying reasons would appease Red China. They are blind to history's clear lesson, for history teaches with unmistakable emphasis that appeasement but begets new and bloodier war. It points to no single instance where this end has justified that means, where appeasement had led to more than a sham peace.
Like blackmail, it lays the basis for new and successively greater demands until, as in blackmail, violence becomes the only alternative. Why, my soldiers asked of me, surrender military advantages to an enemy in the field? I could not answer.
Some may say to avoid spread of the conflict into an all-out war with China. Others, to avoid Soviet intervention. Neither explanation seems valid, for China is already engaging with the maximum power it can commit, and the Soviet will not necessarily mesh its actions with our moves. Like a cobra, any new enemy will more likely strike whenever it feels that the relativity in military or other potential is in its favor on a worldwide basis.
The tragedy of Korea is further heightened by the fact that its military action is confined to its territorial limits. It condemns that nation, which it is our purpose to save, to suffer the devastating impact of full naval and air bombardment while the enemy's sanctuaries are fully protected from such attack and devastation.
Of the nations of the world, Korea alone, up to now, is the sole one which has risked its all against communism. The magnificence of the courage and fortitude of the Korean people defies description. They have chosen to risk death rather than slavery. Their last words to me were: "Don't scuttle the Pacific."
I have just left your fighting sons in Korea. They have met all tests there, and I can report to you without reservation that they are splendid in every way.
It was my constant effort to preserve them and end this savage conflict honorably and with the least loss of time and a minimum sacrifice of life. Its growing bloodshed has caused me the deepest anguish and anxiety. Those gallant men will remain often in my thoughts and in my prayers always.
I am closing my fifty-two years of military service. When I joined the army, even before the turn of the century, it was the fulfillment of all my boyish hopes and dreams.
The world has turned over many times since I took the oath on the plain at West Point, and the hopes and dreams have long since vanished, but I still remember the refrain of one of the most popular barracks ballads of that day which proclaimed most proudly that old soldiers never die; they just fade away.
And like the old soldier of that ballad, I now close my military career and just fade away, an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty. Good-by.
|
|
| |
|
|
|
gsmoove23
|
|
I wonder what McArthur felt the aim of the war was? Was it to protect S. Korea or unify Korea? My distinct impression was it was the former. So why after the N. Korean army is largely destroyed was it necessary to pursue them all the way up to the Yalu and beyond? The entrance of China into the war was due to this overstepping of bounds. MacArthur whines about how he didn't want to commit ground forces but the natural conclusions of his proposals would be just that as the chinese would escalate as well.
Ned, calling Truman an appeaser is just ridiculous since he went into S Korea in the first place and used the bomb in Japan. I know you like the word but its completely inapropriate in this case.
|
|
| |
|
|
|
gsmoove23
|
|
You didn't SHOW me anything but your opinion.
|
|
| |
|
|
|
gsmoove23
|
|
Q, I think the idea that Mao would have joined the war regardless as unlikely, although I won't dispute that he may have wanted to join it. He certainly joined the war with monetary support and the like from the beginning but I think events showed that he was willing to stay out of it if the US didn't approach to near the border. The fact that he had a large army on the border doesn't say much accept that he could foresee that he might need to use them. Certainly not that he was going to use them either way.
|
|
| |
|
|
|
Q Cubed
|
 |
t3h y3ll0w p3ril
Apr 1999
time: 23:27
|
|
other sources:
cnn special
quote:
"The first aim of the Volunteers going into Korea was to defend our homes and country, the Motherland. We couldn't allow others to cross the Yalu River and invade us. But also we wanted to help the Korean people."
Narration: As in China's long civil war, Mao believed that greater motivation could defeat an enemy with superior arms.
Interview: Chan Boliang, Chinese People's Volunteers
"Because our war was a just war the enemy could be defeated. Our bravery and our strategy developed during the years of the liberation struggle would help defeat the enemy." |
note: the UN never crossed the Yalu.
quote:
Both Chen and Zhang agree that, by the time of the North Korean attack on 25 June 1950, the Chinese leadership had long-since concluded that the United States was China's primary enemy and that a military conflict was likely...They note that the prevailing Western interpretation shifted in the 1960s from a belief that China's entry was part of a well- orchestrated Soviet aggression to a view that China's actions were simply a response to a perceived threat posed by US-led forces advancing toward the Chinese border, an interpretation held by most Chinese scholars as well. Chen challenges this view, arguing that because "Beijing's decision to enter the war was based on the belief that the outcome of the Korean crisis was closely related to the new China's vital domestic and international interests . . . there was little possibility that China's entrance into the war could have been averted." Chen also points out that just as the Chinese word for "crisis" (weiji) contains the two characters meaning "danger" and "opportunity," the American intervention in Korea was, from the beginning, both a dangerous threat, confirming Mao's fundamental view of the aggressive nature of US policy in Asia, and an opportunity to confront the United States. The confrontation could reduce the threat to China, enhance China's revolutionary momentum, and strengthen Chinese communist authority domestically and in the region.
In July 1950, soon after the first US reinforcements were deployed to Korea, the Chinese established a substantial military force and logistical stockpiles in the Northeast and began political mobilization in preparation for possible intervention. On 4 August as the North Korean army began its offensive against the Pusan Perimeter, Mao raised the possibility of sending an army of "volunteers" to Korea. Throughout the month of August and into September, the Chinese Politburo debated intervention. According to Chen, Mao was the leading proponent for intervention, but had difficulty mobilizing support so long as North Korea was on the offensive. When the North Korean attack stalled and General MacArthur began a United Nations Command (UNC) counteroffensive with the 15 September Inch'on landing, Mao won the argument. On 2 October, two days after the first Republic of Korea forces crossed the 38th parallel, Mao sent a long telegram to Stalin, informing the Russian leader that China had decided to send an army of "volunteers" into Korea. Five days later, US forces also moved north across the 38th parallel. Although the Chinese leadership momentarily hesitated on 12 October when Stalin appeared to renege on promises to provide support, they made the final decision on 18 October, and the next day the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) under the command of General Peng Dehuai began to cross the Yalu River into Korea. |
source taken from mt holyoke
|
|
| |
|
|
|
gsmoove23
|
|
In your quote Mao decides to send chinese "volunteers" into Korea after the NK army is thoroughly trounced, after Inchon. The decision isn't an offensive one. Its made to shore up the NK army which after the UN forces pass the 38th is primarily a guerilla army. Before this he didn't have support in his own government to do so, certainly he wouldn't have if the NK had remained cohesive and he didn't have Soviet support. One aim Mao had for sure was that N Korea survived the war.
Besides, this scholar's view is still contested by a large number of historians, hardly reason for any certainty on the subject.
|
|
| |
|
|
|
gsmoove23
|
|
The primary stupidity in the war was the "be home by Christmas" mentality, follow the enemy right up to the Yalu instead of falling back to defensive positions between Pyongyang and Wonsan for the winter. The NK army had already been largely defeated and there was no reason to push straight to the border. What more was there to accomplish?
|
|
| |
|
|
|
gsmoove23
|
|
This is bs, first off the soviets made it quite clear that China would largely be on its own if they entered into Korea which was one of the reasons China hesitated in entering. Now I'm sure the Soviets were quite happy to allow the chinese and americans to go at it as long as the soviets sat on the sidelines and I'm sure there are plenty of Kremlin documents that say this but Stalin was hardly in the position to dictate policy to Mao and Mao was hardly disposed to taking orders. BS plain and simple.
As for Quemoy, thanks for bringing it up I didn't know much about it, interesting reading. You bring it up saying Eisenhower's non-appeasement stance made the difference but ignore how much of a different scenario it was. The first major engagement UN forces had with Chinese was well into the north of N Korean territory, looking for all the world that the Chinese were entering the war to protect the NKorean government from annihilation and to protect their national security by keeping hostile forces away from their borders. China had much firmer ground to stand on in this situation as opposed to Quemoy where they would be the prime actors in a war of aggression. They also had the memory of the Korean War where the US was willing to send its men to die halfway across the world to halt communist aggression in a country that had little to do with US citizens. Eisenhower hardly stood down the chinese in that situation based on his grit alone.
|
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
gsmoove23
|
|
Your link is screwy, I can't find anything on it but a login screen. Can you post the gist of it here?
|
|
| |
All times are GMT. The time now is 05:27.
Apolyton Time is 00:27. |
top of page
|
| archivepost |
|
Forum Rules:
You may not post new threads
You may not post replies
You may not post attachments
You may not edit your posts
|
HTML code is ON
vB code is ON
Smilies are ON
[IMG] code is ON
|
|
|
|
|
|
03-05-2003 20:56
|