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chegitz guevara
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Ft. Lauderdale, FL Communist Party of Apolyton
Jun 2000
time: 00:27
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quote:
Originally posted by PLATO1003
Azazel, other than Vietnam, care to share some examples for discussion? |
Haiti, Puerto Rico, Cuba, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, the Congo (in the 1960s), Mexico, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and those are just where we directly militarily intervened. The list gets much bigger when you toss in places where the CIA was screwing around.
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panag
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MY WORDS ARE BACKED WITH BIO-CHEMICAL WEAPONS
Oct 2000
time: 07:27
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NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 263
TO: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT: South Vietnam
At a meeting on October 5, 1963, the President considered the recommendations contained in the report of Secretary McNamara and General Taylor on their mission to South Vietnam.
The President approved the military recommendations contained in Section I B (1 -3) of the report, but directed that no formal announcement be made of the implementation of plans to withdraw 1,000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963.
After discussion of the remaining recommendations of the report, the President approved the instruction to Ambassador Lodge which is set forth in State Department telegram No. 534 to Saigon. McGeorge Bundy
Copy furnished: Director of Central Intelligence
Administrator, Agency for International Development 11/21/63
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DRAFT
TOP SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO
The President has reviewed the discussions of South Vietnam which occurred in Honolulu, and has discussed the matter further with Ambassador Lodge. He directs that the following guidance be issued to all concerned:
1. It remains the central object of the United States in South Vietnam to assist the people and Government of that country to win their contest against the externally directed and supported Communist conspiracy. The test of all decisions and U.S. actions in this area should be the effectiveness of their contributions to this purpose.
2. The objectives of the United States with respect to the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel remain as stated in the White House statement of October 2, 1963.
3. It is a major interest of the United States Government that the present provisional government of South Vietnam should be assisted in consolidating itself in holding and developing increased public support. All U.S. officers should conduct themselves with this objective in view.
4. It is of the highest importance that the United States Government avoid either the appearance or the reality of public recrimination from one part of it against another, and the President expects that all senior officers of the Government will take energetic steps to insure that they and their subordinate go out of their way to maintain and to defend the unity of the United States Government both here and in the field. More specifically, the President approves the following lines of action developed in the discussions of the Honolulu meeting of November 20. The office or offices of the Government to which central responsibility is assigned is indicated in each case.
5. We should concentrate our own efforts, and insofar as possible we should persuade the government of South Vietnam to concentrate its efforts, on the critical situation in the Mekong Delta. This concentration should include not only military but political, economic, social, educational and informational efforts. We should seek to turn the tide not only of battle but of belief, and we should seek to increase not only our control of land but the productivity of this area whenever the proceeds can be held for the advantage of anti-Communist forces. (Action: The whole country team under the direct supervision of the Ambassador.)
6. Programs of military and economic assistance should be maintained at such levels that their magnitude and effectiveness in the eyes of the Vietnamese Government do not fall below the levels sustained by the United States in the time of the Diem Government. This does not exclude arrangements for economy on the MAP accounting for ammunition and any other readjustments which are possible as between MAP and other U.S. defense sources. Special attention should be given to the expansion of the import distribution and effective use of fertilizer for the Delta. (Action: AID and DOD as appropriate.)
7. With respect to action against North Vietnam, there should be a detailed plan for the development of additional Government of Vietnam resources, especially for sea-going activity, and such planning should indicate the time and investment necessary to achieve a wholly new level of effectiveness in this field of action. (Action: DOD and CIA)
8. With respect to Laos, a plan should be developed for military operations up to a line up to 50 kilometers inside Laos, together with political plans for minimizing the international hazards of such an enterprise. Since it is agreed that operational responsibility for such undertakings should pass from CAS to MACV, this plan should provide an alternative method of political liaison for such operations, since their timing and character can have an intimate relation to the fluctuating situation in Laos. (Action: State, DOD and CIA.)
9. It was agreed in Honolulu that the situation in Cambodia is of the first importance for South Vietnam, and it is therefore urgent that we should lose no opportunity to exercise a favorable influence upon that country. In particular, measures should be undertaken to satisfy ourselves completely that recent charges from Cambodia are groundless, and we should put ourselves in a position to offer to the Cambodians a full opportunity to satisfy themselves on this same point. (Action: State.)
10. In connection with paragraphs 7 and 8 above, it is desired that we should develop as strong and persuasive a case as possible to demonstrate to the world the degree to which the Viet Cong is controlled, sustained and supplied from Hanoi, through Laos and other channels. In short, we need a more contemporary version of the Jordan Report, as powerful and complete as possible. (Action: Department of State with other agencies as necessary,.)
McGeorge Bundy
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Ned
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of Aptos, CA
Oct 1999
time: 21:27
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quote:
Originally posted by Oerdin
If MacAurthor had stopped 20 miles short of the Yalu river like the Commies had told him to then the war would have been over shortly after Inchon. It's because the UN forces charged right up to the Manchurian border that the Communists invaded. |
The "muffled" and unconfirmed Chinese warning said US forces should no go North of the 38th parallel.
"In retrospect the events on the battlefield in late October and early November 1950 were harbingers of disaster ahead. They had been foreshadowed by ominous "signals" from China, signals relayed to the United States through Indian diplomatic channels. The Chinese, it was reported, would not tolerate a U.S. presence so close to their borders and would send troops to Korea if any UN forces other than ROK elements crossed the 38th Parallel. With the United States seeking to isolate Communist China diplomatically, there were very few ways to verify these warnings. While aware of some of the dangers, U.S. diplomats and intelligence personnel, especially General MacArthur, discounted the risks. The best time for intervention was past, they said, and even if the Chinese decided to intervene, allied air power and firepower would cripple their ability to move or resupply their forces. The opinion of many military observers, some of whom had helped train the Chinese to fight against the Japanese in World War II, was that the huge infantry forces that could be put in the field would be poorly equipped, poorly led, and abysmally supplied. These "experts" failed to give full due to the revolutionary zeal and military experience of many of the Chinese soldiers that had been redeployed to the Korean border area. Many of the soldiers were confident veterans of the successful civil war against the Nationalist Chinese forces. Although these forces were indeed poorly supplied, they were highly motivated, battle hardened, and led by officers who were veterans, in some cases, of twenty years of nearly constant war."
http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/brochure...ter/chinter.htm
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Ned
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of Aptos, CA
Oct 1999
time: 21:27
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quote:
Originally posted by gsmoove23
 We couldn't have done anything to China whatever Truman said. What would you have proposed, escalate to full scale war, forgetting that China and Russia had a mutual defense pact. China was equally worried about escalation which was why they put nowhere near their full strengh into the field. Your ideas would have created WWIII. |
gsmoove, and you ever heard of the word "appeasement?" Truman's attitude about engaging the Chinese, or more precisely, his groveling fear of doing so, was communicated to the Chinese when he told McArthur that he could not pursue North Korean air power across the Yalu River nor bomb North Korean bases in China. Had Truman authorized McArthur to pursue the North Koreans wherever they went and to bomb their bases no matter where they were, and also issued stern warnings the Chinese and Russians not the harbor the North Koreans nor give them material support otherwise we would declare war on them, I do not think that either the Chinese or Russians would have been very open in her support of the North Koreans.
I believe there is at least a Russia memo that says that they did not want war with United States. I don't know what the Chinese position was. But their actions in attacking us in Korea were emboldened and made possible because of Truman's weakness. Had we made it clear to the Chinese that if they attacked us in North Korea that we would declare war, it would have been the Chinese who would have risked World War III by intervention. In other words, the Chinese would've thought once, twice and three times before making any intervention. I don't think it would have happened.
History is legion with examples of weakness and appeasement inviting attack. (For example, Osama bin Laden cites Clinton's withdrawal from Somalia as justification for his attack in New York on 9/11.) Truman brought the Chinese into the conflict because of his own appeasement of the Chinese.
McArthur was not a lunatic. Truman, rather, was a weakling, unworthy of being president of the United States. Truman was no Roosevelt.
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gsmoove23
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I assume you're referring to after Seoul changed hands for the third time.
Interesting thing I found, a website with the war from a N Korean's perspective...
http://www.kimsoft.com/korea/eyewit18.htm
quote:
I get to know Comrade Choe very well. He is 35 years old - his family was killed by Koreans working for the Japanese in Manchuria. He joined the Chinese 8th Route Army at the age of 14. I met him a few days earlier in the meadow across from my house (back of the Hamhung Medical School - an army hospital now). As usual I was chatting with a group of wounded soldiers sun bathing in the meadow. I asked about the famous Chinese 8th Route Army - using the derogatory "Ddong ddae nom" (dirty chinaman).
One of the comrades gave me a tongue lashing for using this term. This comrade was Choe. He told me his story - how he was taken care of by Chinese peasants when his family was wiped out in Manchuria. He went on to relate his war experience in China and S Korea. Choe says that the American soldiers rely on tanks and air planes. They are no match for us - man to man, but they do have more tanks and planes (which we don't have). He points to a wounded tank commander sitting next to him. His tank shot down an American B29 plane, but not before he was wounded.
Comrade Choe says that the American soldiers are afraid to die. At the first sign of a trouble, they panic and abandon their weapons. The Americans like to play opossum. Choe recommends shooting "dead" Americans at least twice in the head. The Americans are afraid of night fighting because their air planes cannot help them during the night. They depend on trucks and jeeps for mobility - they don't like to walk any long distance. You destroy their vehicles and they surrender without fight.
Choe's winning secret is to slip a few men behind the enemy positions and fire a few shots. This spooks the Americans into daze and frantic calls for help. Choe was leading an attack when friendly covering fires by a green-horn gunner hit him on the left foot. Choe has no bad feelings towards the gunner: he is eager to rejoin his unit. |
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gsmoove23
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Ned, China or Russia didn't want war with the US but that proves nothing since the US didn't want war with China or Russia. Passing the 38th parallel was certainly not appeasement, Going right up to the Chinese border was madness. China was not quaking in their boots at the idea of a US attack. The legacy such reckless diplomacy would have left the US is plain idiocy. Imagine the amount of troops that would have had to have been called up, the amount that would have died on the battlefield as if over 50,000 in 3 years wasn't enough.
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