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David Floyd
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The bottom of a large bottle of beer
Jan 1970
time: 05:31
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LotM,
quote:
and in 1940 the troop situation in the mideast is not as dire as in 1942, is it? - in 1940 Japan is not in the war, and Indian and Aussie troops are more available. |
Of course, the ground forces of the various nations are less built up at this time - the BEF, for example, is barely equipped in many areas due to Dunkirk.
On the other hand, the timeframe of 1940 gives the Brits much MORE naval power, and the Germans significantly LESS. The Germans had just lost the Blucher in the Norwegian campaign, the Tirpitz was still a year away, and the Bismarck would not be fully commissioned until late August of 1940. The light cruisers Konigsberg and Karlsruhe and also recently been sunk in the Norwegian campaign, along with numerous destroyers, and there were no replacements for these ships forthcoming. The Italian battleship Roma was also not in service until 1942, and the Littorio and Vittorio Veneto had only JUST entered service in our mid 1940 timeframe. The good news for the Italians is that they would have 3 additional Zara class heavy cruisers and 1 additional Trento class heavy cruiser, plus 4 additional light cruisers.
On the other hand, the British had not yet lost the Hood, Prince of Wales, Repulse, Barham, Ark Royal, Eagle, Hermes, (possibly) Glorious, and approximately 25 cruisers that would have been lost by 1942. In fact, the only capital ships lost by the summer of 1940 were the carrier Courageous and the battleship Royal Oak, as well as a couple of cruisers.
This alone gave the Royal Navy a great deal extra combat power to transfer to the Med. The British could also easily transfer more ground forces to the Mediterranean theater, given that if the Germans are going all-out trying to supply a large force in Africa, they have nothing left with which to invade England (in terms of logistics or shipping).
Anyone who tries to claim that the Royal Navy didn't have enough combat power to control the Mediterranean in 1940 is seriously deluding themselves. If the Germans tried for a heavy-Med strategy, the British Home Fleet would have deployed major reinforcements to the Med (in the worst case scenario, around Africa and through the Suez) immediately, and shut down the Regina Marina, which would either have dashed back to port when the RN approached, or heavily lost pitched battles that would have been heavily in favor of the British, in terms of numbers and leadership and training. At this point, it doesn't matter how many divisions the Germans have in Africa - in fact, the more the better, because they will all cease to be combat effective very quickly, once they run out of gasoline, bullets, food, etc.
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Drake Tungsten
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Knee deep in alien womyn...
Oct 2001
time: 14:31
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quote:
In his History of the Second World War, B.H. Lidel-Hart said that Japan's Southern strategy was for the purpose of conquering China. The purpose of conquering Chnia was to use as a base for attacking the USSR. |
I don't think this is entirely accurate, from the research I've done in the past. The Northern and Southern strategies, while based on pre-existing strategic plans, weren't proposed in earnest until after the Japanese had already become bogged down in China, a war that the Japanese never really wanted.
A lot of people seem to think that the Japanese set out to conquer all of China, but that was never really their plan. They just wanted secure access to the resource rich regions in China, mainly in Manchuria and the areas around Beijing. The Japanese would've greatly preferred to rely on friendly warlords and puppet governments to gain the resources they needed, but the conflict in China quickly spun out of control and necessitated a more agressive and far-ranging military action. A massive war of conquest in China was never what the Japanese wanted; it was forced upon them.
Once the Japanese got embroiled in China, they were faced with a new set of strategic problems that affected their planning. The IJA's view of the Soviet Union as the greatest threat to Japanese security had actually been the most popular viewpoint for many years. The Army's Northern Strategy lost a lot of its luster, however, with much of the IJA tied up in China and after a couple of maulings by the Soviets in skirmishes. The Navy's Southern Strategy, on the other hand, took on greater importance after it became clear that imports of oil (particularly from the U.S.) were in danger of being cut off in response to Japanese aggression in China. Events in Europe also made the Southern Strategy seem less risky than it had in the past.
If Japan had never stumbled into a war in China, there's no knowing what might have happened. It's probably likely that the Japanese military would've retained their focus on the Soviet Union, maybe even opening a second front with the Germans. Without a pressing need for oil, the Southern Strategy certainly would've looked less attractive.
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Dr Strangelove
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In the early 1940s Franco was too busy torturing the Spaniards to bother with joining the axis. It's not easy making all those little boys wear the right length of knickers. ("Come here leetle boy! Papa Franco gonna spank you for showing too much thigh you bad bad leetle boy!") If Franco had wanted Gibralter then he could have taken it without German help since after all the whole colony is literally downhill from Spain. In the twentieth century there was no way that Gibralter could be defended from an attack from Spain. What Franco was worried about was what would happen after he occupied Gibralter, because he knew that his grip on Spain wasn't really very solid. Not only was there still considerable socialist and democratic sympathy, but many conservatives were miffed because they had expected for Franco to put a monarch back on the throne.
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Dr Strangelove
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quote:
Originally posted by Alexander's Horse
Franco was a wily character no doubt about that. He sat on the fence and survived the war in spite of his close links with Hitler and Mussolini. But I think the document helpfully posted by Boshko settles the argument as to whether Franco would have entered the war on the German side if given an ultimatum in 1940 when all the indications were Germany would win.
On transit rights - Sweden, a far more neutral country than Franco's Spain, allowed German troops to transit its territory. |
Ah! But Franco's demands were nothing but a tease, since Germany couldn't reassign France's territories without essentially breaking the treaty with Vichy France. Yes, Germany did eventually do that very thing, but in 1940 it wasn't prepared to make the commitment of troops. Also some of the territories he asked for were occupied by Free French forces.
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Dr Strangelove
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I don't think that Spanish assistance for the Axis and the seizure of Gibralter were really crucial for an Axis victory in the mediterranean, because I don't think that the Axis really had the resources to win the desert war. With Britain using Malta as an interdicting air and sea base their supply routes to North Africa were usually severely pressed. Even if they had managed to take Malta their supply routes would have given them trouble because the British waged a fairly effective submarine campaign against Axis shipping also. Furthermore supply routes in Tunisia and Libya were inadequate. Indeed, the Italian refineries in Africa were insufficient to process enough fuel to supply the Axis armies in Africa. Oil had to be shipped to Europe to be refined and shipped back. The Axis armies in Africa were more dependent on mechanized transport than their comrades in Europe because the desert had a way of chewing up pack animals. There weren't any major ports beween Tobruk and Alexandria, suh that when the Axis did manage to press towards the canal they generally stretched their supply lines too much.
The Allies on the other hand seem to have been able to cope with stretched supply lined. There even was a time when the Axis nearly neutralized Malta and most of the supplies bound for Egypt had to go all the way around Africa. You also have to realize that there was a British empire east of Suez, and that part of the empire contributed supplies and men as well. In the war of supplies the Allies managed to cope, the Axis did not. That may have been the deciding factor in the Mediterranean war.
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Dr Strangelove
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quote:
Originally posted by Alexander's Horse
Yes quite true Doc but that was a negotiating position on Franco's part and he deliberately set a high price because the shrewd old coot was risk averse and wanted to see how the war turned out. He also got support during the civil war from the Western powers as well - particularly from Britain and The United States and he didn't want to upset those powers.
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Right. That was the most diplomatic way of "just saying no" to war. He asked for a price that he knew Hitler would/could not pay.
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23-09-2003 23:46
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